Wednesday, December 24, 2008

Who assassinated Benazir Bhutto?


Who assassinated Benazir Bhutto?
The News, December 23, 2008
By Lubna Thomas

ISLAMABAD: Former prime minister Benazir Bhutto was attacked from three sides on December 27, 2007 in Rawalpindi. One of the assassins seen in the videos fired at her from the left side but the cause of her death was a wound on the right side of her head. Her vehicle was supposed to turn left towards Gawalmandi from the Liaquat Bagh but police blocked the road from the left side and her vehicle was forced to turn right after the public meeting and she was attacked immediately after taking the right turn.

These facts were revealed in a special investigative episode of Capital Talk on Geo News on Monday night. Hamid Mir conducted the investigations and interviewed all those who were present with Benazir Bhutto in her vehicle at the time of the attack. He also interviewed some key eyewitnesses who were injured in the attack.

Benazir Bhutto also wrote an email to an American journalist, Wolf Blitzer, on October 26, 2007 before her assassination, saying Musharraf should be held responsible if she was killed. Benazir was also aware of the dangers to her life, as the Interior Ministry had already informed her about the threats to her life on December 12, 2007. But in spite of all these threats, she continued her election campaign. She said on December 26, 2007 in a public gathering in Peshawar that life should be spent like a lion, not like a jackal.

The investigative feature of Geo was based on 12 questions: 1) Why did Benazir come out of the sunroof? 2) Why was there no sufficient security on her return from the Liaquat Bagh? 3) Why was her car turned right when it had to go left? 4) Was her death caused by the lever of the vehicle or a bullet? 5) Were the firing and blast triggered by one person? 6) Did more than one person fire at Benazir? 7) Why was her autopsy not done? 8) Who ordered to wash the crime scene immediately? 9) Which direction was she shot from — left or right? 10) Are the accused arrested in her murder case the real killers? 11) What did the government say in reply to the letter she wrote to General (retd) Musharraf, naming three persons who should be held responsible for her murder? 12) Why her last email to Wolf Blitzer was not made the basis of the investigations into her murder?

For complete article, click here

Tuesday, December 23, 2008

Islam in the West: Young Muslims Build a Subculture on an Underground Book



Young Muslims Build a Subculture on an Underground Book
By CHRISTOPHER MAAG, New York Times, December 22, 2008

CLEVELAND — Five years ago, young Muslims across the United States began reading and passing along a blurry, photocopied novel called “The Taqwacores,” about imaginary punk rock Muslims in Buffalo.

“This book helped me create my identity,” said Naina Syed, 14, a high school freshman in Coventry, Conn.

A Muslim born in Pakistan, Naina said she spent hours on the phone listening to her older sister read the novel to her. “When I finally read the book for myself,” she said, “it was an amazing experience.”

The novel is “The Catcher in the Rye” for young Muslims, said Carl W. Ernst, a professor of Islamic studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Springing from the imagination of Michael Muhammad Knight, it inspired disaffected young Muslims in the United States to form real Muslim punk bands and build their own subculture.

Now the underground success of Muslim punk has resulted in a low-budget independent film based on the book.

For complete article, click here

Monday, December 22, 2008

Book Review: The Duel, Pakistan on the Flight Path of American Power



COVER STORY: Point Of Return
Reviewed By Shahid Javed Burki, Dawn, December 21, 2008

The Duel, Pakistan on the Flight Path of American Power
By Tariq Ali


Tariq Ali’s latest book could not have been published at a better time. On November 26 Mumbai was attacked by a small group of terrorists who, it is said, came from the sea and took over a couple of five star hotels, the city’s main railway station, a hospital, and a Jewish centre.

According to the Indian intelligence agencies, there were only 10 terrorists who held some of the symbols of Mumbai’s economic power, social vibrancy and dynamism in their grip for three days. By the time they were overpowered, nearly 200 people were dead, many more were injured, the home minister of the Indian government had resigned and India and Pakistan were once again locked in a verbal dispute that could deteriorate into something worse by the time this review is published.

What is the relevance of this incident to the book under review? Tariq Ali looks dispassionately at the factors that have contributed to Pakistan earning the reputation of being ‘the most dangerous place on earth’. The common wisdom in the West is not the one Ali holds. It is said in dozens of books, academic articles and in hundreds of newspaper accounts that have appeared in recent years that the country is fast slipping into anarchy.

