Why Pakistan Army is against PPP?

PPP and the Pakistan army
Daily Times editorial, January 15, 2008

President Pervez Musharraf’s view, expressed to an American magazine, that the late PPP chairperson, Benazir Bhutto, “was very unpopular with the military”, clears the issues surrounding his policy drift in the last eight years and foreshadows what might transpire in the coming months. He began his career as the ruler of Pakistan by stigmatising both the mainstream parties, then plumping for the breakaway PML, in line with his military indoctrination against the PPP. The army’s dislike of Ms Bhutto dated from her 1988-1990 government when she was reluctantly allowed to rule under “conditions”, but was doubly disliked when she failed to walk in step with the military adventurers of Pakistan .

The army’s hatred of Ms Bhutto was once hatred of the PPP as a legacy of its populist founder, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was the first truly elected leader of Pakistan after the 1970 elections. Mr Bhutto’s handling of the post-1971 military structure brought out the animus of its upper echelons, but the anti-PPP orientation became really entrenched in the entire body of the army during the era of General Ziaul Haq who hanged Bhutto, then changed the ideological identity of the state to keep the PPP out of power. What was purely a self-protecting reaction to Mr Bhutto’s interventionist approach gradually became an ideological animosity. Ms Bhutto was treated roughly by General Zia after her father’s hanging because he feared a “ revanchist -dynastic” backlash.

The PML was Gen Zia’s gift to the politics of Pakistan . He bequeathed to it what he had bequeathed to the Pakistan army too: Islam, superimposed on the old India-driven nationalism. Ms Bhutto soon began to be called a “security risk” after she took over the government in 1988. The PPP now began to be judged by the army and the broad rightwing Urdu press on the yardstick of Pakistan ’s revisionist stance towards India . The army top brass and the rank and file now had a catechism on which to judge one another. Officers suspected of being pro-PPP walked under a shadow and were not promoted.

The PPP was allowed to rule in 1988 by army chief Mirza Aslam Beg only after she had accepted the army’s “preconditions”, which included non-interference in the following spheres: India and Afghan policy and the nuclear policy. She was ousted because she was seen as not adhering to the “preconditions”, and ISI officers were caught red-handed trying to topple her through a rigged vote of no confidence in the National Assembly. Her interior minister, Mr Aitzaz Ahsan, was accused in the anti-PPP Urdu press of betraying the Khalistani secrets to New Delhi .

Then there is the relationship between the Pakistan army and the US . Every time the Pakistan military cohabits with the United States , it breeds an intense anti-US sentiment among its officers. Under SEATO and CENTO, a whole generation of officers grew up hating the US for not “helping” during the 1965 war. The same sort of thing happened when General Zia got the army to cohabit with the US to defeat the Soviet Union in Afghanistan . The army bred Generals Aslam Beg and Hameed Gul as a result of this period of perverse cross- fertilisation , prized for their contribution to the army’s anti-US pathology. Therefore the PPP was condemned as the “liberal” party which was accused of not being faithful to the country’s ideology.

In 2001, the army’s chief did something that its torso was unprepared to accept overnight. General Pervez Musharraf went with the American global response to Al Qaeda because he thought there was no other reasonable course to take in the national interest, but he knew fully that this course would make him unpopular with an army that still responded to the anti-American maunderings of Aslam Beg and Hameed Gul. That is why he had to get rid of Gen Mahmood Ahmed, the then DG-ISI, because he was not fully on board. However, one concession that General Musharraf made to the army at this point was to pander to its enduring anti-PPP legacy, which could very well have been also a result of his own personal development as a successful officer. From condemning both the mainstream parties, he settled down to rule in conjunction with the PML after excluding from it Mr Nawaz Sharif with whom he had a personal score to settle.

That General Musharraf was a half-formed man with some tactical skill was the only way one could look at him after 2001, but as time passed he also developed some strategic skill unknown in the Pakistan army. He negated the military shibboleth of overtly hating India and secretly hating the US , and projected a vision of a “liberal” Pakistan serving as a “trade corridor” for India and the rest of the world. As he distanced himself from the army’s entrenched position, he appeared to move closer to the worldview of the PPP as led by Ms Bhutto, arousing misgivings and fears in the breast of his PMLQ partner in power. This was the period of ambivalence. It cost him more than he may have realised. His policies failed because of lack of political support. Caliban -like, he drove on till an accumulating mountain of failures overtook him in 2007.

Now General (Retd) Musharraf seems to be returning to the military’s traditional anti-US stance. But this won’t even get it brownie points with the anti-US middle classes of Pakistan . Today the Pakistan army is viewed by them as an “interfering” army, and he has become the symbol of this “subversion of democracy”. The PPP stands to make big gains in the coming elections, as a parting gift from Ms Bhutto. And he is suspected of doing what the Ziaist crop of generals did in the past: derailing the political process to keep the PPP out.

Dark Days Ahead for Musharraf

Q&A: 'Pakistanis Know I Can Be Tough’
Newsweek, Jan 12, 2008
Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf talks about fair elections, Benazir Bhutto's assassination and security in the region.
By Fareed Zakaria

Since Benazir Bhutto's assassination weeks ago, Pakistan has been plunged into one of the worst crises in its history. President Pervez Musharraf, having recently given up control of the nation's army, remains firmly in charge and as reluctant as ever to share power, despite a rising tide of criticism. He spoke to NEWSWEEK's Fareed Zakaria from his camp office in Rawalpindi. Excerpts:

NEWSWEEK: What do you make of reports that the United States is thinking about launching CIA operations in Pakistan with or without Pakistan's approval?
Pervez Musharraf: We are totally in cooperation on the intelligence side. But we are totally against [a military operation]. We are a sovereign country. We will ask for assistance from outsiders. They won't impose their will on us.

How do you take Hillary Clinton's suggestion that the United States and Britain help Pakistan secure its nuclear weapons?

Does she know how secure [the weapons] are and what we are doing to keep them so? They are very secure. We will ask if we need assistance. Nobody should tell us what to do. And I'd ask anyone who says such things, do you know how our strategic assets are handled, stored and developed--do you know it?

Have you told the American government that?
No, why should we? We have said we are totally under control.

Graham Allison of Harvard says that these weapons must be disbursed for them to have survivability, which means that they could also fall into the wrong hands, because there might be a local command structure that is weak.

He doesn't know anything--how disbursed they are, and he shouldn't think that we don't know these things. We are from the military, we understand how to handle things, whether they need to be disbursed or concentrated.

But you understand that due to past episodes there is concern.

Yes, the past has [caused] some concern, but we must understand the difference between past and now. Before we were a declared and overt nuclear state, we had to hide everything. Everything was covert. Only the scientists and the president of Pakistan knew what was going on. Now there is a national command authority. It is the top body, headed by the president and the prime minister, and there are members from the military and the civilian side. And there's a huge strategic planning division, a full secretariat headed by now-retired [Lt. General Khalid] Kidwai. He is in charge of this Strategic Planning Division that is the secretarial arm of the National Command, responsible for development and employment. Then we have army, navy, air force, the strategic force command. If anything happens, indeed it's a failure of everyone from myself to SPD to the Army Strategic Force Command.

