DJEREJIAN: U.S.-Iranian relations
Edward P. Djerejian
The Washington Times, September 17, 2008
You negotiate peace with your adversaries and enemies, not with your friends. That is what diplomacy is all about. With current sanctions and talks under the aegis of the United Nations making little progress in impeding Iran's nuclear program, concerns are mounting and there is a steady drumbeat of possible resort to military options. Under these circumstances, and on the eve of our presidential elections, there could be no more urgent need than to address the overall United States-Iranian relationship.
The costs of not talking with our adversaries are clear. This came home to me when we were engaged in the Iraq Study Group (ISG) in 2006 and met with the Iranian Permanent Representative to the United Nations. The lack of official and sustained communications between the United States and Iran not only have led to misperceptions, certainly on the part of the Iranians as to United States policies, but have also proved an impediment to our ability to influence Iranian behavior beyond sanctions and the implied threats of military action. The task before us is this: How to engage the Iranians in serious discussions that have the potential to identify whatever common ground may exist between us on specific issues, and then to try to resolve those issues in bilateral and multilateral forums, as appropriate.
The Iranians have engaged with us on Iraq, but they do not want a dialogue on Iraq alone. They seek a broader agenda of discussions where the major issues, both bilateral and regional, are on the table. Sustained engagement between the United States and Iran on key issues (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan, Arab-Israeli peace, terrorism, support for Hezbollah and Hamas, human rights, and bilateral relations) could make real progress possible on the nuclear issue.
We need to put Iran into perspective. Without question, Iran is a regional power in the Gulf and Middle East, by virtue of its size, strategic location, rich history and culture, and oil and gas resources. But Iran is not the Soviet Union, which constituted an existential strategic threat to the United States.
Iran can threaten its neighbors in the Gulf and the region, including Israel. However, most of these countries have strong bilateral relations with the United States. Iran knows that if it threatens or acts against them, it would seriously risk the active opposition of the United States and other major powers. The concept of deterrence is real in this respect from political and economic to military measures.
Given Iran's domestic, economic, and political problems and challenges, Iran has strong reason not to antagonize the United States to the point of confrontation. Such a confrontation would be costly for both sides; for Iran, it would be devastating.
Therefore, as the world's preeminent power, the United States can afford to take the first step in putting the Iranian regime to the test by offering a broad strategic dialogue on all the key issues between us. Our willingness to engage with Iran is not and in no way should be seen as a lack of United States resolve on the key issues that affect our national security interests and those of our friends, especially the issue of nuclear weapons. While pursuing the nuclear issue actively through multilateral means, a first step in a dialogue could be an exchange of respective assessments regarding the key regional issues such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Arab-Israeli peace, Lebanon, Gulf security, and terrorism.
The overall subset of these discussions would be the United States-Iranian bilateral relationship. Here we will have to make clear that we are not pursuing regime change. Instead, the United States will look for a change in behavior and policies by Iran. We would promote our positions on human rights, democracy, the role of civil society, and the rule of law as structural parts of the bilateral dialogue.
With regard to the nuclear issue, some analysts have suggested that there are at least three key schools of thought in Iran. The first school consists of hardliners who are determined to achieve a nuclear weapons capability. A second is comprised of those who seek what might be called the Japanese model. Namely, acquire the means to produce nuclear weapons - without crossing that threshold, yet retain the ability to do so. A third school argues that nuclear weapons are not necessary. For these Iranians a more important goal is to address pressing socio-economic needs through integration into the global economy. These different factions should be taken into consideration by U.S. diplomacy in a sophisticated manner to test the possibilities for forward movement on the nuclear issue.
The stakes are simply too high in the United States-Iranian relationship to not adopt a comprehensive, strategic and direct dialogue at the highest levels. In sum, we should not miss this opportunity to engage realistically and without illusions one of the most important and adversarial regimes we face in the region.
Edward P. Djerejian, who served as ambassador to Syria and Israel, is founding director of the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University.
Thursday, September 18, 2008
Wednesday, September 17, 2008
Tackling Taliban
Romancing the Taliban
By Adil Zareef, Dawn, September 17, 2008
PAKHTUNKHWA is in flames. Suddenly, we are at the epicentre of a conflict — and there exists a feeling of total helplessness.
Suffering is writ large on the handsome faces of ordinary folk at the mercy of raging gunfire, bombs and explosions for no fault of theirs — except for being at the wrong place at the wrong time. Such is the pitiless hand of fate.
With repeated US threats and incursions into Pakistan’s tribal territories, GHQ’s sound and fury has become a whimper, reflecting both the limits of power and the odds confronting Pakistan. An unequal patron-client relationship exists between the US and Pakistan. Democratic niceties apart, the Bush administration always considered it expedient to carry on business with its chosen strongman military dictator, at the peril of the long-term national interests of both countries.
In a calculated move, when the nation’s economy and foreign policy became totally bankrupt, Gen Musharraf went away. What did the elected leaders inherit? Plundered national assets (privatisation, deregulation) a destabilised Afghanistan, and worse, a militarised state with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan unleashed on the Pakhtunkhwa landscape. This is not the first time Pakistan has been ditched and all’s fair in love and war. Two lovers turned antagonists is not novel. So why then are we cursing our stars and the US?
What has actually touched our hearts is the human suffering. The helpless non-combatants have nothing to gain from the shenanigans of the merciless powerbrokers in Washington D.C. or Islamabad. They have everything to lose. It is yet another numbers’ game for the US. What with Iraq, Afghanistan and the bloody trail of human tragedies America has inflicted on one civilisation after another in its quest for unbridled power, it is not surprising that we are now at the receiving end.
What makes matters really worrisome is the national discourse on terrorism and our outright rejection of the global opprobrium being heaped on us. From Kashmir to Delhi and from Afghanistan to the capitals of Western Europe, the footprints of Islamic militants have been traced to Pakistan and Afghanistan hinterlands. The jihad policy of various governments in Islamabad, with regard to the destabilisation of Indian-administered Kashmir and Afghanistan, has been flawed. Surviving on monthly IMF rations, Pakistan cannot afford to have grandiose ambitions. The jingoism and bravado instilled in the minds of common Pakistanis by successive governments, whether democratic or otherwise, have proved self-destructive.
While ANP’s central leadership was consumed by Zardari’s presidential elections, innocent Pakhtuns and their party activists and local leadership were being killed brutally in the Swat valley by Taliban fanatics. Their homes, hujras and livelihoods were being blown up. Hundreds of thousands of civilians were displaced in Bajaur as the Taliban advanced towards Dir and Buner. Hangu and Kurram have become irredeemable. A worthwhile effort against this onslaught is seen lacking by both Islamabad and their Pakhtun coalition partners.
Credible reports confirm that most high-value Taliban leaders remain unharmed, while the fleeing innocent population bears the brunt of guns and bombs. It seems that the establishment, led by the agencies, is now earnestly clinging on to its pipe dream that the home-grown Taliban will defeat the advancing US forces. This policy of ‘strategic depth’ has not waned, despite changed actors, and the ‘cloak and dagger’ policy remains intact. Governor Owais Ghani lashes out at the Taliban as enemies of the state, but also tells the BBC that Afghanistan has to come to terms with the Taliban as ‘a legitimate political force’.
This double-dealing discredits the entire military operation. The fumbling anti-terrorist policy is marked by a disconnect among several state agencies, often working at cross purposes and creating confusion. As one policy expert said, the federal government, intelligence agencies, provincial government, Fata administration and the military are not on the same wavelength. Under these circumstances, quite naturally the brunt of militancy and the military operation is borne by the population.
Take for instance the operation in Swat and Bajaur. Reportedly, the military is not targeting hideouts of the Taliban as it should. When Taliban fanatics were killing the family members of ANP legislator Waqar Khan in Swat, blowing up their homes and hujra, military personnel, according to some reports, were present across the hill near a government school. The extremists walked over, ordered the victims to stand in a line and then mowed them down. Evidently, no military personnel came to save them. Meanwhile, Mullah Fazullah still roams around freely and so do other leaders of the TTP openly addressing the media.
Likewise in Bajaur, the Taliban leadership remains as elusive as ever. The refrain of government functionaries blaming RAW and KHAD agents takes one back to the Afghan jihad period. With millions of dollars pouring in to hunt down the militants, if the intelligence operatives cannot trace the Taliban leaders and perhaps a handful of hardcore militants who are responsible for countrywide bombings and suicide attacks witnessed almost on a daily basis, then they need to quit their jobs.
Writer Ahmed Rashid has graphically described the involvement of our jihadis in the “comprehensive destruction” of Afghanistan. Most vexing is the role of the ulema and religious parties who refuse to openly disown these dastardly acts of terrorism. In the same vein, enlightened representatives like Imran Khan by terming the entire TTP movement a reaction to the US presence in Afghanistan, and absolving Pakistan’s policy blunders, are trivialising a serious issue.
The question of ‘national sovereignty’ becomes irrelevant each time a drone hits a Taliban sanctuary inside Pakistan territory. As we have miserably failed, despite gobbling up billions of dollars in this “war against terror”, does not our defence of the ‘borders’ become tenuous?Having jettisoned an independent judiciary that is meant to promote transparency and credibility in the affairs of the state, the role of the political parties has become questionable. Without checks and balances, the discredited and personalised politics of the Musharraf period persist. And so will the Kafkaesque ‘war against terror’. adilzareef@yahoo.com
Also See:
In Pakistan, sympathy for the Taliban By Mustafa Qadri - Asia Times
By Adil Zareef, Dawn, September 17, 2008
PAKHTUNKHWA is in flames. Suddenly, we are at the epicentre of a conflict — and there exists a feeling of total helplessness.
