Surprises In Pakistan

Editorial: Surprises In Pakistan
Chicago Tribune: August 27, 2007

For a long time, observing Pakistani politics has involved about as many surprises as looking at the landscape on a long drive across rural Illinois . There is corn and soybeans in Illinois , and there is President Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan , and not much else. Since he seized power in 1999, he has served as head of government and head of the army, locking down both of the country's centers of power and almost single-handedly deciding the country's direction. But lately, things have been getting more interesting.

First, a new power asserted itself -- the legal community. When Musharraf tried to sack the nation's chief justice, who he feared might block his efforts to remain in office, lawyers and other demonstrators poured into the streets to protest his abuse of power. The Supreme Court said the president had broken the law and ordered the reinstatement of the chief justice.

Musharraf, faced with mass protests, sliding popularity and extremist violence along the border with Afghanistan , considered declaring a state of emergency and postponing parliamentary elections. But he changed his mind after a call from Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who presumably advised against it.

Last week, the Supreme Court created an opening for the political opposition to further challenge Musharraf. It said the government may not bar the return from exile of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who is leader of one of the country's major parties and whom the general overthrew eight years ago.

This decision came amid speculation that the embattled Musharraf would allow the return of another opposition leader, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, as part of a power-sharing deal that would let him retain his office. It also comes just months before the parliamentary elections scheduled for year's end.

Sharif says he will run to regain his former office. Instead of joining forces with Musharraf, Bhutto may have the option of entering an alliance against him with Sharif.

Musharraf's 1999 coup was popular with Pakistanis, who hoped he would end corruption, revive the economy and restore civil rights that Sharif had suspended. No more. In the past year, his approval rating has plunged from 63 percent to 34 percent, and 64 percent of his people oppose giving him another term as president.

His experience is the latest repetition of a familiar cycle, in which military rulers and elected civilians take turns proving their inability to solve the deep problems that have long, long plagued the country.

Having witnessed Musharraf's failures, Pakistanis are eager for a return to democracy, and they may get it. This time, maybe it will even put down roots.

Why Do They Hate US?: Reza Aslan

Books
Why Do They Hate Us?
Strange answers lie in al-Qaida's writings.
By Reza Aslan
Slate.com: Aug. 6, 2007

Why do they hate us?

Americans have been asking this question for nearly six years now, and for six years President Bush and his accomplices have been offering the same tired response: "They hate us for our freedoms." With every passing year, that answer becomes less convincing.

Part of the problem has to do with the question itself. Who exactly are they? Are we referring to al-Qaida and its cohorts? Are we talking about Iran, Syria, and the other nation-states whose interests in the Middle East do not properly align with America's? Or perhaps we mean Hamas, Hezbollah, or the myriad religious nationalist organizations across the Muslim world that share neither the ideology nor the aspirations of global, transnational groups like al-Qaida, but that have nevertheless been dumped into the same category: them.

But what is most surprising about this question is how little interest anyone seems to have taken in examining the answers that are already on offer in multiple languages, through various media outlets, and on the Internet, from the very they who allegedly hate us so much. A spate of books has appeared over the last year, gathering the words of America's enemies. The first and best of these is Messages to the World, a collection of Osama Bin Laden's declarations translated by Duke University professor Bruce Lawrence, in which Bin Laden himself dismisses Bush's accusation that he hates America's freedoms. "Perhaps he can tell us why we did not attack Sweden, for example?"

Now comes a second, more complete collection, The Al Qaeda Reader, edited and translated by Raymond Ibrahim, a research librarian at the Library of Congress. Unlike Lawrence, Ibrahim includes writings from both Bin Laden and his right-hand man, Ayman Al-Zawahiri. And while both volumes provide readers with a startling series of religious and political tracts that, when taken together, chart the evolution of a disturbing (if intellectually murky) justification for religious violence, Ibrahim's collection is marred by his insistence that his book be viewed as al-Qaida's Mein Kampf.

The comparison between the scattered declarations of a cult leader literally dwelling in a cave and the political treatise of the commander in chief of one of the 20th century's most powerful nations may be imprecise, to say the least. But Ibrahim's point is that we can learn about al-Qaida's intentions by reading their words, that a book like this can help Americans better understand the nature of the anger directed toward them.

In the most general sense, this is certainly true. But whether a hodgepodge of interviews, declarations, and exegetical arguments can be read as a sort of jihadist manifesto is debatable. While these writings provide readers with page after page of, for example, arcane legal debates over the moral permissibility of suicide bombing, they do not really get to the heart of what it is that al-Qaida wants, if it wants anything at all. Al-Qaida's nominal aspirations—the creation of a worldwide caliphate, the destruction of Israel, the banishing of foreigners from Islamic lands—are hardly mentioned in the book. It seems the president of the United States talks more about al-Qaida's goals than al-Qaida itself does. Rarely, if ever, do Bin Laden and Zawahiri discuss any specific social or political policy.

What al-Qaida does lay out, however, are grievances—many, many grievances. There is the usual litany of complaints about the suffering of Palestinians, the tyranny of Arab regimes, and the American occupation of Iraq. But again, legitimate as these complaints may be, there is in these writings an almost total lack of interest in providing any specific solution or policy to address them. Indeed, al-Qaida's many grievances against the West are so heterogeneous, so mind-bogglingly unfocused, that they must be recognized less as grievances per se, than as popular causes to rally around. There are protests about the United Nations' rejection of Zimbabwe's elections, the Bush administration's unwillingness to sign up to the International Criminal Court, and America's role in global warming. (To quote Bin Laden: "You have destroyed nature with your industrial waste and gases, more than any other country. Despite this, you refuse to sign the Kyoto agreement so that you can secure the profit of your greedy companies and industries.") Zawahiri's many complaints include the mistreatment of prisoners at Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, which he calls "a historical embarrassment to America and its values," as well as the United Kingdom's anti-terrorism laws, which "contradict the most basic principles of fair trial." There is even a screed against America's campaign-finance laws, which, according to Bin Laden, currently favor "the rich and wealthy, who hold sway in their political parties, and fund their election campaigns with their gifts."