But it would need the collusion of several people, up and down the chain.

Absolutely. It's like an army unit. Can one rifle be taken away from an army unit? Can the bullet of a rifle be taken away from an army unit? I challenge anyone to take a bullet, a weapon, away from an army unit.

You've said that Benazir Bhutto took risks. Surely it's normal for a politician to stand in a car's sunroof. If this is taking a risk, then politics is impossible in Pakistan.

This gathering she addressed was maybe 25,000-to-30,000 people. I have addressed gatherings of hundreds of thousands. She was given security. [But] you have to be conscious of security. The man in charge of security should be conscious. The man in charge of her security was her own handpicked superintendent of police. This area was known to be dangerous. There was a death threat, intelligence that there would be an attack, and we told her, yet she wanted to go, she was intent about it. She went into a dangerous place, and if you get out of the vehicle, you are responsible. All the others sitting inside the vehicle were safe.

...

Do you think you're the right person to fight this war against the jihadis?

The United States thought Benazir was the right person to fight terrorists. Who is the best person to fight? You need three qualities today if you want to fight the extremists and the terrorists. Number one, you must have the military with you. Well, she was very unpopular with the military. Very unpopular. Number two, you shouldn't be seen by the entire religious lobby to be alien--a nonreligious person. The third element: don't be seen as an extension of the United States. Now I am branded as an extension, but not to the extent she was. Pakistanis know that I can be tough. I can speak out against Hillary Clinton. I can speak out against anyone. These are the elements. You be the judge.

For complete Interview, click here

Also see: Musharraf’s Last Stand Newsweek, Jan 12, 2008

Asif Zardari — can this man hold the PPP together?

Asif Zardari — can this man hold the PPP together?
By Ahmed Rashid; January 15, 2008

Before Benazir’s death, the Pakistani press referred to Zardari as ‘Mr Ten Percent’. Now, this same media prefers to hang on his every word. It appears that in light of his wife’s death, Zardari has been forgiven his sins – for the time being at least

More than two weeks after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, people are still coming in their tens of thousands to condole with her husband Asif Ali Zardari and weep and rage at her graveside.

They come on camels and tractor trolleys, luxury cars and private planes. Like an endless stream the lines of vehicles clog this small village, sending up showers of dust that settle on the lush fields of sugar cane. Some have walked the 300 kilometres from Karachi like monks doing penance.

There are Sindhis with their embroidered caps, Punjabis with enormous turbans and fierce looking Pashtun and Baloch tribesmen, as well as Kashmiris and Afghans with their winter caps and Mongols who live close to the Chinese border. In death no other politician in Pakistan has the capacity to assemble the entire nation in such a way – a nation usually divided by ethnic and sectarian hatred.

In the feudal family farmhouse of Bhutto at Naudero, Zardari sits in the middle of a warren of rooms and courtyards jam-packed with mourners. He moves from room to room hugging friends and raising his hands in frequent prayer. The rooms are windowless, built over the years to accommodate the maximum number of supplicants as Benazir herself was a feudal landlord. Now the walls are covered with pictures of her and her children and people burst into tears looking at them. We are now in the tenth day of the 40-day mourning period prescribed by Islam and the crowds should be thinning out, but there is no sign of that as yet.

As we wait to see Zardari, sitting next to me are one of the country’s top industrialists, senior lawyers and Pakistan’s leading landscape painter. Also an elderly woman who bursts into tears every few minutes and wails, “Oh God could you not have taken me instead of her.” Outside in the courtyard, thousands of peasants mill around, dazed and confused waiting to touch the hem of Zardari’s clothes, if not his hands.

Since Benazir’s death the Western media has revived Zardari’s nickname ‘Mr Ten Percent’, accrued from the commissions he allegedly made in deals when Benazir was prime minister twice in the 1990s. At one point he was immensely disliked in the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) but now the same leaders say he is a changed man, more mature, responsible and more humble.

For starters, he spent eight years in jail under President Pervez Musharraf but was never found guilty of any of the charges against him. For many in the PPP he has paid his dues with his excessively long jail term. Not a single Pakistani newspaper has used the nickname since Benazir’s death and the media now hangs on to Zardari’s every word. In the light of his wife’s murder, he has been forgiven his sins – for the time being at least.

He has said he will guide the PPP up to the elections on February 18 and then take a back seat. The permanent leader of the party is his son Bilawal Bhutto, aged 19, and now in his first year at Oxford University. Zardari will not contest a seat in parliament and he has appointed another PPP leader, fellow Sindhi landlord Amin Fahim, as the party candidate to be prime minister.

Again much criticism has come from the Western media about the dynastic succession and the lack of democracy in the party – but in rural Sindh people would accept nothing less than a Bhutto to lead them. Benazir was first and foremost a Sindhi and even if Bilawal is underage, unimpressive and raw he is a Bhutto. Politics across South Asia is littered with political dynasties and there is nothing anyone can do about it for the time being.

Zardari escapes with a small group of journalists into his hideaway, a tiny soundproof room that can only seat five people. In a private conservation he unburdens his thoughts and fears for the future.

He knows he has a very tough job to keep the party together. Every one of the 54 members of the PPP central executive is loyal to Benazir. Zardari is meeting some of them for the first time. Benazir dictated her orders to them, Zardari says all decisions are being made collectively and through consensus. He says nobody can replace Benazir with her knowledge and experience – “we need all the brains we can muster to take the right decisions,” he says. In every sentence he invokes her name and her memory.

Zardari, along with every other Sindhi and perhaps the majority of Pakistanis, is convinced that the government, the army and the intelligence services were involved in Benazir’s murder. Despite heated government denials, the bumbling mistakes made by the regime since her death and the total lack of remorse shown by President Pervez Musharraf and his political partners have only further convinced the public of a conspiracy. Zardari and the PPP insist that nobody had the capacity to carry out such a murder except the state, the so-called establishment.

Zardari and the PPP also fear that Musharraf and the military will never allow general elections to take place on February 18 because there will be a landslide sympathy vote for the PPP. All the indications are that he is right.

The ruling Pakistan Muslim League (PML) is in a panic, their leaders dare not come out of their houses for fear of crowds beating them up or blaming them for Benazir’s death. Some PML politicians are trying to whip up Punjabi-Sindhi ethnic tensions – a sure fire way to get the polls postponed. Nobody rules out more political assassinations either.

Zardari asks, that when Musharraf has done everything possible in the past nine months to stop the PPP juggernaut – declared an emergency, suspended the constitution, imprisoned thousands of people, curbed the media and sacked Supreme Court judges – how can he now allow free and fair elections.

Equally the military could try and rig the elections but that is more difficult now than it was on the original election date of January 8. Now there is greater public vigilance and much greater hatred for the regime. Zardari does not doubt that the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) will use the next eight weeks to try and break the PPP.

Either way, Zardari and the PPP have to find answers and a strategy to deflect all these possibilities. The distraught mourners also expect answers. Beyond the gates of Naudero, the stream of people head to the massive mock Mughal tomb three miles away.

