The News, December 13, 2005
Pakistan’s ‘no-borders-plus’ Kashmir solution
Nasim Zehra
The writer is an Islamabad-based security analyst, and a fellow of the Harvard University Asia Centre
It has been a gradual coming out of the closet. For Pakistan’s ‘no-borders-plus’ solution for Kashmir, it is exposÈ time. The idea that was first briefly alluded to publicly by General Pervez Musharraf at his Delhi press conference in April are now being repeated by Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and Kashmiri leaders on both sides of the Line of Control (LoC). In April, Musharraf had insisted that there were solutions that do not include converting the LoC into an international border nor would they mean redrawing of existing borders. It would be a ‘win-win’ situation for all three parties, the people of Kashmir being the key beneficiaries of such a solution.
Ever since Musharraf had put forward his idea in 2004 of a six-district solution, one that was close to the Dixon proposal of a district-wise plebiscite, Musharraf had not publicly spelt out another proposal. However, he has led the more recent Pakistani thinking on how to move forward on Kashmir. It is a four-step approach: one, identify the troubled areas; two demilitarise the troubled areas; three, concede self-governance to the Kashmiris; and four, appoint a tripartite supra-body comprising the Kashmiris, Pakistanis and Indians to ‘oversee’ the functioning of a self-governing Kashmir. Perhaps the most significant factor here has been Pakistan’s decision to put Azad Kashmir, a territory it has controlled since 1948, ‘on the table’ as well.
This new thinking in Islamabad for a potential Kashmir solution has been conveyed to the Indians during the back-channel plus top-channel negotiations that largely focus on how to move towards resolving the Kashmir dispute. Musharraf has shared these ideas with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.
This potential ‘no-borders-plus’ solution does acknowledge the primacy of Kashmiri interests while addressing the Kashmir dispute. It not only concedes to the Kashmiris the genuine autonomy granted by the Constitution of Pakistan and Article 370 of the Indian constitution, but also opens the possibility of granting substantive self-governance jointly agreed upon by Pakistan, India and the Kashmiris.
In addition, the setting up of an overarching trilateral body comprising of these three parties, jointly governing the newly configured Kashmir, would mean more than autonomy for the Kashmiris. In effect, they would also secure a chair at the high policy table determining the foreign and national security polices for a ‘new Kashmir’.
Such a solution would amount to a ‘no-border-plus’ solution for the Kashmiris while not conceding self-determination insofar as giving the Kashmiris the choice to either join Pakistan or India. Instead it would allow them to be ‘joined with both’. Reflecting the regional political and strategic realities, such a solution would rule out an independent Kashmiri country but would concede to the Kashmiris the complete exercise of ‘political self-determination’. Within the newly created Kashmir, the Kashmiris could freely exercise their right to ‘political self-determination’.
The prerequisite for a ‘soft-border-plus’ solution is premised on flexibility on the part of both Pakistan and India and acceptability to the Kashmiris. In fact, Pakistan has to move many positions away from its ‘UN resolutions calling for a plebiscite in the entire Jammu and Kashmir position’. So it is neither a plebiscite in the state, nor even a partial plebiscite as envisioned under the original Dixon plan.
Instead this is not only a ‘minus plebiscite’ position, it is one that most importantly greatly dilutes the control that Pakistan has exercised over what is now Azad Kashmir. The other areas of the Jammu and Kashmir state and those now under Pakistan’s control, including the Northern Areas, would be fully integrated into Pakistan while giving unconditional validity to the 1963 Pakistan-China Border Agreement under which some territory falling in Khunjerab, which was part of the original Jammu and Kashmir state and then controlled by Pakistan, was given to China.
Significantly Pakistan is now willing to walk the talk on Kashmir. Multiple reasons, mostly home-grown but also external factors, have led to this state of affairs. Since the fifties, successive Pakistani governments have tried through back-channel negotiations with Delhi to find ‘flexible solutions’ to the Kashmir dispute. This included Ayub Khan, Ziaul Haq, Zulifikar Ali Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. As such Musharraf’s attempt to resolve Kashmir with an out-of-the-box approach is not unprecedented. In talks with the BJP administration, the Nawaz Sharif’s government had initiated negotiations using the report of the Kashmir Study Groups as the starting point. The Kargil operation disrupted those negotiations.
Now Musharraf’s ‘soft-borders-plus’ approach concedes the maximum to the primary party to the dispute, the Kashmiris. It is also a realistic approach insofar as it does not expect India to either unilaterally concede what it controls, even on the back of tens of thousands of troops and spilling of Kashmiri blood. Instead it expects Pakistan and India to both partially cede political and administrative control to the Kashmiris.
This ‘no-borders-plus-approach’ that Musharraf has discussed with the Indians, the Kashmiris and with others had been kept under wraps until the earthquake. Within a week of the deadly earthquake that devastated Kashmir, Musharraf proposed that free cross-LoC mobility be granted to Kashmiris living on both sides of the Line of Control. He proposed that those very points on the LoC which Delhi had proposed as ‘meeting’ points be opened up as ‘crossing points’ so that instead of merely meeting relatives at those points and then turning back, divided Kashmiri families could travel back and forth. After some negotiations, Delhi agreed.
There is now more frequent Kashmiri movement across the LoC than there has been since the fifties. India and elements within the Pakistani policy-making institutions are not entirely comfortable with this movement but it is nevertheless taking place. And the Kashmiris are pleased about it. Even the pro-independence Kashmiri leader Yasin Malik conceded in private discussions in Islamabad that "all Kashmiris are happy about this opening up". Yasin Malik, like many others, had suspected that the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service was a first step towards Pakistan accepting the LoC as an international border.
In recent days the demand for demilitarisation and self-government has been articulated by many. Azad Kashmir Prime Minister Sikandar Hayat has called for self-government and autonomy in Kashmir, while from across the LoC Mirwaiz Umar Farooq called for the demilitarisation of Kashmir. He even somewhat surprisingly demanded that NATO forces could be instrumental in ensuring the demilitarisation process. More recently, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz has also categorically stated that Pakistan supports demilitarisation and self-governance in Kashmir.
Pakistan’s new approach has also attracted support from previous antagonists in the Kashmiri political line-up. Omar Abdullah, the articulate Kashmiri leader, is now more supportive of Islamabad’s position. He is publicly criticising Delhi for not reciprocating Islamabad’s flexibility on Kashmir. In the coming days, Pakistan’s position on Kashmir will inevitably find greater support among Kashmiri politicians in Indian-occupied Kashmir.
Islamabad’s new approach is a logical. However, how far can it resolve the Kashmir dispute will depend on how far the Indians are willing to go. Does Delhi want to go the traditional route on Kashmir and believe that they can use continued killings by their forces, the cross-border terrorism stick against Pakistan and the emerging US-India strategic alliance to maintain the status quo on Kashmir? The answer to this question will determine the possibilities of a Kashmir solution based on Pakistan’s recent thinking on Kashmir. Without a change of heart in Delhi, an end to the Kashmiri tragedy and to the Kashmir dispute are unlikely. Equally, the Pakistan-India normalisation process will doubtless remain stonewalled by an unresolved Kashmir dispute.
2 comments:
A welcome and sensible set of ideas after a long time. These aught to be aired more openly and propagated along so that a genuine movement towards breaking the stalemate on Kashmir can germinate.
Still one unanswered question - what will happen to the minorities of Kashmir? Will they be driven out compeltely?
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