Most Americans would agree with many of these complaints. And that's precisely the point. These are not real grievances for al-Qaida (it does not bear mentioning that Bin Laden is probably not very concerned with campaign finance reform). They are a means of weaving local and global resentments into a single anti-American narrative, the overarching aim of which is to form a collective identity across borders and nationalities, and to convince the world that it is locked in a cosmic contest between the forces of Truth and Falsehood, Belief and Unbelief, Good and Evil, Us and Them.

In this regard, al-Qaida has been spectacularly successful, thanks in no small part to the assistance of the divisive "Clash of Civilizations" mentality of our own politicians. In fact, far from debunking al-Qaida's twisted vision of a world divided in two, the Bush administration has legitimized it through its own morally reductive "us vs. them" rhetoric.

In the end, this is the most important lesson to be learned from these writings. Because, if we are truly locked in an ideological war, as the president keeps reminding us, then our greatest weapons are our words. And thus far, instead of fighting this war on our terms, we have been fighting it on al-Qaida's.

Don't believe me? Ask Bin Laden:

Bush left no room for doubts or media opinion. He stated clearly that this war is a Crusader war. He said this in front of the whole world so as to emphasize this fact. … When Bush says that, they try to cover up for him, then he said he didn't mean it. He said, 'crusade.' Bush divided the world into two: 'either with us or with terrorism' … The odd thing about this is that he has taken the words right out of our mouths.

Odd, indeed.

Reza Aslan is the author of No god but God: The Origins, Evolution, and Future of Islam.

To the barracks they must go - Ayesha Siddiqa

VIEW: To the barracks they must go —Dr Ayesha Siddiqa
Daily Times, August 27, 2007

Given how the situation is unfolding politically, there is a sense that General Pervez Musharraf will either have to leave the scene or at least be forced to give up his uniform.

A third player has entered Pakistan’s politics: the Supreme Court. The Court does not appear to be in control of the GHQ or the politicians, and is taking decisions that will have a long-lasting impact on the country’s politics. While it is too early to say when and how Musharraf will remove his uniform, people hope that the honourable judges will not allow him to contest elections in uniform.

If the Court does prevent Musharraf from contesting elections while being the army chief, its decision will further curtail Musharraf’s powers. He will also be seriously challenged once the two political leaders in exile return to Pakistan. Most people are confident that Nawaz Sharif’s early return will increase the pressure of public opinion on Musharraf.

Pushed into a corner, Musharraf could either gracefully accept the new dynamics or fight his last battle with coercive methods. The problem with the latter approach is that Pakistanis are, by and large, prepared to stand up to the state. Musharraf’s best bet, therefore, would be to seek re-election after removing his uniform. That would also mean the end and disintegration of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League — Quaid (PML-Q); and unless some political parties guarantee their support for Musharraf’s re-election bid, he could be set aside. So far, only Benazir Bhutto has emphasised the importance of retaining the general-president.

But is Musharraf’s fate an important issue? No. He is at the tail-end of his political career and one does not look at him as a seasoned and mature old man with the acumen to survive in politics. Some politician or the other will push him out eventually. Musharraf’s departure is, however, indirectly connected to another issue i.e. how to deal with the military.

This is important, not least because one general’s departure would not make any difference to the larger issue of containing the armed forces. The military will still remain consequential to the country’s politics. The organisation is so deeply entrenched in state and society that curbing its power is quite another matter.

There are some who argue that with the ongoing war on terror, it would be difficult to push the military back into the barracks. Or to put it simply, the military will continue to have a role in governance and will remain a powerful actor in politics. The internal security situation in the country is such that the military would be asked to participate. This does not bode well for institutional balance in the country. But then the question is, are political players ready to push the military back?

No. Given the authoritarian tendencies of the political parties, they would continue to interact with the GHQ and accord it significant space in power politics. There is no evidence to suggest the political parties have the sense to put their own houses in order, the only way they can strengthen themselves institutionally. After all, strengthening democracy means that political parties significantly improve themselves and proportionate to that reduce their inherent dependency on the military.

What we certainly lack is the capacity to create neutral civilian umpires who can negotiate between opposing political faction or parties. The political leadership continues to look at the GHQ as an arbiter which, in turn, means the army remains significant.

Reducing the military’s power becomes even more difficult in a situation where the ruling elite are also dependent on external sources of capital for their own and the nation’s survival. For the country’s foreign patrons, the most important institution remains the military. Only the military can deliver according to the prescribed geo-strategic objectives of the US.

Certain key segments in Pakistan’s society feel threatened by the rise in religious extremism and conservatism which they believe can only be fought with a credible and secular political-military partnership. Pakistani society is completely divided on the issue of religion and related extremism. This is a kind of division that can only strengthen the authoritarian tendencies of the state and society. It is believed that a secular military is essential in securing a secular or moderate state, as was the case in Turkey.

The only problem with such an approach is that this is not a secular military, but essentially a post-colonial institution which changes colour based on the worldview of its leadership. It can move from one extreme to the other depending on what benefits accrue to it. For instance, General Zia-ul Haq would have cracked down on religious fundamentalists as severely as General Musharraf had 9/11 taken place in 1981 instead of 2001.

Referring to the issue of pushing the military back, we in Pakistan continue to lack clarity on: (a) should the military be pushed back and (b) how to make it vacate significant political space. It is true that the military has an important role in fighting terrorism. But this is a role which it can perform without dominating political life.

Militaries all over the world assist civilian authorities in natural disasters or other civilian emergencies. Political stakeholders have to conceptualise institutional mechanisms through which they could fight terrorism. This would mean retaining the military for extreme situations rather than involving it at every step. Internal use of the military is an extremely coercive tool: best avoided for the benefit of society as well as the military itself.

More importantly, the military does not have to undertake other functions that make it extremely visible. For example, according to a recent report in this newspaper, nine out of twelve electricity companies in the country are being managed by serving and retired military personnel. There are other stories as well. This visibility has to be reduced for the betterment of the institution, and the state and society in general.