Here, Benazir is buried next to her beloved father, former prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was hanged by the military in 1979. Just four weeks ago she had come to lay a wreath at her father’s grave and as if full of premonitions, had marked out exactly where she wanted to be buried, telling attendants to fence off the area.

There are moving displays of public grief at her graveside, but even more there is boiling public anger. The noise is deafening as men and women walk in together chanting not prayers, but slogans against Musharraf. Two black banners hanging above her grave, say it all. One whispers “Benazir – the unblemished and innocent”, the other cries out, “we will take revenge on her killers”.

Her grave is covered in a mountain of rose petals – outside flower vendors say her death has sucked up all the roses in Pakistan like a giant vacuum cleaner. Some people pick a rose petal of her grave, carefully smell its fragrance and then pocket it. The memory of her and the manner of her death will haunt Pakistan for years to come.

Pakistan army: declining credibility By Andy McCord

Pakistan army: declining credibility
Andy McCord; the Hindu, January 14, 2008

In the coming days and months, the Pakistan army’s role in the deterioration of the state will come under more and more scrutiny. Few will be able to repeat the canard one used to hear from outsiders that the army was the “only load-bearing institution” in the country.

In 1970, a cyclone and an accompanying tidal surge out of the Bay of Bengal hit the district of Bhola in what then was East Pakistan. The inaction and indifference of the Pakistan government and army in the aftermath of this disaster are often cited as a principal reason why East Pakistan’s last nerve frayed, and it turned overwhelmingly in favour of the movement that would in 1971 lead to Pakistan’s break-up and the independence of Bangladesh.

Now, in the wake of a relentless series of mostly man-made disasters, there is fear that the four provinces of Pakistan’s former west wing may also break up, leaving large parts of the country ripe for takeover by armed internationalist Islamist puritans. A respected friend wrote to me recently that his devastation on the assassination of Benazir Bhutto was “not because of anything else but the fact that she symbolised the Federation.” But in the response to another natural disaster — the 2005 earthquake that flattened Balakot, Muzaffarabad and other places along the ceasefire line, which separates parts of Kashmir that are held by Pakistan from those held by India — there is a sign of a force that can hold Pakistan together: its people.

Last February, I visited Lahore after a long absence and spent much of my time driving to meet old friends and contacts with Riaz Shah, a driver I had employed while spending a Fulbright year there some 10 years earlier. One day, as we were passing a truck depot, Riaz said, “You should have seen this place. Truck after truck after truck was being loaded, and everyone was headed for the earthquake area. It went on for days and days.”

I had thought most of the spontaneous public response to that disaster had been among the rich. The volunteers would have to afford taking time off and have their own sturdy cars. They would have been part of the elite that has more recently been organising “civil society” for small scale demonstrations in support of Pakistan’s ousted judges and of restoration of the “rule of law.” Riaz’s excitement with his story was infectious, and as we looked out on the depot full of lavishly decorated trucks and the rough and ready drivers who command them, another image was conjured up in my mind of independent action for good on the part of common citizens — the same working people who have been underrepresented in the movement against President Pervez Musharraf, the retired General who last March ousted his country’s Supreme Court and who claims to have the people on his side, except for a few members of the elite.

In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake in 2005, the army was preoccupied with restoring its defences along the always tense de facto border with India and with digging out its own soldiers: a friend of mine, who was educated among future army officers, told me that the talk among his classmates was that as many as 30,000 Pakistani soldiers died in the pre-dawn quake, when the timbers lining their underground bunkers caved in. General Musharraf himself was slow to respond, and while his army, after the initial delay, was active in helping tens of thousands survive a mountain winter in tents, it may have lost some of its institutional credibility as the best hope for Pakistanis in a crisis.

Whether or not the earthquake contributed to it, there is no doubt that the army’s reputation is declining. A September poll by the International Republican Institute found that the army’s favourable ratings had dropped 10 per cent to 70 per cent, behind both the media and the legal profession (both of which have been activist in response to increasing assertions of authority by General Musharraf). The army’s reputation cannot be helped by Pakistan’s deteriorating security situation or its association with the increasingly unpopular retired General.

There is also a growing awareness that as an institution with a finger in a bewildering array of economic pies — from corn flakes to road-building — the army may be biting off so much that there is not enough left for the rest of society, with an expanding population and rising expectations. A ground-breaking new book by a former bureaucrat named Ayesha Siddiqa has begun the process of tallying up just how much economic space the armed forces and connected institutions are taking up — as much as 10 per cent of the GDP, and this is without counting the agricultural, industrial and urban land given out to retired generals and the like. Ms Siddiqa has given a name to this phenomenon: “Military, Inc.”

In the coming days and months, the army’s role in the deterioration of the Pakistani state will come under more and more scrutiny. Few will be able to repeat the canard one used to hear from outsiders that the Pakistani army was the “only load-bearing institution” in the country. An outright revolt against it is a terrifying prospect, given the rise of jihadis within Pakistan and in Afghanistan, as well as the likelihood that the army would lash out chaotically if it were to feel that its cosy position was drastically threatened.

But little by little — like the trucks leaving one by one from Lahore — the rise of public opinion could convince the generals that they must give room to the rest of society if Pakistan is to survive as a 21st century nation. The mobilisation of “people power” is a tricky business, and even more so is the transformation of the instinct for democracy into a working system of government. But sometimes it does happen, as it has seemed to in Nepal since 2006.

One shouldn’t discount the resilience, intelligence or willpower of Pakistanis of lower estate and lower wattage glamour than the elite. When I travelled between Lahore, Peshawar, Islamabad and Karachi last February, I was struck by the active discussion going on in every place I visited, amongst the rich and middle and poor alike. Questions were being asked and wide-ranging answers were being proposed on everything from how is it that any person could become a suicide bomber to the rise of China and India in the international economy. There was a verbal vitality in the air that I had not felt in Pakistan since 1988 in the aftermath of the assassination of the unretired General-President Zia-ul Haq and during the exhilarating first campaign of Benazir Bhutto.

‘People living by wits’


The well-known and accomplished lawyer, Asma Jahangir, is wont to object when it is proposed that the average Pakistani has no strength left to assert himself or herself. After half a lifetime of, case by case, representing people from the entire range of Pakistani society, she may have a better finger on a more representative pulse than anyone in or out of Pakistan.

What she says is that the Pakistani people have incredible strength. They have survived, and, in the local and personal scale of life as we all live it individually, in many cases thrived, despite a system that is utterly unconcerned with their welfare and in many ways dependant on the siphoning off of their wealth. They are not going anywhere. As Ms Jahangir says, “They are living by their wits.” Good wits.

(Andy McCord, a freelance writer, is a fluent Urdu/Hindi speaker who has lived and worked in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. He is currently working on a biography of Faiz Ahmed Faiz.)

The Question Remains - Who Betrayed Benazir Bhutto?

‘BB’s assassination is part of a great game against Pakistan’
Staff Report: The News, January 14, 2008

KARACHI: Politicians and former judges said that the assassination of Benazir Bhutto was a part of a great game against the Federation of Pakistan.