Suffering is writ large on the handsome faces of ordinary folk at the mercy of raging gunfire, bombs and explosions for no fault of theirs — except for being at the wrong place at the wrong time. Such is the pitiless hand of fate.
With repeated US threats and incursions into Pakistan’s tribal territories, GHQ’s sound and fury has become a whimper, reflecting both the limits of power and the odds confronting Pakistan. An unequal patron-client relationship exists between the US and Pakistan. Democratic niceties apart, the Bush administration always considered it expedient to carry on business with its chosen strongman military dictator, at the peril of the long-term national interests of both countries.
In a calculated move, when the nation’s economy and foreign policy became totally bankrupt, Gen Musharraf went away. What did the elected leaders inherit? Plundered national assets (privatisation, deregulation) a destabilised Afghanistan, and worse, a militarised state with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan unleashed on the Pakhtunkhwa landscape. This is not the first time Pakistan has been ditched and all’s fair in love and war. Two lovers turned antagonists is not novel. So why then are we cursing our stars and the US?
What has actually touched our hearts is the human suffering. The helpless non-combatants have nothing to gain from the shenanigans of the merciless powerbrokers in Washington D.C. or Islamabad. They have everything to lose. It is yet another numbers’ game for the US. What with Iraq, Afghanistan and the bloody trail of human tragedies America has inflicted on one civilisation after another in its quest for unbridled power, it is not surprising that we are now at the receiving end.
What makes matters really worrisome is the national discourse on terrorism and our outright rejection of the global opprobrium being heaped on us. From Kashmir to Delhi and from Afghanistan to the capitals of Western Europe, the footprints of Islamic militants have been traced to Pakistan and Afghanistan hinterlands. The jihad policy of various governments in Islamabad, with regard to the destabilisation of Indian-administered Kashmir and Afghanistan, has been flawed. Surviving on monthly IMF rations, Pakistan cannot afford to have grandiose ambitions. The jingoism and bravado instilled in the minds of common Pakistanis by successive governments, whether democratic or otherwise, have proved self-destructive.
While ANP’s central leadership was consumed by Zardari’s presidential elections, innocent Pakhtuns and their party activists and local leadership were being killed brutally in the Swat valley by Taliban fanatics. Their homes, hujras and livelihoods were being blown up. Hundreds of thousands of civilians were displaced in Bajaur as the Taliban advanced towards Dir and Buner. Hangu and Kurram have become irredeemable. A worthwhile effort against this onslaught is seen lacking by both Islamabad and their Pakhtun coalition partners.
Credible reports confirm that most high-value Taliban leaders remain unharmed, while the fleeing innocent population bears the brunt of guns and bombs. It seems that the establishment, led by the agencies, is now earnestly clinging on to its pipe dream that the home-grown Taliban will defeat the advancing US forces. This policy of ‘strategic depth’ has not waned, despite changed actors, and the ‘cloak and dagger’ policy remains intact. Governor Owais Ghani lashes out at the Taliban as enemies of the state, but also tells the BBC that Afghanistan has to come to terms with the Taliban as ‘a legitimate political force’.
This double-dealing discredits the entire military operation. The fumbling anti-terrorist policy is marked by a disconnect among several state agencies, often working at cross purposes and creating confusion. As one policy expert said, the federal government, intelligence agencies, provincial government, Fata administration and the military are not on the same wavelength. Under these circumstances, quite naturally the brunt of militancy and the military operation is borne by the population.
Take for instance the operation in Swat and Bajaur. Reportedly, the military is not targeting hideouts of the Taliban as it should. When Taliban fanatics were killing the family members of ANP legislator Waqar Khan in Swat, blowing up their homes and hujra, military personnel, according to some reports, were present across the hill near a government school. The extremists walked over, ordered the victims to stand in a line and then mowed them down. Evidently, no military personnel came to save them. Meanwhile, Mullah Fazullah still roams around freely and so do other leaders of the TTP openly addressing the media.
Likewise in Bajaur, the Taliban leadership remains as elusive as ever. The refrain of government functionaries blaming RAW and KHAD agents takes one back to the Afghan jihad period. With millions of dollars pouring in to hunt down the militants, if the intelligence operatives cannot trace the Taliban leaders and perhaps a handful of hardcore militants who are responsible for countrywide bombings and suicide attacks witnessed almost on a daily basis, then they need to quit their jobs.
Writer Ahmed Rashid has graphically described the involvement of our jihadis in the “comprehensive destruction” of Afghanistan. Most vexing is the role of the ulema and religious parties who refuse to openly disown these dastardly acts of terrorism. In the same vein, enlightened representatives like Imran Khan by terming the entire TTP movement a reaction to the US presence in Afghanistan, and absolving Pakistan’s policy blunders, are trivialising a serious issue.
The question of ‘national sovereignty’ becomes irrelevant each time a drone hits a Taliban sanctuary inside Pakistan territory. As we have miserably failed, despite gobbling up billions of dollars in this “war against terror”, does not our defence of the ‘borders’ become tenuous?Having jettisoned an independent judiciary that is meant to promote transparency and credibility in the affairs of the state, the role of the political parties has become questionable. Without checks and balances, the discredited and personalised politics of the Musharraf period persist. And so will the Kafkaesque ‘war against terror’. adilzareef@yahoo.com
Also See:
In Pakistan, sympathy for the Taliban By Mustafa Qadri - Asia Times
Washington Is Risking War with Pakistan: Robert Baer (TIME)
Washington Is Risking War with Pakistan
By Robert Baer
Time, Wednesday, Sep. 17, 2008
As Wall Street collapsed with a bang, almost no one noticed that we're on the brink of war with Pakistan. And, unfortunately, that's not too much of an exaggeration. On Tuesday, the Pakistan's military ordered its forces along the Afghan border to repulse all future American military incursions into Pakistan. The story has been subsequently downplayed, and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, Mike Mullen, flew to Islamabad, Pakistan's capital, to try to ease tensions. But the fact remains that American forces have and are violating Pakistani sovereignty.
You have to wonder whether the Bush administration understands what it is getting into. In case anyone has forgotten, Pakistan has a hundred plus nuclear weapons. It's a country on the edge of civil war. Its political leadership is bitterly divided. In other words, it's the perfect recipe for a catastrophe.
All of which begs the question, is it worth the ghost hunt we've been on since September 11? There has not been a credible sighting of Osama bin Laden since he escaped from Tora Bora in October 2001. As for al-Qaeda, there are few signs it's even still alive, other than a dispersed leadership taking refuge with the Taliban. Al-Qaeda couldn't even manage to post a statement on the Internet marking September 11, let alone set off a bomb.
U.S. forces have been entering Pakistan for the last six years. But it was always very quietly, usually no more than a hundred yards in, and usually to meet a friendly tribal chieftain. Pakistan knew about these crossings, but it turned a blind eye because it was never splashed across the front page of the country's newspapers. This has all changed in the last month, as the Administration stepped up Predator missile attacks. And then, after the New York Times ran an article that U.S. forces were officially given the go-ahead to enter Pakistan without prior Pakistani permission, Pakistan had no choice but to react.
On another level the Bush Administration's decision to step up attacks in Pakistan is fatally reckless, because the cross-border operations' chances of capturing or killing al Qaeda's leadership are slim. American intelligence isn't good enough for precision raids like this. Pakistan's tribal regions are a black hole that even Pakistani operatives can't enter and come back alive. Overhead surveillance and intercepts do little good in tracking down people in a backward, rural part of the world like this.
On top of it, is al-Qaeda worth the candle? Yes, some deadender in New York or London could blow himself up in the subway and leave behind a video claiming the attack in the name of al-Qaeda. But our going into Pakistan, risking a full-fledged war with a nuclear power, isn't going to stop him.
Finally, there is Pakistan itself, a country that truly is on the edge of civil war. Should we be adding to the force of chaos? By indiscriminately bombing the tribal areas along the Afghan border, we in effect are going to war with Pakistan's ethnic Pashtuns. They make up 15% of Pakistan's 167 million people. They are well armed and among the most fierce and xenophobic people in the world. It is not beyond their military capabilities to cross the Indus and take Islamabad.
Before it is too late, someone needs to sit the President down and give him the bad news that Pakistan is a bridge too far in the "war on terror."
Robert Baer, a former CIA field officer assigned to the Middle East, is TIME.com's intelligence columnist and the author of See No Evil and, most recently, the novel Blow the House Down.
Also See:
Why Adm. Mullen Is Going To Pakistan - NPR
Mullen arrives amid growing tensions - The News
Missile attack reported in Pakistan - CNN
By Robert Baer
Time, Wednesday, Sep. 17, 2008
As Wall Street collapsed with a bang, almost no one noticed that we're on the brink of war with Pakistan. And, unfortunately, that's not too much of an exaggeration. On Tuesday, the Pakistan's military ordered its forces along the Afghan border to repulse all future American military incursions into Pakistan. The story has been subsequently downplayed, and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, Mike Mullen, flew to Islamabad, Pakistan's capital, to try to ease tensions. But the fact remains that American forces have and are violating Pakistani sovereignty.
You have to wonder whether the Bush administration understands what it is getting into. In case anyone has forgotten, Pakistan has a hundred plus nuclear weapons. It's a country on the edge of civil war. Its political leadership is bitterly divided. In other words, it's the perfect recipe for a catastrophe.
All of which begs the question, is it worth the ghost hunt we've been on since September 11? There has not been a credible sighting of Osama bin Laden since he escaped from Tora Bora in October 2001. As for al-Qaeda, there are few signs it's even still alive, other than a dispersed leadership taking refuge with the Taliban. Al-Qaeda couldn't even manage to post a statement on the Internet marking September 11, let alone set off a bomb.