No politician has thought of ways to negotiate political and social spaces with the military. The continued presence of armed forces personnel in public spaces reduces civilian capacity to perform, and increases the military’s political strength. Perhaps, increasing transparency and accountability of the armed forces is the first step towards a long-term accommodation between the civilian and military enclaves.

Pakistan’s military need not completely follow the Turkish model. It does not have the kind of history and social relations with its people which would make it a more acceptable instrument of governance. A better option is a phased withdrawal. The issue for civil society is how to make that withdrawal possible.

The writer is an Islamabad-based independent defence analyst and author of the book, Military Inc, Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy

Talibanisation goes on unchecked in Swat Dristrict

Second Editorial: Talibanisation goes on unchecked
Daily Times, August 27, 2007

The video shops of Swat have been closed down by the administration after receipt of threatening letters from unidentified terrorists. The police are wondering who sent them. We can help. It is Fazlullah of the TNSM, the rider on the white stallion whom the police can’t arrest. And who is behind Fazlullah? We can help again. Baitullah Mehsud of South Waziristan who sent the two suicide bombers that targeted Islamabad during the Lal Masjid crisis. And who is behind Baitullah Mehsud? It is Al Qaeda, because it functions as the ruler of South Waziristan on behalf of Osama bin Laden.

But Al Qaeda is not the only Talibanising entity. In Azad Kashmir, NGOs have frequently been driven out by a jihadi militia which the government has allowed to work there. The territory is being claimed. The government should not complain if it loses the territory later on just because it let the people pass under a marauder’s rule in the name of Islam. In this case no locally made cruise missile, costing millions of dollars, will be able to help. *

Changing Horses in Mid-stream: Potential impact in the Muslim World?

GOP lobbying firm undermines al-Maliki
Washington Times: Aug. 24, 2007

WASHINGTON, Aug. 24 (UPI) -- A U.S. lobbying firm with close ties to the White House is campaigning to undermine Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's government, CNN reported Friday.

A senior Bush administration official confirmed the White House is aware that Barbour Griffith & Rogers is "blasting e-mails all over town," criticizing al-Maliki and promoting its client, former interim Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, as his replacement.

But the official insisted White House officials are not endorsing or involved in the campaign to remove al-Maliki.

"There's just no connection whatsoever," the official told CNN. "There's absolutely no involvement."

The report comes as President Bush has publicly declared his continued support for the embattled Iraqi leader.

When asked whether the White House will request that the prominent Republican lobbying firm stop working against al-Maliki, the official said, "I don't rule it out."

So, why would allies of the White House contradict the president publicly in this matter?

"They're making a lot of money," the official replied.

Also See: Angry Iraqi Leader Lashes Out at Clinton - Forbes

Iraq PM hits out at critics - Aljazeerah

Musharraf Willing to Doff Uniform?

Musharraf Willing to Doff Uniform
Afzal khan/ Islamabad

Islamabad Aug 26: President Gen. Pervez Musharraf's trouble shooters have gone to London with a package that envisages doffing the uniform even prior to presidential election, The Nation has learned on good authority.

The presidential emissaries are believed to have begun direct and indirect negotiations with both exiled premiers, Ms. Benazir Bhutto and Mian Nawaz Sharif. Inside Pakistan the main interlocutor is Leader of the Opposition Maulana Fazlur Rehman.

The package was firmed up in a top level meeting in Camp Office last Tuesday which was attended by the Chaudhry cousins, a couple of senior ministers. Hamid Nasir Chatha, top aides and security chiefs. The Prime Minister was conspicuous by his absence.

The central issue being discussed in these contacts revolves around the new formulation evolved in the Presidency to forge a national reconciliation involving mainstream parties. Its salient features include Musharraf's willingness to quit the army post provided he is accepted as president for next five years even while with truncated powers.

The President would not insist on getting elected from present assemblies given the commitment that the new assemblies would vote for him. The power to dissolve the assembly under Article 52-B would be withdrawn.

There would be general amnesty for all political leaders. The ban on two- time prime ministers would be removed. In return, the constitutional hurdles in Musharraf's candidature would also be removed.

The two exiled prime ministers have convened meetings of the Central Executive Committees of their respective parties, the PPP on August 28 and PML-N next day. The immediate focus is on the PPP against the backdrop of Ms. Bhutto's insistence on performance of the terms of the deal clinched on January 24 in the first meeting in Abu Dhabi and fine- tuned later on July 27 in the aftermath of the post- March 9 events that have eroded Musharraf's hold on power.

Ms. Bhutto is getting restive because of quiet outrage surging within the rank and file of the party over the deal and its resultant impact of PPP's total isolation. She has given a virtual ultimatum to Musharraf to hasten the promised implementation of terms of the deal. The Supreme Court verdict on Nawaz Sharif's petition and his determination to return to the country have added urgency to Ms. Bhutto's concerns because of the huge political space she has conceded to Nawaz by aligning with Musharraf.

The President's emissaries are trying to dissuade Ms. Bhutto from taking any desperate step that may further complicate the situation. To Nawaz Sharif the message being conveyed is designed to delay his return till an arrangement satisfactory to both sides is evolved. The Sharifs, however, are in a more belligerent mood. Unlike Ms. Bhutto who is prepared to work with Musharraf, Nawaz is seeking a pledge by the General that he would not contest next election.

The Chaudhry cousins prefer aligning with Fazl's JUI. The carrot being offered to him is repeal of the graduation qualification and possibility of creation of the post of deputy prime minister.

Reliable sources said the President had asked the participants in the meeting on Tuesday to undertake initiatives that, in their wisdom, may resolve the current crisis that is deepening by each passing day. He agreed with a consensus opinion in the meeting that the move to woo Ms. Bhutto has created more problems and antagonized friends and foes alike. Besides it has discredited her to an extent that she cannot sell the deal to her party nor provide much relief to Musharraf. .