The main consequence of this will be that the extremist elements will gain strength, and may even gain control of the country and its nuclear arsenal. That, of course, is the West’s worst nightmare. Ali challenges this view and suggests that it will be the West and not Pakistanis that may force the country to move in that direction. Left to itself, Pakistan is inclined to follow a different path.

According to the author extremists occupy only a small margin of Pakistani society. The salience they have acquired is almost entirely the consequence of the American — and later the European — response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. President George W. Bush responded to 9/11 by unleashing the full military might of his country first against Afghanistan and then, a few months later, against Iraq — a country that had no connection whatsoever with the group that mounted the attacks on America. The attack on Afghanistan was initially successful. The Taliban regime in Kabul that had offered a sanctuary to Al Qaeda was quickly overthrown and was replaced by a government that was friendly towards Washington.

Had America stayed involved and turned its attention to nation-building in Afghanistan, the situation would not have deteriorated to the point that Washington is once again confronted with a conflict it cannot win with the use of military power. If it uses excessive force, the author argues, instead of solving the Afghan problem, it will push the entire region towards extremism and lead to a prolonged conflict between those who believe they represent Islam and the Christian West.

Ali explores at some length why Pakistani society, once known for religious tolerance and practicing mostly the Sufi version of Islam, has become associated with extremism. The story he tells is a familiar one for those who know the political history of Pakistan. Also, in an earlier work (Shadows of the Pomegranate Tree, 1996) he has written extensively about Spain under its Muslim rulers where the Islam that was practiced was of an exceptionally tolerant variety. That is the type of Islam that would have become the creed of Pakistan had the country’s leaders not failed in such a spectacular way.

In assigning blame for what has happened to Pakistan since its birth in 1947, Ali does not spare the civilian leadership. He focuses in particular on Prime Minster Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the way he acquired political power and used it once he was in office.

One of the more interesting ‘what ifs?’ of Pakistan’s history concerns Bhutto’s behaviour in office. If he had governed as a true democrat, been tolerant of opposition and interested in promoting the welfare of the country’s common citizens, Pakistan would today be working with a better set of economic and political institutions instead of operating in an institutional vacuum.

My reading of the book is that the author still sees hope for the country if it is not pushed by the West into going in the direction in which it would not like to travel. Pakistanis, he says, want to modernise their country and join the world as responsible citizens. They don’t want to be pushed to the margins of the global political and economic systems. He has with this important book, therefore, joined the debate that is going on in a number of policy circles about how to deal with the situation in the no-man’s land between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Earlier this year I attended a conference organised by the British Foreign Office at Wilton Park, a mayoral mansion south of London. The conference was about Pakistan and was attended by more than 80 people, most of them Europeans and Americans. America’s war in Afghanistan was one of the several themes discussed at the conference. The small Pakistani contingent made two statements; one was made by a former Pakistani Ambassador to Kabul and the other by a retired civil servant who had served in a number of senior positions in the North West Frontier Province.

The ambassador was of the view that the only solution to the Afghan problem is the complete withdrawal of western forces from Afghanistan and the return of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the FATA, to their traditional ways.

The other view was that only a deep involvement by Pakistan and its western allies in the economic and social development of the Pakhtoon areas on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan divide will wean the people of the region away from religious extremism.

Tariq Ali’s timely book and the thesis that it puts out should be read by the people who, along with President-elect Barack Obama, are preparing to define the new American approach towards what is now being called the Pakistan problem.

The Duel should also be read by the Indian leadership. Both New Delhi and Washington have by their actions brought Pakistan to where it is today. Missteps by both could plunge the country into chaos which will generate a tsunami that will not just leave Pakistan in ruins but hit many other shores.

Sunday, December 21, 2008

Newsweek's Global Elite - Pakistan's Army Chief is No. 20!

Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani
NEWSWEEK, Published Dec 20, 2008
From the magazine issue dated Jan 5, 2009

In theory this mumbling, chain-smoking general answers to President Asif Ali Zardari. But Kayani and his troops remain the dominant power in what could be the most dangerous country in the world. He's responsible for Pakistan's nukes; for the battle against Al Qaeda and its tribal allies along the Afghan border; and for managing tensions with neighbor India. So far, his army has kept itself out of politics and seems focused on the battle against jihadists. In the wake of the November terrorist attacks in Mumbai, Kayani stood firm on Pakistan's sovereignty while also taking measures against the alleged sponsors of the outrage.

