Saturday, February 16, 2008

"Pakistan: Opposition Parties Are Poised to Win Poll"

"Pakistan: Opposition Parties Are Poised to Win Poll"
Oxford Analytica, February 15, 2008

By Hassan Abbas, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom, International Security Program, and Project on India and the Subcontinent

"While there is a considerable risk that the elections will be rigged and that poor security will deter voting, pro-Musharraf parties will be swept from power. The PPP is expected to secure the most votes, raising the prospect of a grand coalition of parties united in opposition to the president. Stable government will depend on their ability to work together, as well as with Musharraf, for as long as he remains in power."

For Complete article, click here

Also See:
A Pakistani Revolution: Not Today But Perhaps Tomorrow By Xenia Dormandy Harvard International Review, February 2008

The Encyclopedia Britannica defines a revolution as "...a fundamental, rapid, and often irreversible change in the established order." While, without question, some significant events have taken place within Pakistan over the past ten months, culminating in Benazir Bhutto's assassination on December 27, 2007, the broader context suggests that any swift change is unlikely. In fact, most profoundly, we could be seeing the first signs of wider public participation in the political system; if this continues and is encouraged, it could lead to a slow-burning revolution that transforms the nation's future.

Since March 2007, Pakistan has been going through a period of upheaval. Following eight years of leadership by President Musharraf, the moderate majority in Pakistan has finally found its voice. Demonstrations, which started last March, have continued in one form or another since then, led at various times by lawyers, Mullahs, and political party leaders. Throughout the presidential and now parliamentary elections, the people have taken to the streets to protest for fair elections, freedoms, or independent institutions. However, what is holding the country back is the sheer lack of effective political leaders to channel these sentiments: individuals who will put Pakistan on a positive trajectory towards a stable democracy, economic growth, transparency, and institution building. A revolution, if there is one, could bring chaos and instability for a while; any truly positive progress for Pakistan will be long in coming.

The Context

Unlike many other countries that have undergone revolution in recent years, Pakistan has long played with democracy. Since gaining independence in 1947, Pakistan has veered back and forth between democratically-elected and authoritarian military leaders. Its earliest years were unstable: Pakistan fought against its neighbor, India, as they established their borders and their populations migrated. This acrimonious relationship continued; three wars were fought, including the 1971 war over the split of East and West Pakistan, which resulted in the creation of Bangladesh.

Following the loss of East Pakistan under the rule of Yahya Khan, a former chief of army staff, a new civilian leader, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, was elected in 1972. He was deposed in 1979 by another general, Zia ul Haq. Zia was the first leader to truly try to change the secular nature of Pakistan that had been inculcated by Pakistan's first leader, Muhammad Ali Jinnah.

Zia died in 1988 in a plane crash, and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's daughter, Benazir Bhutto, was elected for the first time. For eleven years, between 1988 and 1999, democracy reigned, unstable as it might have been, alternating between Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, with neither completing a full term. Finally, in October 1999, another chief of army staff, Pervez Musharraf, led a coup against Sharif and took over as president.

Over the past eight years, President Musharraf has done many good things for Pakistan, most notably building a relatively stable and fast growing economy (GDP growth in 2006 was 6.5 percent). On the other hand, he has not pushed progress on other very vital areas such as building independent institutions, improving the provision of education and other social services, or building local governance systems and networks. Over the past year, the situation has worsened significantly with the dismissal of Supreme Court Chief Justice Chaudhry in March 2007, a state of emergency declared in November, and Benazir Bhutto's assassination the following month. The judiciary is now thoroughly politicized, the media is restricted by a "code of conduct," and the interim government is biased.

A New Actor: People Power

Historically, only three players have had influence in changing Pakistan's future: the politicians, the Mullahs, and the military.

Politics in Pakistan is personality-driven. Until her assassination on December 27, Benazir Bhutto led the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), the party that her father, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, founded. Directed by her will, and following a party meeting, Benazir's 19-year-old son, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, will be filling her shoes with her husband, Asif Zardari, acting as regent while Bilawal finishes his Oxford degree. The other major secular party, the Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz (PML-N), is led by Nawaz Sharif and supported by his brother, Shahbaz. The Pakistan Muslim League – Quaid-i-Azam (PML-Q) was founded by President Musharraf, and will not last if he leaves. One of the smaller parties, a more religious one, is led by former cricket star, Imran Khan. Each of these parties is defined by its leaders rather than by its policies. There are few attempts to educate and develop new, younger leaders to replace them. The consequences of this are at least two-fold: without new blood Pakistan will not break out of what has been 60 years of oscillation between authoritarian and quasi-democratic states, and until there are new drivers for transformation in these senior ranks, any revolution would be headless and thus ineffective.

The Mullahs have enormous social but little political power. The religious coalition, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), typically garners less than 6 percent of the popular vote (the exception being the October 2002 national elections, "managed" by President Musharraf, where they gained 11.3 percent). The MMA has ruled for the past five years in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and shared power with the PML-Q in Baluchistan. After five years of governance, they are widely regarded as incompetent. While many in Pakistan might support some of the policies of the Mullahs, such as the imposition of shari'a law, they do not support their reign.

As Aeyesha Siddiqa made clear in her book Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy, Pakistan's military influences almost all aspects of Pakistan, including policy, the economy, social services, and security. The military has repeatedly played a central role in Pakistani politics, either directly, by leading coups, or more indirectly, by affecting policy debates on major political issues from nuclear weapons to the fight against terrorism. Both Bhutto and Sharif have each separately stated that, while prime minister in the 1980s and 1990s, they did not control the nation's strategic weaponry.

In March 2007, a fourth actor appeared on Pakistan's scene: the people. Not since the elections of 1977, won by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, has the country seen such a grass-roots movement for change. This hitherto silent majority has already had a significant impact on the country's political development. They induced President Musharraf to reinstate the Supreme Court Chief Justice, ensuring – at least for a short while – the continued independence of the judiciary (he was since re-dismissed). They had a role in ensuring that Musharraf followed through on his promise to step down as chief of army staff before being reappointed as president in mid-November. And still on the streets in the weeks following Bhutto's assassination, they now appear to be forcing Musharraf to continue to pursue at least a quasi-legitimate political process and, in particular, to investigate the assassination in conjunction with outside and unbiased assistance from Britain's Scotland Yard.

