Long live Musharraf! By Dr. Moeed Pirzada
The Kahleej Times, Jan 24, 2008
RECENTLY, in Karachi , a poor man living on the coast, went fishing and caught a big fish. Happy with his catch, he gave the fish to his wife to cook. But the disgruntled wife shouted: "Throw it, stupid man... I cannot cook; we have no gas, no electricity, no atta (flour) and no cooking oil." The disappointed man went back and threw the fish into the water. It is said the fish then jumped back to the surface and shouted, "GEO Musharraf!" (Long live Musharraf).
Someone sent this to me as a text. And many such arrive almost every day. I had read somewhere that if you want to know a people, watch their dances for bodies never lie. I think the same is true of the jokes. They too have a weird, uncanny window to the pubic mind. And the interesting thing is not that there are these jokes; every dictator, perhaps every ruler is subject to this juicy gossip mill; what I find interesting is how increasingly these comic life forms are drained of their earlier acidity. Could it be that just like the political field the retired generalissimo has managed to exorcise the public mind of its venom against him? More importantly, is he on a path to a successful resurrection of his image?
It is time to make confessions. Many of us in the media were far too quick to write him off. One such journalist was my friend, Omar Warraich. Immediately after the first sacking of the Justice Iftikhar Chowdhry that had kick-started the lawyers' movement in March 2007, he penned down an op-ed, in Guardian, with clear prognosis: "The End of the General." A few days ago, we met again in Islamabad . And while reflecting on the thick steam clouds rising from his mulligatawny soup bowl, Omar confessed that it is embarrassing to recollect how hasty his conclusions were. I sympathised wholeheartedly. I think I also added patronisingly, "We all make our misjudgements."
I was patently dishonest. I should have told him that how seriously I had believed this: The "beginning of the end" theory. And not only on March 9, but again on November 3, I spent hours convincing everyone around me and on top of it myself that the good general simply cannot tide this over.
I think Bertrand Russell had written somewhere that most people are more happy and excited in the days of war as long as it does not mean a personal loss. And on November 3, the day emergency was imposed, I found myself amidst a whole crowd of media-persons possessed by the same frenzy, the kind of which makes you believe that something big is about to happen; history is being made and we are part of it, that sort of excitement. In that mood I confronted a stony faced senior colleague much known for his radical activism as a once powerful editor. And I tried marketing this "beginning of the end" thesis to him. His sombre face lit up with an ironic smile and he said, "I am afraid, he has rather saved himself." And on hearing that cynical remark, I told myself, "Oh! He simply does not get it."
A few days ago, we were again together in the newsroom. President Musharraf was on TV screens giving a rather brash dressing to the Western Press core, telling them more or less that they don't understand this country; neither knew the language, nor the culture and merely relied upon translators to understand. I remarked, "How desperate he sounds!" And my senior colleague said wryly, "Desperate? I think he is getting confident." And this time around I knew that he knows better. And then he added, "I think they miscalculated; they don't understand this country." I did not ask him who are "they" for I knew what he meant.
Looking back at all these weeks since the imposition of emergency, I think Musharraf's strategy of deliberate escalation and then a pre-planned step wise de-escalation, which he effectively managed at his own pace, has given him political dividends all along the way. His principal aim on November 3 was decapitation of the judiciary; rest of all including his fight with the media was an inevitable default of that option. But at every step down the hill - ending the emergency, easing restrictions on most of the media, taking off his uniform and announcing the elections, he managed to control domestic passions and international concerns.
Let there be no mistake: I am not giving him any credits for sincerity or for substance; I am only deconstructing his technique and apparently it worked. Though courts are powerless to restrict the executive, but he takes the credit for lifting the emergency; the army is behind him, but he is without uniform; the media are tamed but he can point to fifty television channels as he just did in a public meeting in Brussels . His arguments may be flawed, but he ensures that they are half true. The most important message he has conveyed, internally and externally, is that: he is still the man who can control.