U.S. forces have been entering Pakistan for the last six years. But it was always very quietly, usually no more than a hundred yards in, and usually to meet a friendly tribal chieftain. Pakistan knew about these crossings, but it turned a blind eye because it was never splashed across the front page of the country's newspapers. This has all changed in the last month, as the Administration stepped up Predator missile attacks. And then, after the New York Times ran an article that U.S. forces were officially given the go-ahead to enter Pakistan without prior Pakistani permission, Pakistan had no choice but to react.
On another level the Bush Administration's decision to step up attacks in Pakistan is fatally reckless, because the cross-border operations' chances of capturing or killing al Qaeda's leadership are slim. American intelligence isn't good enough for precision raids like this. Pakistan's tribal regions are a black hole that even Pakistani operatives can't enter and come back alive. Overhead surveillance and intercepts do little good in tracking down people in a backward, rural part of the world like this.
On top of it, is al-Qaeda worth the candle? Yes, some deadender in New York or London could blow himself up in the subway and leave behind a video claiming the attack in the name of al-Qaeda. But our going into Pakistan, risking a full-fledged war with a nuclear power, isn't going to stop him.
Finally, there is Pakistan itself, a country that truly is on the edge of civil war. Should we be adding to the force of chaos? By indiscriminately bombing the tribal areas along the Afghan border, we in effect are going to war with Pakistan's ethnic Pashtuns. They make up 15% of Pakistan's 167 million people. They are well armed and among the most fierce and xenophobic people in the world. It is not beyond their military capabilities to cross the Indus and take Islamabad.
Before it is too late, someone needs to sit the President down and give him the bad news that Pakistan is a bridge too far in the "war on terror."
Robert Baer, a former CIA field officer assigned to the Middle East, is TIME.com's intelligence columnist and the author of See No Evil and, most recently, the novel Blow the House Down.
Also See:
Why Adm. Mullen Is Going To Pakistan - NPR
Mullen arrives amid growing tensions - The News
Missile attack reported in Pakistan - CNN
Tuesday, September 16, 2008
Defeating al-Qaeda's Air Force: Pakistan's F-16 Program in the Fight Against Terrorism!
Defeating al-Qaeda's Air Force: Pakistan's F-16 Program in the Fight Against Terrorism
Donald Camp, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and
Statement Before the U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on South Asia, Washington, DC - September 16, 2008
Chairman Ackerman, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to address you today on Pakistan’s F-16 program.
On February 18 of this year, the Pakistani people went to the polls and elected moderate leaders who are working to set a stable, prosperous, democratic path for Pakistan into the future. The journey along this path is going to be a difficult one as Pakistan faces increasing economic challenges and the serious threat of growing instability in the border regions. The United States wants to see this new government succeed, not only because it represents the desires of the Pakistani people but because we believe that a moderate government with a democratic mandate is the most effective partner in the fight against terrorists and violent extremism.
During Prime Minister Gillani’s visit to Washington in late July, you saw the United States and Pakistan committed to maintaining and strengthening our broad-based partnership, and the United States committed to steps that can help Pakistan deal with economic problems and increase its effectiveness in countering the extremist threat. The Administration’s request to re-direct Foreign Military
Financing in 2008 and beyond to support F-16 Mid-Life Updates speaks directly to these two commitments. Updates to Pakistan’s F-16s will make these aircraft far more effective against terrorist targets, while helping with these payments will provide the newly-elected Pakistani government valuable fiscal flexibility as they deal with rising food and fuel prices.
Mr. Chairman, my colleagues and I represent the Administration’s commitment to the F-16 program and we ask for your support to approve the Administration’s request to re-direct the remaining $110 million in 2008 Foreign
Military Financing for the Mid-Life Update and an additional $142 million in the future. The new Government of Pakistan stands behind these requests and has committed to assume subsequent payments with national funds beginning in December 2009.
F-16s Defined U.S.-Pakistan Engagement
The sale of F-16s to Pakistan became a transformative element of the U.S.- Pakistan bilateral relationship over 20 years ago, and this historical context is important to understand and remember as we determine how to handle the questions of F-16 financing today. Not only a component of Pakistan’s national defense, the F-16 has become an iconic symbol of our bilateral relationship and our commitment to each other.
In the early 1980s, the U.S. government initially agreed to sell Pakistan 111 F-16 aircraft. This decision was influenced by our close partnership with Pakistan during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. By October 1990, however, Pressler sanctions were imposed when President (George Herbert Walker) Bush was unable to certify that Pakistan was not developing a nuclear weapon. The Pressler sanctions led to a decade-long suspension of security assistance to Pakistan and a deficit of trust between our two countries that we are still working to overcome. The suspension of our security assistance programs required under Pressler meant the suspension and eventual cancellation of an additional sale of F-16 aircraft that would have augmented the 40 F-16s Pakistan purchased in 1982. That cancellation has been viewed as a symbol of the collapse of our relationship during the 1990s, a period which remains highly emotional for many Pakistanis. The suspension of our security assistance also precluded Pakistani military officers from attending U.S. military schools, which has produced nearly a generation of Pakistani military officers who have not traveled to the United States to learn sideby- side with American officers.
For complete statement, click here
Donald Camp, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and
Statement Before the U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on South Asia, Washington, DC - September 16, 2008
Chairman Ackerman, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to address you today on Pakistan’s F-16 program.
On February 18 of this year, the Pakistani people went to the polls and elected moderate leaders who are working to set a stable, prosperous, democratic path for Pakistan into the future. The journey along this path is going to be a difficult one as Pakistan faces increasing economic challenges and the serious threat of growing instability in the border regions. The United States wants to see this new government succeed, not only because it represents the desires of the Pakistani people but because we believe that a moderate government with a democratic mandate is the most effective partner in the fight against terrorists and violent extremism.
During Prime Minister Gillani’s visit to Washington in late July, you saw the United States and Pakistan committed to maintaining and strengthening our broad-based partnership, and the United States committed to steps that can help Pakistan deal with economic problems and increase its effectiveness in countering the extremist threat. The Administration’s request to re-direct Foreign Military
Financing in 2008 and beyond to support F-16 Mid-Life Updates speaks directly to these two commitments. Updates to Pakistan’s F-16s will make these aircraft far more effective against terrorist targets, while helping with these payments will provide the newly-elected Pakistani government valuable fiscal flexibility as they deal with rising food and fuel prices.
Mr. Chairman, my colleagues and I represent the Administration’s commitment to the F-16 program and we ask for your support to approve the Administration’s request to re-direct the remaining $110 million in 2008 Foreign
Military Financing for the Mid-Life Update and an additional $142 million in the future. The new Government of Pakistan stands behind these requests and has committed to assume subsequent payments with national funds beginning in December 2009.
F-16s Defined U.S.-Pakistan Engagement
The sale of F-16s to Pakistan became a transformative element of the U.S.- Pakistan bilateral relationship over 20 years ago, and this historical context is important to understand and remember as we determine how to handle the questions of F-16 financing today. Not only a component of Pakistan’s national defense, the F-16 has become an iconic symbol of our bilateral relationship and our commitment to each other.
In the early 1980s, the U.S. government initially agreed to sell Pakistan 111 F-16 aircraft. This decision was influenced by our close partnership with Pakistan during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. By October 1990, however, Pressler sanctions were imposed when President (George Herbert Walker) Bush was unable to certify that Pakistan was not developing a nuclear weapon. The Pressler sanctions led to a decade-long suspension of security assistance to Pakistan and a deficit of trust between our two countries that we are still working to overcome. The suspension of our security assistance programs required under Pressler meant the suspension and eventual cancellation of an additional sale of F-16 aircraft that would have augmented the 40 F-16s Pakistan purchased in 1982. That cancellation has been viewed as a symbol of the collapse of our relationship during the 1990s, a period which remains highly emotional for many Pakistanis. The suspension of our security assistance also precluded Pakistani military officers from attending U.S. military schools, which has produced nearly a generation of Pakistani military officers who have not traveled to the United States to learn sideby- side with American officers.
For complete statement, click here
Monday, September 15, 2008
How to win a Losing Game?
analysis: Winning a losing game —Rasul Bakhsh Rais
Daily Times, September 16, 2008
Admiral Mike Mullen has made this frank evaluation after almost seven years of unending, no-holds-barred, brutal war in Afghanistan: “I’m not convinced we are winning it [the war] in Afghanistan”. But to revive hopes and lift the morale of his country’s political leadership and his troops, he added, “I am convinced that we can”.
How? Some reflection on what are emerging as the contours of his war-winning strategy is in order.
Historically, Afghanistan has been a graveyard of foreign armies. It will be a first in history if the Americans, a foreign power, are able to subdue the Afghans and impose their brand of nationalism, statehood and political leadership on them. It is a hazardous and ambitious task.
Perhaps the American strategist derives his optimism from the changed times and calculus of regional and global power. But on previous occasions, when the other two great powers invaded Afghanistan, the operational environment was not the same.
The myths, traditions and heroic folklore of Afghan history remain the same, no matter who the new friends and invaders are, or however noble their mission might appear to themselves. The current power imbalance in Afghanistan has perhaps not been witnessed anywhere in the world at any time: a superpower equipped with the most destructive military technology looking to ‘right the wrongs’ versus the insurgents in the Pashtun regions of Afghanistan.
I have deliberately avoided mentioning the Taliban, because the label is a narrow and unreal characterisation of the ethos that has shaped the insurgency in the Pashtun-dominated regions of Afghanistan. ‘Taliban’ is a convenient term, and makes the adversary identifiable, portraying him as anti-everything that stands for civilised and humane notions of social organisation. The portrayal is not entirely untrue in view of the conduct of the Taliban in the border regions of Pakistan or in Afghanistan during their regime.