What is today unclear is whether this new force will be sustainable. The people's rise was made possible, in part, by the growth in the middle class in Pakistan, providing breathing space to consider issues beyond mere survival. The event that fired engagement was the dismissal of Chaudhry, an act that appeared to mark a reversal of some the freedoms that had been granted by President Musharraf in his earlier years. It is too early to tell whether any future reversals (such as managed elections) would provide enough incentive for the people to stay active, or would instead result in apathy and a sense of disempowerment. International support and continued attention could provide some security and encouragement, but any changes will have to be internal.

Musharraf's Downfall

President Musharraf wants to retain power; unfortunately, it appears that the people disagree. His approval ratings have declined from 51 percent in late 2006 to 28 percent today. [i] In December, polls indicated that around 67 percent wanted Musharraf to resign immediately. He was blamed by many for Bhutto's assassination, and as a result his support has likely plummeted further, driving his and the Election Commission's decision to delay elections until February 18, 2008. Despite the clear views of the majority, Musharraf continues to prioritize his own political survival. However, today he is in an untenable situation: regardless of whether he conducts himself and the elections legitimately, he is no longer trusted by either the Pakistani people or the international community. For him, perception has become reality, and the perception is not good.

In addition to lacking the support of the people, over the past year Musharraf has increasingly lost support from two other groups in Pakistan: the political parties (a number of his cabinet members have resigned and switched allegiances) and the Mullahs (the siege and subsequent attack against the Red Mosque in July 2007 ensured this opposition). Having succumbed to pressure to remove his uniform in November, it is increasingly unclear how much influence he will retain over the last player in Pakistan, the military. If the international community, particularly the United States, were to reject Musharraf (as could still happen if the elections are overtly illegitimate), then it is unlikely that the military would stick with him for long. Without the support of this final group, Musharraf is unlikely to remain President.

A Brewing Storm

The lack of predictability and transparency through both the presidential and parliamentary elections (the latter still ongoing) have compounded the confusion, the instability, and Musharraf's loss of credibility. Tensions have risen since October 6, when the presidential elections were called. Many of the parties boycotted or didn't vote, leading to Musharraf's substantial victory. But the parties did file legal cases against the process and his legitimacy to run, leading in early November to Musharraf calling a state of emergency and soon afterwards dismissing all of those Supreme Court justices who would not support him. These machinations, culminating in Musharraf removing his uniform and being reinstated as president for a new term, only raised the temperature.

In early December, the parliamentary elections were called for January 8 2008, and political campaigning started. Both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif had returned to Pakistan for the race and were battling it out on the streets. The process was complicated by the necessity for these two parties to also work together to push for a legitimate process. It seemed as though, if a fair and free election were held, the PPP would fulfill polling predictions and win, albeit without a ruling majority. But after Benazir Bhutto was assassinated, for three days it seemed as though Pakistan was going to boil over.

These political fights have been compounded in the past months by a concurrent rise in militancy, previously largely contained within the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, but which have started to spread, commingling with the ongoing sectarian violence throughout Pakistan and the fight for more autonomy in the southwest state of Baluchistan. The July siege against the Red Mosque provided the extremists with an excuse to fight. The political process distracted both the government and the international community. The political campaigns have been targeted – not just the attack against Bhutto, but also others against the PML-Q and the PML-N. Security in Pakistan is fading, a fact made clear in January 2008 as we began to see refugees flood into Afghanistan from Pakistan, the former being perceived as providing a safer environment.

A Lack of Options

Tensions will remain on the boil at least until the parliamentary elections, which are currently scheduled for February 18. The militant attacks will not diminish, particularly when they appear to be having such a powerful impact. And the political fights are only going to continue, perhaps compounded by the additional confusion surrounding the new and multi-headed leadership of the PPP.

What is clear, however, is that the people will not accept a Musharraf victory. While he does retain some support, it is fading fast. Despite his efforts, he cannot win the upcoming elections legitimately, and if he does so illegitimately, the streets are likely to become uncontrollable. As Musharraf himself is no longer chief of army staff, indications are that if his replacement, General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani, is asked to impose martial law, he will decline, being more loyal to Pakistan than to Musharraf.

So, if not a Musharraf-led parliament, then what? According to polls conducted in November 2007, if a legitimate election were held, the PPP, the only truly national party, would win by a slight margin. Following Bhutto's assassination, all indications are that the PPP will gain additional sympathetic support, and could now even garner a majority, allowing them to rule solo rather than in a coalition. The PML-N will likely also benefit slightly from the sympathy vote, the loser being Musharraf's PML-Q.

The debate surrounding who will win is, however, less relevant than one might initially think. If Musharraf does manage to hold on to power, Pakistan will only get more of what has been seen for the past eight years. Yet behind this wall, the frustrations of the people will rise, perhaps even exploding during the next administration, leading to real chaos and, if played right by the religious parties, a rise in their power and influence. If Nawaz Sharif wins, Pakistan will go back to the 1990s and his ineffective government. The only real question is what a PPP success would look like. Zardari, Bhutto's husband and the acting party chairman, was known to be corrupt and incompetent during Benazir's reign; there is no reason to think that has changed. However, PPP distaste for Zardari is so great (only 5 percent of PPP cadre supported his leadership in January polling) that a split in the PPP could result in a spin-off party led by a more competent senior figure such as Aitzaz Ahsan, the current president of the Supreme Court Bar Association still under house arrest. Perhaps Benazir's recent legacy – a strong desire for democracy – could prevail, resulting in an administration that promotes institution building and the separation of military and civilian powers.

However one looks at it, the options available to the Pakistani people are all regurgitated from previous administrations. There can be no revolution as there are no new and effective leaders to follow.

A Revolution Long in Coming

A revolution is a fundamental and rapid change in the established order. Today, the lack of leadership in Pakistan prevents this from occurring. The options available to the people are all former rulers; the personality politics that characterizes Pakistan ensures that this will not change.