Kayani insists he's a committed democrat, but he nevertheless argues that military interventions (there have been four since independence 61 years ago) are sometimes necessary to maintain Pakistan's stability. He likens coups to temporary bypasses that are created when a bridge collapses on democracy's highway. After the bridge is repaired, he says, then there's no longer any need for the detour.

For the complete list, click here

Arms recovered from Lal Masjid stolen from Islamabad Police Station

Arms recovered from Lal Masjid stolen
The News, December 22, 2008
SHO among 10 cops arrested; SSP removed, ASP suspended
By Shakeel Anjum

ISLAMABAD: Heavy consignment of arms and ammunition, recovered during the Lal Masjid operation in July last year, has been stolen from the Aabpara police station, police and intelligence agencies sources told The News. About 80 guns, including mortars, heavy machine guns (HMGs), light machine guns (LMGs), Kalashnikovs and a large quantity of bullets were among the stolen weapons.

Adviser on Interior Rehman Malik, taking serious notice of the incident, has removed SSP Islamabad Capt (retd) Ahmad Latif from his post with immediate effect and suspended ASP (city) Dr Shahzad Asif while station house officer (SHO) Malik Naeem Iqbal, five assistance sub-inspectors (ASIs), including Muharrar, a head constable and four constables have been arrested. The interior adviser has asked the Inspector General of Police (IGP) Islamabad to hold inquiry into the incident.

Rehman Malik, while talking to the News, said a joint investigation team (JIT) has been constituted to investigate the issue. He said DIG (security) Inayatullah Farooq would be the head of the team while representatives of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) and Intelligence Bureau (IB) would be members of the team.

For complete article, click here

Saturday, December 20, 2008

Indian Muslims and Mumbai

Indian Muslims and Mumbai
By Kunwar Idris, Dawn, December 21, 2008

THE agonising memories of the disintegration of Pakistan have returned to haunt at a time when rebels freely roam vast swathes of our territory in the northwest and India is growling in anger from across the eastern border.

Can it happen again? Hopefully, it will not. This hope is instinctive and not born of glib talk coming from the president and the prime minister assuring us that Pakistan is capable and ready to defend its integrity. Such assurances were plentiful in 1971.

As Karachi’s district magistrate in those fateful days, it was the lot of this writer to witness President Yahya and other leaders flying into Karachi from Dhaka one after the other and telling the people that the ‘miscreants’ had been crushed and that calm had returned to East Pakistan.

Gen Tikka Khan was the last to arrive past midnight one day. He was then surrounded by a gaggle of journalists who had been monitoring the news, contrary to official accounts, of the tough resistance put up by rebels long after the army crackdown. A firecracker exploding on the border did not constitute resistance was the general’s curt comment. He then sped off telling the agitated pressmen to go home and sleep and to let him sleep too. That was just months before the surrender.

Admittedly, the rebels here at this point are few, on the fringes, and all are not secessionists. India too is not poised to attack. But the point to emphasise is that if it chose to do so Pakistan would hardly have any supporter or sympathiser. Britain and China epitomise the current worldwide attitude.

According to British Prime Minister Gordon Brown the majority of the terrorist plots that his government had investigated had originated in Pakistan. And China, for the first time, did not feel persuaded to veto a UN committee resolution carrying the implication of Pakistan being branded a terrorist state if it did not outlaw religious organisations suspected of sponsoring the Mumbai attack and arrest their leaders.

The world at large and the powers that matter are all inclined to believe that the terrorists who struck so mercilessly in Mumbai had come from Pakistan. But they do not find much credence in Pakistan’s charge that India foments and finances insurgents in its tribal region. The world also believes that Pakistan is not restraining radical elements even if its intelligence agencies are not colluding in training and equipping them.

With Pakistan put in the dock in full public view and no one to defend it, the Mumbai horror is bound to recoil on the Indian Muslims among whom the government there would surely be seeking out local collaborators of the foreign attackers. In 1946, when the British finally decided to quit India, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, a staunch supporter of India’s unity, cautioned Muslims that by supporting partition they would become aliens in their own country. What has come to pass over a period of 60 years is much worse.