This was stated during a seminar held Sunday on ‘National Security – Challenges and Response after the Martyrdom of Benazir Bhutto’, organised by the Sindh United Forum at a hotel.

They backed the PPP and the Bhuttos’ demand for a United Nations tribunal conducting an inquiry into the assassination. Wajihuddin Ahmed, a former judge and the only contestant in the presidential election against Pervez Musharraf’s re-election last year, said that the assassins must be exposed.

“Ms Bhutto was brought back to the country by some forces that wanted her to tie their policies, but, she defied them and paid the price,” he stated. Ahmed further said that the attack on her in Karachi on October 18, 2007 was the first message from those forces which wanted her to desist from politics of the masses.

He argued that the Scotland Yard team lacked the mandate to conduct an in-depth probe. He urged the regime to inform the entire nation why forensic evidence was washed away from the scene of the October 18 attack. The former judge added that, on December 27, the same scene was repeated by the government as all the evidence was wiped out.

Therefore, he said he supported the PPP’s stance - that the UN should probe into her death to expose the real killers of the most popular leader of the country.

“The government wants to postpone the elections once again. The rulers want to create a Bangladesh-like situation to justify the postponement of the elections and to maintain the status quo,” he said.

He added that sitting rulers should learn from the people’s reaction to the assassination of the PPP chairperson. Sindhi, Muhajir, Pathan, Baloch and Punjabi people did not target each other during the recent riots; it was the frustration of the poor against a regime that creates further differences between the haves and haves-not, he maintained.

He cited the example of Karachi, where many banks and luxurious cars were set ablaze because of mass frustration against the regime. The fact is that the rioters were not PPP workers, they were the deprived and poor classes of the country, he claimed.

He questioned why security personnel didn’t try to stop the theft and arson and protect the citizens of the country.

Former chief justice of the country Saeed-uz-Zaman Siddiqui said that Benazir was a symbol of the Federation. He proposed that the Centre should give provincial autonomy to the provinces to pay respect.

Former speaker of the National Assembly Ilahi Bakhsh Soomro said that her assassination was a great loss to the country. He proposed that President Musharraf should invite all political party leaders to devise a plan to surmount the challenges of national security.

Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz Vice President Imdad Chandio said that anti-democratic forces never tolerated the Bhuttos because Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, his widow and their sons and daughter were considered a constant threat to the dictators in Pakistan.

Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaaf Secretary General Dr Arif Alvi said that the -Pakistan elements have started a “great game against the country through her assassination”.

Former chairman of Pakistan Steel Mill Lieutenant General (retd) Qayum, who had also served as a military secretary to Ms Bhutto in her second tenure as prime minister, said that her death was a national tragedy since she was the most loyal politician of Pakistan.

General Kayani to Army Officers - Stay away from Politics

Keep away from politicians, Kayani tells officers
By Nadeem Alvi, the News, January 14, 2008

LAHORE: The Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, has directed all officers of the Pakistan Army, including commanding officers, to refrain from meeting politicians.

According to reliable sources, the Army chief told the officers in a letter that they had no role to play in politics. He stressed that soldiers should pay heed to their professional responsibilities. The prime role of the armed forces is to carry out their professional duties and they should not indulge themselves in political affairs of the country, the COAS said.

He said no officer should call any politician to the GHQ, warning that anyone who violated the directive would have to face the music. He advised the Army men to avoid any direct or indirect interaction with political leaders.

The sources said that following the directives of the COAS, Army officers deployed in civil departments were being recalled to their units. It may be mentioned that Army officers have already been withdrawn from the Wapda and the Railways.

Gallup Poll (Pakistan): Who Killed Benazir Bhutto?

Press Release on BENAZIR BHUTTO'S ASSASSINATION
Gallup Pakistan, January 11, 2008

The grief on the assassination of Benazir Bhutto was almost universal in Pakistan. As a community, it evoked a different response compared to the demise of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and General Zia-ul-Haq when certain segments of the society seemed to breathe a sigh of relief and even rejoice in the tragedy. The grief in the case of Benazir Bhutto has been observed across provincial and linguistic boundaries as well as political and socio-economic divides. It may have been shared with different levels of intensity, but it was grief nevertheless. This expression of unity, which remained elusive during her life and times, was a big gain for Pakistan.

This opinion poll is dedicated to the memory of Benazir Bhutto.

The poll was carried out in two rounds. The First Round was conducted shortly after her assassination, on December 30-31, 2007. The Second Round was carried out during January 6-8, 2008. The sample comprised of over 1300 men and women in all the four provinces spanning cities, large and small towns and villages. Fieldwork was carried out face-to-face. Details on the sample are provided at the end.

The poll addressed the following issues:
1- First Source of Information on the Assassination
2- Public Opinion on 'Who killed Benazir'
3- Public Opinion on Foreign Investigation
4- Public Opinion on the Succession of Leadership in the Pakistan People's
Party
5- Public Opinion on the Handling of Crisis by Musharraf and other key Political Leaders

FIRST SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON THE ASSASSINATION

For nearly half of the respondents in this survey, their first source of information was Mass Media, principally television (43%) followed by radio (3%). The tragic news reached the other half through relatives and friends, face-to-face (35%) or telephone (17%).

The information reached most people early in the evening, within a couple of hours after the incident (62%); most of the remaining were informed of it later that night (35%). The rest 3% came to know of it on the following morning.

Public Opinion on WHO KILLED BENAZIR BHUTTO?

Nearly half of the sample suspected Government agencies (23%) and Government allied politicians (25%). Al-Qaeda or Taliban were suspected by 17%, while 16% suspected other external forces, principally the United States (12%) and India (4%). 19 % said they would not know.

The view that Government agencies and allied politicians were responsible for the assassination was higher than the national average among voters of Pakistan People's Party (61%).

Public Opinion on FOREIGN INVESTIGATION

A question was asked about views on involving foreign investigators to probe the assassination. In response to the question, 'In your view, would a decision to invite foreign experts to investigate this incident be right or wrong', 46% favoured the possible invitation, 30% opposed it, while 24% said they did not know. (This survey was carried out during December 30-31, 2007, before the decision was made to invite Scotland Yard to assist GOP in the investigation). One might guess that the favourable view on inviting foreign investigators would have risen later, especially after the formal decision had been made.

Public Opinion on SUCCESSION OF LEADERSHIP IN PAKISTAN PEOPLE'S PARTY

Who should lead the PPP after Benazir Bhutto was a key question. In the First Round of survey (carried out during December 30-31), we provided two options, Asif Zardari or Amin Fahim, but allowed the possibility of nomination of any other person by the respondents to the survey. Between the two pre-structured options, the majority favoured Amin Fahim (48%) followed by Asif Zardari (30%). A number of names other than the two provided in the Question were given by 17% of the respondents, while the remaining 5% did not answer this question.