Things could be different if one looks further into the future. In 2007, a fundamental adjustment occurred when the people made clear their intention to participate. They have had some degree of success in forcing both President Musharraf and the opposition parties to listen. It is not yet clear whether this profile will be encouraged, or whether it will die out from lack of support and effect. In order to be maintained, the people will have to see some success from their efforts in the coming election, not just in the result, but in the policies implemented by the new leadership and perhaps in time even new parties or new leaders to follow. Longer-term efforts will be needed, not just from Pakistanis but also from the international community, to help grow institutions and grassroots organizations, and to develop these leaders. That would require truly a more enduring strategy from outside groups as any deep-seated change in the political system will be long to take effect. And, it will require the build up of trust between these nations and the Pakistan government and people, something that is sorely lacking today, particularly vis-à-vis the United States. But the arrival on the scene of the silent and moderate majority could be the first step in a slower but more fundamental institutional change in Pakistan.

On the other hand, if the people are not supported in having their voices heard, the implications for Pakistan over the long-term could turn the other way. If democracy doesn't bring them benefits, many will turn to other less desirable mechanisms to effect change. And the new militant leadership that we are seeing along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border could find more traction within the nation, leading the country down a dark path. Perhaps this way will also bring about a revolution, but it will be one that nobody wants to see take place.

This article was originally published in the Harvard International Review: http://www.harvardir.org
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[i] IRI Index: Pakistan Public Opinion Survey, November 19-28, 2007. International Republican Institute. Available online at: http://www.iri.org/mena/pakistan/pdfs/2007-12-12-pakistan-poll.pdf

The Coming Fall of the MMA

The moment of truth for Fazlur Rahman by Rahimullah Yusufzai
The News, February 16, 2008

The man who until a few months ago was one of Pakistan's most influential politicians is now mostly confined to his rural home in a remote part of the country in Dera Ismail Khan. Maulana Fazlur Rahman cannot campaign publicly due to security concerns in an election that could drastically reduce his importance and cut down to size the MMA, the religio-political alliance that he and fellow Islamic political leaders led to a spectacular victory and power in the October 2002 general elections.

The maulana and his brothers live outside the city of Dera Ismail Khan and not far from the airport, which is deserted due to disconnection of PIA flights for quite sometime now. An under-construction mosque with its tall domes and minarets beckons from afar. The sprawling compound behind the mosque contains the row of houses belonging to the five brothers, four of whom are contesting the February 18 elections. The fifth, Ziaur Rahman, is a government employee and, therefore, ineligible to become a candidate for the polls.

Twice in recent months, the compound was attacked with rockets fired by unknown people. According to the maulana's youngest brother Obaidur Rahman, who is a candidate from the NWFP Assembly constituency comprising the city and its suburbs, the rockets fell in the agricultural fields on both sides of their houses but failed to cause any damage. On one occasion, the rockets were fired from the road just outside the compound and directly targetted Maulana Fazlur Rahman's home. The rocket attacks and subsequent intelligence reports put together by government agencies highlighted the danger to the maulana's life. Though the maulana isn't convinced that the militants linked to al-Qaeda and Taliban were plotting to kill him, he has been forced by his family members and party leadership to restrict his outdoor political activities. This has affected not only his own election campaign in Dera Ismail Khan and in neighbouring Bannu district where he is contesting another National Assembly seat but also that of his party, JUI-F, and MMA.

Visiting the maulana at his home a few days ago, one saw him delivering a speech on the phone to an election rally of his party in Ziarat in Balochistan province. Seated on a comfortable sofa in his spacious drawing room, he spoke in Pashto to a crowd sitting far away in a place so green, forested and pleasant that Pakistan's founder Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah selected it after falling ill to spend his last days. One wasn't aware of the impact that the maulana's speech would have made on the voters in Ziarat. His physical presence in Ziarat and the rest of Balochistan would certainly have made a difference and swung sections of the electorate to vote for his party candidates. Thanks to the London-based MQM leader Altaf Hussain who introduced the idea of telephonic speeches due to his inability or unwillingness to return to Pakistan on account of security concerns, this innovative method to keep in touch with supporters and run election campaign has now caught on. Islamic politicians, forever keen to make use of modern technology even if they initially suspect the western innovations to be some kind of a trap, are now increasingly using all kinds of phones, emails, SMS texts and websites to mobilize supporters, organize rallies and seek votes.

Though the maulana said he was able to visit five villages in Dera Ismail Khan the previous day and was planning to campaign in some more places that evening, it was obvious that the threat to his life has severely curtailed his movement and almost made him captive in his tightly-guarded home. His party activists are sending out CDs containing his speeches to compensate for his absence.

Making matters worse for the maulana is the split in his party, JUI-F, in Balochistan and also in some districts of NWFP and the disunity in the ranks of MMA following boycott of the polls by the Jamaat-i-Islami. A faction of the JUI-F led by Maulana Asmatullah has parted ways and formed a group known as JUI-Aaeeni, or the JUI Constitutional. It is challenging the mainstream JUI-F faction headed by Maulana Mohammad Khan Sherani and has put candidates against party ticket-holders. This was a golden chance for the JUI-F to sweep the polls in Balochistan, particularly in the Pashtun belt due to the boycott of the elections by its major rival, Mahmood Khan Achakzai's Pashtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PMAP). But the emergence of the splinter JUI Constitutional faction and also the aloofness of top JUI-F leaders such as former MNAs Hafiz Hussain Ahmad and Maulana Noor Mohammad due to the denial of party ticket for the coming elections have spoiled its chances of success at the polls in Balochistan. In its NWFP strongholds, the JUI-F has encountered split in its ranks in Swabi, Swat and some other districts and dissidents are contesting election against party nominees. This would certainly result in defeat of several JUI-F candidates and further reduce the political clout of the MMA.