But that is not the point. What I want to suggest is that the Taliban couldn’t operate on the Pakistani or Afghan side of the border without a significant degree of support from the Pashtun population. It is good propaganda to say that the population has been taken hostage, but a concrete analysis of the situation must take into account the sympathies of the locals in areas where insurgents operate and seek sustenance.
If the battle for hearts and minds in Afghanistan’s Pashtun areas has not entirely been lost, it has been messed up big time. Many observers of Afghanistan, both journalists and scholars, have for a long time argued that American strategy in Afghanistan has been badly handled from the very beginning. Three things stand out very clearly.
First, the Afghan-Americans in high advisory and ambassadorial roles played traditional Afghan factional politics in smoothing the way for Hamid Karzai and the shift of power to the Northern Alliance, as if they and not the American forces had dislodged the Taliban. Instead of seeking national reconciliation, the new power group went for the politics of vengeance. Yes, Pashtuns were present in the corridors of power, but in small numbers and on the margins.
Since the parliamentary elections, things have improved for the Pashtuns. But the residual resentment has continued to fuel unease. There is an almost unanimous view that Hamid Karzai has delivered very little on governance, and state- and nation-building.
The second important reason for unrest in the Pashtun regions is that development assistance has been too little and arrived too late. This failure has turned Afghanistan into a narco-state. Even if a small share of the billions that opium production and trade generate ends up in Taliban hands — which it does — it would be enough to keep ISAF and NATO forces tied down for decades.
Finally, the insensitivity to civilian casualties has taken a heavy toll on the American image in Afghanistan. NATO forces entered Afghanistan amid the deafening thunder of strategic bombing and daisycutters, and declared that their mission was to free Afghanistan from the scourge of the Taliban and rebuild the Afghan state and nation. At least in the Pashtun parts of Afghanistan, this mission is now seen very differently.
There is no greater loss in war than losing the sympathy and support of the people you think you are helping. When they see your presence in adversarial terms, it means more than half the battle has been lost.
This is the dilemma the Americans and the international community face in Afghanistan. There is definitely great distress and war fatigue among the American political and military ranks, with acknowledgement of the bitter truth that the war on terror has not gone right. But getting it back on the right track would require a better grasp of the complex region they have landed in, by fate or misfortune, or under illusion of a grand strategic design.
Extending the war effort to the tribal areas of Pakistan is not a great idea. At best, it will destroy Taliban and Al Qaeda hideouts, keep them on the run and cut their control and communication lines. It is uncertain if these missions can be accomplished without too much collateral damage and also without severely damaging the political standing of the new Pakistani government and the public prestige of the armed forces of Pakistan.
Pakistan has done a better job of destroying Al Qaeda in the region than the United States and Afghanistan or other allies. As stated in the Daily Times editorial of last Saturday (“US Strategy: excessive and unnecessary”, September 13), 90 percent of Al Qaeda arrests have been made by Pakistani intelligence and security forces. Pakistani state and society have clearly drawn the battle lines against Al Qaeda and the Taliban and fought with greater resolve than any other country.
American raids inside Pakistan will only play into the hands of Taliban and Al Qaeda sympathisers and place the Pakistan army in a nutcracker situation. This cannot be a winnable strategy in the war against terrorism.
The war against terror is also our war. We have been the first line of defence for the world — has anybody counted the victims of suicide bombing in Pakistan, or the number of our brave troops slaughtered by terrorists? This war is going to be long and difficult but we all have a stake in winning it. It will require patience, better understanding of the complexities of the region, and the respect and trust of partners like Pakistan. All else will be only a strategy of defeat.
Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at rasul@lums.edu.pk
Also See:
Pakistan's dilemma in FATA - Khalid Aziz, The News
Govt pursuing three-pronged strategy to nip extremism: Sherry, The News
Raids into Pakistan - Christian Science Monitor
US helicopters abort mission in Waziristan - Daily Times
Daily Times, September 16, 2008
Admiral Mike Mullen has made this frank evaluation after almost seven years of unending, no-holds-barred, brutal war in Afghanistan: “I’m not convinced we are winning it [the war] in Afghanistan”. But to revive hopes and lift the morale of his country’s political leadership and his troops, he added, “I am convinced that we can”.
How? Some reflection on what are emerging as the contours of his war-winning strategy is in order.
Historically, Afghanistan has been a graveyard of foreign armies. It will be a first in history if the Americans, a foreign power, are able to subdue the Afghans and impose their brand of nationalism, statehood and political leadership on them. It is a hazardous and ambitious task.
Perhaps the American strategist derives his optimism from the changed times and calculus of regional and global power. But on previous occasions, when the other two great powers invaded Afghanistan, the operational environment was not the same.
The myths, traditions and heroic folklore of Afghan history remain the same, no matter who the new friends and invaders are, or however noble their mission might appear to themselves. The current power imbalance in Afghanistan has perhaps not been witnessed anywhere in the world at any time: a superpower equipped with the most destructive military technology looking to ‘right the wrongs’ versus the insurgents in the Pashtun regions of Afghanistan.
I have deliberately avoided mentioning the Taliban, because the label is a narrow and unreal characterisation of the ethos that has shaped the insurgency in the Pashtun-dominated regions of Afghanistan. ‘Taliban’ is a convenient term, and makes the adversary identifiable, portraying him as anti-everything that stands for civilised and humane notions of social organisation. The portrayal is not entirely untrue in view of the conduct of the Taliban in the border regions of Pakistan or in Afghanistan during their regime.
But that is not the point. What I want to suggest is that the Taliban couldn’t operate on the Pakistani or Afghan side of the border without a significant degree of support from the Pashtun population. It is good propaganda to say that the population has been taken hostage, but a concrete analysis of the situation must take into account the sympathies of the locals in areas where insurgents operate and seek sustenance.
If the battle for hearts and minds in Afghanistan’s Pashtun areas has not entirely been lost, it has been messed up big time. Many observers of Afghanistan, both journalists and scholars, have for a long time argued that American strategy in Afghanistan has been badly handled from the very beginning. Three things stand out very clearly.
First, the Afghan-Americans in high advisory and ambassadorial roles played traditional Afghan factional politics in smoothing the way for Hamid Karzai and the shift of power to the Northern Alliance, as if they and not the American forces had dislodged the Taliban. Instead of seeking national reconciliation, the new power group went for the politics of vengeance. Yes, Pashtuns were present in the corridors of power, but in small numbers and on the margins.
Since the parliamentary elections, things have improved for the Pashtuns. But the residual resentment has continued to fuel unease. There is an almost unanimous view that Hamid Karzai has delivered very little on governance, and state- and nation-building.
The second important reason for unrest in the Pashtun regions is that development assistance has been too little and arrived too late. This failure has turned Afghanistan into a narco-state. Even if a small share of the billions that opium production and trade generate ends up in Taliban hands — which it does — it would be enough to keep ISAF and NATO forces tied down for decades.
Finally, the insensitivity to civilian casualties has taken a heavy toll on the American image in Afghanistan. NATO forces entered Afghanistan amid the deafening thunder of strategic bombing and daisycutters, and declared that their mission was to free Afghanistan from the scourge of the Taliban and rebuild the Afghan state and nation. At least in the Pashtun parts of Afghanistan, this mission is now seen very differently.
There is no greater loss in war than losing the sympathy and support of the people you think you are helping. When they see your presence in adversarial terms, it means more than half the battle has been lost.
This is the dilemma the Americans and the international community face in Afghanistan. There is definitely great distress and war fatigue among the American political and military ranks, with acknowledgement of the bitter truth that the war on terror has not gone right. But getting it back on the right track would require a better grasp of the complex region they have landed in, by fate or misfortune, or under illusion of a grand strategic design.
Extending the war effort to the tribal areas of Pakistan is not a great idea. At best, it will destroy Taliban and Al Qaeda hideouts, keep them on the run and cut their control and communication lines. It is uncertain if these missions can be accomplished without too much collateral damage and also without severely damaging the political standing of the new Pakistani government and the public prestige of the armed forces of Pakistan.
Pakistan has done a better job of destroying Al Qaeda in the region than the United States and Afghanistan or other allies. As stated in the Daily Times editorial of last Saturday (“US Strategy: excessive and unnecessary”, September 13), 90 percent of Al Qaeda arrests have been made by Pakistani intelligence and security forces. Pakistani state and society have clearly drawn the battle lines against Al Qaeda and the Taliban and fought with greater resolve than any other country.
American raids inside Pakistan will only play into the hands of Taliban and Al Qaeda sympathisers and place the Pakistan army in a nutcracker situation. This cannot be a winnable strategy in the war against terrorism.
The war against terror is also our war. We have been the first line of defence for the world — has anybody counted the victims of suicide bombing in Pakistan, or the number of our brave troops slaughtered by terrorists? This war is going to be long and difficult but we all have a stake in winning it. It will require patience, better understanding of the complexities of the region, and the respect and trust of partners like Pakistan. All else will be only a strategy of defeat.
Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at rasul@lums.edu.pk
Also See:
Pakistan's dilemma in FATA - Khalid Aziz, The News
Govt pursuing three-pronged strategy to nip extremism: Sherry, The News
Raids into Pakistan - Christian Science Monitor
US helicopters abort mission in Waziristan - Daily Times
A Perfect Storm Brewing in Pakistan?
