VIEW: Failing top-down counter-terrorism
Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi: Daily times, November 12, 2006
The November 8 suicide bomb attack on army troops at a training camp in Dargai is yet more evidence of the growing threat of religious extremism and militancy to Pakistan’s internal security and harmony. A day earlier, rockets were fired while NWFP Governor, a retied Lt.-General, was addressing a tribal jirga in Wana. These two incidents took place within nine days of the attack by the military in the Bajaur area, and which prompted some militant Islamic groups in the region threaten revenge.
Despite official claims that Islamic extremism and militancy has been contained, the tribal areas and the adjoining territories have become strongholds of Taliban-like elements. In some areas, young and defiant mullahs exercise more sway over the hearts and minds of the people than the tribal chiefs or the civil and military authorities.
These elements enjoy the sympathy of the Mutahidda Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) and other Islamic elements, including Islamic seminaries elsewhere in Pakistan, especially in the NWFP and Pashtun areas of Balochistan. The MMA has often used its political clout to soften the Musharraf government’s tough policies to counter Islamic extremism and militancy.
The government decided towards the end of 2000 and in early 2001 to deal sternly with the Islamic groups that engaged in sectarian violence and killings. It also sought the cooperation of the Taliban government in Kabul to deny sanctuary to Pakistan’s sectarian activists in Afghanistan. The Taliban government rejected Pakistan’s demand. This annoyed Pakistani policy-makers but they continued to support the Taliban government at the bilateral and global level.
In August 2001, almost a month before the terrorist attacks in the United States, the government banned some Islamic-sectarian groups in Pakistan. However, a major shift in Pakistan’s policy towards Islamic extremism and militancy took place two days after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. Pakistan abandoned the Taliban government and joined the US-led global effort to control trans-national terrorism. This policy shift reflected a realistic assessment of the regional and global situation on the part of President Pervez Musharraf and his senior military commanders.
Pakistan’s counter-terrorism policy was fully articulated by Musharraf in his address to the nation on January 12, 2002. Some Islamic militant groups were banned in January 2002 and similar action was taken in 2003. The government reaffirmed its determination to root out extremism and militancy from Pakistan and arrested over 600 Islamic-extremists during 2002-2005, most with Al Qaeda linkages. In the summer of 2003, the government inducted troops in the tribal areas to uproot from the area foreign militant elements and their Pakistani supporters. Some initial successes aside, the operations ran into problems because the militants took advantage of the difficult terrain and local support.
Despite Pakistan’s commitment to counter-terrorism and President Musharraf’s talk of enlightened moderation, Pakistan continues to face the challenge of Islamic extremism and militancy. This challenge has become more lethal because some of the militant groups are now targeting the state and its officials.
The problems of counter-terrorism policy can be attributed to the lack of unanimity in the official circles about the direction and pace of counter-terrorism, reservations in the official circles about the total abandonment of militancy as a foreign-policy tool, the power imperatives of the Musharraf government and a refusal to open up the political system by allowing mainstream, liberal and centralist political elements to mobilise. Pakistan has been pursuing a top-down counter-terrorism policy with a heavy reliance on state apparatus and executive orders to contain extremism and militancy rather than working towards building a popular base by allowing non-official liberal political discourse and mobilisation.
Right from 9/11, some elements in the official circles have remained sceptical about changing course — i.e., Pakistan abandoning the Taliban and joining hands with the US. These differences were partly responsible for change in the top personnel of the army the day the US launched air attacks on Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. A less publicised incident on that day was the outbreak of fire in a section of the army headquarters; the fire destroyed some records.
So even leaving aside the MMA and other Islamic elements, many in the civil and army establishment are not convinced that Pakistan should be so closely linked with the US policy in Afghanistan. There is a noticeable sympathy for Taliban-like elements in the lower echelons of the administration, including the army, that enables them to carry on with their activities in NWFP, the Balochistan areas adjacent to Afghanistan and the tribal areas. They can easily link up with the anti-Karzai and anti-US/NATO insurgents in Afghanistan.
Most Islamists and their sympathisers in the official circles are of the view that Pakistan should not completely abandon militant groups as long as the Kashmir problem is not settled. They are also perturbed by the domination of the Karzai government by the Northern Alliance, which is known for anti-Pakistan and pro-India leanings. Another complaint against the Karzai government pertains to the alleged anti-Pakistan activities by Indian consulates staff (which includes under-cover appointments of Indian intelligence personnel) in the Afghan cities bordering the Durand Line. Unless the Karzai government addresses Pakistan’s concerns adequately, the situation may not improve.
The Musharraf government’s counter-terrorism strides face another dilemma. It moderates its tough policies in order to maintain working relations with the MMA, which supports the Taliban and sympathises with Al Qaeda. Consequently, the counter-terrorism policy is event-driven and lacks consistency. When some serious incident takes place, the government rounds up some Islamic activists but moderates its tough approach incrementally over time.
The Musharraf government’s top-down counter-terrorism policy does not allow mainstream and liberal political forces which, share its agenda, to engage in political mobilisation because they question Musharraf’s political legitimacy. Consequently, only two political discourses are available for popular mobilisation: the official and the MMA’s. In the case of official circles, President Musharraf and some cabinet members (Foreign and Interior Ministers) speak on terrorism-related issues. The ruling PML hardly engages in mobilisation for containment of Islamic extremism and militancy and promotion of enlightenment and moderation.
The MMA and other religious elements get a wide space for mobilising people against Pakistan’s counter-terrorism policy. The politically conscious people in the middle and lower classes are constantly exposed to the political discourses of the Islamic elements, especially the MMA’s. Their most common themes are: the ‘Yahud and Nasara’ (Jews and Christians) cannot be friend of the Muslims; Pakistan’s western borders have become insecure since Pakistan joined the US-sponsored war on terrorism; the Taliban are against the US and Karzai but they are friends of Pakistan; the government of Pakistan is serving American agenda at the expense of Islam; and the West wants to destroy Islam and the Muslims.
How can the government’s counter-terrorism policy win popular support when the political space has been left open only to the Islamists?
No credible alternative political discourse is available that emphasises moderation and tolerance in societal and state affairs. The government should recognise that it cannot effectively manage its counter-terrorism policy without opening up the political system to mainstream liberal and centralist political forces subscribing to the view that Pakistan’s national interests are served by containing extremism and militancy.
Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst
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