Being a realist, the pragmatic maulana conceded that the Frontier was heading for a split mandate in the elections. However, he was hopeful that the MMA despite the disunity in its ranks would emerge with the largest bloc of seats in the NWFP Assembly. In his view, MMA would have to be accommodated as part of the ruling coalition in the province and at the centre as the alliance would be holding the balance of power. Known for long to be nursing ambition to become the prime minister, he humorously remarked that the parties could agree to his becoming a consensus candidate in view of the likelihood of a split mandate at the centre as well. That is unlikely to happen. Neither PPP nor PML-Q and PML-N would forego claim to the prime minister's office in favour of someone like Maulana Fazlur Rahman with much fewer number of seats in the National Assembly. In fact, his best chance to grab the prime ministerial job was after the 2002 general elections when the MMA had almost 70 seats in the National Assembly and was the dominant electoral force in the NWFP and Balochistan. That is now history and there is no chance that the MMA would repeat its unprecedented electoral performance.

However, it would be wrong to underestimate Maulana Fazlur Rahman, who is widely acknowledged as a shrewd politician. One cannot help recall that his late father Mufti Mahmud too bargained for and got the chief minister's job in the NWFP despite having only three seats in the provincial assembly compared to 13 won by its coalition partner, National Awami Party, the predecessor to Khan Abdul Wali Khan's ANP. To his credit though, Mufti Mahmud resigned as chief minister some months later to protest the dismissal of Balochistan chief minister Sardar Attaullah Mengal by the then prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto on trumped up charges. That was probably the only time that a Pakistani politician gave up such a coveted position to uphold principles. Times have changed and Maulana Fazlur Rahman cannot claim or be expected to practice principled politics in a country where politics has become the name of a money-making and power-grabbing game and political parties have been turned into family businesses.

As for the Maulana, he possesses a trump card that would keep him and his ilk of Islamic politicians relevant even if they lose elections. Here is how he explained it: "The MMA is a wall that is blocking the militants and hardliners. If the MMA comprising moderate Islamic parties is removed from the scene and made irrelevant, then it would not be easy dealing with the militants, particularly the emotional young men among them, who believe in the power of the bullet unlike us striving for a peaceful change through the power of the ballot."

Benazir's Legacy By Mark Siegel

Benazir's Legacy
By MARK A. SIEGEL, Wall Street Journal February 16, 2008

This week's publication of Benazir Bhutto's "Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and the West" is bittersweet to me, her friend and collaborator on the book, which was written in her last days. Many mullahs may hate the book, but so might many in the U.S. State Department. It takes on both the West and the Islamic world equally, exposing the dysfunctions of their respective world views, and puts Pakistan at the epicenter of the dual crises that were Benazir's themes -- the internal crisis within Islam and the crisis between Islam and the West.

Benazir and I worked on this project over the last very difficult days of her life, through assassination attempts, house arrest, emergency rule, martial law and constant harassment and intimidation. We had reason to know that all of our conversations and email exchanges were intercepted and monitored by the Musharraf regime. What we could not know, of course, was that this book would become Benazir's untimely final legacy.

Benazir believed that the international terrorist movement has two primary aims. First, the jihadists seek to reconstitute the concept of the caliphate, politically uniting the great Muslim populations of the world. Second, they seek to provoke the much debated clash of civilizations between Western values and Islam that they hope will result in the domination of a medieval interpretation of Islam that rejects modernity and pluralism. Benazir hoped to pre-empt this collision through reconciliation with the West and mobilization of the moderates within the world's 1.4 billion Muslims.

Benazir was critical of Western governments that in the past helped Muslim monarchs and dictators suffocate democratic movements and democratic governance. But she condemns Muslim hypocrisy as well. She says that while one billion Muslims around the world seem united in their outrage at the war in Iraq and the deaths of Muslims caused by U.S. military intervention, there is little similar outrage against the sectarian civil war in Iraq that has led to far more casualties. Benazir castigates Muslim leaders and intellectuals for criticizing harm inflicted on fellow Muslims by the West, but remaining deadly silent when confronted with Muslim-on-Muslim violence. She finds the Muslim community's silence about genocide in Darfur particularly reprehensible.

In her book, Benazir seeks to educate the West about what she believed to be the true nature of Islam. From the core of her being she rejects those who would use Islam to justify acts of terror; who pervert, manipulate and exploit religion for their political agendas. Chronicling and cataloging their assertions against democracy, pluralism, tolerance to other religions and societies, equality for women, and rejection of technology and modernity, she shows through specific citations of the Quran that the jihadist interpretations are not only antithetical to Islam but specifically prohibited by it.

Benazir believed that extremism thrives under dictatorship, and is nurtured and fueled by it. She believed that when people lose faith in the political process, frustration and despair lead them to reach out to extra-governmental solutions. That is exactly what she believed is happening in Pakistan today. The U.S. is once again "dancing with a dictator" by supporting President Pervez Musharraf, a policy that will come back to haunt America. Despite the administration casting its lot with a military dictator, extremism has flourished.

Benazir Bhutto and I collaborated on "Reconciliation" while she planned her return to Pakistan to contest parliamentary elections that all polls indicated she would win. Mr. Musharraf repeatedly denied requests for meaningful security for Benazir, even after the heinous assassination attempt against her on Oct. 19 that left 179 dead. The State Department continued to dismiss repeated expressions of concern about her safety. When Congress sent letters and made phone calls, Congress was ignored.

And on Dec. 27 Benazir Bhutto was assassinated in Rawalpindi, in the heart of the nation's military garrison. On Monday Pakistan will hold the national elections for which Benazir returned. The U.S. Congress has demanded that these elections be free, fair, transparent and internationally monitored. The U.S. State Department however, seems content to concede that the elections will not be free and fair but still (somehow) "good." In Islamabad these words are seen as a green light to rig with impunity.

Benazir Bhutto gave her life for the principles in which she believed. It is time for the Bush administration to tell Mr. Musharraf that anything less than free and fair elections is unacceptable and that an electoral fraud will not stand.

Mr. Siegel collaborated with Benazir Bhutto on the recently published book "Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and the West" (Harper). He is a partner at Locke Lord Strategies in Washington, D.C.