A Perfect Storm Brewing in Pakistan
Shuja Nawaz, The Huffington Post, September 13, 2008
Within a matter of days, events on the Afghan border seem to be creating a perfect storm of mistrust and conflict between the United States and Pakistan: The recent US heliborne attack with troops inside Pakistan’s tribal area; the report that President George W. Bush had signed off on such attacks in July, allowing US forces to conduct these raids without clearance from Pakistan; the short-term shutting down of the US supply route to Afghanistan by Pakistan, ostensibly for “security reasons”; and finally an unequivocal riposte from Pakistan’s army chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani that “There is no question of any agreement or understanding with the coalition forces whereby they are allowed to conduct operations on our side of the border.” Unless good sense prevails, the US-Pakistan alliance may be heading for the rocks in a storm that could rent the tenuous alliance between these two “allies”.
There may be good grounds for the US to feel that it has been let down by Pakistan in the past. Pakistan’s ambivalent approach to the Afghan Taliban and continuing hidden links to former Afghan Mujahideen commanders, such as Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Siraj, came to be at odds with its partnership with the US against militants in the border region. Coming clean on that score may not have satisfied the US. Hence the Bush signature on unilateral attacks even perhaps as he entertained the new Pakistani prime minister in Washington this July.
Suddenly the old policy of “a wink and a nod” that worked for President Pervez Musharraf and that appeared to be continuing under the new democratically elected Peoples’ Party government seems to have been set aside. Kayani’s tough statement appears to have widespread public support in Pakistan. The Prime Minister echoed his words. But President Asif Ali Zardari uncharacteristically has been silent. If this portends fissures in the ruling hierarchy then the signs are not good for the balance of power inside Pakistan.
Other dangerous possibilities appear likely in the US-Pakistan relationship. The next time the US physically invades Pakistani territory to take out suspected militants, it may meet the Pakistan army head on. Or it may face a complete a cut-off of war supplies and fuel in Afghanistan via Pakistan. With only two weeks supply of fuel available to its forces inside Afghanistan and no alternative route currently available, the war in Afghanistan may come to a screeching halt. The Bush approach may prove to be yet another example of short-term thinking that damages the longer term objective. The Taliban meanwhile will be applauding from the sidelines.
A major consequence of the US invasion of Pakistan’s territory will be the further alienation of the Pakistani public and a serious internal problem for the fledgling civil government that took over from Musharraf’s autocracy. The US may think it has considerable leverage over the Pakistani government because of the latter’s economic ills and financial straits and its overwhelming reliance on US aid. But it is failing to measure the power of the Pakistani street. Already, a vast majority of people in Pakistan, including inside the army, see the United States with hostile eyes. Anyone in Pakistan seen as aligning with the Americans would lose public favor. And the nationalists and religious extremists will then get a chance to say “we told you so!” and gain the upper hand.
All this is happening as the lame duck Bush presidency is getting ready to pack its bags. But the campaign to succeed Bush is heating up. Cross border US attacks inside Pakistan will distract from the war on terror in the region. They will also divert the campaigns of Senators John McCain and Barack Obama from finding solutions to hurling new rhetorical bombs at each other to prove that each is tougher in the use of military force than the other.
Both Pakistan and the United States need to rethink their actions. Pakistan must prove with actions not just words that it is willing to shed its ties to all militants. The United States must ratchet down the rhetoric and the use of force, especially against an “ally” in this war on terror, a war that will last well into the next president’s term and may be beyond. And it must fully equip the Pakistan army to fight a mobile counter insurgency in its borderlands. Otherwise, the US will not only lose an ally in Pakistan but ignite a conflagration inside that huge and nuclear-armed country that will make the war in Afghanistan seem like a Sunday hike in the Hindu Kush.
Shuja Nawaz is the author of Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within (Oxford University Press 2008). He can be reached at www.shujanawaz.com
Shuja Nawaz, The Huffington Post, September 13, 2008
Within a matter of days, events on the Afghan border seem to be creating a perfect storm of mistrust and conflict between the United States and Pakistan: The recent US heliborne attack with troops inside Pakistan’s tribal area; the report that President George W. Bush had signed off on such attacks in July, allowing US forces to conduct these raids without clearance from Pakistan; the short-term shutting down of the US supply route to Afghanistan by Pakistan, ostensibly for “security reasons”; and finally an unequivocal riposte from Pakistan’s army chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani that “There is no question of any agreement or understanding with the coalition forces whereby they are allowed to conduct operations on our side of the border.” Unless good sense prevails, the US-Pakistan alliance may be heading for the rocks in a storm that could rent the tenuous alliance between these two “allies”.
There may be good grounds for the US to feel that it has been let down by Pakistan in the past. Pakistan’s ambivalent approach to the Afghan Taliban and continuing hidden links to former Afghan Mujahideen commanders, such as Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Siraj, came to be at odds with its partnership with the US against militants in the border region. Coming clean on that score may not have satisfied the US. Hence the Bush signature on unilateral attacks even perhaps as he entertained the new Pakistani prime minister in Washington this July.
Suddenly the old policy of “a wink and a nod” that worked for President Pervez Musharraf and that appeared to be continuing under the new democratically elected Peoples’ Party government seems to have been set aside. Kayani’s tough statement appears to have widespread public support in Pakistan. The Prime Minister echoed his words. But President Asif Ali Zardari uncharacteristically has been silent. If this portends fissures in the ruling hierarchy then the signs are not good for the balance of power inside Pakistan.
Other dangerous possibilities appear likely in the US-Pakistan relationship. The next time the US physically invades Pakistani territory to take out suspected militants, it may meet the Pakistan army head on. Or it may face a complete a cut-off of war supplies and fuel in Afghanistan via Pakistan. With only two weeks supply of fuel available to its forces inside Afghanistan and no alternative route currently available, the war in Afghanistan may come to a screeching halt. The Bush approach may prove to be yet another example of short-term thinking that damages the longer term objective. The Taliban meanwhile will be applauding from the sidelines.
A major consequence of the US invasion of Pakistan’s territory will be the further alienation of the Pakistani public and a serious internal problem for the fledgling civil government that took over from Musharraf’s autocracy. The US may think it has considerable leverage over the Pakistani government because of the latter’s economic ills and financial straits and its overwhelming reliance on US aid. But it is failing to measure the power of the Pakistani street. Already, a vast majority of people in Pakistan, including inside the army, see the United States with hostile eyes. Anyone in Pakistan seen as aligning with the Americans would lose public favor. And the nationalists and religious extremists will then get a chance to say “we told you so!” and gain the upper hand.
All this is happening as the lame duck Bush presidency is getting ready to pack its bags. But the campaign to succeed Bush is heating up. Cross border US attacks inside Pakistan will distract from the war on terror in the region. They will also divert the campaigns of Senators John McCain and Barack Obama from finding solutions to hurling new rhetorical bombs at each other to prove that each is tougher in the use of military force than the other.
Both Pakistan and the United States need to rethink their actions. Pakistan must prove with actions not just words that it is willing to shed its ties to all militants. The United States must ratchet down the rhetoric and the use of force, especially against an “ally” in this war on terror, a war that will last well into the next president’s term and may be beyond. And it must fully equip the Pakistan army to fight a mobile counter insurgency in its borderlands. Otherwise, the US will not only lose an ally in Pakistan but ignite a conflagration inside that huge and nuclear-armed country that will make the war in Afghanistan seem like a Sunday hike in the Hindu Kush.
Shuja Nawaz is the author of Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within (Oxford University Press 2008). He can be reached at www.shujanawaz.com
Sunday, September 14, 2008
Peshawar Museum displays largest collection on Buddha’s life
Peshawar Museum displays largest collection on Buddha’s life
Daily Times, September 15, 2008
PESHAWAR: The almost century-old Peshawar Museum is unique for displaying the most important and world’s largest collection of architectural pieces.
The unique stone sculptures carved in Gandhara Art not only speak of the artists’ competence, but also tell a complete life story of Buddha from birth to death and his miracles.
In the main hall of the museum, the antiques and sculptures put on display represent the stories on the life of Buddha from his birth to death – all the episodes.
The Buddha’s life story in stones is beautifully carved with all details from the Queen Maya’s dream, interpretation of the dream, birth of Siddhartta (historic Buddha), bath scene, seven steps, going to school, writing lessons, wrestling matches, palace life, marriage scene, renunciation, great departure, ascetic life, fasting, first meditation, demons attacks, attaining enlightenment, first sermon, death scene, cremation of Buddha, distribution of relics and construction of stupas on the relics.
The collection includes different types of architectural pieces, relics caskets, stupa models of schist and bronze, stucco sculptures, terracotta figurines, toiletry objects along with life size Buddha statues.
“The life stories of Buddha, depicted in Gandharan Art, are an authentic document of the Mahyana text composed during the time of Kanishka (1st Century AD),” said Prof Fidaullah Sehrai, renowned archaeologist and former director NWFP Department of Archaeology and Museums,
Prof Sehrai said the cosmopolitan art of Gandhara, with influences from Indian Greek, Roman and Persian artists, appeared in this region in 1st century BC for propagation of Buddhism through stone carved as well as images in stucco, terracotta and bronze.
These images were placed in chapels of monasteries and in stupas across Gandhara region by Buddhist followers for worship.
“The current Buddhist religion in Korea and Japan is a wonderful example of extension of Gandharan Buddhism,” Sehrai said. “The sculptures were fixed to the bases, drums and stairs of the stupas, around which the worshippers gather and worships.”
Prof Sehrai said in the old Buddhist art the Buddha was not represented in human form but shown by symbols.
The four important events of Buddha’s are his birth at Lumbini Garden, his enlightenment under the Bodhi tree, his first sermon in the Deer Park and his death at Kusinara. All these events are symbolised by a lotus, a tree, a wheel or a deer and a stupa, respectively.
But in Gandhara Art, Prof Sehrai continued, the Buddha was represented in human form in these and other events in shape of sculptures.