A commission headed by Mr Rajinder Sachar, a former Chief Justice of India, reported in 2006 that India’s Muslim community had sunk to the bottom of the heap, below even the untouchables, when it came to benefits flowing from government-run welfare schemes, access to education, employment, bank credit, etc. Poverty and insecurity have driven them into ghettos where they are open to exploitation by corrupt officials and Hindu fanatics. Though they form 12.5 per cent of the population their representation in the public services is less than one-third of that.

Pakistan owes it to the Muslims of India who staked their own future on its creation not to add to their woes. It may be recalled that Partition became inevitable only when Nehru unilaterally retracted after the Congress and Muslim League had both accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan. Jinnah felt betrayed. For him then there was no going back despite lobbying by Lord Mountbatten and Maulana Azad.

Under that plan India was to be divided into three autonomous regions. The centre was to retain only defence, foreign affairs and communications. The three regions are now independent states but continue to carry the bitter burden of the division of Punjab and Bengal and the bloodshed and mass migrations that followed.

The passage of time and a legacy of mistrust and hostility leave no room to think about a loose federation now. But it should still be possible for the governments of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh to form a bloc or union of the kind that emerged in Europe out of the hostilities of the Second World War. Evolving a common mechanism that diverts their attention and resources from the weapons of war to the poverty of their people could be the first step in that direction.

Pakistan would stand to gain more than the others because as a percentage of national income it spends twice as much on defence than India and also suffers from terrorism much more than India does. In such a collaborative arrangement 470 million Muslims of the subcontinent would count for more than they do at present, spread as they are, almost equally, over three countries.

In a long confrontation punctuated by wars the losers all round have been only the people of Pakistan and the Muslims of India. The Mumbai massacre has highlighted this fact and also underlined the need for the reversal of policies pursued so far. The controversy pertaining to culpability and evidence, as in past incidents, can lead nowhere.

kunwaridris@hotmail.com

Barbarians at the gate: Militant Islamist forces Vs. democratic forces of enlightenment

Barbarians at the gate
The News, December 21, 2008
by Ghazi Salahuddin

There has been no dearth, for some time, of foreign experts and analysts who imply that Pakistan is becoming a failed state. That Nawaz Sharif should now have reasons to corroborate this assessment is surely ominous. Reflecting the impression that the global media has projected about Pakistan being the most dangerous place in the world, he has said that the country has become ungovernable, though he pointedly attributes this to the damage done by the dictatorial rule of Pervez Musharraf.

If Pakistan is beginning to present the look of a failed state and if it is ungovernable in the eyes of a politician of Nawaz Sharif's importance – and that too in the aftermath of the Mumbai carnage that has planted frightening thoughts in the minds of most Pakistanis – what lies ahead?

At one level, remarks made by the leader of his faction of Pakistan Muslim League in Geo's 'Aaj Kamran Khan Ke Saath' on Thursday evening signal the advent of a flaming confrontation in domestic politics. But this confrontation can only be played out on the sidelines of the great crisis in which Pakistan finds itself. Given the stance that has been adopted by both Pakistan and India with relation to the terrorist attack in Mumbai, the situation is likely to get worse, at least in the near future.

As for Nawaz Sharif taking an offensive against the Pakistan People's Party-led government in Islamabad, the bugle had actually sounded on Wednesday when he revealed that he had been offered a deal to keep quiet over the Farah Dogar case. That this time was chosen for an offensive against the ruling coalition has intrigued some observers, though many had seen it coming against the backdrop of politics in Punjab and the red rag that Salman Taseer has become.

However, the main crisis of Pakistan transcends this confrontation and the other issues that keep bubbling in the media. I have always held – and this view has repeatedly surfaced in my columns – that the conflict between the potentially militant Islamist forces and the democratic forces of enlightenment will decide the fate of this nation. This historic contest is surely becoming rather ferocious, mainly because of the complexity that has been injected by the global war against terrorism and the social and economic deprivations of the people of Pakistan.

Unfortunately, not all our political players and opinion makers are aware of the seminal nature of this antagonistic tussle. Hence, there are parties and leaders who straddle the dividing line, often for short-term expediencies. But the time has come when all of us should be aware of what is really at stake and have the courage to speak out and act in defence of our beliefs and, indeed, our survival.