Musharraf’s outbursts: Dawn

Musharraf’s outbursts
Dawn Editorial, February 16, 2008

PRESIDENT Musharraf is now so totally divorced from reality that he finds it difficult to accept the fact that his popularity ratings are slumping. He therefore feels he is within his right to warn the people of Pakistan against consequences yet to be defined if things don’t go the way he thinks they should post Feb 18. For starters, Mr Musharraf doesn’t like the opinion polls, which make it all too clear that all and sundry simply dislike him and possibly even his progeny with a passion that escapes calculation. He thinks, immersed in the positive reinforcement supplied by a fast diminishing group of yes-men (even flunkeys have a modicum of sense and an eye cocked to the future), that these opinion polls are biased, influenced by NGOs of devious bent and similar anti-social elements capable of independent and rational thought. What exactly is he threatening, you and me being the audience, when he says that putting him in a “bind” would be inadvisable? How, precisely, will he lash out? Remember that Mr Musharraf’s worst has already been seen. Consider also that he no longer commands the army, an institution that now follows the dictates of a man seemingly of far more sober an outlook. So what does putting Musharraf in a “bind” really entail? Please explain that, Mr President. Are we to expect state-sponsored violence if things don’t go your way?

Pakistan is not alone in suffering dictators and insecure midget-men who seem convinced that they are the chosen saviours. Yet we do get more than our fair share of these tinpots. Why is that? One, you can’t escape the fact that the people of Pakistan (quite incredibly) still haven’t lost all faith in the inherent goodness of the Pakistan Army. That’s a given, like it or not. So it is that people as patently mediocre as Pervez Musharraf can rise to great heights and shout from the pulpits at any given time and in a manner which would get you and me arrested in the Islamic republic. Two, we have suffered fools for way too long without doing anything about it. Three, because our mindset as a people and a nation is not revolutionary, at least no longer, we deserve ‘leaders’ even as controversial as Asif Zardari. Think about that before you vote.

Fear and loathing, to quote Hunter Thompson, is how the pre-election sentiment can best be described. Hyderabad started shutting down on Thursday and Karachi will follow on Saturday. The Frontier, Balochistan and Punjab will no doubt follow the dictates of their own peculiar exigencies. Already food is in short supply across the country.

Feb 18 is being viewed with trepidation, not hope. What an irony.

Friday, February 15, 2008

Call for International Monitoring of Pakistan Elections by US Congress Members

US Congress Members Express Concern with Musharraf Government Manipulating Elections and Call for International Monitoring and Removal of Restrictions on Media

Washington, DC— Today, Congressman Steve Israel (D-NY) led twelve of his colleagues in Congress in sending a letter to Secretary Rice regarding the upcoming elections in Pakistan. The letter calls on Secretary Rice to encourage Pakistani President Musharraf to allow international monitoring of the February 18 elections in Pakistan and to remove restrictions on the media.

“Without a credible electoral process, instability in Pakistan will continue, and likely worsen, to the detriment of the people of Pakistan and U.S. national interests,” said Congressman Israel, a Member of the State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee. “We need to do everything we can to ensure the elections are fair, that media can work without restriction and that the elections are not further postponed.”

The letter, sent today, was signed by the following House Members: Steve Israel (D-NY), Gary Ackerman (D-NY), Joseph Crowley (D-NY), Lloyd Doggett (D-TX), Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), Maurice Hinchey (D-NY), Patrick Kennedy (D-MA) Steve Rothman (D-NJ), Tim Ryan (D-OH) and Anthony Weiner (D-NY).

A full copy of the letter follows:

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

February 8, 2008

The Honorable Condoleezza Rice
Secretary of State
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Madam Secretary:

We write to express our concern that the United States is not doing enough to prevent the government of President Pervez Musharraf from manipulating the upcoming February 18th elections in Pakistan. Without a credible electoral process, instability in Pakistan will continue, and likely worsen, to the detriment of the people of Pakistan and U.S. national interests.

As you know, on November 3, 2007, President Musharraf suspended the Pakistani constitution and assumed emergency powers under a Provisional Constitutional Order. That order suspended a number of fundamental rights listed in the Pakistani constitution including freedom from unlawful arrest and detention and the freedoms of movement, assembly, association and speech. In addition, the order required that the country’s judges take a new oath of office. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court refused to take the new oath and he, along with seven of his colleagues and scores of other High Court judges, were suspended. The courts were subsequently reconstituted with justices appointed by President Musharraf.

The lack of an independent judiciary also undermines Pakistan's Election Commission since the commission is headed by a former Supreme Court Justice handpicked by President Musharraf and is made up of sitting High Court judges from each of the four provinces. As these judges all now serve at the pleasure of President Musharraf, it is difficult to see how the people of Pakistan can have any faith that the institutional supervision of the upcoming elections will be free and fair.

In addition, it is our understanding that the Government of Pakistan has barred monitors from conducting exit polls and has otherwise severely restricted the ability of international monitors to oversee the election. Because of these restrictions, the International Republican Institute (IRI), which had previously planned to send dozens of election monitors to Pakistan, has now decided against sending such a mission. In a January 25th article published in the McClatchy Newspapers, Lorne Craner, President of IRI, was quoted as saying, "It's very unusual not to be able to do an exit poll......An exit poll or a parallel vote tabulation is an extra assurance of the legitimacy of the election."

In light of these circumstances, we urge you to call on President Musharraf to allow all international monitors the freedom to do their job fully, including access to polling stations in areas beyond the major cities. In addition, we urge you to ask that the Election Commission be reconstituted so it enjoys the confidence of all major political parties. Lastly, we urge you to ask President Musharraf to lift all restrictions on the media, and for his assurance that the elections will not be postponed beyond the stated February 18th date.

According to the latest opinion polls, 75% of Pakistanis want President Musharraf to step down immediately. With the elections for the new Parliament one week away, President Musharraf has an obvious incentive to manipulate the elections in order to produce a parliament supportive of him. Pakistan is the world's sixth largest country and its 165 million people deserve an election that is free, fair and transparent. We must do all that we can to warn President Musharraf not to undermine the credibility of the election, an act which could trigger mass unrest and create further instability in a nation that is crucial to our fight against global terrorism.