The main focus of the art was Buddha’s life stories and individual images, his previous birth stories (Jatakas) and future Buddhas.
The devoted local artists, stimulated by the personality of Buddha, took advantage of contacts, motifs and technology from Greeks, Romans and Persians, which gave Buddha an eternal life.
The art, mainly a product of the land of Gandhara under the Kushan rulers, is more dynamic than the contemporary Mathura Art of India.
“Peshawar Museum has the largest collection of Gandhara art in the whole world, consisting of 4247 (936 on display and 3311 in stores) antiques of Buddhist stone sculptures and panels, architectural elements, stucco sculptures, terracotta figurines, relic casket and toiletry objects,” said Saleh Muhammad, NWFP Archaeology and Museums director.
The major poses of Buddha in Peshawar Museum were Dhayana Mudra or Medtation Pose, Abhaya Mudra or Reassurance Pose, Dharma Chakra Mudr or Turning of the Wheel of Law Pose and Bhumispersa Mudra or Earth Touching Pose, Saleh said.
The main Gandharan collection of Peshawar Museum came from excavations of the Archaeological Survey of India, Frontier Circle from 1902 to 1941 and donations from public and purchases, he informed.
These sculptures mainly recovered from the sites of Shari Bahlol (1906-26) in Mardan district, Shah Ji-ki-Dheri (1908-10) in Peshawar district and Palatu Dheri (1902-03), Mamane Dheri, Akhun Dheri, Ibrahimzai, Utmanzai, Hamid Garhi Turangzai, Bala Hisar and Sheikan Dheri in Charsadda district.
Saleh Muhammad said the true story of Buddha’s life was not known and what we had displayed was a canonised version of his life.
“It is the miraculous story that is narrated in stone. This story was developed in greatest detail in Gandhara Art while in other schools of art only a few events are told,” he added.
The Gandharan Art pieces in the museum can be dated back to 2nd century AD to the 5th century AD, except a few Hindu sculptures, which can be dated from the 9th century AD to the 11th century AD.
The story begins from his birth and continues through his human career until his death and even later when his relics and reliquaries became objects of worship.
Total collection of antique is reckoned at 14,156 items in five main sections; Gandharan Coins, Islamic, Ethnological and Iranian and due to unique and most extensive Gandharan collection, Peshawar Museum is famous worldwide.
Saleh Muhammad said earlier large number of foreigners, especially from Japan and Korea, visited Peshawar Museum to see Buddha’s unique sculptures. But now the number of visitors had reduced due to law and order situation.
He suggested for proper projection of Peshawar Museum at international level, in special reference to Buddha’s sculptures, with renewed spirit for attracting tourists and followers of Buddhism. app
Daily Times, September 15, 2008
PESHAWAR: The almost century-old Peshawar Museum is unique for displaying the most important and world’s largest collection of architectural pieces.
The unique stone sculptures carved in Gandhara Art not only speak of the artists’ competence, but also tell a complete life story of Buddha from birth to death and his miracles.
In the main hall of the museum, the antiques and sculptures put on display represent the stories on the life of Buddha from his birth to death – all the episodes.
The Buddha’s life story in stones is beautifully carved with all details from the Queen Maya’s dream, interpretation of the dream, birth of Siddhartta (historic Buddha), bath scene, seven steps, going to school, writing lessons, wrestling matches, palace life, marriage scene, renunciation, great departure, ascetic life, fasting, first meditation, demons attacks, attaining enlightenment, first sermon, death scene, cremation of Buddha, distribution of relics and construction of stupas on the relics.
The collection includes different types of architectural pieces, relics caskets, stupa models of schist and bronze, stucco sculptures, terracotta figurines, toiletry objects along with life size Buddha statues.
“The life stories of Buddha, depicted in Gandharan Art, are an authentic document of the Mahyana text composed during the time of Kanishka (1st Century AD),” said Prof Fidaullah Sehrai, renowned archaeologist and former director NWFP Department of Archaeology and Museums,
Prof Sehrai said the cosmopolitan art of Gandhara, with influences from Indian Greek, Roman and Persian artists, appeared in this region in 1st century BC for propagation of Buddhism through stone carved as well as images in stucco, terracotta and bronze.
These images were placed in chapels of monasteries and in stupas across Gandhara region by Buddhist followers for worship.
“The current Buddhist religion in Korea and Japan is a wonderful example of extension of Gandharan Buddhism,” Sehrai said. “The sculptures were fixed to the bases, drums and stairs of the stupas, around which the worshippers gather and worships.”
Prof Sehrai said in the old Buddhist art the Buddha was not represented in human form but shown by symbols.
The four important events of Buddha’s are his birth at Lumbini Garden, his enlightenment under the Bodhi tree, his first sermon in the Deer Park and his death at Kusinara. All these events are symbolised by a lotus, a tree, a wheel or a deer and a stupa, respectively.
But in Gandhara Art, Prof Sehrai continued, the Buddha was represented in human form in these and other events in shape of sculptures.
The main focus of the art was Buddha’s life stories and individual images, his previous birth stories (Jatakas) and future Buddhas.
The devoted local artists, stimulated by the personality of Buddha, took advantage of contacts, motifs and technology from Greeks, Romans and Persians, which gave Buddha an eternal life.
The art, mainly a product of the land of Gandhara under the Kushan rulers, is more dynamic than the contemporary Mathura Art of India.
“Peshawar Museum has the largest collection of Gandhara art in the whole world, consisting of 4247 (936 on display and 3311 in stores) antiques of Buddhist stone sculptures and panels, architectural elements, stucco sculptures, terracotta figurines, relic casket and toiletry objects,” said Saleh Muhammad, NWFP Archaeology and Museums director.
The major poses of Buddha in Peshawar Museum were Dhayana Mudra or Medtation Pose, Abhaya Mudra or Reassurance Pose, Dharma Chakra Mudr or Turning of the Wheel of Law Pose and Bhumispersa Mudra or Earth Touching Pose, Saleh said.
The main Gandharan collection of Peshawar Museum came from excavations of the Archaeological Survey of India, Frontier Circle from 1902 to 1941 and donations from public and purchases, he informed.
These sculptures mainly recovered from the sites of Shari Bahlol (1906-26) in Mardan district, Shah Ji-ki-Dheri (1908-10) in Peshawar district and Palatu Dheri (1902-03), Mamane Dheri, Akhun Dheri, Ibrahimzai, Utmanzai, Hamid Garhi Turangzai, Bala Hisar and Sheikan Dheri in Charsadda district.
Saleh Muhammad said the true story of Buddha’s life was not known and what we had displayed was a canonised version of his life.
“It is the miraculous story that is narrated in stone. This story was developed in greatest detail in Gandhara Art while in other schools of art only a few events are told,” he added.
The Gandharan Art pieces in the museum can be dated back to 2nd century AD to the 5th century AD, except a few Hindu sculptures, which can be dated from the 9th century AD to the 11th century AD.
The story begins from his birth and continues through his human career until his death and even later when his relics and reliquaries became objects of worship.
Total collection of antique is reckoned at 14,156 items in five main sections; Gandharan Coins, Islamic, Ethnological and Iranian and due to unique and most extensive Gandharan collection, Peshawar Museum is famous worldwide.
Saleh Muhammad said earlier large number of foreigners, especially from Japan and Korea, visited Peshawar Museum to see Buddha’s unique sculptures. But now the number of visitors had reduced due to law and order situation.
He suggested for proper projection of Peshawar Museum at international level, in special reference to Buddha’s sculptures, with renewed spirit for attracting tourists and followers of Buddhism. app
War on Terror and Pakistan - In the Eyes of a Retired Pakistani General
Is there War On Terror yet?
By SHAHID AZIZ, The Nation, September 13, 2008
Current US strategy for the War On Terror, adopted by Pakistan, has produced devastating results for the country. It has increased extremism, violence and terrorism in Pakistan and the government has lost credibility since it is playing the US game in the region. Besides the focus on the use of military instrument, other steps like education, economic development and measures adopted under the 'visionary enlightened moderation' are long-term and cannot influence the current situation. Our strategic alignment with the US war in Afghanistan has no support within the country, other than in elite drawing rooms. US meddling in our internal affairs has further disillusioned the people from the government. Frontier Province is almost out of hand, Balochistan is simmering to explode, and Karachi has been taken hostage by Altaf Hussain and Baitullah Mehsud, who are jointly prompting a great massacre. Is a 'foreign hand' goading them on? Or do we simply explain it by saying that we are in habit of externalising our problems?
By deliberately spreading extremism and terrorism in Pakistan and through intense exhortations on the media, we are trying to rally the people behind War On Terror. Given the social, political and economic milieu, as well as the state of governance in Pakistan, the government's support for this war cannot last very long. It is time to drop the pretentious.
The Bush administration's new policy of denying sanctuary in Pakistan to Taliban, not constrained by concerns regarding Pakistan's stability, is already unfolding and showing the strains it is causing on our polity. Entry of US troops in Pakistan is an attack on our national sovereignty, or whatever is left of it. The consequences could be horrendous, both for Pakistan and the US. Militants would multiply by the thousands. Pakistan Army would not be able to support US operations, or else its command structure would collapse.
Financial crisis and street unrest would create chaos in the country. Extremists would be pushed deeper into Pakistan and war will spread, making the US far more vulnerable. Pakistan would be destabilised, presenting the US with the final challenge, or perhaps the opportunity, to tackle Pakistan and attempt to denuclearise it by having our nuclear arsenal declared dangerous under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter and ordered to be placed under safe custody of the IAEA. When the Army is fully committed on internal security duties, will the Indian Army be, then, deployed on our borders to complete the scenario for dismembering the country? One wonders if an implosion is being engineered.