One problem in this encounter is the power and the role of the establishment that had initially promoted Islamist militancy. There is general confusion about what the establishment has learnt in the face of emerging realities and the imperative for Pakistan's progress and prosperity. At the same time, the parties that have supported the jihadist sentiments have to understand the consequences of their approach.

Let me now refer to a few instances of what the jihadists are doing in this age and time. On Tuesday – this was December 16, a day that lives in infamy – there was this report published in some newspapers that the militants exhumed the body of Pir Sameeullah and hanged it along with four followers in a public place in Mingora. The pir had been killed in a gunbattle with the militants. Have the leaders of the likes of Qazi Hussain Ahmed and Imran Khan expressed their horror over this act of barbarism? Have the people of Pakistan had time to contemplate the meaning of this incident which, alas, is not out of character for militants who have been allowed to thrive in our northern areas?

The next day, on Wednesday, I read this report, quoting BBC Urdu, that the "Pakistani Taliban have issued a video of five slain people, accused of spying on key Al Qaeda leader Abu Laith Al-Libi". The report added that the beheaded bodies were found in different parts of North Waziristan Agency at different times. For many people, this may not be totally surprising because this is how the jihdists have behaved as a matter of routine. Remember Daniel Pearl, who was brutally killed in front of a video camera in early 2002?

In a different context but relevant to the struggle for enlightenment and sanity in the country, there are increasing reports of honour killings and inhuman, tribal ways of administrating 'justice'. For instance, this newspaper's Islamabad/Rawalpindi edition published on Tuesday a large picture of a man walking on burning coal to prove his innocence in a murder case in Dera Murad Jamali in Balochistan. What is more lamentable is that a tribal leader, when interviewed by a private TV channel, defended this practice. Remember Mir Israrullah Zehri and Mir Hazar Khan Bijarani, now members of the federal cabinet?

Coming back to the thought of Pakistan becoming a failed state and being ungovernable, who should we expect to pick up the pieces and set a direction for Pakistan that is in consonance with the dictates of the modern world and, to invoke a clichƩ, the vision of Mohammad Ali Jinnah? I wonder if Jinnah would be able to live in Pakistan of today without feeling threatened and insecure.

We know that Pakistan of today is beset by grave challenges, the aftermath of the Mumbai carnage being only one dimension of what our ruling ideas have wrought. One of my major regrets is that the forces that should be on the side of democracy and enlightenment are not united and have not been mobilised into action. This is one reason why I feel disenchanted with the leadership of Asif Ali Zardari and mourn his apparent loss of credibility and moral authority.

Could Benazir Bhutto, had she been spared by the forces of evil, done better – given the 'deal' that was made? Well, this is the week that will revive our memories of a great charismatic leader who symbolised, in her person, the struggle for liberal values and our political emancipation. She had the capacity and the courage to take difficult decisions and to adjust to emerging realities. She was the only major leader of Pakistan to have come out so forthrightly and boldly against religious militancy and terrorism.

As we grieve for a leader whose assassination – (and who were her murderers?) – has left a void in our polity, it is necessary, as the poet said, "to find strength in what is left behind". We still have our ruling ideas and we do not know if the establishment has the power and the will to finally slay the monster of militancy.

The writer is a staff member. Email: ghazi_salahuddin@hotmail.com

Friday, December 19, 2008

Memo to the President: Expand the Agenda in Pakistan and Afghanistan

Memo to the President: Expand the Agenda in Pakistan and Afghanistan

To: President-Elect Obama
From: Vanda Felbab-Brown, The Brookings Institution
Date: December 18, 2008
Re: Expand the Agenda in Pakistan and Afghanistan


The Situation

You inherit a dangerous crisis in South Asia. The war in Afghanistan is not being won. Al Qa’eda has built a stronghold in the mountains between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The November attacks in Mumbai painfully show the serious threat of jihadist terrorism. As a result of those attacks, tensions are running high between India and Pakistan, two nuclear-armed countries that have fought four wars.

Your administration will need to deal urgently with many interrelated dimensions of the crisis:

The Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan is becoming stronger and has succeeded in creating an atmosphere of great insecurity. In much of Afghanistan’s south and increasingly in its east, government officials, international advisers and even local district chiefs do not dare travel outside provincial capitals without military escort.

In many locales the insecurity has brought economic development to a standstill. Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world; lawful economic opportunities remain meager for many, and only international aid saves millions of people from dire food crisis.