The President has also been confronted with deepening dissension within the coalition. During discussion on the national reconciliation, the Chaudhry cousins reportedly argued that a national reconciliation could be evolved only by a non-controversial figure who should replace Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz. The President asked them to convince Aziz which they tried in a meeting with Aziz next day.

The Prime Minister declined to resign and sought an urgent meeting with the President who backed off shifting the onus of making the suggestion on Chaudhry cousins. Aziz later flew to Lahore where he declared that he is a candidate to continue in his office after the elections as well. Shujaat responded immediately that no decision has been taken to that effect. Knowledgeable sources say Mr. Jamali's statement on these events is very close to the truth.

A major snag in the President's package is that while it envisages somewhat honourable way out to him in addition to five more years in office, his institution would return to barracks badly battered in the eyes of the public. In the meeting on Tuesday Musharraf even hinted at other options if the efforts for national consensus did not materialize. The obvious hint was imposition of martial law.

But analysts say the army would not like to stage a retreat to barracks fully discredited and dishonoured in the eyes of the people. Instead it would like to do something creditable that could restore its respect. The best possible option would be to hold free and fair elections, transfer power to the elected representatives sans Musharraf and return to barracks amid popular acclaim.

"If Musharraf imposes martial law, he would be its first casualty", said an insider. The next strongman would oversee democratic revival, facilitate appointment of a new army chief and himself retire honourably after salvaging the honour of his institution, he said.

Choices for Sharifs

Editorial: Significance of SC judgement in Nawaz Sharif case
Daily Times, August 24, 2007

The Supreme Court has decided that Nawaz Sharif and Shahbaz Sharif are free to return to Pakistan without let or hindrance. The judgement clearly did not give credibility to the “agreement” presented by the government in which the Sharifs undertook to stay away from Pakistan for ten years and not take part in politics. Mr Sharif says there was no agreement with the government of Pakistan but admits there was an “understanding” with the Saudi Arabian government. However, Mr Sharif refuses to disclose the details of the prosecution of this understanding between his family and Saudi Arabia “because not everything is to be disclosed in the national interest”. The text of the “Harmless Agreement” binds him to secrecy, a condition apparently also accepted by the Musharraf government. Since no other party is mentioned, President Musharraf can be said to be as much bound “under presumption” by its content as Saudi Arabia.


Mr Sharif challenged the government to show evidence after the series of events unfolding in Pakistan since March this year. The government did not apparently anticipate it or it would have acquired the original text of the “Harmless Agreement” from Saudi Arabia much earlier. In any case, this will go down as one of the many oversights of which the government has been guilty in recent times. The attorney general was stopped by the government from explaining the identity of the “gentleman” mentioned in the agreement who arranged the “agreement” that let the Sharif family leave Pakistan in 2000; but President Musharraf in his book In the Line of Fire has clearly stated that it was arranged by Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud (now King). Was the agreement signed for the “state” of Saudi Arabia? This point is hard to decipher because of the nature of the Saudi state itself.

The news from the Gulf is that the real document containing the “agreement” was lying with the late prime minister of Lebanon, Mr Rafik Hariri, who was said to be a business partner of the Sharif family together with some members of the Saudi family. The report also says that the Saudi government “lost interest” in the prosecution of the “agreement” after the death of King Fahd. This forces us to presume that the approach of Crown Prince Abdullah to President Musharraf for the release of the Sharif family was made on behalf of the then King. That the signed document was allegedly kept in Lebanon with the Hariri family strongly suggests that the release of the Sharif family was arranged by his friends abroad in their personal capacity. The fact that no other contracting party is mentioned in the agreement and only a “gentleman” is mentioned in the text seems to confirm it as such.

Now the honourable SC has decided that the “Harmless Agreement” is not binding on Mr Nawaz Sharif. So the matter of the pardon granted by the state of Pakistan to Mr Nawaz Sharif in 2000 in pursuance of a “harmless agreement” is bound to become the focus of attention since the government has revived the cases it had set aside after the pardon “because Mr Sharif violated the agreement”.

More significantly, Mr Sharif will have to decide quickly whether he will return to Pakistan immediately or drag his feet on one excuse or the other. The SC judgement has catapulted him into the limelight as the sole challenger to the unpopular General Musharraf. But all this depends on whether or not Mr Sharif is courageous enough to catch the next flight and brave General Musharraf’s repression in Pakistan. If he does, he will surely be arrested. But given the mood of the Supreme Court he should expect to be bailed out soon enough. That will make him seem even more invincible than he appears in the wake of the SC judgement. Will he take this calculated risk? But if he stays back, he will lose the initiative and Pakistanis will say he is a coward after all and is simply playing politics. Indeed, if he stays back while General Musharraf is able to retain power and hold the next elections, Mr Sharif will be marginalised from politics for a long time. Equally, if he returns to Pakistan but his strategy to become a conquering hero is overtaken by martial law, then he should expect to remain behind bars for as long as General Musharraf is around.

This judgement obviously goes against General Musharraf. But it is up to Nawaz Sharif to determine for himself whether it will go in his favour or against him. *

Washington Post's Conversation with Benazir Bhutto - Insights into Benazir's Thinking

A CONVERSATION WITH BENAZIR BHUTTO
Sunday, August 26, 2007; Page B03: Washington Post

Gen. Pervez Musharraf may sense that his days as president of Pakistan could be numbered. So he has been talking to his former archrival, Benazir Bhutto, about a possible power-sharing arrangement. Bhutto, who was twice prime minister of Pakistan and is currently leader of the popular opposition party PPP, is on the verge of deciding whether to strike a deal with Musharraf or join the opposition against him. She sat down with Newsweek-Washington Post's Lally Weymouth in New York last week to talk about her options. Excerpts:

Q. Some say that if you make a deal with President Musharraf to return to power, it will diminish your popularity.

A. Many in my party have been urging me to distance myself from General Musharraf. They say his popularity ratings are down. But I am trying to convince them that the international community and the armed forces have confidence in Musharraf, and therefore we need to work out a solution [with him]. Our goal is to strengthen the forces of moderation and that's why we've been involved in this negotiation with General Musharraf.

