Leaked excerpts of Musharraf's book?

Kargil boosted Kashmir cause: Opposing US would be disastrous, says Musharraf in book
By Jawed Naqvi Dawn: September 24, 2006

NEW DELHI, Sept 23: President Pervez Musharraf’s yet-to-be-released book — In the Line of Fire — has painted a bleak picture for Pakistan had it not joined the United States in the war on terrorism and says that the 1999 Kargil standoff with India boosted the cause of freedom for Kashmir, The Hindu reported on Saturday.

The newspaper said copies of the book, due to be released on Monday in New York by The Free Press, and imprint of Simon and Schuster, had been leaked and that the Indian prime minister’s office was understood to have excerpts on chapters dealing with Kashmir, including the Kargil standoff.

Pakistan’s decision to side with the United States was taken after Gen Musharraf “war-gamed the US as an adversary.” Could Pakistan withstand a US onslaught? “The answer was no, on three counts.” Militarily Pakistan would be destroyed, thus wiping out the “military parity it had achieved with India”.

India would exploit the standoff to gain “a golden opportunity vis-à-vis Kashmir. They might be tempted to undertake a limited offensive there; or more likely, they would work with the US and the United Nations to turn the present situation into a permanent status quo. The US would certainly have obliged ... and India needless to say would have loved to assist the US to the hilt (in destroying Pakistan’s nuclear installations).”

The third reason for cooperating with the United States was that failure to do so would end up in the destruction of Pakistan’s economic infrastructure.

UNPLEASANT MEETING: Referring to the unpleasant post-9/11 meeting between US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Pakistan’s intelligence chief, Gen Musharraf says: “In what has to be the most undiplomatic statement ever made, Armitage added to what Colin Powell had said to me (‘You are either with us or against us’) and told the Director- General that not only had we to decide whether we were with America or with the terrorists, but if we chose the terrorists then we should be prepared to be bombed back to the Stone Age. It was a shockingly barefaced threat, but it was obvious that the US had made up its mind to hit back and to hit back hard.”

The book is divided into six sections with a Prologue and an Epilogue. The Hindu wrote that it could be “a clear attempt to show him as an international leader of stature able to transform a deeply conservative, often extremist, society into what he calls a modern and moderate Islamic state.”

The Prologue sets the tone, with the Gen Musharraf emerging unscathed from the several assassination attacks against him. “I have confronted death and defied it several times in the past because destiny and fate always smiled on me,” he writes.

Recounting the December 2003 attack against him, Gen Musharraf says he heard a loud muffled thud. “As my car became airborne I immediately realised what was happening — I was staring terrorism in the face... While leaders of other countries only visit scenes of carnage later or see it on their television screens, I was personally in the midst of it. Not only that, I was the target. But unlike most leaders, I am also a soldier, Chief of Army Staff and Supreme Commander of my country’s Armed Forces. I am cut out to be in the midst of battle —- trained, prepared and equipped. Fate and the confluence of events have seen to it that Pakistan and I are in the thick of the fight against terrorism, caught right in the middle. My training has made me constantly ready for the assignment.”

FORMER PREMIERS: Through much of the book Gen Musharraf is strongly critical of former premiers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. He believes that Mr Sharif’s personality was thoroughly crushed by his autocratic father Abbaji.

Describing a dinner in the Sharif’s household, Gen Musharraf remarks: “So domineering was Abbaji’s personality that both Nawaz and Shahbaz (Chief Minister of Punjab) sat demurely like little children trying to remain in their father’s good book ... they were more like courtiers than sons.” He says the late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto “masqueraded as a democrat but ruled like an autocrat.” He blames Bhutto for breaking the back of a “nascent industrial base” and for encouraging corruption.

The First Section of the book deals with his early childhood, the family’s move from Delhi to Karachi and the future General’s antics as a naughty and irrepressible schoolboy, The Hindu says.. In Section Two, Gen Musharraf talks about his life in the Pakistan army, which he calls “the best in the world,” while Section Three deals with the hijacking drama and the subsequent coup that brought him to power. While on the aircraft as it makes its way from Colombo to Pakistan, Gen Musharraf’s one worry was that he would be forced to land in “enemy” India.

KARGIL EPISODE: The Kargil conflict is dealt with in the second half of the book, but gets just a handful of pages and is portrayed as a victory for President Musharraf.

The conflict, according to him, began with India trying to find a casus belli by reporting “make belief attacks” from the Pakistani side. He therefore decided to reinforce Pakistan’s forward positions along the Line of Control since Indian forces has been “creeping forward” since and despite the Shimla Agreement.

Pakistani manoeuvres were conducted “flawlessly” with the Indians being “completely oblivious” of Pakistan’s new strength. India’s response, claims Gen Musharraf, was a steady build-up throughout the month of May 1998. In international fora, India exploited the situation, which had a demoralising effect on Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the book says.