Poppy cultivation and the drug trade are burgeoning, providing resources for the insurgency and fueling government corruption.

The Afghan people are questioning the performances of the government of President Hamid Karzai and the international community. The people are deeply troubled by the growing insecurity, the weakness and corruption of the government, the rise in criminality and the lack of rule of law.

Across the border in Pakistan, the Taliban and Al Qa’eda enjoy safe havens and have integrated themselves into a complex web of jihadist groups. Despite some of these groups’ long-standing links to the Pakistani intelligence services, they increasingly threaten the security of Pakistan itself.

Pakistan is a fragile and failing state with weak civilian leadership, reflecting a long history of military coups and ineffective governance, and a collapsed economy.

The current tensions between India and Pakistan easily could escalate into a proxy war in Kashmir or Afghanistan, if not into a direct military confrontation. Highly dangerous in itself, an escalation would—as before—divert Pakistan’s military resources away from its border with Afghanistan and weaken the government’s resolve to take on the jihadist groups.

Despite the grave situation, there are several promising opportunities:

The Mumbai attacks underscore, for Congress and the general public, the strategic importance of the region and the need for broad, multilateral and coordinated efforts against terrorism in South Asia and globally. There is now a general recognition in the United States that the war in Afghanistan is not going well and needs an infusion of resources and a new strategy.

Our NATO allies and countries in the region are looking to your administration for leadership and a new direction in Afghanistan. They also look to you to spur multilateral engagement with Pakistan.

The Afghan people are similarly turning to your administration to help reverse the disturbing trends in their country. Despite their current dissatisfaction, the people as a whole have not embraced the Taliban. They still want an Afghanistan free of oppressive armed groups, warlords and criminals and capable of satisfying their fundamental economic needs.

Although weak and facing multiple internal challenges, the Pakistani civilian leadership of President Asif Ali Zardari has repeatedly indicated its willingness to reach accommodation with India and counter the terrorist threats facing both countries.

Your Stance

During the campaign, you identified the resurgence of Al Qa’eda and the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan as the greatest single threat to U.S. security. You repeatedly promised to refocus attention and resources on the region by:

Increasing troop levels in Afghanistan. Three more American brigades have been authorized already. Reductions in troop deployments to Iraq will permit further increases in Afghanistan.

Seeking a similar contribution from our allies. Your political capital and a new focus on Afghanistan will enable you to show how the allies can contribute to success in the region in a productive, sustained way.

Pressing the Afghan government to meet more of the needs of its population and tackle corruption and the opium trade. Your administration’s increased engagement can help convince the Kabul government to take resolute action against corruption, including drug trafficking, and improve governance, especially if our contributions are backed by additional technical assistance from other countries. It is equally necessary to find ways to strengthen provincial and district governments.

Increase nonmilitary aid to Pakistan while holding it accountable for disrupting Taliban safe havens and providing security along the border with Afghanistan. The Biden-Lugar bill that would commit $15 billion in development aid to Pakistan over 10 years provides a vehicle for assistance. While beefing up economic assistance, you need to stress to Pakistan that jihadist terrorism now threatens its own security and that combating terrorism is in its own national interest.

Further Recommendations

In addition to implementing your campaign proposals, you should broaden your efforts in South Asia, demonstrating further your vision and resolve.

Security in Pakistan: You should continue counterinsurgency aid and training for the Pakistani military, enhanced with careful monitoring of the flow of dollars. Although U.S. military action against high-level jihadists in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas may sometimes be warranted, such strikes should be undertaken with great care to avoid civilian casualties.

Security in Afghanistan: It is necessary to increase troop levels in Afghanistan. In addition to obtaining greater deployment of NATO troops, you should continue efforts to enlarge the Afghan National Army, which ultimately must hold responsibility for the country’s security. Swift reform of the Afghan National Police, now widely seen as corrupt and incompetent, is also necessary, as is strengthening the Afghan judicial system. These institutions need to focus on delivering the essential rule of law to the population.

Although earning the confidence of Afghan tribal leaders is important, the tribes are unprepared to assume a military role in the counterinsurgency. Fractious, fundamentally weak and caught up in local disputes, they have a poor record in fighting the Taliban. Similarly, strategic negotiations with the Taliban hold little promise of success. Although a mechanism for demobilizing individual fighters and small splinter groups would be highly beneficial, the Taliban leadership has repeatedly shown a lack of interest in any outcome short of NATO withdrawal.

