VIEW: The government-MMA relations —Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi
Daily Times, September 24, 2006
The MMA often criticises the Musharraf government on cultural and political issues and for its pro-US policies — including its role in the global effort to contain terrorism. Recently it threatened to launch street agitation against the government. However, the government and the MMA both avoid the point-of-no-return in their relations. Each applies pressure on the other to extract political gains and control the political initiative
The failure of the government to amend the Zia-era Hudood laws in the recently concluded National Assembly session represents a typical dilemma of the Musharraf government. It wants to project a moderate and liberal disposition under the caption of ‘enlightened moderation’ and amend the Hudood laws to remove the hardships faced by women charged under these laws. However, the exigencies of staying in power compel it to step back on many ‘Islam-related’ matters under pressure from the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) and the pro-MMA elements in the ruling Pakistan Muslim League (PML).
On August 21, the government introduced a bill in the National Assembly to amend the Hudood laws. The MMA, in view of its conservative and literalist approach to Islam, reacted bitterly — tearing its copies on the floor of the house — and vowed to resist. It maintained that the ‘basic tenets’ of Islam could not be changed.
The government rejected the MMA opposition and sent the bill to the parliamentary select committee where it obtained the support of the PPPP — a development that alarmed the MMA and a section of the PML leaders. While the select committee approved the bill the government reviewed its strategy in view of the MMA threat to resign from the National Assembly and the Balochistan Assembly if the government passed the bill. It is interesting to note that the MMA did not talk of quitting the provincial assembly in the NWFP, where it is the ruling party.
Some senior PML leaders contacted the MMA for a dialogue and the government established a committee of religious scholars to develop consensus on the bill. These scholars suggested some changes, which were incorporated in the draft. However, the government could not move the bill in the house because the MMA rejected the amended draft, claiming that it fell short of the agreement. On September 13 the government put the bill on hold to bring the MMA on board. It is now expected to be shelved or changed to such an extent that the original purpose of the amendment is defeated.
This is not the first time that the government has backtracked under pressure from the MMA. In the past it accommodated the MMA on the insertion of a religion column in the new passport and the proposed amendments to the blasphemy laws. For its part, the MMA joined hands with the government in December 2003 to pass the 17th constitutional amendment that enabled General Pervez Musharraf to continue as president on the basis of the uncontested referendum in April 2002. The amendment also paved the way for the government to pass an ordinary law enabling him to hold on to the command of the army, although he had made a commitment in an address to the nation to give up this office by December 31, 2004.
The government and the MMA have strong ideological differences but they work together periodically in pursuance of their political power agendas. This is a complex relationship manifesting divergence and convergence at the same time. The MMA often criticises the Musharraf government on cultural and political issues and for its pro-US policies — including its role in the global effort to contain terrorism. Recently it threatened to launch street agitation against the government. However, the government and the MMA both avoid the point-of-no-return in their relations. Each applies pressure on the other to extract political gains and control the political initiative. Rather than a permanently friendly relationship they pursue issue-oriented cooperation.
From time to time, for understandable reasons, the government and the MMA come close to each other. Like the Musharraf government the MMA has a stake in the continuation of the present political order. Religious parties have never enjoyed so much power and influence in Pakistan as they do now: they rule the NWFP and share power in Balochistan. Time and again they have also displayed political clout at the federal level.
Thus their situation is different from the mainstream political parties like the PPP and the PML-N, which do not have any stake in the continuation of the present political order. Therefore, it is convenient for the government to work out issue-oriented arrangements with the MMA.
The MMA enjoys another advantage. Several ruling PML leaders maintain pro-MMA leanings. The PML president, Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, and his close associates are generally viewed as MMA sympathisers. This is mainly because they use their relationship with the MMA to ward off Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. They do not want the presidency to cultivate Benazir Bhutto and the PPP because this threatens their privileged position.
Two developments led Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain and his associates to woo the MMA on the Hudood laws. First, though the PPPP favoured the abolition of the Hudood laws, it supported the amendments in the select committee as a step in the right direction. Second, this PPPP decision coincided with reports that the presidency had approached Benazir Bhutto for political accommodation. Though the PPPP denied this report, political circles continue to talk about some kind of indirect interaction between the presidency and the top PPPP leadership.
The PML leaders did not want the presidency to cultivate Benazir Bhutto or get the bill passed from the parliament with PPPP help. They opened negotiations with the MMA and then used their clout to stall the bill. This boosted the MMA morale. For the PML, it neutralised, at least for some time, the prospects of an understanding between the presidency and the PPPP.
The episode brought the government another gain. The opposition parties are no longer in a position to launch the joint agitation they threatened. The MMA and the ARD, especially the PPPP, entertain serious doubts about each other’s ultimate goal, i.e. a nationwide agitation against the Musharraf regime or exclusive understanding with the government about future political arrangements.
The MMA’s current closeness with the government is mediated through a section of the ruling party. However, it will continue to maintain its autonomous profile and continue building pressures on the government. It is hard to say whether the Jamaat-i-Islami and the JUI-F are equally keen to confront the Musharraf regime in the streets. The same can be said about the major ARD parties. Both alliances are looking for non-confrontational options for political change. However, the MMA has a clear advantage over the ARD in that a powerful section of the ruling PML prefers it over the PPPP. If this group stays effective, the MMA may not go for a nationwide agitation, although it will continue to criticise the government and to make demands to maximise its political gains.
Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst
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