Now we are at a critical point where I am being tugged in two directions -- between those in the party who believe in dialogue and those who think that time is running out and that we can't spend more time [talking] unless there are upfront confidence-building measures.

What have you asked President Musharraf to do?

We want a balance of power, reforms for a fair election, lifting of the ban on a twice-elected prime minister [running for a third term], as well as immunity for all holders of public office prior to 1999 or 2000. Where there are unproven charges that go back now for more than a decade or two, a chapter should be closed. General Musharraf has told me he wants this.

Did you tell Musharraf that he would have to step down as army chief of staff if you entered into partnership with him?

I told him that we could not have a working arrangement with the army chief of staff. His term finishes either this November or December, so we are concerned that there should not be an extension on that.

What did he say?

He has said that he would respect the constitution. Even if the president is not the army chief of staff, he would still appoint the heads of the military, so he would still control the military as the commander in chief.

What are the other issues that stand between you and him?

One issue is the power of the president to sack the parliament. This power was used in the '90s to destabilize democracy, so we are saying it must go.

The presidents kept dismissing governments?

Yes, we believe this was actually done at the request of the security services. The political parties were discredited and the militants grew in strength. . . . But we feel that having 10 governments in 10 years leads to a collapse in governance. The extremists benefit from the chaos.

Is that what stands between you, Musharraf and a deal?

That's one issue, but what stands between us right now is confidence-building steps which were promised and which we want done by the end of the month.

Such as?

Lifting the ban on a twice-elected prime minister. . . . He said yes to that in July. And also immunity to holders of public office from 1988 to 2000. He said yes to that in January of this year.

So Musharraf hasn't lifted the ban on your serving a third term?

I expected him to do the lifting of the ban on the twice-elected prime minister and the immunity for public officers by the end of August. Because he plans to get elected 15 days later in September. So my party needs to see these steps if we are expected to take a certain course of action during the elections.

In other words, if you are expected to support him?

He doesn't want our support, but he doesn't want us going out on the streets and agitating against him. . . . My party says that we have to oppose the presidential election because it is illegal. I have said that if he takes confidence-building measures, then we don't have to vote for him but we don't have to create a ruckus in the streets.

What are the Americans saying?

Their message is, 'We want the stability of Pakistan, fair elections, and General Musharraf is our ally.'

Can Musharraf get elected without your party?

Yes. He told me, 'I don't want your vote.' I advised him that it was better not to seek election from this assembly but to seek election from the next assembly because he would have greater legitimacy without a uniform, elected by a democratic verdict. But he has a different perspective. He thinks it is legal to be elected by this assembly. So we have left it to the courts to decide.

The courts might rule against him?

I think the courts will rule it is illegal.

Then what?

If he does not want us to resign now and join an opposition movement, he needs to take measures.

What do you say to critics who say you cannot control the army?

I say that I controlled the army better than any of the others. When I was prime minister, the tribal areas were part of Pakistan. Now their control has been ceded to the militants and pro-Taliban forces. I did not allow a situation to develop with India that could lead to a war like the one that took place under [former prime minister] Nawaz Sharif. I could not stop the intelligence from destabilizing my government, because I didn't have the presidential power to appoint the service chiefs.

When I was prime minister, I worked closely with the military to get an agreement on no export of nuclear technology. It was subsequently violated -- we don't know whether it was an individual act or because of one of the governments that came and went. I could not stop them from some actions of which I did not approve and for which they got clandestine presidential approval.

If your deal materializes, Musharraf will control the army?

Yes, and I don't want the security services to disagree with my attack on internal militancy and get him to sack the parliament once again. I'd be setting myself up to repeat the past. Which is why president must give up the power [to dissolve the parliament]. In a perfect situation, the prime minister should have power over the armed services. But in this transition period, if Musharraf is still commander in chief of the armed forces, he will still appoint the army chiefs.

Have you heard from him lately?

Yes. He's getting back to me by the end of the month. He has to decide. The people who are stopping him are Chaudhry Shujaat [president of the Pakistan Muslim League Q, Pakistan's ruling party]. He is telling Musharraf to go with the enemy -- the religious parties [known as the MMA] -- and we can get you reelected and we don't need the PPP.

I think Chaudhry Shujaat is setting Musharraf up for failure. He's saying, 'Seek election and I will be your cover candidate.' A lot of the people involved in the Afghan jihad are with him. If Musharraf is knocked out by the courts, guess who will be the president? Chaudhry Shujaat. It's under his party that the extremists have spread in power. Musharraf thinks he needs these people but they are planning to depose him. He trusts them because he's been working with them. To us, it's a fight between moderation and extremism.

Do you think Musharraf is a moderate?

He says he is a moderate, but if so, he has to strengthen the moderate forces.

Can you make an alliance with Nawaz Sharif [head of the Pakistan Muslim League N, or Nawaz group]?

If our negotiations with Musharraf fall apart, we can always turn to the other political party. [But] Nawaz Sharif and I had a falling out over the MMA. I think they are the supporters of extremist groups. Nawaz wanted an alliance with them and I did not. As long as he is with them and they are in government, we will go as a third force.

The military tries to say that the alternative [to Musharraf] is the religious parties, which is not the right argument. The third force is the democratic force. Since 2002, the military and the religious parties and Shujaat have been in power. This alliance has ceded territory to the pro-Taliban forces in the tribal areas and ceded ground in our cities to the militants. . . . And they neglected the people: Unemployment has risen. Musharraf has to decide whether to go with the moderate forces and to accept the people's democratic choice.

Unless the United States pressures him, will he go that way?

He says he has an interest, but Chaudhry and those who supported the rise of militancy don't have an interest and are trying to sabotage the understanding.

So will you return to Pakistan?

I'm planning to go back between September and December. I need to be there to strengthen my party and the moderate forces.

Are you worried you will be arrested?

As things stand, it will be difficult to arrest me. There is a risk, but I am prepared to take it.