The Second Round of the survey was carried out after the succession issue had been settled by the party and Benazir Bhutto's son, young Bilawal Bhutto Zardari had been chosen to head the party, with the assistance of his father, Asif Ali Zardari, until the young party head came of age and completed his studies. The question was asked: 'People's Party has chosen Bilawal Bhutto Zardari as its head. Would you say they made the right or the wrong decision?'

Among the respondents to this survey, 53% believed it was the right decision, 28% considered it wrong, while 19% did not answer. The support for the party decision was much higher among PPP voters, 74% of whom endorsed the party choice in favour of Bilawal, while only 14% considered it wrong and 12% did not answer.

In a follow up question, the respondents were asked: 'If you were a member of the People's Party Central Executive Committee, who would you have supported for party leadership: Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, Asif Zardari,Sanam Bhutto or a competent leader from other members of the party?' In response to this, 47% favoured Bilawal Bhutto Zardari; the remaining were distributed among Sanam Bhutto (21%), Asif Zardari (6%) and one of the other competent party member 19%; 7% provided other alternatives to the issue.

Among the PPP voters, views were slightly different than the national average. Among them the responses were: Bilawal Bhutto Zardari (64%), Sanam Bhutto (21%), Asif Zardari (5%), other competent party leader (5%), while the remaining 5% did not respond. These were the findings of the Second Round of survey carried out mostly during January 6-8, 2008.

Public Opinion on HANDLING OF THE CRISIS BY POLITICAL LEADERS

The positive role of Nawaz Sharif on the occasion of the assassination was given the highest rating by the respondents of this survey.

For a pdf version with sampling details, click here

How Pakistanis view their Army?

Angry Pakistanis turn against army
Christina Lamb in Islamabad; Sunday Times January 13, 2008

IT IS the most expensive - and talked about - property development in Pakistan, but few can get near it. Hidden behind barbed wire, the new state-of-the-art army headquarter to replace a garrison in Rawalpindi is costing a reputed £1 billion and will cover 2,400 acres of prime land in Islamabad, including lakes, a residential complex, schools and clinics.

Originally intended to represent the best of Pakistan, the new army HQ is now being seen as a symbol of all that is wrong with the country.

Amid nationwide anger over the killing of the opposition leader Benazir Bhutto and a widespread belief that the country’s military or intelligence may have been involved, the population is turning against the army for the first time.

From the wailing rice-pickers at Bhutto’s grave in the dusty village of Garhi Khuda Bakhsh in the southern province of Sindh to the western-educated elite sipping whisky and soda in the drawing rooms of Lahore, the message is the same: General Pervez Musharraf, the president, must go and the army must return to its barracks.

Feelings are running so high that officers have been advised not to venture into the bazaar in uniform for fear of reprisals.

“The interests of the people of Pakistan are now totally at odds with those of the army,” said Asma Jahangir, the head of Pakistan’s Human Rights Commission, who was one of hundreds of lawyers placed under house arrest in November.

“If a civilian president had done what Musharraf has done, he would have been dragged by his hair to the sea.”

It is not just civilians who argue that, if the country is to stay together, power must go back into the hands of the politicians, however corrupt or inept.

Asad Durrani, a retired general, headed the notorious Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) bureau during the 1990 elections when, he admits, it spent millions of dollars to prevent Bhutto being voted back into power. Now he believes the army should step back.

“If you’re in charge for such a long time, you can’t blame anyone else for the state of the country,” he said. “You have to take responsibility for the situation.”

“We’re all trying to get across the message [to Musharraf] that ‘you are the problem’,” said another retired general. “I’m hearing the same from serving generals.”

For decades children in Pakistan have grown up on text-books glorifying the Pakistani army and glossing over its defeat in three wars and loss of half the country in 1971 (to become Bangladesh). When army chiefs have seized power they have generally been welcomed. The news of Musharraf’s takeover in 1999 was greeted with people handing out sweets. But none of Pakistan’s military rulers have stepped down voluntarily and Musharraf, it seems, is no different, picking an unpopular fight with the country’s judiciary when they tried to take him on.

Elections scheduled for last week were delayed after Bhutto’s assassination. The new date is February 18, but there is scepticism about whether they will go ahead. A suicide bomb that killed 22 in Lahore last week was seen as another step in creating a climate of insecurity that makes voting impossible.

Even if they do go ahead, the elections are widely expected to be rigged in favour of Musharraf’s allies. Last Wednesday the head of the European Union observer mission visited the president with a list of 10 concerns about a lack of transparency.

Bhutto’s death has left her one-time rival Nawaz Sharif, leader of the Pakistan Muslim League, as the main opposition figure. Although he emerged on the political scene in the 1980s under the patronage of Pakistan’s last military ruler, General Zia ul-Haq, he now insists the army must stop interfering in politics. “The only way to move forward is for people to defy the army and to realise that these generals who keep staging coups are our real enemies,” he told The Sunday Times in an interview at his heavily guarded farmhouse outside Lahore.

“It is not the job of generals to hold the prime minister, cabinet or parliament accountable,” he added. “They are accountable to the people. The army has to go back to barracks or we’ll never have a functioning state.”

Resentment against the men in khaki is particularly acute in Bhutto’s home province of Sindh. To Sindhis, she was killed not because of her stand for democracy and against terrorism but because of where she came from. After her death many Sindhis went on the rampage, burning lorries, trains and banks.

They have been reined in by Bhutto’s husband, Asif Zardari, who has taken over running her Pakistan People’s party. But he warns: “If elections are rigged or don’t go ahead, this may be impossible to contain.”

Those close to Musharraf say he still believes he is the only person able to sort out Pakistan, even though under his rule suicide bombs have become an almost daily occurrence.

“The problem is that 9/11 went to his head,” said Durrani. “After that I found him a changed man. He went from being a pariah to applause, saviour of Pakistan and the West.”

Washington and London are clinging to Musharraf for want of other options and the belief that he represents the best hope of preventing Pakistan’s 50 or so nuclear warheads falling into militant hands. The West had hoped that Bhutto would be brought in as prime minister to provide his regime with a democratic face, but are now working on co-opting Sharif or Zardari.

Sharif, who has received three calls from David Miliband, the foreign secretary, since Bhutto’s assassination, was the prime minister ousted by Musharraf in 1999. He insists that working with Musharraf is not an option.

Were free elections to go ahead and the opposition parties to achieve a two-thirds majority, they would be in a position to impeach the president. But few believe that, with Musharraf’s hand-picked caretaker government overseeing the elections, this is a realistic possibility.

The only way he might go is if the army were to decide he had outlived his purpose.

More than 700 Pakistani soldiers have been killed in the fight in the tribal areas against militants said to be linked to Al-Qaeda, and officers admit that morale has not been so low since they lost Bangladesh in 1971.

“We’re being asked to bomb our own people and shrug it off as collateral damage,” said a Mirage pilot. “I call it killing women and children.”

Hope rests on General Ashfaq Kayani, who took command of the army in late November when Musharraf succumbed to pressure to take off his uniform and become a civilian president.

Little is known about Kayani apart from his love of golf and his professionalism as a soldier. He is said to be unhappy about the army’s involvement in politics and might pull back if elections proceed smoothly.