Socio-Economic Development and the Drug Trade: Socio-economic development is critical for Afghanistan’s future, for sustaining any gains in security and for achieving progress in counter-narcotics. It should lead to improvements in infrastructure, irrigation and micro-credit and to the creation of value-added chains and employment. And, it should be directed to high-value, labor-intensive crops as well as to off-farm income, such as from textiles. Targeting high-level drug traffickers in Afghanistan is essential. Eradication of poppy crops should focus on areas where there are enough lawful economic activities to offer a viable alternative.

Development efforts should be imbedded in a regional economic framework that also helps develop Pakistan’s border areas.

Donor Coordination: Lack of coordination among the Afghan government and the international actors hampers both security and development. While several initiatives have been undertaken to improve coordination, they have proved insufficient so far. Your administration can help build organizational structures to streamline program management and make greater use of existing mechanisms.

Public Awareness Campaign: Many development projects have improved the lives of the Afghan people; roads and wells have been built. Yet, inundated with Taliban propaganda, the Afghan people appear mostly unaware of these successes. In Pakistan, the United States—rather than Al Qa’eda and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan—is blamed for the violence that is ravaging the country. To win local support, the administration should craft and sufficiently fund an effective public awareness campaign.

Regional Framework: Unfortunately, the Mumbai attacks are likely to derail any rapprochement between India and Pakistan, including over Kashmir. Yet, it is critical that your administration help the two countries deescalate the current tensions and avoid a military confrontation or a proxy war. While urging Pakistan to cooperate more fully in counterterrorism efforts, the administration should engage India in a direct and robust relationship. However tragic and destabilizing, the Mumbai attacks can inject an important sense of urgency into regional stakeholder deliberations, by showing that terrorism in any form cannot be tolerated and that a platform for multilateral engagement must be constructed. Besides Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, engagement should also include Europe and our other important allies in Afghanistan, as well as China, Russia, Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Conclusion

You may wish to consider outlining your overall strategy toward South Asia in your Inaugural address, when Americans and leaders across the globe will be listening carefully. The upcoming NATO summit in April 2009 will provide another important opportunity to roll out a new policy for the region.

Success is vital. A complete state failure in Pakistan would generate a grave and severe crisis, as would any serious military confrontation between India and Pakistan. Across the border in Afghanistan, failure against the Taliban would indicate how limited the United States and the international community can be in helping countries achieve security and development. The world is looking to you for leadership in reversing dangerous trends and building a security framework in a vital region.

Murder she wrote

Murder she wrote
By Ayesha Siddiqa, Dawn, December 19, 2008

THESE days a common concern of many ordinary Pakistanis pertains to the conspiracy to destroy the country. But what happens when the country’s own institutions are involved in spinning a cobweb or falling into a trap that can cause ultimate damage to the state is a question worth asking. This line of questioning stems from a story recently published in Britain’s Sunday Times on Dec 14 and reported by Dawn the following day.

The story titled ‘UK may help find Pakistani general’s killers’ written by Carey Schofield is about the mysterious death of former Special Services Group Maj-Gen Amir Faisal Alavi. The article claims that Gen Alavi was not killed by militants in November 2008 as claimed initially but that those responsible may have been some of his senior colleagues about whom he had complained to army chief Gen Kayani with regard to their alleged involvement in evil and corrupt transactions with the Taliban. These officers, whose names were blacked out by the writer herself before publication, had apparently been a cause of Gen Alavi’s removal from service two years ago while he was serving in Wana, Waziristan.

The military publicity machine, of course, went into action soon after. It made counterclaims that the general in question had been removed due to his involvement with a woman in Islamabad. Considering former Gen Pervez Musharraf’s reputation as a cultural liberal (not to be confused with political liberal), he was hardly the person to have questioned or punished his officers for such a crime. Or perhaps there were too many people involved in the affair.

Undoubtedly the Schofield story raises questions about the military’s reputation as a professional and cohesive force. What it says between the lines is that rather than a cohesive force it may be divided between those officers who compromise on the national interest by doing questionable deals with the Taliban who then target army personnel and others who choose to confide in foreign journalists and governments about internal wrongdoings. According to the story, Gen Alavi had not only foretold his own death to the journalist after he dispatched the letter to the army chief, but had also complained to the British military in August 2005 (during his visit to the headquarters of the special forces or the SAS) about the lack of the army’s will to fight terrorism.

