Pakistan's Afghanistan Strategy: An Official Perspective

New York Times, April 7, 2007
A United Front Against the Taliban
By MUNIR AKRAM

AS the spring fighting season opens, Afghanistan faces many challenges: terrorism, the Taliban, Islamic extremism, drugs and criminals, warlords and factional friction, weak government and an inadequate national and international security presence.

This is a good time to make an objective assessment of the Afghan and regional environment and to put together a strategy to overcome those challenges. This strategy should be comprehensive, combining military containment with political reconciliation, administrative control and rapid socio-economic development. It must build peace through a bottom-up approach — village by village, district by district — by offering incentives and disincentives to secure the support and cooperation of local populations.

Winning the hearts and minds of the people is even more important than killing or capturing insurgents. Military tactics that cause collateral civilian casualties and damage property may kill 10 terrorists, but they will create 100 more. Most important, no strategy will succeed without accelerated reconstruction and economic development. It must offer hope to the people — hope for peace, jobs and better lives for themselves and their children.

Pakistan's frontier regions have seen tremendous support for extremism during the three decades of conflict in Afghanistan. After the Taliban's ouster in late 2001, thousands of Qaeda and Taliban fighters crossed into Pakistan. We are committed to eliminating their influence. This is essential for Pakistan's goals of rapid modernization and increased trade and energy links with Central Asia.

Thus any strategy for stabilization in Afghanistan's south and southeast must go hand-in-hand with efforts in Pakistan's frontier region. Contrary to criticisms from some in Kabul and Washington, Pakistan has made significant contributions to such stabilization.

First, the Pakistan Army and intelligence services have captured more than 700 Qaeda terrorists and destroyed most of the group's command-and-control structure on our side of the border. As Vice President Dick Cheney has noted: "We have captured and killed more Al Qaeda in Pakistan than any place else."

In this, we have paid dearly: in 90 military operations, Pakistan has lost some 700 soldiers. The terrorists have launched several suicide attacks against our leaders, our security forces and civilian targets. But this has not deterred us. Al Qaeda is on the run. It will certainly not be allowed to regroup on our soil.

Second, we have captured and handed over to Afghanistan more than 1,500 Taliban militants in the past three years, including a large part of the leadership. Of course, we can do only so much considering that the Taliban's centers for recruitment, financing and command are in Afghanistan, as the United Nations secretary general's reports have attested.

Third, Pakistan is making new efforts to control its difficult 1,500-mile border with Afghanistan. Today 80,000 Pakistani troops are deployed in the tribal areas and along the border. Some 1,000 border posts have been established. About 20 miles of the roughest border terrain, where many clandestine crossings take place, will soon be fenced.

We are also starting stricter measures to regulate legal border traffic between Pakistan and Afghanistan — about 300,000 people cross each day — by, among other means, introducing biometric cards to improve identity checks. (I must note that it is not very helpful when border guards on the Afghan side cut up and throw away these cards.)

Of course, the movement of militants goes in both directions. Control of the border is a joint responsibility of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the international coalition forces. The onus cannot be placed on Pakistan alone.

Indeed, there is intense cooperation, through such formal partnerships as the military Tripartite Commission — made up of Pakistan, Afghanistan and NATO — its new Operational Coordination Working Group and a recently established Joint Intelligence Operations Center in Kabul. Apart from real-time intelligence sharing, Pakistan would benefit from Western-supplied electronic and other equipment to crack down on illegal border movement more effectively.

Fourth, Pakistan will act shortly to remove any last basis for allegations about so-called "sanctuaries" and "safe havens" for the Taliban in Pakistan. After crossing into Pakistan, Taliban elements often merge into the large population at camps for Afghan refugees. It is difficult to distinguish Taliban militants from the rest of the thousands of Afghans. It is mostly in these camps that the Taliban finds recruits.

To resolve this problem, we have reached an agreement with the Afghan government to move four large camps — Pir Alizai and Gidri Jungle in Baluchistan Province, and Jallozai and Kachi Garhi in the North-West Frontier Province — to Afghanistan. Pakistan will also repatriate the last of the three million Afghan refugees who have found protection inside its borders within the next three years. We have been their host for 30 years without any appreciable international assistance, which has placed a tremendous burden on our economy and contributed to the rise of militancy.

Finally, Pakistan has a comprehensive strategy to promote peace and progress in our frontier regions. The objective is to win over the local population and to isolate the militants. The agreement that the Pakistani government reached with tribal elders in North Waziristan last September was essentially an exchange of peace for economic development.

Contrary to the assertions of some Afghans, there is no proved relationship between that agreement and the rise of violent incidents in Afghanistan last year. Rather, the military strikes in recent weeks by tribal forces against Uzbeks and other foreign militants in South Waziristan should confirm the effectiveness of our approach.

Pakistan has advocated a similar approach in working with tribal leaders on the Afghanistan side of the border, in which Kabul would reach agreements through local assemblies, or jirgas. This idea was the essence of the three-party meeting of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the coalition forces organized by President Bush in September. It led to the first meeting of the Pakistan and Afghanistan jirga commissions in January in the Pakistani capital, Islamabad. The sides agreed to stop the blame game and increase cooperation to address common problems of border control and refugee repatriation.

In the long run, joint efforts by Afghanistan and Pakistan are about more than terrorism: each country desperately needs rapid reconstruction and development on its side of the border. We are grateful for the United States commitment of $750 million over the next five years for Pakistan's tribal areas. We hope for more help from other donors for this vital objective.

A key part of Pakistan's effort is to create "reconstruction opportunity zones" in the tribal areas. Pakistan's private sector will invest in industry and manufacturing, while Washington has promised special tariff- and duty-free access in the United States market for products from these areas. The European Union should provide such access as well. In turn, we would provide help to Afghanistan in creating similar economic zones on its side of the border.

Creating a peaceful, stable and prosperous Afghanistan is as much in the interest of Pakistan as of the United States and the Afghans themselves. The cooperative framework that has been established by Afghanistan, Pakistan, the United States, NATO and the international community will be vital for success. But we must ensure that bond is not eroded by mutual recrimination or frustration with occasional setbacks.

Munir Akram is Pakistan's ambassador to the United Nations.

Copyright 2007 The New York Times Company