Gen Musharraf calls the operation “a landmark in the history of the Pakistan Army” since just five units “in support of freedom fighters” compelled the Indians to employ more than four divisions. He describes the withdrawal “as no negotiation at all” but a capitulation by Mr Sharif to demands made by US President Bill Clinton.

He asserts that Prime Minister Sharif was involved throughout the planning and execution of the plan. Gen Musharraf concludes that because of his personal foresight the “Indian plan of an offensive was pre-empted.” The chapter concludes with a telling claim: “I would like to state emphatically that whatever movement has taken place so far in the direction of finding a solution to Kashmir is owed considerably to the Kargil conflict.”

AGRA TALKS: Commenting on the India-Pakistan peace process, Gen Musharraf blames the failure of the Agra talks squarely on Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee’s advisers. “I met Prime Minister Vajpayee at 11 o’clock that night in an extremely sombre mood. I told him very bluntly that there seemed to be someone above the two of us who had the power to overrule us. I also said that today both of us had been humiliated. He just sat there speechless ... “

Although he has cordial words for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, whom he found to be “positive and genuine,” Gen Musharraf feels the initial flexibility displayed by the Indian leader has diminished. “I think the Indian ‘establishment’ -— the bureaucrats, diplomats and the intelligence agencies and perhaps even the military -— has had the better of him.”

In the Line of Fire ends with an Epilogue entitled ‘Reflections’, in which Gen Musharraf speaks of the leadership needed to steer Pakistan out of a difficult spot. “I started with the biggest domestic challenge of having to steer the ship of state out of troubles waters before it sank ... Things were moving well domestically despite the negative external constraints on me being exerted by the west in its demand for “democracy” ... Then came 9/11 and its aftermath. The whole world changed ... Counterterrorism, nuclear proliferation, democracy, human rights and narcotics. Pakistan sits in the centre of each, the external pressures are diametrically opposed to domestic feelings ... I believe my positions on all these issues are in our interest and morally strong. But there are times when the behaviour of our western allies undercuts our alliances.”

FREEDOM STRUGGLE: In defence of his oft-repeated definition of Kashmir’s freedom fighters, Gen Musharraf declares: “The west rejects militant freedom struggles too broadly. The US and Europe too often equate all militancy with terrorism, in particular equating Kashmir’s struggle for freedom in Held Kashmir with terrorism. Pakistan has always rejected this broad brush treatment.”

However, according to The Hindu, he does concede that Pakistan’s position becomes difficult to sustain when the Mujahideen in “Held Kashmir are guilty of terrorist activities in other parts of India and around the world ... My efforts towards rapprochement with India and the significant thaw in our relations have saved Pakistan to a large extent from the blame of abetting what the world calls terrorism and what we call freedom struggle in Indian Held Kashmir.”

According to the newspaper, “the rumoured figure coughed up by the publisher is anywhere between a hundred thousand and a million dollars.” The book will be published simultaneously in Urdu, says the report.

Kargil was planned in advance: Musharraf
Rediff India Abroad: September 23, 2006

Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf has confirmed in his book that the Pakistani military had begun preparations for the 1999 Kargil incursion months before the conflict in May.

He claimed that the move was in response to activities on the Indian side.

The book In the line of fire, to be released on Monday in New York, suggests the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was aware of the Pakistani army plan well before he hosted Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Indian Prime Minister at that time, in Lahore on March 20,1999, according to excerpts reported by NDTV.

In the book, Musharraf, then Pakistan's army chief, says, 'Whatever movement has taken place so far in the direction of finding a solution to Kashmir issue is owed considerably to Kargil conflict.'

'1999 may have been the most momentous year of my life,' he says, adding, 'It is time to lay bare what has been shrouded in mystery.'

'A plan calling for plugging gaps between our positions was formally presented and approved towards the middle of January 1999,' the book says.

'There was specific information of a possible Indian attack in Saqna sector. It was aimed at positions we had used to shell the road between Dras and Kargil in early summer of 1998,' Musharraf says in the book.

'On May 15, I ordered the FCNA to improve our defensive positions in coordination with freedom fighters,' says the army chief, who seized power in a coup on October 12, 1999.

The book says army had 'briefed the prime minister (Nawaz Sharif) in Skardu on January 29, 1999 and Kel on February 5, 1999. During these briefings, our defensive manoeuvre was explained as a response to all that was happening on the Indian side.

"He (Sharif) subsequently was briefed on March 12, 1999 at the Directorate-General of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).'

Vajpayee had traveled by bus to Lahore on March 20 to hold talks with Sharif and less than two months later, India detected intrusions in Kargil leading to a four-month bloody conflict.

Sharif, whose government was overthrown by Musharraf, later claimed that the Kargil aggression was the handiwork of the army and he had no knowledge about it.

On reports that during the conflict, Pakistan had prepared to carry out a nuclear strike against India, Musharraf says in the book, "I can say with authority that in 1999, our nuclear capability was not yet operational. Any talk of preparing for a nuclear strike is preposterous.'