Musharraf's gradual tiding over the storm that erupted with Bhutto's assassination only reinforced this point. Only Gordon Brown might know what Scotland Yard found out in Pindi, but no one will deny that their presence certainly helped ease out the pressures on Musharraf government. And now Brig (retd) Cheema of Pakistan 's Ministry of Interior has earned the rare distinction that his rather hasty pronouncements on Bhutto's murder investigation have been seconded by CIA.
Connect the dots and President Musharraf appears all set to be with us for a few more years. The only tiny weenie puzzle is: how to hold the coming elections in a way that they still look like elections. But looking at his impressive resume so far, I am sure he will find a way out. Courtesy: Khaleej Times
Dr Moeed Pirzada, a broadcaster and political analyst, with GEO TV Network, has been a Britannia Chevening Scholar at London School of Economics and Political Science.
Email: mp846@columbia.edu
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Friday, January 25, 2008
Sunday, September 02, 2007
"A new US vision?": Realistic or Wishful?
A new US vision? BY DR MOEED PIRZADA
Khaleej Times: 8 August 2007
THE US Congressional bill designed to implement the '9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007' contains the seeds of new thinking on Pakistan. As widely known, this voluminous piece of legislation makes the continuation of assistance to Pakistan contingent upon its performance against the Taleban.
But oddly enough, it does something more: it allows for future presidential waivers on the basis of the pace of democratic reform; extension of the rule of law; and the conduct of the parliamentary elections.
Not surprisingly, this bill has been received with anxiety in Islamabad; but — outside the government — this has more to do with the timing than a fair assessment on merits. Unfortunately, it emerged at the tail end of a sequence of events: bloody siege of the 'Lal Masjid' in Islamabad; a string of reprisal suicide attacks across Pakistan's northwest; publication of 'National Intelligence Estimates' in Washington and threats by US national security officials of possible military strikes inside Pakistani territory.
The grotesqueness of military action against 'Lal Masjid' and the violent disruption of the suicide attacks in the northwest that left more than 300 dead were to Pakistanis poignant reminders of the ever growing costs of the war against terror, and of the difficult policy choices. Many observed cynically that the much talked about 'National Intelligence Estimate' in the context of Pakistan also mentions, on the very same page, that 'Al Qaeda in Iraq' — in a country where it never existed before the luxurious invitation by the US misadventure — is planning to attack the US homeland.
Amidst this mindset, the repeated mantras by the US national security officials that 'Pakistan needs to do more', coupled with the threat that they reserve the right of military attacks inside Pakistani territory were received with the scorn they probably deserved. No wonder then that many in the Pakistani civil-military establishment and the vernacular press saw the bill as a coda to the familiar American music of betrayal and abandonment.
But far from that the US Congress seems to be arguing for a tighter embrace; the bill in its draft form was making its legislative journey through the House and the Senate since January 2007, and section 1442 dealing with Pakistan grew out of the realisation — a product of the thinking of past several years — that despite the risks involved the US has no option but to push towards ensuring a democratic Pakistan as the best guarantor of regional security and US interests in South Asia.
One may wonder where this understanding originates from. The answer is: the renewed Pak-US relationship since 9/11 had a broader bandwidth; often beyond the traditional channels of communication. It saw an intense exchange of ideas between the State Department, various US agencies and think tanks on one side and Pakistani NGOs, print and electronic media and civil society opinion makers on the other.
The increasingly sophisticated understanding of the nexus between the state agencies and Jihadi culture, the role of madrassas, the spread of extremism under the military rule and ironically the collapse of all institutions sans Pakistan army is a result of this continuous and intense exchange.
It is precisely a result of this fine tuned understanding that the US Congress now identifies, in its "findings", the issues like: increasing poverty and corruption, lack of effective government institutions, dwindling rule of law as the "critical issues" that have the potential of disrupting the relationship between the US and Pakistan. And it wants the US president to put up a strategy, within 90 days of the new Act, to deal with these issues on a level parallel with the risks like 'nuclear proliferation' and 'Islamic terrorism'.