There is no War On Terror going on in the region. US presence is creating more hatred and more 'terrorists'. There is no solution to be found on this road. The solution lies only in search for peace, but that has been forbidden by the US.
War On Terror has come to mean defeating and destroying the concept of political Islam as an ideology. The more the Muslims are cornered, the more political will Islam become. You cannot kill this idea with guns. Religions cannot be destroyed through force, not even brute force.
There is no search for Osama going on here. Osama will be found only when the US has created another greater threat to be presented to the world. Then Osama will not be needed any more, as an alibi. Then, a new drama of terror will unfold.
The writer is a former Chief of the General Staff.
Also See:
The War in Pakistan: U.S. attacks on Taliban and al-Qaeda targets are risky -- and necessary: Editorial, Washington Post, September 14, 2008
By SHAHID AZIZ, The Nation, September 13, 2008
Current US strategy for the War On Terror, adopted by Pakistan, has produced devastating results for the country. It has increased extremism, violence and terrorism in Pakistan and the government has lost credibility since it is playing the US game in the region. Besides the focus on the use of military instrument, other steps like education, economic development and measures adopted under the 'visionary enlightened moderation' are long-term and cannot influence the current situation. Our strategic alignment with the US war in Afghanistan has no support within the country, other than in elite drawing rooms. US meddling in our internal affairs has further disillusioned the people from the government. Frontier Province is almost out of hand, Balochistan is simmering to explode, and Karachi has been taken hostage by Altaf Hussain and Baitullah Mehsud, who are jointly prompting a great massacre. Is a 'foreign hand' goading them on? Or do we simply explain it by saying that we are in habit of externalising our problems?
By deliberately spreading extremism and terrorism in Pakistan and through intense exhortations on the media, we are trying to rally the people behind War On Terror. Given the social, political and economic milieu, as well as the state of governance in Pakistan, the government's support for this war cannot last very long. It is time to drop the pretentious.
The Bush administration's new policy of denying sanctuary in Pakistan to Taliban, not constrained by concerns regarding Pakistan's stability, is already unfolding and showing the strains it is causing on our polity. Entry of US troops in Pakistan is an attack on our national sovereignty, or whatever is left of it. The consequences could be horrendous, both for Pakistan and the US. Militants would multiply by the thousands. Pakistan Army would not be able to support US operations, or else its command structure would collapse.
Financial crisis and street unrest would create chaos in the country. Extremists would be pushed deeper into Pakistan and war will spread, making the US far more vulnerable. Pakistan would be destabilised, presenting the US with the final challenge, or perhaps the opportunity, to tackle Pakistan and attempt to denuclearise it by having our nuclear arsenal declared dangerous under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter and ordered to be placed under safe custody of the IAEA. When the Army is fully committed on internal security duties, will the Indian Army be, then, deployed on our borders to complete the scenario for dismembering the country? One wonders if an implosion is being engineered.
There is no War On Terror going on in the region. US presence is creating more hatred and more 'terrorists'. There is no solution to be found on this road. The solution lies only in search for peace, but that has been forbidden by the US.
War On Terror has come to mean defeating and destroying the concept of political Islam as an ideology. The more the Muslims are cornered, the more political will Islam become. You cannot kill this idea with guns. Religions cannot be destroyed through force, not even brute force.
There is no search for Osama going on here. Osama will be found only when the US has created another greater threat to be presented to the world. Then Osama will not be needed any more, as an alibi. Then, a new drama of terror will unfold.
The writer is a former Chief of the General Staff.
Also See:
The War in Pakistan: U.S. attacks on Taliban and al-Qaeda targets are risky -- and necessary: Editorial, Washington Post, September 14, 2008
Saturday, September 13, 2008
Charlie Wilson’s war: The academic blowback - By Dr. Mohammad Taqi
Charlie Wilson’s war: The academic blowback
By Dr. Mohammad Taqi
Statesman, September 13, 2008
Just when we thought that Charlie Wilson would fade away into the dustbin of history, he staged a come-back last year, via a Mike Nichols movie “Charlie Wilson’s War” based on a 2003 book by George Crile with the same title.
Both the book and the movie represent an American view of the Afghan conflict of the 1980s, presented in a post-Soviet era, when very few people are willing to or care about analyzing these works objectively. The author, director and their US audiences do have a right to gloat over a glossed-up version of the history.
So far so good, but now there is group of Pakistani-Americans who have started a campaign to name a soon-to-be-founded Pakistan Studies Chair at the University of Texas, after Rep. Charlie Wilson. An Iftar dinner has been arranged in Washington, D.C. on September 24, 2008 to help plan, support and possibly raise money for this venture. Dr. Randy Diehl, the Dean of College of Liberal Arts at the University of Texas at Austin, TX, will be the featured speaker at the event.
Whereas we don’t doubt the sincerity of the efforts by this group, among which are some leading lights of the Pakistani Americans Public Affairs Committee (PAKPAC), it is unfortunate that these fine men and women have chosen one of the most controversial figures of the Afghan imbroglio, ostensibly to promote, in the USA, the study of Pakistan-related matters.
Unlike Charlie Wilson, few - if any - of these do-gooders have ever set foot on the Pashtun-Afghan lands and are completely oblivious of the fact that Afghans and Pashtuns continue to reap - till this day - what Wilson and Ziaul Haq sowed in the killing fields of Afghanistan.
Charlie Wilson might be a hero to a few Americans, who wanted to give the Soviets a bloody nose in Afghanistan, to avenge their own humiliation in Vietnam. However, it is an established fact that Wilson is also the grand-daddy of the present-day Taliban and is one of the few people directly responsible for Talibanisation of Pakistani and Afghan societies.
Warlords like Jalaluddin Haqqani - Wilson’s favorite commander - and Gulbudin Hikmatyar were direct beneficiaries of the arms and largesse pumped in by Wilson. It is not a surprise that Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin remain active Taliban till today, fighting both the US and Pakistan and that the US had to bomb their hideout on September 7, 2008. Hikmatyar too, is not far behind OBL on America’s wanted list.
Wilson and his coterie’s stated strategy of mixing religion with politics and more importantly, a covert war continue to give us a blowback in the form of battle-hardened religious zealots, now marauding the tribal and settled areas of Pakistan. He remained a part and parcel of an unholy war, which in the words of a CIA operative “was fought with Saudi money, American arms and the Afghan blood”. All the players in this war, including Wilson, remained committed to fight “till the last Afghan”.
This is not the only concern about Wilson’s methods, for some would argue that anything and everything was necessary to defeat the “Evil Empire”. What is of more concern to the democratic forces in Pakistan and their supporters in the US and the West is that Wilson, along with George Schultz, Richard Armitage and Michael Armacost produced a post-Zia policy, thus sidelining the nascent democratic government of Benazir Bhutto. According to Steve Coll, the author of “Ghost Wars”. Wilson and Co. drafted this policy literally on the fly, while en route to attend Zia’s funeral.
The fallout from this relationship, where money and weapons were handed over to an intelligence agency, without the civilian oversight would come back to haunt all of us. Twenty years later Senator Joe Biden, along with Senator Dick Lugar, had to undertake the herculean task of rectifying this anomaly. The VP aspirant is trying to undo the damage done to both the US-Pak relations as well the Pakistani people, through the “Biden-Lugar” bill.
The issue at hand is fairly straight-forward: is there a need for a Pakistan Studies Chair at the University of Texas or for that matter at any other US academic institution? The answer is a resounding yes. The next question we have to ask is if such Chair should be named after someone like Charlie Wilson, whose personal and political scruples are very dubious to say the least. What kind of role model would he make for the students enrolling at the proposed center?
If Rep. Wilson and the Temple Foundation - the other potential donor - want to do something substantial for Pakistan Studies, a reasonable way to proceed would be by making an unmarked and unrestricted donation to establish a Chair in Pakistan studies at the University of Texas at Austin.
I call upon the academics and pro-democracy friends in Pakistan and around the world to write directly to Dr. Randy Diehl, the Dean of College of Liberal Arts, University of Texas at Austin, TX asking him to revisit the idea of naming a wonderful venture after a divisive character from the cold-war era. The blowback from Charlie Wilson’s war must stop - at least in the academia.
(The author teaches and practices Medicine at the University of Florida and can be reached at taqimd@gmail.com)
By Dr. Mohammad Taqi
Statesman, September 13, 2008
Just when we thought that Charlie Wilson would fade away into the dustbin of history, he staged a come-back last year, via a Mike Nichols movie “Charlie Wilson’s War” based on a 2003 book by George Crile with the same title.
Both the book and the movie represent an American view of the Afghan conflict of the 1980s, presented in a post-Soviet era, when very few people are willing to or care about analyzing these works objectively. The author, director and their US audiences do have a right to gloat over a glossed-up version of the history.
So far so good, but now there is group of Pakistani-Americans who have started a campaign to name a soon-to-be-founded Pakistan Studies Chair at the University of Texas, after Rep. Charlie Wilson. An Iftar dinner has been arranged in Washington, D.C. on September 24, 2008 to help plan, support and possibly raise money for this venture. Dr. Randy Diehl, the Dean of College of Liberal Arts at the University of Texas at Austin, TX, will be the featured speaker at the event.
Whereas we don’t doubt the sincerity of the efforts by this group, among which are some leading lights of the Pakistani Americans Public Affairs Committee (PAKPAC), it is unfortunate that these fine men and women have chosen one of the most controversial figures of the Afghan imbroglio, ostensibly to promote, in the USA, the study of Pakistan-related matters.
Unlike Charlie Wilson, few - if any - of these do-gooders have ever set foot on the Pashtun-Afghan lands and are completely oblivious of the fact that Afghans and Pashtuns continue to reap - till this day - what Wilson and Ziaul Haq sowed in the killing fields of Afghanistan.