Didn't Musharraf make a big mistake when he fired the chief justice?

Yes, it was a very big mistake.

Who was behind it?

I think he received wrong information that the action was legal and would be upheld by the courts. People who wanted to weaken him did that.

The fact that Musharraf has extended his term as army chief so many times has not gone down well with the armed forces. There's public discontent over the involvement of the army in the running of the state.

How did you keep going all these years in exile?

The people of my country supported me and the Pakistani community encouraged me. So did my husband and my children. My husband was in prison for eight years and he never once told me he could not take it anymore. My children never told me not to travel

The State of Pakistan’s Children 2006

EXCERPT: An elusive goal
By Irfan Raza

The State of Pakistan’s Children 2006
SPARC (Society for the Protection of the Rights of the Child)
Edited by Fazila Gulrez

Education is the key to development. It opens the mind to the world that exists both inside the human being and outside. It helps people to dream and the ability to realise those dreams. It provides every individual a chance to live his/her life to the fullest. It gives a society the values of tolerance, honesty, integrity and brotherhood. It gives a nation an opportunity to become a power to reckon with. The Quaid’s words clearly state the obvious that ‘without education a nation will not only be left behind but wiped out altogether’.

Owing to the deteriorating standards of education in Pakistan, it has been labelled as ‘home to world’s most illiterates’ in Global Monitoring Report for Education 2007. Education in Pakistan suffers from the worst forms of negligence, indifference and apathy. It serves the government to keep huge chunks of its population illiterate so that strong voices are not raised to challenge its weak governance. Illiteracy of the masses is a useful tool for the weak and corrupt governments to remain in power. According to the figures by UNESCO, almost 50 million of adult population in Pakistan is illiterate, while the drop out rate in primary schools is the highest in the world… again 50 per cent.

The greatest challenge facing Pakistan today is creating an environment where every child goes to school. First Education Census 2006, though a flawed exercise also gives an extremely depressing view of the state of education in Pakistan. The system of education has divided the children in Pakistan between the haves and the have-nots. To bridge the gap, not only is it important to provide education to every child but also it should be free, uniform and quality education that opens up equal opportunities for progress and prosperity for everyone. There is no doubt that only education can liberate children from poverty and deprivation and Pakistan from fundamentalism, intolerance, corruption and terrorism and herald an era of progress, enlightened moderation and justice.

‘Pakistan’s education system is regularly cited as one of the most serious impediments preventing the country from achieving its potential. This United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Report gives Pakistan the lowest education index score for any country outside Africa. According to the International Crisis Group, Pakistan is one of only 12 countries in the world that spends less than 2 per cent of its GDP on education. The adult literacy rate in Pakistan is under 50 per cent, while less than one-third of adult women have a functional reading ability. Even a short list of the problems Pakistan’s education system faces today would include inadequate government investment, a shortage of qualified teachers and poor teacher training, curricula that promotes intolerance and violence, insufficient number and poor quality of textbooks and other teaching materials, fraud and corruption, and weak institutional capacity at both the central and local levels.’

The population of Pakistan makes it the sixth most populous nation and almost half of its total population of over 160 million comprises children less than 18 years of age and women make up almost 50 per cent. An estimated 25 million children are not going to school and approximately 10 million are in child labour. About 20 per cent children go to private English medium schools, whereas the huge chunk almost, three quarters of the remaining child population study in public schools. Consequently the rest of the children, who are not attending either the private or the public schools are in the madrassah. There is no data quoting the exact number of children attending the madaris. But it is no doubt a substantial number.

In addition, Pakistan also suffers from the malady of serious gender imbalance, which is getting worse with the continued burning and arsonist activities being carried out in some of the areas of North West Frontier Province (NWFP). A number of girls’ schools have been bombed, closed down or threatened with dire consequences. In some schools, girls are being forced to wear burqas if they want to continue schooling. The situation has gotten even worse, since the Taliban style extremists threatened the private co-ed schools to either close down or face the consequences.

Shahid Javed Burki, a well known writer and economist, estimates that in Balochistan, only 15 per cent of adult women are literate. Using data from the ministry of education, he notes that while more than 83 per cent of primary school-age boys attend school, the enrolment rate for girls is less than 63 per cent clearly identifying the obvious gender gap. The issue raised by these disparities is not one just of fairness; study after study has shown that gender discrimination retards development and exacts a large toll on both present and future generations.’

The ills that plague education in Pakistan are numerous beginning from the basic flaw of different types of education for children from different economic strata. In addition to a number of problems cited above, education in Pakistan suffers from poor infrastructure i.e. lack of facilities in schools such as clean drinking water, furniture, dilapidated schools, shortage of educational staff and teachers, outdated traditional teaching methods and assessment system, teacher absenteeism and irregularity, no or ineffective teacher trainings, teacher’s low salary package and harsh behaviour, and low level of parent and community involvement and participation in education system. All this act as push factors and drive the children away from the school.

Meanwhile, successive governments continue to pay tokenistic attention to the improvement of education in Pakistan under international pressure. In 1990, Pakistan participated in the Education For All (EFA) Conference in Jomtien, Thailand and committed to the goal of Universal Primary Education (UPE) by the year 2000. The target was not achieved as is obvious in the ten years period. In the EFA Conference, held in Dakar in 2000, Pakistan moved the target and committed to achieve the UPE goals by 2015. Pakistan is lagging behind in achieving all its targets committed in the international conferences, be it Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), or Universal Primary Education (UPE) or Education for All (EFA). This is, despite the fact that a large amount of American and World Bank aid has been flowing in to improve educational and literacy numbers. What is the current situation, as we enter 2007? Pakistan has already consumed 50 per cent of the allocated time as well as funds to achieve 100 per cent UPE by the year 2015. The current education scenario does not appear very promising either, this report will discuss and shed light on the situation as it existed in 2006 and the steps and measures taken by the state to achieve the pledges made in international conferences and more importantly for the well being of children in Pakistan.