Even the dramatic re-emergence of Benazir Bhutto on Pakistan's political scene, and behind the doors US diplomacy to push for a rapprochement between her and General Musharraf was a byproduct of this newer understanding.
Washington understands the risks — of radicalisation and instability — inherent in continued military rule, but also calculates that in a state of advanced institutional collapse politicians will not be able to deliver on anything unless military backs them up. This then is the basis for Pakistan's much talked about "deal" between Bhutto and Musharraf.
In Pakistan we have always under-estimated the importance of the feedback provided by the chattering classes; but the newer US legislation and Washington's behind the scenes diplomacy of continuous engagement, of sustained persuasions, to nudge apparently irreconcilable political interests towards meaningful dialogue only proves that the Americans were listening all along — and this time perhaps for the better.
However, it is perhaps time for Pakistanis to tell the Americans that if they are really serious about making progress then they need to understand and do more. Flashes of a new thinking here and there may inspire but are hardly a replacement for a coherent vision. Four areas are of immediate importance:
One; the US needs to come up with, and publicise, the contours of a relationship with Pakistan beyond the narrow confines of the 'war against terrorism'. Is there a day after? What if this so called war ends? As long as there is no vision beyond the 'war against terrorism' vested interests in both Islamabad and Washington will ensure that a war that makes them relevant or influential will continue.
Two; It needs to rethink its long term strategy in Afghanistan. Since December of 2001, 67 months of military conflict have passed with one clear result: resistance and a sense of failure have increased. The Senate resolution 34 of January 2007 on Afghanistan, pointed out that over the last 12 months the roadside bomb attacks doubled, incursions across Pak-Afghan borders and the frontal attacks against the US and allied forces tripled, suicide attacks quintupled and the poppy cultivation significantly increased.
It is high time for the US to ask this honest question: Is the continuing rot in Afghanistan merely the result of 'safe sanctuaries' in Pakistan's tribal areas or does it reflecct a deeper malaise, of gaps and holes, in the power sharing arrangement in Kabul? Can something be done?
Three; as Vali Nasr, the senior fellow at the 'Council on Foreign Relations' had recently argued, in the Christian Science Monitor, after the appearance of the 'National Intelligence Estimate' that if the US wants the whole hearted support of Pakistani establishment in the war against Taleban, then it also needs to safeguard the strategic interests of the Pakistani state in Afghanistan.
And they include: preventing the southern Afghanistan to be used by the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) and other interests for insurgency inside the Pakistani territories; the inclusion of pro-Pakistan Pashtun elements in the Kabul regime and most importantly an acceptance of the Durand line as the frontier.
Washington is fully capable of delivering on all counts; but for some reasons it does not.
Four; the US can play a crucial role in the political party reform in Pakistan. At the moment except for the ironic exception of 'Jamat-e-Islami' no political party (including the so called moderate or liberal democrats) has any visible, transparent and meaningful process of elections, selections or decision making in place; most are little more than personal fiefdoms.
The US has often talked of its interest in such political reform but now it has a fair chance: PPP's Ms Bhutto is a continuing beneficiary of the US diplomacy behind the scenes; any political reform inside her party will compel all others to follow suit.
Dr. Moeed Pirzada is a broadcaster and media analyst based in London. He can be reached at director@media-policy.com
Khaleej Times: 8 August 2007
THE US Congressional bill designed to implement the '9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007' contains the seeds of new thinking on Pakistan. As widely known, this voluminous piece of legislation makes the continuation of assistance to Pakistan contingent upon its performance against the Taleban.
But oddly enough, it does something more: it allows for future presidential waivers on the basis of the pace of democratic reform; extension of the rule of law; and the conduct of the parliamentary elections.