Charlie Wilson might be a hero to a few Americans, who wanted to give the Soviets a bloody nose in Afghanistan, to avenge their own humiliation in Vietnam. However, it is an established fact that Wilson is also the grand-daddy of the present-day Taliban and is one of the few people directly responsible for Talibanisation of Pakistani and Afghan societies.
Warlords like Jalaluddin Haqqani - Wilson’s favorite commander - and Gulbudin Hikmatyar were direct beneficiaries of the arms and largesse pumped in by Wilson. It is not a surprise that Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin remain active Taliban till today, fighting both the US and Pakistan and that the US had to bomb their hideout on September 7, 2008. Hikmatyar too, is not far behind OBL on America’s wanted list.
Wilson and his coterie’s stated strategy of mixing religion with politics and more importantly, a covert war continue to give us a blowback in the form of battle-hardened religious zealots, now marauding the tribal and settled areas of Pakistan. He remained a part and parcel of an unholy war, which in the words of a CIA operative “was fought with Saudi money, American arms and the Afghan blood”. All the players in this war, including Wilson, remained committed to fight “till the last Afghan”.
This is not the only concern about Wilson’s methods, for some would argue that anything and everything was necessary to defeat the “Evil Empire”. What is of more concern to the democratic forces in Pakistan and their supporters in the US and the West is that Wilson, along with George Schultz, Richard Armitage and Michael Armacost produced a post-Zia policy, thus sidelining the nascent democratic government of Benazir Bhutto. According to Steve Coll, the author of “Ghost Wars”. Wilson and Co. drafted this policy literally on the fly, while en route to attend Zia’s funeral.
The fallout from this relationship, where money and weapons were handed over to an intelligence agency, without the civilian oversight would come back to haunt all of us. Twenty years later Senator Joe Biden, along with Senator Dick Lugar, had to undertake the herculean task of rectifying this anomaly. The VP aspirant is trying to undo the damage done to both the US-Pak relations as well the Pakistani people, through the “Biden-Lugar” bill.
The issue at hand is fairly straight-forward: is there a need for a Pakistan Studies Chair at the University of Texas or for that matter at any other US academic institution? The answer is a resounding yes. The next question we have to ask is if such Chair should be named after someone like Charlie Wilson, whose personal and political scruples are very dubious to say the least. What kind of role model would he make for the students enrolling at the proposed center?
If Rep. Wilson and the Temple Foundation - the other potential donor - want to do something substantial for Pakistan Studies, a reasonable way to proceed would be by making an unmarked and unrestricted donation to establish a Chair in Pakistan studies at the University of Texas at Austin.
I call upon the academics and pro-democracy friends in Pakistan and around the world to write directly to Dr. Randy Diehl, the Dean of College of Liberal Arts, University of Texas at Austin, TX asking him to revisit the idea of naming a wonderful venture after a divisive character from the cold-war era. The blowback from Charlie Wilson’s war must stop - at least in the academia.
(The author teaches and practices Medicine at the University of Florida and can be reached at taqimd@gmail.com)
Bombings in New Dehli
Coordinated Bomb Blasts Rock New Delhi
Scores Injured, More Than a Dozen Killed in Multiple Explosions in India's Capital
By Rama Lakshmi and Emily Wax
Washington Post, September 13, 2008
NEW DELHI, Sept. 13 -- At least five bombings within 45 minutes struck busy shopping districts in India's capital Saturday, killing at least 18 people and injuring more than 60.
A little known group calling itself the Indian Mujaheddin asserted responsibility for the attacks, saying in e-mails sent to several news stations: "Stop us if you can. We strike with message of death. We are terrorizing for your sins."
"This is shameful, but they can't kill the spirit of Delhi's people," the city's mayor, Arti Mehra, told reporters as she visited one of the blast sites.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh also condemned the attacks and appealed for calm.
More than 400 people have been killed in bombings across India in the past three years. The attacks usually lead to waves of arrests but are rarely solved.
The first blast Saturday occurred just after 6 p.m. in a crowded market in northwestern Delhi. Two blasts were reported at a shopping arcade known as Greater Kailash in southern Delhi, where restaurants and bars were packed on a Saturday night. The last two blasts occurred in the central part of the city at Connaught Place, a popular tourist spot.
Another bomb failed to detonate near India Gate, a historic arch near the heart of the government complex.
The explosions in the Greater Kailash market shattered windows and blew glass across sidewalks. The bombs, which were apparently made of ball bearings, also blew out the windshields of several cars. Police and forensic experts were trying to work through crowds of curious by-standards.
"I was outside my shop sipping my tea, and suddenly I heard the blast somewhere near the car. And I dropped my cup," said Avinash Mishra, 21, a salesman at a Levi's store at Greater Kailash near one of the blasts. "Everyone was running here and there. People started rushing out of shops crying. Women were holding onto children. My heart beat went from 72 to 92."
The words "Run! Run!" echoed through "the entire market," Mishra said. Within moments, another bomb went off nearby. "The people didn't know where to run," Mishra said. "They thought bombs were going to explode from all four corners. God saved my life."
Television images of other bomb sites showed blood-drenched sidewalks and ambulances trying to push through the crowds.
Heavily trafficked areas are often the target of attacks in India.
On July 26, at least 56 people were killed when a series of blasts tore through the western city of Ahmedabad. The blasts occurred outside a diamond market, near a hospital, next to a railway station and in a bus, a day after at least seven small explosions killed two people in Bangalore, a technology hub.
India's Intelligence Bureau received an e-mail from the Indian Mujaheddin about the attacks in Ahmedabad. A similar message was received in May when the pink-walled city of Jaipur, in northwestern India, was rocked by a series of simultaneous blasts that killed more than 83 people and seriously wounded more than 200.
In 2005, 50 people were killed in New Delhi during the festive holiday weekend of Diwali.
The government has been criticized for failing to boost security in busy marketplaces. Many security cameras put in after the Diwali bombings do not work, according to recent newspaper reports.
"It's a posh market and a peaceful market," O.P. Shardam, a local official in Greater Kailash, said as he toured the market. "All this is to get people scared. The government is too soft on terrorists. They are not in control. People keep losing lives and shedding tears. And the government keeps issuing statements."
Wax reported from Calcutta.
Also See:
22 dead, scores injured in New Delhi bomb blasts - AFP
Terror challenge to be met head on: PM - The Hindu
Scores Injured, More Than a Dozen Killed in Multiple Explosions in India's Capital
By Rama Lakshmi and Emily Wax
Washington Post, September 13, 2008
NEW DELHI, Sept. 13 -- At least five bombings within 45 minutes struck busy shopping districts in India's capital Saturday, killing at least 18 people and injuring more than 60.
A little known group calling itself the Indian Mujaheddin asserted responsibility for the attacks, saying in e-mails sent to several news stations: "Stop us if you can. We strike with message of death. We are terrorizing for your sins."
"This is shameful, but they can't kill the spirit of Delhi's people," the city's mayor, Arti Mehra, told reporters as she visited one of the blast sites.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh also condemned the attacks and appealed for calm.
More than 400 people have been killed in bombings across India in the past three years. The attacks usually lead to waves of arrests but are rarely solved.
The first blast Saturday occurred just after 6 p.m. in a crowded market in northwestern Delhi. Two blasts were reported at a shopping arcade known as Greater Kailash in southern Delhi, where restaurants and bars were packed on a Saturday night. The last two blasts occurred in the central part of the city at Connaught Place, a popular tourist spot.
Another bomb failed to detonate near India Gate, a historic arch near the heart of the government complex.
The explosions in the Greater Kailash market shattered windows and blew glass across sidewalks. The bombs, which were apparently made of ball bearings, also blew out the windshields of several cars. Police and forensic experts were trying to work through crowds of curious by-standards.
"I was outside my shop sipping my tea, and suddenly I heard the blast somewhere near the car. And I dropped my cup," said Avinash Mishra, 21, a salesman at a Levi's store at Greater Kailash near one of the blasts. "Everyone was running here and there. People started rushing out of shops crying. Women were holding onto children. My heart beat went from 72 to 92."
The words "Run! Run!" echoed through "the entire market," Mishra said. Within moments, another bomb went off nearby. "The people didn't know where to run," Mishra said. "They thought bombs were going to explode from all four corners. God saved my life."
Television images of other bomb sites showed blood-drenched sidewalks and ambulances trying to push through the crowds.
Heavily trafficked areas are often the target of attacks in India.
On July 26, at least 56 people were killed when a series of blasts tore through the western city of Ahmedabad. The blasts occurred outside a diamond market, near a hospital, next to a railway station and in a bus, a day after at least seven small explosions killed two people in Bangalore, a technology hub.
India's Intelligence Bureau received an e-mail from the Indian Mujaheddin about the attacks in Ahmedabad. A similar message was received in May when the pink-walled city of Jaipur, in northwestern India, was rocked by a series of simultaneous blasts that killed more than 83 people and seriously wounded more than 200.
In 2005, 50 people were killed in New Delhi during the festive holiday weekend of Diwali.
The government has been criticized for failing to boost security in busy marketplaces. Many security cameras put in after the Diwali bombings do not work, according to recent newspaper reports.
"It's a posh market and a peaceful market," O.P. Shardam, a local official in Greater Kailash, said as he toured the market. "All this is to get people scared. The government is too soft on terrorists. They are not in control. People keep losing lives and shedding tears. And the government keeps issuing statements."
Wax reported from Calcutta.
Also See:
22 dead, scores injured in New Delhi bomb blasts - AFP
Terror challenge to be met head on: PM - The Hindu
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