Gender disparity in education is a major concern, which has been pointed out in all international donor reports as well underscored by the civil society and human rights activists nationally. Girls lags far behind the boys where fulfilment of their right to education is concerned. Even the government accepts that gender disparity in literacy and enrolment is one of the key concerns. Unfortunately, Pakistan’s overall record in promoting and delivering gender equality has been weak.

The factors that keep girls out of schools are more cultural than religious. Islam does not preach illiteracy or unequal treatment in any aspect of life, for girls. It is the male dominated and patriarchal bent of mind that has lead to the belief that girls should not go to school and educate themselves. This is more a clash of power and control. It is a common belief that if a girl is educated she will write letters to her boyfriend.

The situation has worsened in the NWFP with the fundamentalists taking control and extending their own brand of Islam. There has been string of incidents in the Northern Areas of girls’ schools being vandalised, attacked or closed down under threat of dire consequences. Girl students and teachers have been threatened with acid attacks if orders are disobeyed. In early 2007, leading private schools were targeted not only in the NWFP but even in the capital Islamabad, to either discontinue co-education or face the consequences. The situation is frustrating, especially taking into account that millions of dollars are being spent in food for education program, free education etc. to attract parents to send their girls to schools. If such a situation is allowed to gain ground in Pakistan, it will result in a gaping difference between the number of boys and girls accessing education and also have far reaching impact on literacy rate, and Pakistan’s ability to achieve its MDGs and EFA goals despite pledging internationally to give its children their right to education.

In addition to this very serious problem impeding girls’ education, parents in rural areas are reluctant to send their daughters to schools located far away from their homes for safety reasons and therefore the drop out is quite high in rural areas. Besides, parents also avoid sending their daughters to schools after they reach puberty because they fear for their safety. Another hurdle to increasing gender disparity is lack of facilities in school, especially non-existence of latrines, especially for girls.

In the year 2000, data compiled by UNICEF, UNESCO and the World Bank indicated that only around 40 per cent of Pakistani girls are enrolled in schools for elementary education. The situation is much the same even in 2006 as it has been mentioned above. This is by far the lowest amongst all South Asian nations, with India maintaining a rate of around 76 per cent, Sri Lanka 100 per cent, Maldives 100 per cent Nepal 46 per cent and Bhutan 47 per cent respectively according to data from the same independent sources.

‘If you want to make a plan for one year, cultivate rice. If you want to make a plan for ten years, plant a tree and if you want to make a plan for hundred years, establish a school’, so said Aristotle. Education has emerged as a force and the vehicle for socio-economic development of a country. Investment in education contributes towards the accumulation of human capital resulting into shift to knowledge-based economy.

Education is instrumental in poverty reduction by increasing the productivity of the poor, efficiency of labor, reducing fertility and improving health. This enables people to participate fully in the economic and social development of the country. It also enhances the capacity of nation’s institutions resulting in good governance for planning and implementing national policies.

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Pakistan: world’s most illiterate

Pakistan is at serious risk of not attaining the goal of adult literacy by 2015, warns Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2007. The theme of this year’s report is Literacy for Life. Pakistan having over five million illiterates is one of the countries where global illiteracy is concentrated.

According to the report, the Gender Parity Index (GPI) of Pakistan is one of the world’s lowest GPI (0.73); India and Nepal have made much progress since 1998 and nearly reached gender parity in 2002 (India’s GPI increased from 0.84 to 0.96 and Nepal’s from 0.78 to 0.92); Bangladesh, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Maldives and Sri Lanka had already reached parity by 1998.

The UNESCO data shows that the number of illiterates is increasing in Pakistan. According to the census reports 18.64 million people were illiterate in 1951. In 1961, the number increased to 22.08 million, in 1972 it was 33.59 million, in 1981 it was 42.69 and in 1998 it increased to 50.38 million.

Likewise, the percentage of GDP spending on education continued to decline. It was 2.62 percent in 1996-97, 2.34 percent in 1997-98, 2.40 percent in 1998-99. 1.7 percent in 1999-00, 1.6 percent in 2000-01, 1.9 percent in 2001-02, 1.7 percent in 2002-03. 2.1 percent in 2003-04, 2.2 percent in 2004-05 and 2.1 percent in 2005-06; the UNESCO figures said quoting the census of Pakistan.

Pakistan is one of those countries where distance to school is a greater deterrent to schooling for girls than for boys. Economic crises affect education systems. Pakistan along with India and Bangladesh also has the notoriety of being one of the 19 countries that have more than one million out-of-primary schoolchildren.

The report said that literacy was a right denied to over 50 million people in Pakistan and had been neglected in the policy agenda of the country. The report proposed a three-pronged strategy to enhance literacy that included universal quality basic education for girls and boys, scaling up youth and adult literacy programs and development of environments conducive to the meaningful use of literacy.

Source: SPARC Newsletter issue No 48, September 2006

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Why children do not go to school

• Parents indifference: it is a common practice that parents do not accord adequate importance to education and take little or no interest in visiting schools to learn how the child is doing, ensuring that homework is done, or even going to school regularly.

• Poor economic status of parents: poverty, adult unemployment, big family is among the major factors that keep children out of school.

• Location of schools: in many areas (both urban and rural) of Pakistan schools are located very far from homes and particularly girls are not allowed to attend.

• Boring education: unfortunately for children the syllabus as well as the teaching techniques used in public schools is obsolete and rote-oriented. It does not encourage children to ask questions and give opinions and views. In addition, extra-curricular activities are non-existent.

• Poor quality teaching staff: Incompetent and unqualified teachers, low pay scales, poor working environment, over populated classrooms, corporal punishment push children out of school.

• Working in fields, houses for money: In rural areas it is quite common for parents to make their children work in the fields or in the homes, instead of sending them to schools. Children pick cotton, potatoes, tomatoes, and other seasonal vegetables. In urban areas a large number of little girls accompany the mothers who work in the homes as domestic help. The child does not go to school, but at a young age is ready to work as domestic help.

Central Asia’s Seaport: Gwadar (Pakistan) or Chabahar (Iran)?