Not surprisingly, this bill has been received with anxiety in Islamabad; but — outside the government — this has more to do with the timing than a fair assessment on merits. Unfortunately, it emerged at the tail end of a sequence of events: bloody siege of the 'Lal Masjid' in Islamabad; a string of reprisal suicide attacks across Pakistan's northwest; publication of 'National Intelligence Estimates' in Washington and threats by US national security officials of possible military strikes inside Pakistani territory.
The grotesqueness of military action against 'Lal Masjid' and the violent disruption of the suicide attacks in the northwest that left more than 300 dead were to Pakistanis poignant reminders of the ever growing costs of the war against terror, and of the difficult policy choices. Many observed cynically that the much talked about 'National Intelligence Estimate' in the context of Pakistan also mentions, on the very same page, that 'Al Qaeda in Iraq' — in a country where it never existed before the luxurious invitation by the US misadventure — is planning to attack the US homeland.
Amidst this mindset, the repeated mantras by the US national security officials that 'Pakistan needs to do more', coupled with the threat that they reserve the right of military attacks inside Pakistani territory were received with the scorn they probably deserved. No wonder then that many in the Pakistani civil-military establishment and the vernacular press saw the bill as a coda to the familiar American music of betrayal and abandonment.
But far from that the US Congress seems to be arguing for a tighter embrace; the bill in its draft form was making its legislative journey through the House and the Senate since January 2007, and section 1442 dealing with Pakistan grew out of the realisation — a product of the thinking of past several years — that despite the risks involved the US has no option but to push towards ensuring a democratic Pakistan as the best guarantor of regional security and US interests in South Asia.
One may wonder where this understanding originates from. The answer is: the renewed Pak-US relationship since 9/11 had a broader bandwidth; often beyond the traditional channels of communication. It saw an intense exchange of ideas between the State Department, various US agencies and think tanks on one side and Pakistani NGOs, print and electronic media and civil society opinion makers on the other.
The increasingly sophisticated understanding of the nexus between the state agencies and Jihadi culture, the role of madrassas, the spread of extremism under the military rule and ironically the collapse of all institutions sans Pakistan army is a result of this continuous and intense exchange.
It is precisely a result of this fine tuned understanding that the US Congress now identifies, in its "findings", the issues like: increasing poverty and corruption, lack of effective government institutions, dwindling rule of law as the "critical issues" that have the potential of disrupting the relationship between the US and Pakistan. And it wants the US president to put up a strategy, within 90 days of the new Act, to deal with these issues on a level parallel with the risks like 'nuclear proliferation' and 'Islamic terrorism'.
Even the dramatic re-emergence of Benazir Bhutto on Pakistan's political scene, and behind the doors US diplomacy to push for a rapprochement between her and General Musharraf was a byproduct of this newer understanding.
Washington understands the risks — of radicalisation and instability — inherent in continued military rule, but also calculates that in a state of advanced institutional collapse politicians will not be able to deliver on anything unless military backs them up. This then is the basis for Pakistan's much talked about "deal" between Bhutto and Musharraf.
In Pakistan we have always under-estimated the importance of the feedback provided by the chattering classes; but the newer US legislation and Washington's behind the scenes diplomacy of continuous engagement, of sustained persuasions, to nudge apparently irreconcilable political interests towards meaningful dialogue only proves that the Americans were listening all along — and this time perhaps for the better.
However, it is perhaps time for Pakistanis to tell the Americans that if they are really serious about making progress then they need to understand and do more. Flashes of a new thinking here and there may inspire but are hardly a replacement for a coherent vision. Four areas are of immediate importance:
One; the US needs to come up with, and publicise, the contours of a relationship with Pakistan beyond the narrow confines of the 'war against terrorism'. Is there a day after? What if this so called war ends? As long as there is no vision beyond the 'war against terrorism' vested interests in both Islamabad and Washington will ensure that a war that makes them relevant or influential will continue.