“Nobody is anyone’s man once he becomes commander-in-chief with 700,000 soldiers under his command,” says Imran Khan, the former cricketer turned politician.

56 Suicide Attacks in Pakistan in 2007

10-fold increase in suicide attacks
* 2,116 people killed in 2007
* Decrease in missile, improvised explosive device and landmine attacks
By Azaz Syed; Daily Times, January 13, 2008

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan witnessed a ten-fold increase in suicide bombings in 2007 as compared with 2006, an Interior Ministry document made available to Daily Times revealed.

According to the document, 2007 witnessed 56 suicide attacks, killing 419 law enforcement personnel (LEP) and injuring 217 civilians. This is compared to six such incidents in 2006, in which 46 LEP and 91 civilians lost their lives.

The past year also saw an increase of 100 percent in attacks targeting LEP, as 234 of them lost their lives in a total of 465 attacks across the country. Two hundred and sixty-two civilians were also killed. In comparison, 224 attacks targeted LEP in 2006, resulting in 82 personnel and 159 civilians being killed.

The year 2007 also witnessed over a 100 percent increase in bomb blasts, as 42 LEP and 164 civilians lost their lives in 477 blasts compared to the killings of nine law enforcement personnel and 110 civilians in 2006.

Most casualties: The past year also topped in total causalities, as 2,116 people, including 558 LEP, were killed and 3,962 injured in 1,825 attacks compared to 1,482 attacks in 2006 in which 967 people, including 263 LEP, were killed and 1,895 injured.

Decrease in three areas: The year 2007 saw a decrease in three different categories of terrorism — missile/rocket firing, improvised explosive device explosions and mine explosions. Only 417 incidents of missile/rocket firing occurred in 2007, as compared to 528 incidents in 2006.

interview with Munir Malik to the Asian Human Rights Commission

A Paper by the Asian Human Rights Commission
PAKISTAN: The exclusive interview with Munir Malik to the Asian Human Rights Commission

We are publishing an interview with Munir Malik, the former president of the Supreme Court Bar Association who was imprisoned and given drugs under the pretext of painkillers which caused him renal failure and liver damage, but who continues to be an inspiration for the movement for the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law in Pakistan. His insights into the recent events will be helpful in understanding the movement of lawyers as well as the movement of democracy that is taking place in Pakistan now. This interview was conducted by Baber Ayaz on behalf of Asian Human Rights Commission. The Asian Human Rights Commission authorizes the faithful reproduction of this interview with due acknowledgements.

Munir Malik's interview by Baber Ayaz

Unprecedented movement of the legal fraternity for the independence of judiciary in Pakistan is still a cherished but elusive goal. On 20th July 2007, its victory was celebrated by all democratic forces in the country. But the gains of the movement were short-lived. On 3rd November 2007 President General Pervez Musharraf clamped Emergency on the country and chucked out all the independent judges. The struggle started again and it's a long way to go.

In this back ground I went to interview Munir Malik, the man who launched the incredible movement in March 2007, in his capacity as President of Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA). When I went to interview Munir, he was still wearing the hospital uniform and looked frail. Munir had fallen seriously ill during his detention at Attock Jail, where he was mal-treated by the government doctor. He was only shifted to Islamabad hospital when his kidneys collapsed and he developed a liver problem.

For a few weeks that followed civil society feared that the man who valiantly led a movement that became an example even for the lawyers of developed democracies, may not be able to survive due to serious negligence of his health. But the fighter Munir fought and came back.

Following are the excerpts of his interview:

Baber Ayaz (BA): When you got elected to the Supreme Court Bar at that point the chief justice (CJ) reference issue was not there, you must be having some agenda for your tenure. What was that?

Munir Malik (MM): Well I had contested the election precisely because I thought that this would be a defining year. There were a number of issues that were likely to come up in this defining year, for instance: Elections were supposed to be held; the issue that whether an army general can be elected as a president or can he hold two offices of the president and army chief at the same time, was to be decided; then there was the issue of the holding of dual nationality by members of parliament and cabinet ministers and whether they could swear allegiance to two constitutions. There was the issue of madaris' degrees (Degrees from fundamentalist Islamic seminaries) whether they were at par with college graduates, regular college graduates. By that time Malik Qayyum (the sitting Attorney General) and Sharifuddin Pirzada (legal advisor to the president) had established their credentials as supporters of the establishment. They were very close to Chief Justice Iftikhar. There was a feeling that the Supreme Court (SC) is trying to improve its moral image or its public image by taking Suo Motto (taking cases on the court's own initiative) notices of popular issues including especially the steel mills case where a decision was given against the government. It was feared that with this image the Supreme Court will give decisions favouring the government on crucial petitions like that related to the President's election and prices of pharmaceutical products.
So I was certain that we need an independent bar to keep a watch on the SC itself. I was certain in my mind that it would be a defining year. The very first step was that SCBA passed a resolution demanding the restoration of the constitution as it was before Musharraf's take over in 1999.

At that time, by and large the Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP) was very unpopular in the rank and file of the legal fraternity for the principle reason that he was very arrogant and the perception was that he dispenses justice in cases according to the face value of the counsel who appeared before him. If it was Sharifuddin Pirzada he was sugar and honey, and if the counsel was not an important figure he would be otherwise. I think he was over-zealous in clearing the back log even at the cost of miscarriage of justice. Lawyers from Karachi, Quetta, Peshawar and Lahore were given notice in the evening that your case is fixed in Islamabad tomorrow. This roster problem was agitating the lawyers. So I was ready to raise this issue with him as I think justice hurried is justice buried.

BA: But you had condemned the letter written by Naeem Bokhari before the reference was moved. Why?

MM: When Naeem Bokhari's letter appeared in mid-February It was applauded in the bar rooms. I took notice of this issue (despite the fact that other lawyers supported it). Yes, my view was that he should not weaken the judiciary by making these allegations in the press.

But I was still trying to get my pound of flesh, I wanted to have the CJP fix the roster problems which was troubling lawyers, and I would come out vocally in support of him. So he sent me a message through an intermediary that he was embattled and he wants me to issue a statement of support. I gave that statement, it was front page news in Dawn. Publication of this statement on the front page was surprising for me; I assumed it must have got a push from somewhere.

In one of his speeches in February he had said that Munir Malik has promised to give me his unconditional support. When my turn came to speak I said so long as this court moves in the direction of the independence of the judiciary.

Then came the bolt of 9th March, fortunately I was in Islamabad, it was a Friday. I was contacted by the press, at about 5:30 pm or so, they asked my views. The television had broadcast pictures of CJ meeting at the Army House, where sitting in military uniform the President asked the CJP to resign. I was very clear in my stand that this is a direct assault on the third organ of the state and we shall resist it.

BA: The President has a constitutional right to send a reference against a judge of the superior court. Was your reaction more because of the indecent manner in which it was done or was it because the reference was sent in the first place?