International monitors, a reformed judiciary and electoral commission and an unrestricted media are all necessary to bring credibility to the Pakistani elections and we ask you to urge President Musharraf to take these steps to ensure free and fair elections in Pakistan.

Sincerely,

Steve Israel, Gary Ackerman, Joseph Crowley, Lloyd Doggett, Kirsten Gillibrand, Maurice Hinchey, Patrick Kennedy, Steve Rothman, Tim Ryan, Anthony Weiner.

When We Torture: By Nicholas Kristof (NYT)

When We Torture
By NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF, The New York times, February 14, 2008

The most famous journalist you may never have heard of is Sami al-Hajj, an Al Jazeera cameraman who is on a hunger strike to protest abuse during more than six years in a Kafkaesque prison system.

Mr. Hajj’s fortitude has turned him into a household name in the Arab world, and his story is sowing anger at the authorities holding him without trial.

That’s us. Mr. Hajj is one of our forgotten prisoners in Guantánamo Bay.

If the Bush administration appointed an Under Secretary of State for Antagonizing the Islamic World, with advice from a Blue Ribbon Commission for Sullying America’s Image, it couldn’t have done a more systematic job of discrediting our reputation around the globe. Instead of using American political capital to push for peace in the Middle East or Darfur, it is using it to force-feed Mr. Hajj.

President Bush is now moving forward with plans to try six Guantánamo prisoners before a military tribunal, rather than hold a regular trial. That will call new attention to abuses in Guantánamo and sow more anti-Americanism around the world.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice pushed last year to close Guantánamo because of its wretched impact on American foreign policy. But they lost the argument to Alberto Gonzales and Dick Cheney. So America spends millions of dollars bolstering public diplomacy and sponsoring chipper radio and television broadcasts to the Islamic world — and then undoes it all with Guantánamo.

Suppose the Iranian government arrested and beat Katie Couric, held her virtually incommunicado for six years and promised to release her only if she would spy for Iran. In such circumstances, Iranian investments in public diplomacy toward the United States wouldn’t get very far, either.

After Mr. Hajj was arrested in Afghanistan in December 2001, he was beaten, starved, frozen and subjected to anal searches in public to humiliate him, his lawyers say. The U.S. government initially seems to have confused him with another cameraman, and then offered vague accusations that he had been a financial courier and otherwise assisted extremist groups.

“There is a significant amount of information, both unclassified and classified, which supports continued detention of Sami al-Hajj by U.S. forces,” said Cmdr. Jeffrey Gordon, a Pentagon spokesman, adding that the detainees are humanely treated and “receive exceptional medical care.”

Military officials did acknowledge that Mr. Hajj was not considered a potential suicide bomber and probably would have been released long ago if he had just “come clean” by responding in greater detail to the allegations and showing remorse.

Mr. Hajj’s lawyers contend that he has already responded in great detail to every allegation. One indication that the government doesn’t take its own charges seriously, the lawyers say, is that the U.S. offered Mr. Hajj a deal: immediate freedom if he would spy on Al Jazeera. Mr. Hajj refused.

Most Americans, including myself, originally gave President Bush the benefit of the doubt and assumed that the inmates truly were “the worst of the worst.” But evidence has grown that many are simply the unluckiest of the unluckiest.

Some were aid workers who were kidnapped by armed Afghan groups and sold to the C.I.A. as extremists. One longtime Sudanese aid worker employed by an international charity, Adel Hamad, was just released by the U.S. in December after five years in captivity. A U.S. Army major reviewing his case called it “unconscionable.”

Mr. Hajj began his hunger strike more than a year ago, so twice daily he is strapped down and a tube is wound up his nose and down his throat to his stomach. Sometimes a lubricant is used, and sometimes it isn’t, so his throat and nose have been rubbed raw. Sometimes a tube still bloody from another hunger striker is used, his lawyers say.

“It’s really a regime to make it as painful and difficult as possible,” said one of his lawyers, Zachary Katznelson.

Mr. Hajj cannot bend his knees because of abuse he received soon after his arrest, yet the toilet chair he was prescribed was removed — making it excruciating for him to use the remaining squat toilet. He is allowed a Koran, but his glasses were confiscated so he cannot read it.

All this is inhumane, but also boneheaded. Guantánamo itself does far more damage to American interests than Mr. Hajj could ever do.

To stand against torture and arbitrary detention is not to be squeamish. It is to be civilized.

'Kal Aaj aur Kal' (Part 1)- Poem by Aitzaz Ahsan

'Kal Aaj aur Kal' (Part 2)- Poem by Aitzaz Ahsan

Evidence of "Massive" Rigging Plan: Human Rights Watch

Pakistan: Attorney General Aware of ‘Massive’ Election-Rigging Plans
Audio Recording Calls Into Question Government’s Commitment to Fair Elections
Human Rights Watch - February 14, 2008

For Audio of Attorney General Malik Qayyum, click here

(New York, February 15, 2008) – In an audio recording obtained by Human Rights Watch, Pakistan’s Attorney General Malik Qayyum stated that upcoming parliamentary elections will be “massively rigged,” Human Rights Watch said today.

In the recording, Qayyum appears to be advising an unidentified person on what political party the person should approach to become a candidate in the upcoming parliamentary election, now scheduled for February 18, 2008.

Human Rights Watch said that the recording was made during a phone interview with a member of the media on November 21, 2007. Qayyum, while still on the phone interview, took a call on another telephone and his side of that conversation was recorded. The recording was made the day after Pakistan’s Election Commission announced the schedule for polls. The election was originally planned for January 8 but was postponed after the assassination of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto. Another former prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, returned to Pakistan on November 25. An English translation of the recording, which is in Urdu and Punjabi, follows:

“Leave Nawaz Sharif (PAUSE).... I think Nawaz Sharif will not take part in the election (PAUSE).... If he does take part, he will be in trouble. If Benazir takes part she too will be in trouble (PAUSE).... They will massively rig to get their own people to win. If you can get a ticket from these guys, take it (PAUSE).... If Nawaz Sharif does not return himself, then Nawaz Sharif has some advantage. If he comes himself, even if after the elections rather than before (PAUSE)…. Yes….”

