Future of Democracy in Pakistan?

VIEW: Democracy in the times of ‘Amoral Familism’
Dr Ayesha Siddiqa
Daily Times, November 13, 2006

President Musharraf has been vociferously arguing for the need to strengthen democracy in Pakistan. Like previous military rulers, he too has claimed that several measures taken by his regime — devolution of democracy or not allowing a politician to become Prime Minister more then twice — will strengthen democratic norms in the country. President Musharraf has also claimed that he will rid the country of corrupt politicians and replace them with new blood.

However, the fact is that this kind of a democracy project is unviable; the problem here has little to do with the absence or presence of corrupt leaders or the lack of education and more with the nature of the political state and the gradual de-politicisation of society.

Democracy does not happen in a political vacuum. It has a deep social context. Similarly, strengthening of democratic institutions is not just about holding elections, especially if these are manipulated and subjected to rigging. Surely, elections held on a regular basis do make a difference, but these do not necessarily wok in empowering society when other complementary institutions such as the judiciary or the election commission are not independent.

Also, it needs to be emphasized that there are no different versions of democracy; that each society has to have its own version is an argument that does not hold much ground. Surely, what the President and other like-minded people mean while expressing their concern about democracy as a norm relates to their suspicion of the political leadership in the country. Pakistan truly suffers from the absence of a political class that is above board and less questionable than what one might find in developed democracies.

However, the fact is that strengthening of democracy does not take place by focusing on the electoral process alone. There is a family of institutions, which would have to be strengthened to make democracy function in any country. Besides the political class and the election process itself, there are others such as the civil bureaucracy and the audit institution which would have to be reformed and strengthened before a claim about strengthening of democracy can be made. The fact of the matter is that structural flaws emanating from lack of independence is endemic in most institutions of the state. The members of these institutions are so dependent on the largesse of those controlling the state that they cannot truly claim to be above board.

But it does not seem as if these institutions will see much change in the foreseeable future. The reason for this lies in the peculiar nature of the country’s elite or the ruling classes (military and political combined) who have an attitude that is antithetical to institution building. Indeed, they seem to suffer from, what the political scientist, Edward C Banfield, describes in his book ‘The Moral Basis of a Backward Society’ as ‘amoral familism’. This concept refers to a system in which each group focuses on maximizing its own interests and forms temporary coalitions to further their respective interests. What this means in practical terms is that people are driven by short-term objectives rather than long-term goals and, hence, there is an almost complete absence of ideological loyalties or strong values.

The presence of ‘amoral familism’ as a predominant attitude amongst the military and civilian leadership (including members of some of the institutions named above) is due to the fact that they all want to have a monopoly over the state to gain personal power at the cost of weakening the state. While the military leadership does not realize that the organisation’s constant foray into politics damages the state and its institutions, the political leadership and echelons of leading institutions continuously ignore the fact that their questionable behaviour and tendency to join hands with the military to get in power or win rewards does not help in strengthening democracy either.

Recently, there is a lot of talk about the PPP negotiating with the present military ruler. Apparently, there is pressure on the PPP from internal and external quarters to mend fences with the President. In case a deal is struck, the PPP will manage to find its way back into power. However, such a deal will weaken the democratic process and institutions rather than strengthening these. What is also not realized is the fact that the next civilian regime which makes it to power through deal-making will be a lame duck like those in the past and will be removed at the first sign of any divergence of perception between the Prime Minister House and the GHQ.

More importantly, this bargaining has a negative impact on the attitude of the entire society. Today, Pakistan’s political society is divided and de-politicised. While the Baluch or the Sindhis might hate the Punjabis, little is said in the open in terms of questioning policies. Moreover, this lack of agitation in the streets is a sign of an ailing society or one that has turned predatory. This concept refers to a society where the dominant attitude is to shun open protest for the sake of short-term, often, material gains. The society, especially the civil society, and the educated lot become conscious of the benefits of co-option.

Corrective action is not possible in such societies due to the fact that each military authoritarian rule is followed by civilian-authoritarian rule to be followed by another military dictatorship. Thus, there is a political system that represents a symbiotic relationship between military force and political power. The elitist-civilian leadership secretly negotiates with the military leadership to get into power without realising that a possible deal can only harm democracy rather than strengthen it.

So, it is not that educated political leaders such as Benazir Bhutto or street-smart politicians like Nawaz Sharif and the Chaudhrys of Gujrat do not realise the cost of cutting deals with the military. It is just that they are driven by their instincts of ‘amoral familism’. Therefore, links with the GHQ are extremely essential to get power that then becomes the ultimate end rather than a means to an end.

The military leadership is equally culpable for perpetuating conditions where deals are struck for the survival of those at the top of the military machine. In a predatory state, military and civil-authoritarian rule becomes an almost cyclic process in which one form replaces the other to superimpose the vulnerability of the state and society and strengthen elite interests. What is even more unfortunate is that there is no possibility to get out of this vicious cycle.

Of course, the younger lot created by the current regime is less aware of the real danger in compromising on core principles. Suffering from over-confidence in their ability to beat the system, the young Parliamentarians, business tycoons and other clients of the regime do not understand that it is eventually the men in uniform who will have the last laugh.

Elections or the electoral process at large become a victim of circumstances and there is no substantive change in the political situation other than a deep sense of apathy that engulfs all of society.

The application of Banfield’s argument or the concept of a predatory state on Pakistan’s situation echoes the political philosophy of Hamza Alavi who was of the view that there is a coalition between the three dominant classes in the country: (a) the landed-feudal, (b) metropolitan bourgeoisie, and (c) indigenous bourgeoisie. According to his concept, the military and the state serve the interests of these three classes.

I would, on the contrary, argue that the military today represents an independent class and these four classes have shared interests. However, an important reality is that these classes include politicians, middle class urban-based professionals and entrepreneurs who find great wisdom in supporting authoritarianism for their material short-term benefits.

The common interests, it could be argued, should result in absence of friction between different classes. However, the friction relates more to the issue of who must control the affairs of the state rather than an understanding that short-term gains must not form the basis of the socio-political discourse.

Is there a way to get out of this morass? There will not be any change in the short to medium terms. The presence of ‘amoral familism’ and existence of weak institutions is not the recipe for strengthening democracy. A way out is also not possible because the four dominant classes have no incentive not to co-habit for their personal gains. Therefore, Pakistan’s political future will be the same as its political past. It is only if there is an internal struggle in the society or the elites realise, by some stroke of luck, that predation resulting in de-politicisation of the society will produce harmful results and that they must change, that we will see a corresponding change taking place in the system.

The author is an Islamabad-based independent defence analyst. She is also an author of a book on Pakistan’s arms procurement decision-making, and on the military’s economic interests