MM: Three grounds, first, the manner in which he was summoned and detained, at the army camp office. The message it sent was that the judiciary is really not an independent organ of the state and a uniformed President can do what he pleases. And by implication the legal fraternity was also helpless. Second reason was that Pervez Musharraf could not constitutionally make a judge dysfunctional. An executive order was issued, by the 'royal secretary' at 5:03pm saying that the CJ had been suspended and acting CJ was sworn in. This was a complete negation of the principle of separation of powers. Every judge would have felt insecure; all you had to do was send a reference. While it would have subsequently determined whether the reference was of substance or not, the harm to a judge's reputation would have been done. The third reason was that the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) was convened the same day with unholy haste. One of the judges was flown in via special plane. The other was tipped off in Lahore. And without hearing the CJ, the SJC imposed a restrain upon him.

BA: So if the President had followed the constitutional course you would have had no objection?

MM: He should have sent the reference to the SJC to handle, whenever they would take it. Then the manner in which CJP was held incommunicado, together with members of his family. His entire domestic staffs was replaced by ISI (military intelligence agency) agents, they were in his living room, in his lawn, 20-25 people. His cars were fork lifted, no visitors were permitted, only those whom the security gave clearance to come in, I think Asghar Khan was the first to be permitted.

BA: There was a tremendous response to the call of the SCBA when you launched the movement for the restoration of CJP. Were you certain that the people would come out like that or was it also a pleasant surprise?

MM: There was a wave of indignation in the manner of his dismissal and everybody I talked to from the legal fraternity said that though CJ was not a nice man but what has been done with him was not right. I only channelised this wave of indignation, it was boiling, the Supreme Court Bar just coordinated it and I think that the master strategy that everybody gathered around the SC building on every date the CJP was produced, worked. The administration over-reacted, they sealed all roads leading to the SC, and I had to walk 2km before I could get into the SC building.

CJP was supposed to be produced at 1:30 p.m. on 13th March, at 1p.m. images came on TV showing him being dragged by his hair. This agitated the lawyers who were practising in Islamabad and Rawalpindi and other adjoining courts and they started converging on the SC. I had given a call for the sit in at the SJC but I was not sure where it would meet because it was supposed to be in camera.

BA: So one of the reasons perhaps that your movement got such a big response was the contribution of the media?

MM: Absolutely, this was the difference between 2000 and 2007. In 2000 when 6 judges of the SC resigned, they were also detained in their houses and prevented from coming to the SC building. But at that time the print media had not given much importance to this and there was no independent electronic media. I don't think the CJ would have been re-instated without the media support.

I think one of the other factors was that, even though pre-9th March the chief was only paying lip-service to the cases of the missing persons, but those missing persons would continue to picket at the SC daily. But these issue attracted civil society.

BA: In the second Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif stint the judiciary was humiliated by both, but there was no massive movement against that. Why this time?

MM: Well, historically the judiciary has always been a collaborator, with the ruling elite. It has been the 'B' team of the army. It retains the old, imperial mindset that they are there to serve the government. If the president would call a judge of the high court he would probably take out his best suit, take a camera with him and it would be an event for him to remember, that he has been summoned by the president or the prime minister. In Bhutto's white paper that had been published after 1977 I think Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in one of his side notes remarked, 'they will come to you for petty favours' like a plot, for a diplomatic passport, an admission for a child, a posting for a relative. So they were only part of the establishment, they had no moral credibility. If a man in uniform said something that was the law. You could sense that if there was a case involving the corp. commander or cantonment land, the judge would think that before the corp. commander says something to me I should oblige him. So I think both the legal fraternity and the civil society felt why (they had to) support them.

This time the media brought to our drawing rooms a man saying 'No' to the establishment. So the image that came out was that this man has stood up to fight generals, and say that I will not resign I'm innocent.

BA: You had earlier said that there was a whole scheme of building up the image of the CJ and the SC and then getting the most crucial cases like the presidential election through; this means that the CJ was co-operating. Why did the establishment then decide to remove him?

MM: I think the CJ was co-operating with the President but not with the government. The conspiracy against the CJ as he tells me was drawn out by Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, General Javed Hamid, the then Chief Justice of Lahore High Court Iftikhar Hussain and his brother who was the Cabinet Minister and the Law Secretary Mansoor. The CJ had stopped his appointment to the Commonwealth. The CJ was not on speaking terms with Justice Hussain. Shaukat Aziz was really cut up on the judgement quashing the Steel Mills' privatisation. Then the CJP would humiliate civilian officers. CJP never summoned the sitting general but if he summoned the IG police or a secretary, he would take his gripe to Shaukat Aziz. Pervez Musharraf says that they had good family relations, so this reference came from the civilian element of the establishment. Pervez Musharraf was also given the impression that this man is going to be CJ till 2013 and he's already started showing his colours. I think Musharraf was misled. What was Shaukat Aziz doing in the army camp office; he was there on 9th of March. He was there before the CJ had arrived; special planes had started since the morning.

BA: After 20th July, when the SC was restored, you said that the next struggle is to bring independence to lower judiciary and remove corruption. But then the slogan of removing the president was given. Now one view is that, it was an ambitious call without consolidating the gains, the judiciary and the legal fraternity became a bit adventurous and ended up with 9th November situation. Loves' labour was lost. What are your views on this view?

MM: Yes, I was very conscious of that, as a matter of fact I'm on record for having stated if you burden the SC with political cases, it will collapse under its own weight. Now, the problem was that the politicians always wanted to fire from the shoulder of the SC, they wouldn't take the battle to the streets of Pakistan. The CJ cannot dismiss petitions without hearing them. There were Qazi Hussain Ahmed and Imran Khan's petitions before the SC challenging the holding of the dual office by the President.

BA: Is it correct that they had scared Musharraf that he would give a judgement against him?

MM: You will notice that neither the SCBA nor the Pakistan Bar Council (PBC) intervened in these proceedings. We had held out, an olive branch, by saying that the CJ was not a vindictive man, he will not sit on benches hearing cases against Pervez Musharraf and that counsels who were his counsels would never appear before him. But there was one issue, in which we had taken a stand in virtually every public meeting that was the case of missing persons. Now the CJP was under pressure to hear these cases. In the aftermath of the movement of 9th March 2007 he had said that it is the responsibility of the state to account for every missing person. It was not so much that we went after Pervez Musharraf, but we went to look for the missing persons, that antagonized Washington DC because they thought that courts would now be throwing a spanner on the war on terror. Then all the signals that came from the CJP that is the way he constituted benches on these constitutional cases was that he would go slow. The 6-3 verdict that came against Qazi Hussain and Imran Khan Case was certain to go this way. One could have looked at the bench and said that it would be 6-3 split decision in favour of Musharraf. In Justice Wajihuddin case against presidential election, we would have lost that petition, because we didn't have a majority. The reports that went to Pervez Musharraf, from his intelligence people were that the SC would decide against him, that's why he imposed Emergency.

I guess in a sense you are right, that certain political issues for which the courts were not ready were brought before it, but the momentum of the events were such that if the courts did not make an attempt to address them then it would have become the old supreme court and that was not an idea worth fighting for.