Picture: Gwadar

Central Asia’s Seaport: Gwadar or Chabahar?
PakRealEstate.com: August 24, 2007

Both Iran and Pakistan have developed strategies to create strong economic and transport ties with Central Asia and beyond. Anchoring these strategies are two new seaports: Gwadar in Pakistan and Chabahar in Iran. Spreading out from these ports are existing or planned transportation infrastructure that leads into their respective country’s economic center and importantly for Central Asia, northwards. Both ports are well towards becoming fully operable and are offering generous incentives for companies and governments to do business in their ports. However, serious political, economic and logistical problems remain. For Central Asia one of these two ports, or indeed both, will likely become important links to world markets.

The problems with Karachi and Bandar Abbas

Karachi is already overburdened with severe congestion from commercial, fishing and military shipping. And from a strategic vantage point it is quite problematic. The Indian Navy targeted the port in 1971 and any blockade in the future would devastate Pakistan since that country has an overreliance on the port of Karachi. The port of Qasim, built in the 1970s was to relive some of that burden and the port of Gwadar is expected to further reduce the reliance on Karachi.

Bandar Abbas is of enormous strategic significance to Iran as it is located on the Strait of Hormuz leading into the Persian Gulf. But that is also a problem for Iran. The area is already burdened with high traffic and of course, the U.S. Navy. Iran wishes to have another port that is more conducive to trade and further growth.

Gwadar

Gwadar, being much further away from India than Karachi, makes obvious strategic sense. But it is its commercial potential that will provide the most benefits. Gwadar is not some long-term project. Its first phase, with 75% of the costs covered by the Chinese government, is already completed. The existing docks, built by the Chinese Harbor Engineering Company, are now being operated by Port of Singapore. Port of Singapore won the contract over Dubai Ports World, the company that was forced out of America by opportunistic xenophobes in both political parties there. Phase two will be completed by 2010, adding even more capacity. Ziad Haider, a researcher at the South Asia Program at the Henry L. Stimson Center, noted that Pakistan can make the project succeed if it maintains the financial and political support of China for the project and if it makes some concessions to the Baluchis near Gwadar, who have already carried out deadly attacks on Chinese engineers.

The problem with Gwadar, wrote Ammad Hassan in his thesis for the US Naval Postgraduate School, is that while the port has been built, “the supporting infrastructure of railroad link, industrial capacity, and civic structures at Gwadar is almost non-existent.” And of course, all analysts mention Pakistan’s extremely problematic relations with the ethnic Baluch in the area who, in addition to having been in a low-grade insurgency for some time, are not at all supportive of the port. And to understate another issue, southern Afghanistan is not quite ready to be a reliable transport corridor for Pakistan to access Central Asia, despite the Afghan government’s voiced support for the project. Nevertheless, the idea of further integrating Central Asian and Russian resources southward with the Asian and Middle Eastern market has others optimistic about the long-term prospects. The Asian Development Bank is somewhat cautious though, noting that initially the port will be significant only to Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.


Picture: Chabahar
Chabahar

Gwadar’s competition for trade and transport will come from Chabahar, the new Indian-financed port in Iran. A port outside of the Persian Gulf makes sense from a strategic and logistical viewpoint for Iran. The port of Chabahar was part of a plan to develop transportation infrastructure in Iran’s east for many years. Initially put in hold in 1984 it was revived in 2002 with Indian help. And the financing and engineering assistance from India is not limited to the port. India, wishing to bypass Pakistan, is also cooperating on a highway system that leads from the port into Afghanistan as well as a planned railroad to Afghanistan. Iranian officials state that they wish to have Bandar Abbas remain as the port for Russian and European trade and have Chabahar become the port for trade with Afghanistan and Central Asia. Iran already has good relations with everybody along the route leading north (including the local “warlords”) into Tajikistan. And significantly, it is in Tajikistan where Iran has already been financing several transport projects including the Anzob tunnel. And luckily for the Iranians, the U.S. constructed a bridge over the Amu Darya that fits in nicely with the Chabahar to Khojent route.

Prospects for economic integration of Central Asia with the South

For energy and mineral resources to be sent south from Central Asia a much more expensive transport infrastructure will be required than what is being built at the moment. Another limitation is the lack of a business friendly environment in most Central Asian states. And consumer goods are already entering Central Asia from Russia and China. What more is there a demand for? Furthermore, many Central Asian leaders are obsessed over local issues and haven’t been overly enthusiastic about regional integration (with Uzbekistan being the worst offender).

What is a long-term prospect is Central Asia being a transport route from the ports to Xinjiang, Russia and Kazakhstan, all of them important markets. The routes to Gwadar and Chabahar cut off thousands of kilometers for certain trade routes.

Strategic considerations

Any transportation or military problems in the Straits of Malacca, the Straits of Hormuz, the Suez or anywhere along Asia’s southern coastline will further boost the importance of Central Asia as a transport and trade corridor. Beyond Pakistan and Iran, both China and India are seeking closer relations with Afghanistan and Central Asia. The planned transport and trade routes will have the obvious effect of building solid ties. Iran’s considerations are boosting trade, having secure borders, and avoiding “encirclement” by American proxies (no matter how much a figment of the Iranian government’s imagination). As for Pakistan, the governments there has hoped for better relations with Central Asia. However, their Afghanistan policy always got in the way. Now they hope to move away from that era.

Conclusion

The countries of Central Asia will likely benefit from both Chabahar and Gwadar. Diversifying its import and export routes is a logical economic and political step. Although one should not exaggerate the economic benefits to be reaped. As for the competition between the two ports, it will not be a “winner take all” outcome but rather one port earning the greater share of trade. And the “winner” in this respect will likely be Chabahar, at least in the short term. Iran is more stable than Pakistan, it has better relations with Afghanistan and the Central Asian states, and unlike the Gwadar route its proposed route goes through relatively stable parts of Afghanistan. As long as Iran avoids outright conflict with the United States or any sort of domestic turmoil it should come out of this competition with an advantage.