Two; It needs to rethink its long term strategy in Afghanistan. Since December of 2001, 67 months of military conflict have passed with one clear result: resistance and a sense of failure have increased. The Senate resolution 34 of January 2007 on Afghanistan, pointed out that over the last 12 months the roadside bomb attacks doubled, incursions across Pak-Afghan borders and the frontal attacks against the US and allied forces tripled, suicide attacks quintupled and the poppy cultivation significantly increased.
It is high time for the US to ask this honest question: Is the continuing rot in Afghanistan merely the result of 'safe sanctuaries' in Pakistan's tribal areas or does it reflecct a deeper malaise, of gaps and holes, in the power sharing arrangement in Kabul? Can something be done?
Three; as Vali Nasr, the senior fellow at the 'Council on Foreign Relations' had recently argued, in the Christian Science Monitor, after the appearance of the 'National Intelligence Estimate' that if the US wants the whole hearted support of Pakistani establishment in the war against Taleban, then it also needs to safeguard the strategic interests of the Pakistani state in Afghanistan.
And they include: preventing the southern Afghanistan to be used by the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) and other interests for insurgency inside the Pakistani territories; the inclusion of pro-Pakistan Pashtun elements in the Kabul regime and most importantly an acceptance of the Durand line as the frontier.
Washington is fully capable of delivering on all counts; but for some reasons it does not.
Four; the US can play a crucial role in the political party reform in Pakistan. At the moment except for the ironic exception of 'Jamat-e-Islami' no political party (including the so called moderate or liberal democrats) has any visible, transparent and meaningful process of elections, selections or decision making in place; most are little more than personal fiefdoms.
The US has often talked of its interest in such political reform but now it has a fair chance: PPP's Ms Bhutto is a continuing beneficiary of the US diplomacy behind the scenes; any political reform inside her party will compel all others to follow suit.
Dr. Moeed Pirzada is a broadcaster and media analyst based in London. He can be reached at director@media-policy.com
Monday, June 29, 2009
Difficulties of Self-correction
analysis: Difficulties of self-correction — Khaled Ahmed
Daily Times, June 30, 2009
Self-correction looks like defeat, especially in small and weak states prizing honour and self-respect above other fundamental interests of the state such as the national economy
On June 19, 2009, a Dunya TV discussion had ex-foreign secretary Mr Riaz Khokhar protesting that President Asif Ali Zardari had not conformed to norms of ‘protocol behaviour’ while talking to Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh. The newspapers had earlier moaned about Mr Singh having insulted Pakistan by telling Mr Zardari to mend his ways before asking for a dialogue. Mr Singh had insulted Pakistan and Mr Zardari had simply cowered instead of insulting him back.
Anchor Dr Moeed Pirzada rang up the Indian Express’ editor Shekhar Gupta to find out if the Indians thought their PM had given them the satisfaction of insulting Pakistan. Mr Gupta thought that Mr Singh was normal instead of insulting while accepting a foreign secretaries’ meeting. As for the reference to terrorism, he thought Mr Singh was simply repeating what he had been saying to Pakistan earlier without apparently offending its media.
For complete article, click here
Daily Times, June 30, 2009
Self-correction looks like defeat, especially in small and weak states prizing honour and self-respect above other fundamental interests of the state such as the national economy
On June 19, 2009, a Dunya TV discussion had ex-foreign secretary Mr Riaz Khokhar protesting that President Asif Ali Zardari had not conformed to norms of ‘protocol behaviour’ while talking to Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh. The newspapers had earlier moaned about Mr Singh having insulted Pakistan by telling Mr Zardari to mend his ways before asking for a dialogue. Mr Singh had insulted Pakistan and Mr Zardari had simply cowered instead of insulting him back.
Anchor Dr Moeed Pirzada rang up the Indian Express’ editor Shekhar Gupta to find out if the Indians thought their PM had given them the satisfaction of insulting Pakistan. Mr Gupta thought that Mr Singh was normal instead of insulting while accepting a foreign secretaries’ meeting. As for the reference to terrorism, he thought Mr Singh was simply repeating what he had been saying to Pakistan earlier without apparently offending its media.
For complete article, click here
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