Repeated attempts by Human Rights Watch to contact Qayyum by phone were unsuccessful.

Fears of rigging have been a major issue in the current election campaign. Human Rights Watch said that since the official election period commenced in November 2007, there have been numerous allegations of irregularities, including arrests and harassment of opposition candidates and party members. There are also allegations that state resources, administration and state machinery are being used to the advantage of candidates backed by President Pervez Musharraf. Human Rights Watch expressed concern that the Election Commission, which is monitoring the polls, was not acting impartially.

Background

Malik Qayyum is a former judge who resigned from the bench in 2001 amid charges of misconduct. On April 15, 1999, a two-judge panel of the Lahore High Court headed by Qayyum convicted Benazir Bhutto and her husband Asif Ali Zardari in a corruption case. They were sentenced to five years in prison, fined US$8.6 million dollars each, disqualified as members of parliament for five years, and forced to forfeit their property. The impending verdict led Bhutto to go into exile in March 1999.

In February 2001, the Sunday Times, a British newspaper, published a report based on transcripts of 32 audio tapes, which revealed that Qayyum convicted Bhutto and Zardari for political reasons. The transcripts of the recordings reproduced by the newspaper showed that Qayyum asked then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s anti-corruption chief, Saifur Rehman, for advice on the sentence: “Now you tell me how much punishment do you want me to give her?”

In April 2001, on the basis of this evidence, a seven-member bench of Pakistan’s Supreme Court upheld an appeal by the couple, overturning the conviction. In its ruling, the Supreme Court contended that Qayyum had been politically motivated in handing down the sentence. Faced with a trial for professional misconduct before Pakistan’s Supreme Judicial Council, the constitutional body authorized to impeach senior judges, Qayyum opted to resign his post in June 2001.

A close associate of Musharraf, Qayyum was appointed as the lead counsel on behalf of Pakistan’s federal government in the presidential reference against Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, instituted after Chaudhry was first illegally deposed by Musharraf on March 9, 2007. A full bench of Pakistan’s Supreme Court reinstated Chief Justice Chaudhry on July 20, 2007.

Qayyum was appointed attorney general of Pakistan by Musharraf in August 2007.

Thursday, February 14, 2008

Pakistan: Constitutional Deviation


Who can alter Basic Law?
By Justice (retd) Rana Bhagwandas, Dawn, February 14, 2008

WITHOUT even entering into the controversy of the legality or justification of the Proclamation of Emergency on Nov 3, 2007, and the PCO, the legal effect of its revocation on Dec 15, 2007, and the repeal of the PCO need to be clearly examined.

One may recall here the two earlier occasions when extra-constitutional measures were taken by the armed forces which held the Constitution in abeyance and the Supreme Court took steps to give them conditional validity. In fact, the seven-judge bench including the Chief Justice appointed under the PCO held in its order of Nov 23, 2007, that the situation prevailing on Nov 3, 2007, was similar to the one existing on July 5, 1977, and Oct 12, 1999.

The order relied on the precedents of Begum Nusrat Bhutto v. Chief of Army Staff, and Zafar Ali Shah v. Pervez Musharraf, while validating the instruments issued on Nov 3, 2007.

In Nusrat Bhutto’s case, the court had held that the Constitution still remained the supreme law of the land and proceeded to validate the military take-over describing it as an extra-constitutional deviation for a limited period. It held that during this period the CMLA was entitled to perform all acts which could have been done under the Constitution, including the power to amend it for the good of the people.

Indeed, several amendments in the Constitution were introduced by Gen Ziaul Haq in his eight-year martial law, most of them through the Revival of Constitution Order (RCO) — PO XIV of 1985, promulgated on March 2, 1985.

This Order in its schedule carried all the ‘amended’ provisions ordained by the general and also proposed a new Article 270-A purporting to validate all legislative and executive measures taken by the martial law regime. However, soon enough it was realised that the limited authority conferred by the Supreme Court did not enable one individual to make permanent changes in the supreme law of the country.

Therefore, all the amendments introduced were duly placed, deliberated upon and adopted with modifications by the Constitution-amending body, that is, the newly elected parliament. Each House passed the Constitution (Eighth Amendment) Act by two-third majority on Nov 23, 1985. Article 270-A as contained in the Act expressly ‘adopted and affirmed’ all constitutional amendments including the RCO itself.

It is only on account of adoption of the amendments by the Constitution-amending body that the Supreme Court found it possible to uphold them in Mahmood Achakzai’s case.

In Zafar Ali Shah’s case, a military take-over was similarly validated on the basis of the doctrine of state necessity. A timeframe for reverting to a constitutional government was prescribed and the chief executive was likewise given limited authority to amend the Constitution. General Musharraf also made some amendments through the Legal Framework Order 2002 (LFO) introduced in Aug 2002 before holding general elections.

This time a crude attempt was made by some of his advisers to let the ‘one-man amendments’ be treated as a fait accompli by circulating altered copies of the Constitution to newly elected members. Nevertheless, right at the time of taking oath some members not supporting the King’s party refused to accept any Constitution that did not exist on Oct 12, 1999.

The deadlock was finally resolved through negotiations and has been recorded in book form by a PML-Q senator and senior advocate S.M. Zafar. All the amendments purportedly introduced through the LFO were placed before the two Houses of parliament and approved through the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act on Dec 31, 2003. Article 270-AA adopted and affirmed the PCO.

The position that emerges is quite clear. In the cases of Nusrat Bhutto and Zafar Ali Shah as well as in the recent decision, the consistent view of the Supreme Court has been that the Constitution is a supreme law and some deviation has been found permissible on grounds of state necessity.

In the precedent cases, the scope of the powers available to the CMLA/chief executive during the period of such deviation was discussed. The Laws (Continuance in Force) Order and the Provisional Constitution Order issued on both earlier occasions provided that the country would be governed as nearly as may be in accordance with the Constitution.