A closer look shows that the story paints the highest command of the service in a bad light. Were there moles in the army chief’s secretariat who leaked the contents of his letter to those that Alavi accused of being involved in his removal from service? Of course, the other question that comes to mind is that knowing his organisation and the fact that the letter would be opened as a routine before it reached the chief, why did Alavi choose to send it ‘through the proper channel’ rather than secure a private meeting with the top boss?

However, a question that the official-sponsored rebuttal did not ask was about the access provided to the British journalist to write a book on the Pakistan Army. It was in the process of doing so that she came into contact with Alavi and many other generals including Pervez Musharraf. The real and untold story is that of the disappointment felt by the army’s top brass at being accused of killing one of their own. Sources claim that she had direct access to Musharraf and many other generals.

Carey Schofield, whose main expertise is the Soviet military and not South Asia, was introduced a few years ago to the GHQ by one of the army’s favourite writers via one of Musharraf’s most favoured diplomats. The idea was probably to have a foreigner, not popularly known in the world of academia, write a book on the army so that it could sell against all other literature being produced by Pakistani writers generally considered to be unfriendly by the GHQ. She had more access than what an ordinary writer could dream of. Her introduction on the Oxford University Leverhulme Project describes her as writing a book in collaboration with the GHQ in Rawalpindi. We don’t know if she was also given access to classified material but that is hardly the issue.

Our military and civil bureaucrats and politicians say a lot of things during informal discussions. The tendency to tell the real story while boasting about their performance gives away many a secret. It is also worth asking whether anyone bothered to check on her background before providing access.

I remember the British author from my book launch at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, last year. Schofield questioned me on the use of a particular term in my book, Military Inc, with the objective of embarrassing me. Later, a colonel boasted about how the question was passed on to her.

The point I am trying to make here is that it has often been the army’s strategy to support sponsored research in order to create army-friendly literature through luring foreign academics and journalists with free trips, hospitality and access to the institution and its secrets. This approach was used at least on three earlier occasions.

Very briefly, the first book published in 1979 by an unknown publisher never made it beyond a few libraries. The second book the research for which was sponsored by Gen Ziaul Haq was banned. The third one has made the rounds but the author has no academic standing. Finally, an unknown British publisher will publish the latest book by Schofield. What is a matter of greater concern, however, is that at this point the GHQ might not even be sure of the contents of the book for which tremendous cooperation was given to the author.

While Carey Schofield seems to have burnt some if not all of her bridges with the Pakistan Army by publishing the story in the Sunday Times, a question that the generals must ponder over pertains to what else might have landed on the table of the British intelligence other than the Alavi story. This time the facts may be irrefutable because the army itself volunteered them.

The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.ayesha.ibd@gmail.com

Thousands rally against US, NATO in NW Pakistan: AFP

Thousands rally against US, NATO in NW Pakistan
AFP, December 18, 2008

PESHAWAR, Pakistan (AFP) — Thousands of protesters rallied in the northwestern Pakistani city of Peshawar on Thursday, demanding that Islamabad end its logistical support for US and NATO troops in Afghanistan.

The crowd of about 5,000 demonstrators chanted "Allahu akbar" (God is greater), "Crush America" and "No to NATO supplies" as they marched through Peshawar, an AFP correspondent witnessed.

The rally came amid a recent spike in attacks by Taliban militants on NATO and US supply depots on Peshawar's outskirts, close to Pakistan's lawless tribal areas -- a hotbed of Taliban and Al-Qaeda activity.

International forces in Afghanistan are hugely dependent on Islamabad for their supplies and equipment, with about 80 percent transported through Pakistan and then across the border.

The chief of the radical Jamaat-i-Islami party, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, told protesters: "It is a shame for an Islamic country to supply logistics to the US, which is working against the interests of Muslims all over the world."

He demanded the government abandon its role as an ally in the US-led "war on terror", warning that if logistical support is not suspended, "we will force the government with public support to halt all supplies."

On Wednesday, missiles fired by suspected Taliban militants targeting a NATO supply convoy killed a woman and wounded her two children in the Khyber tribal district, on the main supply route into Afghanistan.