We also have to remember, that although from 9th March to 20th of July we were able to rally lawyers of different political persuasions on the largest common denominator, independence of the judiciary, restoration of the CJ and supremacy of the rule of law. On this no democrat could disagree but after 20th July, I would say lawyers belonging to different political parties brought their political agendas forward and over that we had no control.

CJP attitude was that I have reached the position of the Chief Justice now I don't care what they do to me. He told me: "I would go down in history, as the CJ who took a stand, the title is something that comes and goes, I will remain in history."

BA: Do you think had everybody moved more cautiously 3rd November onslaught on superior judiciary could have been avoided?

MM: You see, this was a catch-22, if the judiciary did nothing its public image would have eroded giving an impression that this was a fight only for the CJ and not for the independence of the judiciary, not to preserve the institution. Then the judiciary would again have become weak. So the level of expectation from the masses, the legal fraternity and the civil society was such that there was no turning back without eroding your credibility, and once your credibility was eroded, they would attack again.

In retrospect I think they should have not stayed the notification of the presidential elections. 50% of the battle had been won with the re-instatement of the CJ and the president's assurance in the court that he will take off the uniform before taking oath. The stay order, perhaps gave the feeling to the President's camp that the next step of the court will be declaring the elections invalid.

BA: Most of the judges who refused to take oath under emergency Provisional Constitution Order (PCO) now, had taken the oath in February 2000 although a constitutional government was removed. Why does everybody support them now?

MM: Well even this CJ had taken an oath under the PCO in February 2000, but I think though judges say that they are not influenced by the public opinion, the fact is that this is very far from the truth. They do not sit in ivory towers. One of my favourite lines is from NY Court of Appeal's Chief Justice Cardozo, he said that "the great tides and the currents which engulf the rest of men do not in their course turn aside and pass the judges by." 9th March no one came to meet the CJ, but when the movement started, it had a domino effect. As soon as the people started coming on the streets, one fell, then the other and the other.

What we said was that, the courts say that they interpret the constitution according to the changing times; it's an organic document, not static. This is for the first time the people came to the streets and showed them that these are the changing times. There is an old dictum: "better late than never."

BA: Do you see any chance of the restoration of these judges and how it would be constitutionally possible under the current situation?

MM: I think the ball is now in the parliament's court. Historically, a usurper has sought parliamentary indemnity for the acts done during the period of deviation. Now we can't go before the present SC and expect restoration of judges. In fact they've already ruled that the 3rd November PCO amendments are a valid part of the constitution and they will not require any further parliamentary approval. And they have shifted the onus on parliament, that to undo it you have to repeal it by a 2/3 majority.

So this war will now be in the new parliament or in the streets. On the streets it's supposed to be run by the political leadership.

BA: Does that mean if political parties don't get 2/3 majority they can't change it?

MM: No sir, let's take this scenario, supposing Pakistan People's Party (PPP) gets simple majority, forms the government and the speaker asks to lay the constitution of Pakistan before the house, which one will they present, one with the amendments, or the one which was before Musharraf took over ?

BA: Can they do it legally?

MM: Like Illahi Baksh Soomro (former speaker of the national assembly) did it, when the 2002 Parliament sat, he asked for the 1973 Constitution for administering the oath. So this is a political leadership game.

BA: The government says that the SC was coming in the way of their resolve to fight terrorism. Now we all know that the problem of terrorism is there, it's an extra-ordinary situation, what can be done. The executive also needs certain powers or certain space to deal with terrorism. It is a reality, how do you fight it? And how can the judiciary really contribute to this?

MM: You see the executive ought not to shift the entire onus on the judiciary. I concede the proposition that citizen rights have to be balanced against the interest of state security. Now in England, we have the same problem but their parliament enacted a law.

The question is where do we draw this balance and who draws this balance? The balance is to be drawn by parliament, and then the executive will implement this law. Supposing the law is that they can keep a suspect incommunicado for 7 days. Ok, so they keep me incommunicado for 7 days but on the 8th day I should be produced before a magistrate. Decision on whether the executive has transgressed the law, is the judicial function. Now, in England, after 7/7 they have adopted legislations. We, on the other hand, haven't been able to define terrorism yet. What is terrorism? What is a terrorist act? The definition we have is that which is found in the Anti Terrorist Act as something which is liable to scare the general public. The classic definition of terrorists is state terrorism, where the state uses its coercive power to repress its citizens. Assuming that Al-Qaeda is a state within a state and it has to be dealt with, then the international community must come up with a framework of rules. Now tell me, supposing they pick you up on a charge of national security, doesn't your family have a right to know that they have you in their custody? So the degree of accounting will be less but accounting will have to be done. The state must account for persons. When they pick you up on preventive detention it is not a substantive charge but they say we have picked him up. They don't present you before a court but at least a person doesn't disappear.

BA: In the post 3rd November situation, gradually the movement is dying down. How do you see the future of the movement?

MM: Well, we've gone off the front pages for 2 or 3 reasons. Important events such as return of exile leadership, assassination of Ms. Bhutto and elections are getting prominent newspaper space. The problem is that we don't have many legal options; we don't have a court to turn to. Pre 20th July the struggle was within the courts and without the courts. Movement outside the courts was to put pressure and sensitize them.

Now we are re-thinking our strategy. The entire leadership of the bar was arrested. Aitzaz Ahsan, Tariq Mehmood and Kurd are still under detention.

BA: Now towards a personal side, when you were arrested, were you mistreated?

MM: I was not mistreated at Adiala Jail; I only had the inconvenience of being shifted at 3 a.m. to Attock Jail on the third day. In Attock, the civilian jail staff bent over backwards to do anything for me, but it was the intelligence that would lead them. They would be present at every meeting, at every visitation; they decided when the cell would open and when it would be closed. They would supervise and torture me psychologically. Medical treatment facilities were inadequate; I would get medicines after 3 days. At that time I was on pain killers and the pain killers they gave me, my doctors from Pakistan Institute of Medical Sciences (PIMS) and Sindh Institution of Urology and Transplantation (SIUT) tell me, would have killed a healthy man.

BA: Were you on any medication then?

MM: No, just painkillers. My problem was that they'd shut me in at 4pm and open it back at 7am, the cell only had space to lie on a mattress and the bathroom was right there too. There was nothing to do, all reading and writing material, was confiscated, there was no newspaper and first four days I was in solitary confinement. I would go to the toilet to urinate every hour on the hour. I went to the jail doctor and he said have this medicine and when nothing happened after two days, he changed the medicine.


Eventually my kidneys shut down, and my liver was also not functioning properly. This resulted in accumulation of fluid in my body. Fortunately, I was not disoriented mentally. I don't recall the events after the 23rd November afternoon. I can recall that an SSP came and called Islamabad saying that my health was bad and I should be transferred. I recall being in an ambulance. I don't think I would have survived Saturday. Once I recovered partially with the help of PIMS doctors in Islamabad, I was moved to SIUT in Karachi where I recovered pretty fast and now I am off dialysis.

About AHRC : The Asian Human Rights Commission is a regional non-governmental organisation monitoring and lobbying human rights issues in Asia. The Hong Kong-based group was founded in 1984.