It was in this context that limited power to amend the Constitution during governance in the deviation period was conceded to a particular individual. It may be appropriate to quote the following pre-requisites laid down by Irshad Hassan Khan CJ for the invocation of the doctrine of necessity in Zafar Ali Shah’s case:

“The court is hereby faced with an extra-constitutional situation and (in view) all the elements, namely, inevitable necessity, exceptional circumstances, no other remedy to apply, measure taken must be proportionate to the necessity and it must be of temporary character, limited in duration to the exceptional circumstances … the Constitution provided no solution to meet the extraordinary situation prevailing on Oct 12, 1999.”

The Constitution is a sacred covenant amongst the people of the country requiring a strict mode of alteration. It can be amended only by a two-third majority of the total membership of each House of parliament, one elected on population basis and the other granting equal representation to federating units. On no pretext could a permanent change in the Constitution be countenanced either at the behest of the president or a court.

It is, therefore, evident that the power to amend the Constitution referred to in the cases of Nusrat Bhutto and Zafar Ali Shah was only meant to extend to the period of constitutional deviation and the amendments introduced would only have effect up to such period alone.

It would otherwise be ridiculous to assume that though the chief of army staff issued a Proclamation of Emergency to deal with a particular situation, he can completely deface the Constitution and then revoke the Proclamation within a couple of days after imposing a new basic law.

(To be continued)
The writer is a retired judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

Who can alter the Basic Law — II
By Justice (retd) Rana Bhagwandas; Dawn, February 14, 2008

THE mere inclusion of Articles 270-A and 270-AA in the body of the Constitution unequivocally demonstrates that the president’s power to amend the Constitution could be exercised and have effect only during the period of constitutional deviation.

This was conceded by the Supreme Court in the case of the military takeovers by Ziaul Haq and Pervez Musharraf.

Obviously, once the constitutional government stood restored, all legislative power, including the power to amend the Constitution, exercised by the CMLA/chief executive came to an end. Nevertheless, the amendments in the Constitution could not be allowed to continue of their own force and it is precisely for this reason that the above articles were incorporated in the Constitution.

If the power to make amendments in the Constitution had been made available to any individual by the Supreme Court on a permanent basis they would have had no need to insert the above articles in the body of the Constitution. It is a universally recognised principle that no constitutional provision can be treated as redundant.

Even in the Order dated Nov 23, 2007, it was categorically held that the Constitution remained the supreme law of the land. Albeit some parts thereof — para 4 (1 ) — stated that “the old legal order has not been completely suppressed but it is a case of constitutional deviation for a limited transitional period and the judges of superior courts are subject to accountability before the Supreme Judicial Council in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 209 of the Constitution”.

Against this backdrop, the observation that those who have not taken the oath have ceased to hold their respective offices and therefore their cases were hit by the doctrine of past and closed transaction could only speak of a bar to their reopening during the subsistence of the period of deviation and no more.

It may be recalled that Article 270of the Constitution was inserted through the Seventeenth Amendment to confer constitutional validity to the removal of judges effected through the PCO of 2000. Indeed, a new clause (2) is sought to be inserted to constitutionalise the removal of judges under the PCO of Nov 3, 2007, through the President’s Order 6 of 2007 on Dec 14, 2007. But the aforesaid amendment can have no effect after the revival of the Constitution.

An attempt no doubt has been made to ‘validate’ the amendments made during the period of deviation by insertion of Article 270AAA through the constitutional amendment issued on Nov 21, 2007. It is, however, incomprehensible how a person taking an invalid measure could validate his own act. Keeping in view past history, such a provision could only be made by the Constitution-making body itself.

At the same time, it needs to be kept in view that in Zafar Ali Shah’s case as reviewed by the Supreme Court in the Wasim Sajjad v. Federation of Pakistan, it was held that any constitutional provision stipulating the removal of judges without recourse to the Supreme Judicial Council would impair the independence of the judiciary, negate the basic spirit of the Constitution and would be beyond the Constitution-amending powers of parliament. A view contrary to the above, held by an 11-member bench, has not been taken by a larger bench of the court so far.

The argument that the constitutional amendments made by the president have become effective and do not require any validation is ex facie fallacious. It is yet another crude and senseless attempt to revive a controversy which is both legally and politically dead. On the contrary, upon the revival of the Constitution all amendments made since Nov 3, 2007, ceased to have legal effect and all orders which could not withstand the test of constitutionality became inoperative. Only the executive will to enforce the supremacy of the Constitution is required.

Even the caretaker government could advise the president to do so, though it might not, for its own reasons. However, the constitutional crisis would remain unresolved from the standpoint of any political government unless an independent judiciary in accordance with the parameters laid down by the Supreme Court in the Al Jihad case (PLD 1996 SC 324) and Asad Ali’s case (PLD 1998 SC 161) is duly installed.

In the above cases, the court emphatically insisted upon meaningful consultation with judicial functionaries in the appointment of judges and seniority principles in the appointment of chief justices to ensure the independence of the judiciary from the executive.

Under the PCO, 13 out of 18 judges of the Supreme Court including the Chief Justice were removed and replaced by handpicked individuals. Restoration of an independent judiciary, therefore, must be a prime issue for the functioning of any parliamentary democracy worth the name.

The Order dated Nov 23, 2007, validating the Proclamation of Emergency and PCO, was passed by seven individuals each one of whom was a beneficiary of the latter, that is, one was appointed as Chief Justice and six as judges of the Supreme Court under the said instrument. Incidentally, while three of the four other judges of the Supreme Court who had taken the new oath were initially included in the bench they subsequently declined to participate.

The collective wisdom displayed in one’s own cause might be rare in judicial history and yet their lordships did not consider it proper even to issue notices to judges whose cases were declared “past and closed transaction which could not be reopened”.Again, they categorically held that judges of the superior courts were accountable before the Supreme Judicial Council and could only be removed through the procedure laid down in Article 209 of the Constitution. Yet they sought to validate the removal of their colleagues in defiance of the mandate of the Constitution, the binding precedents of the court and their own judgment.

(Concluded)
The writer is a retired judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan.