Jirga fails to secure release of soldiers
By Alamgir Bhittani and Shams Momand: Dawn, September 3, 2007
TANK/GHALANAI, Sept 2: Local Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud has linked the release of over 150 soldiers taken hostage on Aug 30 to the implementation of the Sararogha agreement signed in Feb 2005, Zulfiqar Mehsud, a spokesman for the commander, said on Sunday.
The agreement requires the government to grant amnesty to the militant commander and restrains Baitullah Mehsud from protecting and assisting foreign militants, attacking government officials and installations or blocking development projects in the area.
But militants claim that a clause, which is not included in the written agreement, requires security forces to stop their movements in the Mehsud-dominated area of South Waziristan.
Militants dispute the figure of 150 hostages given by the government and claim to have seized 300 soldiers.
The spokesman also claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of 10 personnel of the Frontier Corps in the Mohmand Agency, and warned of suicide attacks if the government started military operations in tribal areas.
“Our foremost demand is the implementation of the Sararogha agreement, which binds the government to contain the movement of troops in South Waziristan,” he said.
Sources said that talks between members of a tribal jirga and militants for the release of over 150 security personnel had failed. The 50-member jirga headed by Senator Salih Shah went to Wana from Laddah and briefed Political Agent Hussainzada Khan on Sunday on talks held with militants.
The sources said that militants had told the elders of the Mehsud tribe that further talks were meaningless till the previous agreement was honoured.
Zulfiqar Mehsud told Dawn by phone from an undisclosed location that Baitullah’s men were responsible for kidnapping 10 paramilitary personnel, including a major, from the Mohmand tribal region on Saturday. He said his men had also carried out a suicide attack in the Frontier Region, Jandola, in which six personnel of the security forces were injured.
“We can discuss release of the soldiers and other issues when ‘Mujahideen’ are conveyed that the government is sincerely implementing the peace agreement,” the spokesman said.
“Forget about the release of 300 soldiers at the moment,” he said.
The spokesman warned the government that if it did not change its Waziristan policy, militants would intensify attacks on security forces and launch more suicide attacks.
In a demonstration of defiance, militants in the Mohmand Agency seized two checkpoints of the Khasaddar Force in Lakaro and Haleemzai tehsils of the region on Sunday and set up a checkpost on the highway.
They had kidnapped 10 soldiers of the Mohmand Rifles in the relatively peaceful Mohmand Agency on Saturday, and a tribal jirga was holding talks with the captors to get the personnel freed.
The political administration gave the tribal elders a 24-hour deadline to secure release of the kidnapped personnel, remove militants from the highway or face action. The elders informed the administration that the militants had been removed from the road, and sought 48 hours for release of hostages.
The sources said the militants snatched rifles from the Khasaddar men and started checking vehicles in the Kandaru area.
Meanwhile, a tribesman was killed and another wounded in an exchange of fire near a checkpoint when armed men tried to kidnap a resident. The victim has been identified as Arif.
In the Bajaur tribal region, the authorities have asked tribesmen not to go out after sunset following a recent suicide attack on security forces which left three security personnel and two civilians dead. The administration also postponed the recruitment for the Bajaur Levies for an indefinite period.
Monday, September 03, 2007
Sunday, September 02, 2007
BB-Musharraf Deal Prospects?
The Deal: She has not lost hope
Afzal Khan
The Nation; September 3, 2007
Islamabad Sept. 1: Mohtarama Benazir Bhutto appears to be dejected by the efforts of some "core elements" in the ruling PML-Q for stalling her negotiations with Gen. Musharraf but remains unwavering in her determination to cut a deal with him. She has not shut the door for further talks amid reports that the two may meet any time this week again to repair the damage.
The much-awaited announcement for the return date has been deferred till September 14, a day before the one-month period for presidential election begins. This is apparently meant to allow sufficient time to the General and the powerful foreign backers who are nudging both of them to reached an agreement that envisages a post-election combination with Musharraf as president, preferably without uniform, and Ms. Bhutto as prime minister. The agenda set for Gen. Musharraf would continue to move forward in the new permutation as is evident from PPP chairperson's news conference. It focused mainly on issues of extremism, militancy and resurgent Taliban- three major concerns of the guarantors of the deal.
Musharraf, as is widely believed in the diplomatic circles here, is committed to such an arrangement. Any deviation would probably not be accepted. But his amateurish attempt to conduct the dialogue through his apolitical aides has backfired and created the current impasse. He and his emissaries failed to grasp the political implications of the four critical elements of the new formulation: i) the willingness to take off uniform even prior to his own election;
(ii) Removal of the ban on two-term prime ministers; (iii) Secret negotiations with only one party to the exclusion of others; and (iv) Proclivity to take the coalition MPs for granted, given their five-year slavish conduct. On her part too, it reflected firm belief in the unquestioning ways of party rank and file despite their embarrassingly utter ignorance for what has been going on behind closed doors.
The signal on uniform-the main pillar of the hybrid edifice erected in eight years- generated the devastating perception that the structure is crumbling. The lifting of the prime ministerial ban gave a debilitating and demoralizing message to Chaudhry cousins, Arbab, Leghari, Sherpao. Ejazul Haq, Patriots and other Bhutto haters that she will take the centre stage in the new dispensation after the polls. Their fierce rage should have surprised none as it struck at the roots of their very survival. They have successfully sent the entire dialogue process into a tailspin, queered the pitch and muddied the waters. With it Musharraf's own presidential hopes face a chaotic prospect throwing him at the mercy of the Chaudhrys and others who rallied behind them despite mutual aversion.
Ms. Bhutto had also misread the ground reality when Musharraf approached her for cooperation in amending the Constitution in order to blunt the judiciary's powers to determine eligibility of his candidature. She perceived it as an opportunity for making her own counter –proposals and then provoked Musharraf's ire by making them public and setting a deadline for their acceptance.
A closure to corruption cases has remained on top of the agenda at every meeting and was so in these proposals as well. Musharraf had agreed during the two secret meetings in Abu Dhabi on January 24 and July 27 to phase them. As a quid pro quo Ms. Bhutto expressed willingness to facilitate his election, with or without uniform, by abstaining. The PPP would delink itself from the rest of the opposition in their lethal move to submit en bloc resignations in order to fully expose the farcical nature of the entire exercise divesting it of any credibility or legitimacy. On uniform, Ms. Bhutto and the western backers were prepared to wait till after general elections relying on Musharraf's commitment.
Till then the General was convinced his legal advisers have correctly advised him he can get himself elected in uniform from the present assemblies without any obstacle. But the current mood of the judiciary has shaken this confidence, hence the idea of amending the Constitution with Ms. Bhutto's help to neutralize the judiciary. For the PPP chairperson this was an occasion to claim her pound of flesh. Apart from calling for removal of ban on two-time prime ministers, she demanded another amendment for indemnity to politicians and officials who have served between 1988 and 1999 substituting the earlier promise regarding withdrawal of case dependent on the sweet will of the President. The constitutional amendment would have ended once for all the controversy around these cases.
Ostensibly there is little room for faulting Ms. Bhutto on the question of indemnity. The cases against her are pending for last ten years and the government has been unable to secure any conviction. There is reason to believe that the government deliberate let these let them hanging over her as sword of Damocles to perennially blackmail her. In the PPP the beneficiaries among politicians would be Ms. Bhutto, Asif Zardari, Jehangir Badar, Rehman Malik, Wajid Shamsul Hasan and a few others. But. Intriguingly, the biggest gainer would be Musharraf's staunchest ally, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), that prompted its unhesitating acceptance.
She, however, made another mistake when told by Musharraf's emissaries that the General is prepared to take off the uniform in order to make the PPP MPs to vote for his exemption from other constitutional impediments to be a candidate. She blew it up to the media (this paper had broken the news about Musharraf's willingness to doff the uniform before emissaries landed in London). It was a crude attempt to claim credit for this achievement and vindication of the much-maligned covert contacts with him. It also emboldened her to make another statement that PPP would resign from assemblies if he contested election in uniform. Musharraf was understandably put off by these statements.
It has to be seen how much the two sides would climb down from their new positions. Musharraf is likely to reaffirm his commitment to shed uniform but only after his election. The PPP will abstain and not resign. The proposal for repeal of Article 58 (B) 2 on president's power to dissolve the assembly was more of a suggestion than a condition. It can be considered in the new assemblies. In return for PPP's commitment to vote for constitutional amendments to ensure Musharraf's eligibility as a candidate, the indemnity amendment would also be approved. The uncertainty about Ms. Bhutto's ability to line up all her MPs including, Raza Rabbani and Aitzaz Ahsan (the only two discordant voices in the London meeting), to cast vote for disabling the judiciary is a major worry for Musharraf.
There were many side kicks in PPP chairperson's news conference. . While Ms. Bhutto did not utter even a single word against Musharraf, she flayed PML leaders for derailing the dialogue; accused MMA of being Musharraf's partners in power, exchanged barbs with Nawaz for buying release from jail through a deal in 2000 and berated Imran Khan for supporting Musharraf's referendum..She even accused Nawaz Sharif of indulging in personal vendetta and evaded any comment against Musharraf saying she would not target any individual. Isn't she isolating herself from all the mainstream politics? If so with whom would she share power after elections?
Who is Facilitating the Benazir-Musharraf Parleys
Benazir needs the deal with Musharraf more than he does
By Khalid Hasan: Daily Times, September 3, 2007
WASHINGTON: Talks between the Pakistan People’s Party and General Pervez Musharraf’s representatives have stalled but they have not broken down, although they are being held by “the slenderest of threads”, an informed source in London said on Saturday.
However, the President’s camp believes that Bhutto needs them more than they need her. The shoe, as such, is on the other foot, contrary to the impression given by the PPP.
US and UK “facilitators” are now said to have asked Benazir Bhutto to tone down her demands. No such suggestion has been made to President Musharraf.
The President’s principal troubleshooter Tariq Aziz left London for Islamabad on Saturday afternoon. Contrary to press reports, Lt Gen Hamid Javed never came to London because of a death in his family. Benazir Bhutto told a news conference on Saturday that the talks had stalled. Without naming the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q) or its leader Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, she blamed them for the impasse. She took care not to offer any criticism of President Musharraf, who cannot be faulted for lack of trying to strike a deal with Bhutto and her party.
The President always knew exactly how the PML-Q would react to Bhutto’s demand for the repeal of the third-term restriction on the office of the prime minister. The government party’s public rejection of that particular Bhutto demand was a duly scripted affair designed to force Bhutto to scale down here demands. The government believes that there is “life after Benazir Bhutto” and Plan B is ready and in place if talks with Bhutto collapse entirely, which they might well do. A source close to the parleys said that if Bhutto wanted a deal, she would have to come down from the high horse she had been riding, otherwise she had “no deal”. President Musharraf’s camp believes that Bhutto needs a deal more than the president needs it.
According to Asian Times, former British foreign secretary Jack Straw undertook the delicate mission first to sound out exiled former prime minister Benazir Bhutto about reaching a political understanding with Musharraf. Straw’s three-year mission is expected to come to fruition this weekend. In the Anglo-US plan, while London provided the brain, Washington undertook the tough assignment of persuading Musharraf to change horses midstream. In turn cajoling, threatening and conciliating, Washington softened up the general over the past several months.
In case, the talks between Musharraf and Bhutto collapse entirely, the PPP’s workers may make a token appearance at when Nawaz Sharif arrives in Islamabad on September 10, but the party as such will stay put.
By Khalid Hasan: Daily Times, September 3, 2007
WASHINGTON: Talks between the Pakistan People’s Party and General Pervez Musharraf’s representatives have stalled but they have not broken down, although they are being held by “the slenderest of threads”, an informed source in London said on Saturday.
However, the President’s camp believes that Bhutto needs them more than they need her. The shoe, as such, is on the other foot, contrary to the impression given by the PPP.
US and UK “facilitators” are now said to have asked Benazir Bhutto to tone down her demands. No such suggestion has been made to President Musharraf.
The President’s principal troubleshooter Tariq Aziz left London for Islamabad on Saturday afternoon. Contrary to press reports, Lt Gen Hamid Javed never came to London because of a death in his family. Benazir Bhutto told a news conference on Saturday that the talks had stalled. Without naming the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q) or its leader Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, she blamed them for the impasse. She took care not to offer any criticism of President Musharraf, who cannot be faulted for lack of trying to strike a deal with Bhutto and her party.
The President always knew exactly how the PML-Q would react to Bhutto’s demand for the repeal of the third-term restriction on the office of the prime minister. The government party’s public rejection of that particular Bhutto demand was a duly scripted affair designed to force Bhutto to scale down here demands. The government believes that there is “life after Benazir Bhutto” and Plan B is ready and in place if talks with Bhutto collapse entirely, which they might well do. A source close to the parleys said that if Bhutto wanted a deal, she would have to come down from the high horse she had been riding, otherwise she had “no deal”. President Musharraf’s camp believes that Bhutto needs a deal more than the president needs it.
According to Asian Times, former British foreign secretary Jack Straw undertook the delicate mission first to sound out exiled former prime minister Benazir Bhutto about reaching a political understanding with Musharraf. Straw’s three-year mission is expected to come to fruition this weekend. In the Anglo-US plan, while London provided the brain, Washington undertook the tough assignment of persuading Musharraf to change horses midstream. In turn cajoling, threatening and conciliating, Washington softened up the general over the past several months.
In case, the talks between Musharraf and Bhutto collapse entirely, the PPP’s workers may make a token appearance at when Nawaz Sharif arrives in Islamabad on September 10, but the party as such will stay put.
Gen (r) Zaheer Abbasi forms political party in Pakistan
Gen (r) Zaheer Abbasi forms political party
Daily Times, September 3, 2007
KARACHI: A retired army man has announced that he is forming a new political party - ‘Tehreek Azmat-e-Islam’ - that would prioritize education, health, accommodation, legal and financial aid and work against vulgarity.
Major Gen. (retd) Zaheer-ul-Islam Abbasi was critical of President Musharraf, who he said was using the army for his personal interest and this will have a negative impact on the country’s integrity. He declared this during a press conference held Sunday at the Karachi Press Club.
“I was a part of the army and understand the military’s mentality very well,” he said. “These people will not sustain the present situation further.” Abbasi felt that the army was busy killing its fellow citizens.
He said that people were divided into different sects and there was a conspiracy to push the nation and the army towards civil war. He claimed that 4.5 million families were homeless in the country. Millions lack sufficient medical and education facilities.
Politicians, civil and military bureaucracy were responsible for exploiting the nation since Independence. “The present situation of the country is like General Yahya’s era and I fear that the situation is moving towards that of 1971.”
General Musharraf must remember that the operation in the Northern Areas could be dangerous for the army and the whole nation, he said. “Our rulers should not be used by foreign forces.” staff report
Daily Times, September 3, 2007
KARACHI: A retired army man has announced that he is forming a new political party - ‘Tehreek Azmat-e-Islam’ - that would prioritize education, health, accommodation, legal and financial aid and work against vulgarity.
Major Gen. (retd) Zaheer-ul-Islam Abbasi was critical of President Musharraf, who he said was using the army for his personal interest and this will have a negative impact on the country’s integrity. He declared this during a press conference held Sunday at the Karachi Press Club.
“I was a part of the army and understand the military’s mentality very well,” he said. “These people will not sustain the present situation further.” Abbasi felt that the army was busy killing its fellow citizens.
He said that people were divided into different sects and there was a conspiracy to push the nation and the army towards civil war. He claimed that 4.5 million families were homeless in the country. Millions lack sufficient medical and education facilities.
Politicians, civil and military bureaucracy were responsible for exploiting the nation since Independence. “The present situation of the country is like General Yahya’s era and I fear that the situation is moving towards that of 1971.”
General Musharraf must remember that the operation in the Northern Areas could be dangerous for the army and the whole nation, he said. “Our rulers should not be used by foreign forces.” staff report
"A new US vision?": Realistic or Wishful?
A new US vision? BY DR MOEED PIRZADA
Khaleej Times: 8 August 2007
THE US Congressional bill designed to implement the '9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007' contains the seeds of new thinking on Pakistan. As widely known, this voluminous piece of legislation makes the continuation of assistance to Pakistan contingent upon its performance against the Taleban.
But oddly enough, it does something more: it allows for future presidential waivers on the basis of the pace of democratic reform; extension of the rule of law; and the conduct of the parliamentary elections.
Not surprisingly, this bill has been received with anxiety in Islamabad; but — outside the government — this has more to do with the timing than a fair assessment on merits. Unfortunately, it emerged at the tail end of a sequence of events: bloody siege of the 'Lal Masjid' in Islamabad; a string of reprisal suicide attacks across Pakistan's northwest; publication of 'National Intelligence Estimates' in Washington and threats by US national security officials of possible military strikes inside Pakistani territory.
The grotesqueness of military action against 'Lal Masjid' and the violent disruption of the suicide attacks in the northwest that left more than 300 dead were to Pakistanis poignant reminders of the ever growing costs of the war against terror, and of the difficult policy choices. Many observed cynically that the much talked about 'National Intelligence Estimate' in the context of Pakistan also mentions, on the very same page, that 'Al Qaeda in Iraq' — in a country where it never existed before the luxurious invitation by the US misadventure — is planning to attack the US homeland.
Amidst this mindset, the repeated mantras by the US national security officials that 'Pakistan needs to do more', coupled with the threat that they reserve the right of military attacks inside Pakistani territory were received with the scorn they probably deserved. No wonder then that many in the Pakistani civil-military establishment and the vernacular press saw the bill as a coda to the familiar American music of betrayal and abandonment.
But far from that the US Congress seems to be arguing for a tighter embrace; the bill in its draft form was making its legislative journey through the House and the Senate since January 2007, and section 1442 dealing with Pakistan grew out of the realisation — a product of the thinking of past several years — that despite the risks involved the US has no option but to push towards ensuring a democratic Pakistan as the best guarantor of regional security and US interests in South Asia.
One may wonder where this understanding originates from. The answer is: the renewed Pak-US relationship since 9/11 had a broader bandwidth; often beyond the traditional channels of communication. It saw an intense exchange of ideas between the State Department, various US agencies and think tanks on one side and Pakistani NGOs, print and electronic media and civil society opinion makers on the other.
The increasingly sophisticated understanding of the nexus between the state agencies and Jihadi culture, the role of madrassas, the spread of extremism under the military rule and ironically the collapse of all institutions sans Pakistan army is a result of this continuous and intense exchange.
It is precisely a result of this fine tuned understanding that the US Congress now identifies, in its "findings", the issues like: increasing poverty and corruption, lack of effective government institutions, dwindling rule of law as the "critical issues" that have the potential of disrupting the relationship between the US and Pakistan. And it wants the US president to put up a strategy, within 90 days of the new Act, to deal with these issues on a level parallel with the risks like 'nuclear proliferation' and 'Islamic terrorism'.
Even the dramatic re-emergence of Benazir Bhutto on Pakistan's political scene, and behind the doors US diplomacy to push for a rapprochement between her and General Musharraf was a byproduct of this newer understanding.
Washington understands the risks — of radicalisation and instability — inherent in continued military rule, but also calculates that in a state of advanced institutional collapse politicians will not be able to deliver on anything unless military backs them up. This then is the basis for Pakistan's much talked about "deal" between Bhutto and Musharraf.
In Pakistan we have always under-estimated the importance of the feedback provided by the chattering classes; but the newer US legislation and Washington's behind the scenes diplomacy of continuous engagement, of sustained persuasions, to nudge apparently irreconcilable political interests towards meaningful dialogue only proves that the Americans were listening all along — and this time perhaps for the better.
However, it is perhaps time for Pakistanis to tell the Americans that if they are really serious about making progress then they need to understand and do more. Flashes of a new thinking here and there may inspire but are hardly a replacement for a coherent vision. Four areas are of immediate importance:
One; the US needs to come up with, and publicise, the contours of a relationship with Pakistan beyond the narrow confines of the 'war against terrorism'. Is there a day after? What if this so called war ends? As long as there is no vision beyond the 'war against terrorism' vested interests in both Islamabad and Washington will ensure that a war that makes them relevant or influential will continue.
Two; It needs to rethink its long term strategy in Afghanistan. Since December of 2001, 67 months of military conflict have passed with one clear result: resistance and a sense of failure have increased. The Senate resolution 34 of January 2007 on Afghanistan, pointed out that over the last 12 months the roadside bomb attacks doubled, incursions across Pak-Afghan borders and the frontal attacks against the US and allied forces tripled, suicide attacks quintupled and the poppy cultivation significantly increased.
It is high time for the US to ask this honest question: Is the continuing rot in Afghanistan merely the result of 'safe sanctuaries' in Pakistan's tribal areas or does it reflecct a deeper malaise, of gaps and holes, in the power sharing arrangement in Kabul? Can something be done?
Three; as Vali Nasr, the senior fellow at the 'Council on Foreign Relations' had recently argued, in the Christian Science Monitor, after the appearance of the 'National Intelligence Estimate' that if the US wants the whole hearted support of Pakistani establishment in the war against Taleban, then it also needs to safeguard the strategic interests of the Pakistani state in Afghanistan.
And they include: preventing the southern Afghanistan to be used by the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) and other interests for insurgency inside the Pakistani territories; the inclusion of pro-Pakistan Pashtun elements in the Kabul regime and most importantly an acceptance of the Durand line as the frontier.
Washington is fully capable of delivering on all counts; but for some reasons it does not.
Four; the US can play a crucial role in the political party reform in Pakistan. At the moment except for the ironic exception of 'Jamat-e-Islami' no political party (including the so called moderate or liberal democrats) has any visible, transparent and meaningful process of elections, selections or decision making in place; most are little more than personal fiefdoms.
The US has often talked of its interest in such political reform but now it has a fair chance: PPP's Ms Bhutto is a continuing beneficiary of the US diplomacy behind the scenes; any political reform inside her party will compel all others to follow suit.
Dr. Moeed Pirzada is a broadcaster and media analyst based in London. He can be reached at director@media-policy.com
Khaleej Times: 8 August 2007
THE US Congressional bill designed to implement the '9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007' contains the seeds of new thinking on Pakistan. As widely known, this voluminous piece of legislation makes the continuation of assistance to Pakistan contingent upon its performance against the Taleban.
But oddly enough, it does something more: it allows for future presidential waivers on the basis of the pace of democratic reform; extension of the rule of law; and the conduct of the parliamentary elections.
Not surprisingly, this bill has been received with anxiety in Islamabad; but — outside the government — this has more to do with the timing than a fair assessment on merits. Unfortunately, it emerged at the tail end of a sequence of events: bloody siege of the 'Lal Masjid' in Islamabad; a string of reprisal suicide attacks across Pakistan's northwest; publication of 'National Intelligence Estimates' in Washington and threats by US national security officials of possible military strikes inside Pakistani territory.
The grotesqueness of military action against 'Lal Masjid' and the violent disruption of the suicide attacks in the northwest that left more than 300 dead were to Pakistanis poignant reminders of the ever growing costs of the war against terror, and of the difficult policy choices. Many observed cynically that the much talked about 'National Intelligence Estimate' in the context of Pakistan also mentions, on the very same page, that 'Al Qaeda in Iraq' — in a country where it never existed before the luxurious invitation by the US misadventure — is planning to attack the US homeland.
Amidst this mindset, the repeated mantras by the US national security officials that 'Pakistan needs to do more', coupled with the threat that they reserve the right of military attacks inside Pakistani territory were received with the scorn they probably deserved. No wonder then that many in the Pakistani civil-military establishment and the vernacular press saw the bill as a coda to the familiar American music of betrayal and abandonment.
But far from that the US Congress seems to be arguing for a tighter embrace; the bill in its draft form was making its legislative journey through the House and the Senate since January 2007, and section 1442 dealing with Pakistan grew out of the realisation — a product of the thinking of past several years — that despite the risks involved the US has no option but to push towards ensuring a democratic Pakistan as the best guarantor of regional security and US interests in South Asia.
One may wonder where this understanding originates from. The answer is: the renewed Pak-US relationship since 9/11 had a broader bandwidth; often beyond the traditional channels of communication. It saw an intense exchange of ideas between the State Department, various US agencies and think tanks on one side and Pakistani NGOs, print and electronic media and civil society opinion makers on the other.
The increasingly sophisticated understanding of the nexus between the state agencies and Jihadi culture, the role of madrassas, the spread of extremism under the military rule and ironically the collapse of all institutions sans Pakistan army is a result of this continuous and intense exchange.
It is precisely a result of this fine tuned understanding that the US Congress now identifies, in its "findings", the issues like: increasing poverty and corruption, lack of effective government institutions, dwindling rule of law as the "critical issues" that have the potential of disrupting the relationship between the US and Pakistan. And it wants the US president to put up a strategy, within 90 days of the new Act, to deal with these issues on a level parallel with the risks like 'nuclear proliferation' and 'Islamic terrorism'.
Even the dramatic re-emergence of Benazir Bhutto on Pakistan's political scene, and behind the doors US diplomacy to push for a rapprochement between her and General Musharraf was a byproduct of this newer understanding.
Washington understands the risks — of radicalisation and instability — inherent in continued military rule, but also calculates that in a state of advanced institutional collapse politicians will not be able to deliver on anything unless military backs them up. This then is the basis for Pakistan's much talked about "deal" between Bhutto and Musharraf.
In Pakistan we have always under-estimated the importance of the feedback provided by the chattering classes; but the newer US legislation and Washington's behind the scenes diplomacy of continuous engagement, of sustained persuasions, to nudge apparently irreconcilable political interests towards meaningful dialogue only proves that the Americans were listening all along — and this time perhaps for the better.
However, it is perhaps time for Pakistanis to tell the Americans that if they are really serious about making progress then they need to understand and do more. Flashes of a new thinking here and there may inspire but are hardly a replacement for a coherent vision. Four areas are of immediate importance:
One; the US needs to come up with, and publicise, the contours of a relationship with Pakistan beyond the narrow confines of the 'war against terrorism'. Is there a day after? What if this so called war ends? As long as there is no vision beyond the 'war against terrorism' vested interests in both Islamabad and Washington will ensure that a war that makes them relevant or influential will continue.
Two; It needs to rethink its long term strategy in Afghanistan. Since December of 2001, 67 months of military conflict have passed with one clear result: resistance and a sense of failure have increased. The Senate resolution 34 of January 2007 on Afghanistan, pointed out that over the last 12 months the roadside bomb attacks doubled, incursions across Pak-Afghan borders and the frontal attacks against the US and allied forces tripled, suicide attacks quintupled and the poppy cultivation significantly increased.
It is high time for the US to ask this honest question: Is the continuing rot in Afghanistan merely the result of 'safe sanctuaries' in Pakistan's tribal areas or does it reflecct a deeper malaise, of gaps and holes, in the power sharing arrangement in Kabul? Can something be done?
Three; as Vali Nasr, the senior fellow at the 'Council on Foreign Relations' had recently argued, in the Christian Science Monitor, after the appearance of the 'National Intelligence Estimate' that if the US wants the whole hearted support of Pakistani establishment in the war against Taleban, then it also needs to safeguard the strategic interests of the Pakistani state in Afghanistan.
And they include: preventing the southern Afghanistan to be used by the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) and other interests for insurgency inside the Pakistani territories; the inclusion of pro-Pakistan Pashtun elements in the Kabul regime and most importantly an acceptance of the Durand line as the frontier.
Washington is fully capable of delivering on all counts; but for some reasons it does not.
Four; the US can play a crucial role in the political party reform in Pakistan. At the moment except for the ironic exception of 'Jamat-e-Islami' no political party (including the so called moderate or liberal democrats) has any visible, transparent and meaningful process of elections, selections or decision making in place; most are little more than personal fiefdoms.
The US has often talked of its interest in such political reform but now it has a fair chance: PPP's Ms Bhutto is a continuing beneficiary of the US diplomacy behind the scenes; any political reform inside her party will compel all others to follow suit.
Dr. Moeed Pirzada is a broadcaster and media analyst based in London. He can be reached at director@media-policy.com
Saturday, September 01, 2007
Choices for Pakistan
Deal or transition? By Dr Farrukh Saleem
Daily times, September 02, 2007
What are Mohtarma's demands? One, no uniformed president. Two, free and fair elections. Three, general amnesty for all politicians. Four, no term limit for prime ministers. Five, a balance between the powers of the president and the prime minister.
If diplomacy is 'letting someone else have your way' then Mohtarma is diplomat par excellence. General amnesty, Benazir benefits and so does Nawaz. No term limit, Benazir benefits and so does Nawaz. No uniform, everyone comes out a winner. Here's the mother of all prizes for all of us to cherish: Benazir is doing it all through pure, undiluted diplomacy -- no violence, no chaos, no blood on the streets. If Benazir can manage half of what she is demanding she will be a diplomat par excellence in my book.
Transition there's going to be; transition from a military-led regime to a democratically elected government. Should that transition be peaceful or violent? There are political forces whose path to transition is through violence -- street battles and blood on the street. Benazir's adopted path to transition is non-violent -- court battles, dialogue and diplomacy. Forces of darkness always seek blood; forces of future are non-violent.
Transition there's going to be but transition doesn't take place in a vacuum. Internationally, the 'war on terror' is a reality. Domestically, Pak Army is a reality. Transition would have to take into account the two realities. Forces of extremism have their eyes and minds shut, forces of moderation must win. Why is Benazir helping a general when he is at his weakest? Here's why: Reality has decreed us two contradictions. First, democracy vs dictatorship. Second, moderation vs extremism. We must, at all cost, save Pakistan from a fate similar to Afghanistan's (read: pre-emptive attack). Reality thus demands a simultaneous solution to both of our contradictions.
Benazir's proposed transition stands on three pillars: non-violent, continuity in policy and national reconciliation. Benazir wants free elections, so does Nawaz. Benazir wants politically-induced court cases shut, so does Nawaz. Benazir wants a levelled playing field, so does Nawaz. Benazir wins, Nawaz wins, we all win. And, so does Musharraf. Here's how: Musharraf gets to hold free and fair elections. If the parliament elects him president, good for him, long live democracy. If the cup misses the lips, Musharraf still wins for giving Pakistan transparent elections.
Nawaz also represents forces of moderation -- and forces of moderation must win -- but Nawaz has somehow aligned himself with the forces of darkness. These are the forces of international rejectionism (a "political theory centred on the belief that the only way for the world to function successfully is for the current order to be 'rejected' and overthrown in an international revolution"). These are also the forces of isolationism. Yes, Nawaz's defiance has his stars rising but he must reject rejectionism as well as isolationism in all their forms and content.
Transition through violence means chaos and blood on the streets. Chaos is favoured by forces of darkness. These are the forces bent on seizing through blood of others what they can't through ballot. Forces of moderation -- and that of the future -- must avoid both streets and blood.
Back to democracy we must. Benazir's proposed transition means no blood on the streets. With no blood on the streets, she wins, Nawaz wins and we all win. So does the 'rule of law'. After all, one cannot establish rule of law by first breaking it on the streets. Trust the streets or trust the ballot box. Have faith in blood or in courts.
She's done a deal, they say. What's the big deal, I say. Free and fair elections, they say. That's no deal, I say. Free elections is the law. She's done a deal, they say. What's the deal, I say. No uniformed president, they say. That's no deal, I say. That's the law. She is playing her cards, they say. Playing to get power, they say. Can't get it, I say. Not if people don't vote for her, I say.
The writer is an Islamabad-based freelance columnist. Email: farrukh15@hotmail.com
Daily times, September 02, 2007
What are Mohtarma's demands? One, no uniformed president. Two, free and fair elections. Three, general amnesty for all politicians. Four, no term limit for prime ministers. Five, a balance between the powers of the president and the prime minister.
If diplomacy is 'letting someone else have your way' then Mohtarma is diplomat par excellence. General amnesty, Benazir benefits and so does Nawaz. No term limit, Benazir benefits and so does Nawaz. No uniform, everyone comes out a winner. Here's the mother of all prizes for all of us to cherish: Benazir is doing it all through pure, undiluted diplomacy -- no violence, no chaos, no blood on the streets. If Benazir can manage half of what she is demanding she will be a diplomat par excellence in my book.
Transition there's going to be; transition from a military-led regime to a democratically elected government. Should that transition be peaceful or violent? There are political forces whose path to transition is through violence -- street battles and blood on the street. Benazir's adopted path to transition is non-violent -- court battles, dialogue and diplomacy. Forces of darkness always seek blood; forces of future are non-violent.
Transition there's going to be but transition doesn't take place in a vacuum. Internationally, the 'war on terror' is a reality. Domestically, Pak Army is a reality. Transition would have to take into account the two realities. Forces of extremism have their eyes and minds shut, forces of moderation must win. Why is Benazir helping a general when he is at his weakest? Here's why: Reality has decreed us two contradictions. First, democracy vs dictatorship. Second, moderation vs extremism. We must, at all cost, save Pakistan from a fate similar to Afghanistan's (read: pre-emptive attack). Reality thus demands a simultaneous solution to both of our contradictions.
Benazir's proposed transition stands on three pillars: non-violent, continuity in policy and national reconciliation. Benazir wants free elections, so does Nawaz. Benazir wants politically-induced court cases shut, so does Nawaz. Benazir wants a levelled playing field, so does Nawaz. Benazir wins, Nawaz wins, we all win. And, so does Musharraf. Here's how: Musharraf gets to hold free and fair elections. If the parliament elects him president, good for him, long live democracy. If the cup misses the lips, Musharraf still wins for giving Pakistan transparent elections.
Nawaz also represents forces of moderation -- and forces of moderation must win -- but Nawaz has somehow aligned himself with the forces of darkness. These are the forces of international rejectionism (a "political theory centred on the belief that the only way for the world to function successfully is for the current order to be 'rejected' and overthrown in an international revolution"). These are also the forces of isolationism. Yes, Nawaz's defiance has his stars rising but he must reject rejectionism as well as isolationism in all their forms and content.
Transition through violence means chaos and blood on the streets. Chaos is favoured by forces of darkness. These are the forces bent on seizing through blood of others what they can't through ballot. Forces of moderation -- and that of the future -- must avoid both streets and blood.
Back to democracy we must. Benazir's proposed transition means no blood on the streets. With no blood on the streets, she wins, Nawaz wins and we all win. So does the 'rule of law'. After all, one cannot establish rule of law by first breaking it on the streets. Trust the streets or trust the ballot box. Have faith in blood or in courts.
She's done a deal, they say. What's the big deal, I say. Free and fair elections, they say. That's no deal, I say. Free elections is the law. She's done a deal, they say. What's the deal, I say. No uniformed president, they say. That's no deal, I say. That's the law. She is playing her cards, they say. Playing to get power, they say. Can't get it, I say. Not if people don't vote for her, I say.
The writer is an Islamabad-based freelance columnist. Email: farrukh15@hotmail.com
Different paths to political change in Pakistan
VIEW: Different paths to political change —Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi
Daily times, September 2, 2007
Nawaz Sharif’s decision to return to Pakistan poses a major challenge to President General Pervez Musharraf’s game plan for getting himself re-elected in uniform from the present assemblies. It has also increased pressure on Benazir Bhutto to make up her mind at the earliest on its strategy of negotiations with Musharraf. The key question is what will the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) do if the Musharraf government does not allow Sharif to enter Pakistan, or street confrontation breaks out between the Pakistan Muslim League — Nawaz (PMLN), and the government?
Sharif’s confrontation path is hazardous, but this option is in line with the anti-Musharraf mood of the politically active circles and civil society groups in Pakistan. These circles have gained confidence from the lawyers’ movement that they can bring about political change through collective action. As they favour liberal democracy, they will view Sharif’s return as another blow to centralised and authoritarian rule from the presidency. Sharif is expected to enjoy the support of the All-Parties Democratic Movement (APDM), which has superseded the Alliance for Restoration of Democracy (ARD) after the PPP opted for negotiations with Musharraf. However, the disposition of Maulana Fazlur Rahman is not yet clear. He will wait and see if Sharif returns and launches a protest movement.
In a democratic political system, leadership and policy changes are brought through the vote and the ballot box. However, in authoritarian and semi- or non-democratic systems, political changes are often unpredictable. These are often triggered by the policy and management blunders of over-confident rulers.
Musharraf appeared very confident of his position and future political prospects in December 2006. However, in order to check the efforts of the Supreme Court to acquire an autonomous role for itself, Musharraf stepped beyond his powers to suspend the chief justice in March 2007 and filed a reference for his removal to the Supreme Judicial Council.
The two pictures of the chief justice’s encounter with the state apparatus that appeared in the press appalled politically active circles and contributed to the strengthening of the lawyers’ movement for the chief justice’s restoration. The first picture showed the chief justice sitting in the president’s camp office (army house) while the president was wearing the army chief’s uniform. Press reports indicated that the chief justice also encountered the prime minister and other senior generals who asked him to resign. The second picture showed how security personnel manhandled the chief justice, forcing him into a vehicle by pulling his hair. These images were viewed as the examples of how the army top brass treated the highest civilian institutions and officers.
Despite the restoration of the chief justice by the Supreme Court, Musharraf defends his decision to file a reference against the chief justice. In mid-August, he insisted in Lahore that there was nothing wrong with filing the reference. This was an ill-advised move that led political and societal forces to rise in defence of constitutionalism, independence of judiciary and democracy.
These political and societal forces will be a major obstacle to Musharraf’s effort to banish Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif from mainstream Pakistani politics. Reinvigorated public opinion will dissuade Bhutto from siding with the Musharraf government. The latter may soon realise the futility of the dialogue because the presidency is looking for support for political survival rather than a move towards civilian and democratic order as envisaged by the PPP.
If the three main political players, Musharraf, Bhutto and Sharif, do not reconcile their divergent approaches to the future direction of Pakistani politics and society, Pakistan may face a major internal political crisis that can cause a total or partial breakdown of the political order. Musharraf may have some advantage over Bhutto and Sharif because he controls the state apparatus, including the army. However, heavy reliance on the bureaucratic and army apparatus may not ensure a secure political future for Musharraf.
Musharraf wants to continue with centralised and army-dominated governance and political management in total disregard to changed political ground realities over the last six months. From Musharraf’s perspective, the on-going interaction with the PPP is neither for democratic transition nor for his diminished role in governance. It only aims at keeping the PPP away from other political parties on the presidential elections by dangling the offer of some concessions which may not be actually given until Musharraf is re-elected.
Further, Musharraf is under pressure from the ruling PMLQ leadership to not accommodate Bhutto for understandable reasons. His track record shows that he works with political leaders on his own terms. If he accepts all that Bhutto is reported to have asked for, Musharraf will become a lame-duck president.
The PPP is pursuing a non-confrontational policy towards the Musharraf regime, hoping that mutual accommodation will move Pakistan towards greater democracy and constitutionalism. Bhutto also hopes that American and British influence will ensure that Musharraf accommodates the PPP. Until now, there is no evidence to suggest that the Musharraf government has decided to make any concrete gestures towards the PPP by adopting the required constitutional and legal approaches. The government is expected to keep the dialogue alive in order to divide the opposition and keep Bhutto on the dialogue track until the presidential election process is complete.
Sharif is pursuing a hard line confrontational approach towards the Musharraf government. He said that Musharraf would not be acceptable even if he quits as the army chief. Given the mood of the politically active circles, his strident approach has contributed to building his image. In the absence of Bhutto, Sharif is expected to attract more people on his return to Pakistan.
It can be argued that Sharif and Bhutto are pursuing a similar political agenda but they diverge on their strategies. It is quite possible that the gap between their approaches is narrowed as the PPP realises that its dialogue strategy has outlived its relevance, and Sharif comes to the conclusion that confrontation needs to be moderated in view of international and domestic political realities.
Whether Sharif and Bhutto work separately or together, the Musharraf government faces an uphill challenge to sustain itself. The ruling PMLQ is showing signs of internal disharmony which are expected to increase when Sharif returns to Pakistan. This challenge will not diminish if the government does not allow Sharif to return or his political activities are restrained for one reason or another. Any effort to restrain Sharif will have a host of negative consequences for the government.
The government will face additional problems if the Supreme Court accepts the opposition’s petition and rules that Musharraf cannot contest the presidential elections. This will leave no constitutional option for Musharraf to stay in power beyond the current term.
Time is fast running out for the political status quo in Islamabad. The presidency and its affiliates need to recognise Pakistan’s changed political landscape. Unless they agree to work out a strategy with mainstream political parties for holding presidential and parliamentary elections, Pakistan will experience internal instability which might topple the Musharraf government or make it dysfunctional. The bureaucratic–military underpinnings of the Musharraf government and its political support base in the shape of the PMLQ-led ruling coalition are becoming unsustainable in the face of resurgent political forces and an independent judiciary.
Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst
Daily times, September 2, 2007
Nawaz Sharif’s decision to return to Pakistan poses a major challenge to President General Pervez Musharraf’s game plan for getting himself re-elected in uniform from the present assemblies. It has also increased pressure on Benazir Bhutto to make up her mind at the earliest on its strategy of negotiations with Musharraf. The key question is what will the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) do if the Musharraf government does not allow Sharif to enter Pakistan, or street confrontation breaks out between the Pakistan Muslim League — Nawaz (PMLN), and the government?
Sharif’s confrontation path is hazardous, but this option is in line with the anti-Musharraf mood of the politically active circles and civil society groups in Pakistan. These circles have gained confidence from the lawyers’ movement that they can bring about political change through collective action. As they favour liberal democracy, they will view Sharif’s return as another blow to centralised and authoritarian rule from the presidency. Sharif is expected to enjoy the support of the All-Parties Democratic Movement (APDM), which has superseded the Alliance for Restoration of Democracy (ARD) after the PPP opted for negotiations with Musharraf. However, the disposition of Maulana Fazlur Rahman is not yet clear. He will wait and see if Sharif returns and launches a protest movement.
In a democratic political system, leadership and policy changes are brought through the vote and the ballot box. However, in authoritarian and semi- or non-democratic systems, political changes are often unpredictable. These are often triggered by the policy and management blunders of over-confident rulers.
Musharraf appeared very confident of his position and future political prospects in December 2006. However, in order to check the efforts of the Supreme Court to acquire an autonomous role for itself, Musharraf stepped beyond his powers to suspend the chief justice in March 2007 and filed a reference for his removal to the Supreme Judicial Council.
The two pictures of the chief justice’s encounter with the state apparatus that appeared in the press appalled politically active circles and contributed to the strengthening of the lawyers’ movement for the chief justice’s restoration. The first picture showed the chief justice sitting in the president’s camp office (army house) while the president was wearing the army chief’s uniform. Press reports indicated that the chief justice also encountered the prime minister and other senior generals who asked him to resign. The second picture showed how security personnel manhandled the chief justice, forcing him into a vehicle by pulling his hair. These images were viewed as the examples of how the army top brass treated the highest civilian institutions and officers.
Despite the restoration of the chief justice by the Supreme Court, Musharraf defends his decision to file a reference against the chief justice. In mid-August, he insisted in Lahore that there was nothing wrong with filing the reference. This was an ill-advised move that led political and societal forces to rise in defence of constitutionalism, independence of judiciary and democracy.
These political and societal forces will be a major obstacle to Musharraf’s effort to banish Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif from mainstream Pakistani politics. Reinvigorated public opinion will dissuade Bhutto from siding with the Musharraf government. The latter may soon realise the futility of the dialogue because the presidency is looking for support for political survival rather than a move towards civilian and democratic order as envisaged by the PPP.
If the three main political players, Musharraf, Bhutto and Sharif, do not reconcile their divergent approaches to the future direction of Pakistani politics and society, Pakistan may face a major internal political crisis that can cause a total or partial breakdown of the political order. Musharraf may have some advantage over Bhutto and Sharif because he controls the state apparatus, including the army. However, heavy reliance on the bureaucratic and army apparatus may not ensure a secure political future for Musharraf.
Musharraf wants to continue with centralised and army-dominated governance and political management in total disregard to changed political ground realities over the last six months. From Musharraf’s perspective, the on-going interaction with the PPP is neither for democratic transition nor for his diminished role in governance. It only aims at keeping the PPP away from other political parties on the presidential elections by dangling the offer of some concessions which may not be actually given until Musharraf is re-elected.
Further, Musharraf is under pressure from the ruling PMLQ leadership to not accommodate Bhutto for understandable reasons. His track record shows that he works with political leaders on his own terms. If he accepts all that Bhutto is reported to have asked for, Musharraf will become a lame-duck president.
The PPP is pursuing a non-confrontational policy towards the Musharraf regime, hoping that mutual accommodation will move Pakistan towards greater democracy and constitutionalism. Bhutto also hopes that American and British influence will ensure that Musharraf accommodates the PPP. Until now, there is no evidence to suggest that the Musharraf government has decided to make any concrete gestures towards the PPP by adopting the required constitutional and legal approaches. The government is expected to keep the dialogue alive in order to divide the opposition and keep Bhutto on the dialogue track until the presidential election process is complete.
Sharif is pursuing a hard line confrontational approach towards the Musharraf government. He said that Musharraf would not be acceptable even if he quits as the army chief. Given the mood of the politically active circles, his strident approach has contributed to building his image. In the absence of Bhutto, Sharif is expected to attract more people on his return to Pakistan.
It can be argued that Sharif and Bhutto are pursuing a similar political agenda but they diverge on their strategies. It is quite possible that the gap between their approaches is narrowed as the PPP realises that its dialogue strategy has outlived its relevance, and Sharif comes to the conclusion that confrontation needs to be moderated in view of international and domestic political realities.
Whether Sharif and Bhutto work separately or together, the Musharraf government faces an uphill challenge to sustain itself. The ruling PMLQ is showing signs of internal disharmony which are expected to increase when Sharif returns to Pakistan. This challenge will not diminish if the government does not allow Sharif to return or his political activities are restrained for one reason or another. Any effort to restrain Sharif will have a host of negative consequences for the government.
The government will face additional problems if the Supreme Court accepts the opposition’s petition and rules that Musharraf cannot contest the presidential elections. This will leave no constitutional option for Musharraf to stay in power beyond the current term.
Time is fast running out for the political status quo in Islamabad. The presidency and its affiliates need to recognise Pakistan’s changed political landscape. Unless they agree to work out a strategy with mainstream political parties for holding presidential and parliamentary elections, Pakistan will experience internal instability which might topple the Musharraf government or make it dysfunctional. The bureaucratic–military underpinnings of the Musharraf government and its political support base in the shape of the PMLQ-led ruling coalition are becoming unsustainable in the face of resurgent political forces and an independent judiciary.
Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst
Negotiations on Pakistan Power-Sharing Deal Stalled
Negotiations on Pakistan Power-Sharing Deal Stalled
Former Prime Minister Bhutto Plans to Return Regardless of Outcome
By Griff Witte: Washington Post, September 1, 2007
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, Sept. 1 -- Former prime minister Benazir Bhutto said Saturday that negotiations on a power-sharing agreement with Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, were at a standstill but that she would return from exile regardless of whether the two strike a deal.
Bhutto, who just three days ago had indicated the agreement was nearly complete, sounded pessimistic about the future of the talks as she spoke to reporters in London. She spoke out harshly against the president's political backers, who she blamed for allowing extremism to fester in Pakistan and, she said, have deliberately scuttled the deal in order to keep moderates like herself out of power.
The talks "failed because some elements within the ruling party, who have presided over the expansion of extremism and militancy, did not want the path of moderation," she said.
Bhutto's own party, however, had also been resistant to the deal. Many of her strongest supporters have expressed grave reservations about the idea of negotiating with Musharraf. They have urged her instead to ditch the talks and return to Pakistan to oppose the president's reelection.
Musharraf must be reelected between Sept. 15 and Oct. 15 if he wants to serve another five-year term.
Bhutto said her party will announce on Sept. 14 when she will return to Pakistan. Without a deal in place, she could be in legal jeopardy once she lands because of several outstanding corruption cases against her. That may be one reason why she did not rule out the possibility that the talks with the government could be revived.
Musharraf backers said that even though Bhutto had claimed earlier this week that Musharraf agreed to retire from his post leading the army before his reelection, that step will actually come afterward.
"President Musharraf may relinquish the post of the chief of army staff during the current month, but it'll be after his election from the current assembly," said Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, the leader of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League.
Pakistan's Supreme Court could declare Musharraf ineligible to run. Under the constitution, the president cannot have worked as a government employee during the two years before election. Lawyers who are trying to knock Musharraf out of office say that means that even if he were to retire as army chief, he would be constitutionally prohibited from being reelected.
The lawyers are likely to get a sympathetic hearing at the Supreme Court, where the chief justice, Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry, has been issuing decisions rejecting government views since he was reinstated in July, following Musharraf's botched attempt to fire him.
Bhutto said this week that if talks with the government succeeded, the parliament would waive the two-year prohibition on government employees in exchange for lifting a restriction that keeps prime ministers from serving more than two terms.
But officials from Musharraf's ruling Pakistan Muslim League indicated Friday that they have no intention of eliminating the two-term limit. They also said they would not accept Bhutto, who served two terms in the 1980s and 1990s, as prime minister.
It is unclear how Musharraf would react if the Supreme Court invalidated his candidacy. Information Minister Mohammed Ali Durrani said the government was exploring "other constitutional options."
One of those options, according to government officials, is to declare a state of emergency, which would allow Musharraf to delay elections by a year and blunt the power of the courts. This month, the government seemed on the verge of declaring an emergency, only to pull back in response to domestic and international pressure.
Special correspondent Kamran Khan in Karachi contributed to this report.
Also See, Rebel With the Claws:Another Storm Mushararf has to Weather - Nawaz Sharif is returning; OutlookIndia.com
Government Activates Diplomatic channels: Last Ditch Efforts to Clinch a deal with BB, Blocks Sharif's Return, Daily Times
Former Prime Minister Bhutto Plans to Return Regardless of Outcome
By Griff Witte: Washington Post, September 1, 2007
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, Sept. 1 -- Former prime minister Benazir Bhutto said Saturday that negotiations on a power-sharing agreement with Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, were at a standstill but that she would return from exile regardless of whether the two strike a deal.
Bhutto, who just three days ago had indicated the agreement was nearly complete, sounded pessimistic about the future of the talks as she spoke to reporters in London. She spoke out harshly against the president's political backers, who she blamed for allowing extremism to fester in Pakistan and, she said, have deliberately scuttled the deal in order to keep moderates like herself out of power.
The talks "failed because some elements within the ruling party, who have presided over the expansion of extremism and militancy, did not want the path of moderation," she said.
Bhutto's own party, however, had also been resistant to the deal. Many of her strongest supporters have expressed grave reservations about the idea of negotiating with Musharraf. They have urged her instead to ditch the talks and return to Pakistan to oppose the president's reelection.
Musharraf must be reelected between Sept. 15 and Oct. 15 if he wants to serve another five-year term.
Bhutto said her party will announce on Sept. 14 when she will return to Pakistan. Without a deal in place, she could be in legal jeopardy once she lands because of several outstanding corruption cases against her. That may be one reason why she did not rule out the possibility that the talks with the government could be revived.
Musharraf backers said that even though Bhutto had claimed earlier this week that Musharraf agreed to retire from his post leading the army before his reelection, that step will actually come afterward.
"President Musharraf may relinquish the post of the chief of army staff during the current month, but it'll be after his election from the current assembly," said Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, the leader of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League.
Pakistan's Supreme Court could declare Musharraf ineligible to run. Under the constitution, the president cannot have worked as a government employee during the two years before election. Lawyers who are trying to knock Musharraf out of office say that means that even if he were to retire as army chief, he would be constitutionally prohibited from being reelected.
The lawyers are likely to get a sympathetic hearing at the Supreme Court, where the chief justice, Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry, has been issuing decisions rejecting government views since he was reinstated in July, following Musharraf's botched attempt to fire him.
Bhutto said this week that if talks with the government succeeded, the parliament would waive the two-year prohibition on government employees in exchange for lifting a restriction that keeps prime ministers from serving more than two terms.
But officials from Musharraf's ruling Pakistan Muslim League indicated Friday that they have no intention of eliminating the two-term limit. They also said they would not accept Bhutto, who served two terms in the 1980s and 1990s, as prime minister.
It is unclear how Musharraf would react if the Supreme Court invalidated his candidacy. Information Minister Mohammed Ali Durrani said the government was exploring "other constitutional options."
One of those options, according to government officials, is to declare a state of emergency, which would allow Musharraf to delay elections by a year and blunt the power of the courts. This month, the government seemed on the verge of declaring an emergency, only to pull back in response to domestic and international pressure.
Special correspondent Kamran Khan in Karachi contributed to this report.
Also See, Rebel With the Claws:Another Storm Mushararf has to Weather - Nawaz Sharif is returning; OutlookIndia.com
Government Activates Diplomatic channels: Last Ditch Efforts to Clinch a deal with BB, Blocks Sharif's Return, Daily Times
Sinking Together? By Tariq Ali
Sinking together?
Tariq Ali
Guardian; August 30, 2007
For a politician whose sycophantic colleagues boast that she is closer to the pulse of the people than any of her rivals, Benazir Bhutto's decision to do a deal with Pakistan's uniformed president indicates the exact opposite. She is sadly out of touch. General Musharraf is now deeply unpopular here. It is not often that one can actually observe power draining away from a political leader. And the lifeline being thrown to him in the shape of an over-blown Benazir might sink together with him.
An indication that she was not completely unaware of this came a few days ago when she declared that her decision was "approved" by the "international community" always a code-word for Washington) and the Pakistan army (well, yes). In short, Pakistani public opinion was irrelevant.
The mood among sections of the street - I am currently in Lahore - is summed up in a cruel taunt: "People's Party de ballay, ballay / ade kanjar, ade dallay" (Marvel at the People Party / half-whore and half-pimp). This is slightly unfair and could apply to all the Muslim Leagues as well. The fact is that people are disgusted with politics and see politicians as crooks out to make money and feed the greed of the networks they patronise and which double up as useful vote banks.
But it should be acknowledged that Benazir Bhutto's approach is not the result of a sudden illumination. There is a twisted continuity here. When the general seized power in 1999 and toppled the Sharif brothers (then Benazir's detested rivals), she welcomed the coup and nurtured hopes of a ministerial post. When no invitations were forthcoming, she would turn up at the desk of a junior in the South Asian section of the State Department, pleading for a job. Instead the military charged her and her husband with graft and corruption. The evidence was overwhelming. She decided to stay in exile.
In March this year, Musharraf's decision to sack Iftikhar Hussein Chaudhry, the turbulent chief justice of the Supreme Court, backfired unexpectedly and sensationally. Tens of thousands of lawyers protested and took to the streets, demanding his immediate reinstatement. Political and social activists of almost every political hue joined them and a country usually depicted abroad as a den of bearded extremists on the verge of seizing power was suddenly witnessing an amazing constitutional struggle that had nothing to do with religion. Even the cynics were moved to see lawyers insisting on a rigid separation of powers.
The use of force by Musharraf's supporters in Karachi who opened fire and killed peaceful demonstrators created a further backlash against the regime. The Supreme Court voted unanimously to re-instate their chief. The general was becoming increasingly isolated.
The politicians who surrounded him pleaded for a state of emergency or even a new declaration of martial law, but according to many sources here in Pakistan the joint chiefs said that the military was too over-committed on the western frontier to police the rest of the country, which was a nice way of saying "No". With this route blocked, Washington now insisted on a deal with Ms Bhutto. The inner preoccupation to which she was a prey (power at any cost and the withdrawal of corruption charges) prevented her, I think, from having complete control of herself.
The Bush administration, which has brokered this deal, is basically ignorant of Pakistani politics. To isolate the Sharif brothers instead of including them in the "secular package" will drive them in the other direction. Nawaz Sharif is posing as a man of principle, forgetting how under his watch Muslim League thugs raided the Supreme Court and journalists were harassed and locked up. Memories are always short here and the fact the Sharif refused to negotiate with Musharraf has made him more popular in the country.
The notion that Bhutto can succeed in dealing with the Taliban more effectively than the general is risible, as Kamran Nazeer has already pointed out on Cif. Every time innocents are killed in bombing raids in Afghanistan or Pakistan increases support for the Taliban increases. Militants now control or dominate Tank, parts of Swat, North and South Waziristan, Dir, and Kohat inside Pakistan. The solution is political, not military. Killing more people will not help and there have been cases of soldiers refusing to fire on fellow-Muslims and junior officers taking early retirement after a tour of the duty on the Pak-Afghan border.
Pakistan being Pakistan, many observers are convinced that even if the deal is consummated it will be of short duration.
Tariq Ali
Guardian; August 30, 2007
For a politician whose sycophantic colleagues boast that she is closer to the pulse of the people than any of her rivals, Benazir Bhutto's decision to do a deal with Pakistan's uniformed president indicates the exact opposite. She is sadly out of touch. General Musharraf is now deeply unpopular here. It is not often that one can actually observe power draining away from a political leader. And the lifeline being thrown to him in the shape of an over-blown Benazir might sink together with him.
An indication that she was not completely unaware of this came a few days ago when she declared that her decision was "approved" by the "international community" always a code-word for Washington) and the Pakistan army (well, yes). In short, Pakistani public opinion was irrelevant.
The mood among sections of the street - I am currently in Lahore - is summed up in a cruel taunt: "People's Party de ballay, ballay / ade kanjar, ade dallay" (Marvel at the People Party / half-whore and half-pimp). This is slightly unfair and could apply to all the Muslim Leagues as well. The fact is that people are disgusted with politics and see politicians as crooks out to make money and feed the greed of the networks they patronise and which double up as useful vote banks.
But it should be acknowledged that Benazir Bhutto's approach is not the result of a sudden illumination. There is a twisted continuity here. When the general seized power in 1999 and toppled the Sharif brothers (then Benazir's detested rivals), she welcomed the coup and nurtured hopes of a ministerial post. When no invitations were forthcoming, she would turn up at the desk of a junior in the South Asian section of the State Department, pleading for a job. Instead the military charged her and her husband with graft and corruption. The evidence was overwhelming. She decided to stay in exile.
In March this year, Musharraf's decision to sack Iftikhar Hussein Chaudhry, the turbulent chief justice of the Supreme Court, backfired unexpectedly and sensationally. Tens of thousands of lawyers protested and took to the streets, demanding his immediate reinstatement. Political and social activists of almost every political hue joined them and a country usually depicted abroad as a den of bearded extremists on the verge of seizing power was suddenly witnessing an amazing constitutional struggle that had nothing to do with religion. Even the cynics were moved to see lawyers insisting on a rigid separation of powers.
The use of force by Musharraf's supporters in Karachi who opened fire and killed peaceful demonstrators created a further backlash against the regime. The Supreme Court voted unanimously to re-instate their chief. The general was becoming increasingly isolated.
The politicians who surrounded him pleaded for a state of emergency or even a new declaration of martial law, but according to many sources here in Pakistan the joint chiefs said that the military was too over-committed on the western frontier to police the rest of the country, which was a nice way of saying "No". With this route blocked, Washington now insisted on a deal with Ms Bhutto. The inner preoccupation to which she was a prey (power at any cost and the withdrawal of corruption charges) prevented her, I think, from having complete control of herself.
The Bush administration, which has brokered this deal, is basically ignorant of Pakistani politics. To isolate the Sharif brothers instead of including them in the "secular package" will drive them in the other direction. Nawaz Sharif is posing as a man of principle, forgetting how under his watch Muslim League thugs raided the Supreme Court and journalists were harassed and locked up. Memories are always short here and the fact the Sharif refused to negotiate with Musharraf has made him more popular in the country.
The notion that Bhutto can succeed in dealing with the Taliban more effectively than the general is risible, as Kamran Nazeer has already pointed out on Cif. Every time innocents are killed in bombing raids in Afghanistan or Pakistan increases support for the Taliban increases. Militants now control or dominate Tank, parts of Swat, North and South Waziristan, Dir, and Kohat inside Pakistan. The solution is political, not military. Killing more people will not help and there have been cases of soldiers refusing to fire on fellow-Muslims and junior officers taking early retirement after a tour of the duty on the Pak-Afghan border.
Pakistan being Pakistan, many observers are convinced that even if the deal is consummated it will be of short duration.
STRATFOR ANALYSIS: Pakistan: Systemic Change in the Making?
Pakistan: Systemic Change in the Making?
Aug 31, 2007: STRATFOR
Summary
It no longer is a matter of if, but of when Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf will leave the helm in Islamabad. The judiciary and the man he ousted from power, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, are threatening to throw a monkey wrench into his evasive maneuvers. The issue, however, now turns from the day-to-day drama of internal Pakistani politics to the much deeper issue of whether Musharraf's fall from grace will be paralleled by that of the Pakistani military as a whole.
Analysis
Former Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced Aug. 30 that he will return to Pakistan from forced exile Sept. 10. The same day, another exiled former leader, Benazir Bhutto, announced breakthroughs in negotiations with President Gen. Pervez Musharraf that would ease the general out of power. Meanwhile, the country's Supreme Court began proceedings on petitions challenging on constitutional grounds Musharraf's bid to seek re-election.
Stratfor forecast months ago that Musharraf would have to concede his position as military chief if he intended to stay on as a civilian president, and that he would have no choice but to work out a political agreement with Pakistan's opposition parties, specifically Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party. Prompted by advice from his closest aides, Musharraf is now quietly working toward securing an honorable exit from the scene. He could be forced to throw in the towel sometime after the appointment of a successor military chief on or around Oct. 8.
Once Musharraf vacates the presidency, events will pretty much unfold as per the constitution -- the way they did when the death in 1988 of Pakistan's last military dictator, Gen. Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq, created a power vacuum. A caretaker government headed by an acting president and an interim premier will be charged with holding fresh legislative elections, which will likely produce a highly divided parliament resulting in a coalition government.
Beyond the change in political personalities and groups, a far more important shift will take place in Pakistan in the coming months. For the first time since the army took control of the state in 1958 under Field Marshal Ayub Khan, the military's grip on the reins of the state is in the process of weakening.
This did not happen even when Pakistan's second military dictator, Gen. Yahya Khan, stepped down in 1971 after civil war led to the secession of a major chunk of the country and the surrender of some 100,000 troops to Indian forces. Neither did it happen when Zia-ul-Haq and his top generals died in a mysterious plane crash, ending his 11-year stint. In both cases, the military merely went into the background for some years -- only to return when the politicians could not agree to disagree. Even when the army was not directly ruling, the civilian leaders had to look over their shoulders continuously to see whether the generals were still with them nearly each step of the way.
That was in the past, however, when there were essentially two players in Pakistan -- the army and the political parties. Today, a vibrant civil society and increasingly independent and assertive judiciary have emerged within the country.
The empowerment of Pakistan's civil society was catalyzed by Musharraf's ill-fated decision to sack Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry in March. Chaudhry, breaking with tradition, would not fold, which set in motion a series of events that, within a matter of days, energized bar associations across the country. In turn, this emboldened the judiciary to assert its independence and challenge the military's hold on power.
The Supreme Court already has asserted its power, reversing a number of the Musharraf regime's decisions. The court reinstated the chief justice, released a top Musharraf opponent who was jailed on charges of treason and ensured Sharif's right of return. The judiciary also has taken steps to limit interference by the military and the intelligence agencies in matters of governance.
Meanwhile, the country's media, particularly the private television news channels, also have emerged as a powerful driver of events. In the wake of the judicial crisis, Musharraf tried June 4 to place restrictions on the electronic media through new ordinances empowering the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) to block transmissions, suspend licenses and confiscate equipment of electronic media organizations deemed in violation of the new laws. But five days later, under intense domestic and international pressure, he was forced to withdraw the controversial restrictions.
Pakistan also has witnessed an unprecedented surge in civil society activism. Instead of the political parties that historically have led protests, civil society groups -- especially the legal syndicates -- drove the protests during the legal crisis. There also has been an unprecedented outbreak of social debate on national issues, not only regarding the military's role in politics but also on the issue of rule of law. This debate has included criticism of men in uniform, as well as politicians.
All of this has been made possible by several structural changes that took shape mostly during the first seven years of Musharraf's rule. In order to counter the perception that he was a military dictator, Musharraf created a hybrid political system with a significant civilian component. Despite having manipulated the constitution on a number of occasions, he relied heavily on it to strengthen his grip on authority. In the process, he inadvertently strengthened the country's constitutional roots, which is now weakening the very power he consolidated.
Even within the military, Musharraf's repeated reshuffling of positions has contributed to his own undoing. It has brought to the fore a junior crop of generals that is inexperienced in politics and government. For a long time, this worked to his advantage by preventing any of his subordinates from rising up to challenge him. Now, however, as he faces challenges from Pakistan's civilian sectors, his top generals are unable and/or unwilling to support him.
In essence, the law of unintended consequences has worked against Musharraf. Moreover, it has weakened the military's ability to dominate the state. For now, this is limited to the political sphere. Eventually, the judicial branch can be expected to empower the legislative branch by forcing the military and the intelligence community to open up their books to parliamentary scrutiny. The weakening of the military's hold over the country's economic sector will be the next stage in the ongoing systemic change.
The question moving forward is: How far will the military's grip slacken before arrestors force the generals to take a firmer role? For now, the trend is running against the military -- and historical positions are being reversed. As the civilians entrench their power, it is the military -- not the civilian politicians -- that will mostly have to contend with limitations imposed by the judiciary. And civil society will serve as the watchdog.
And yet, there are plenty of issues that have the potential to topple this emerging civilian structure, such as the ability of Sharif and Bhutto to get along with one another and cooperate in order to check the military's power; the Islamists' level of power in the political system; the level of security in the country's Northwest; the status of the war on terrorism; the amount of pressure from the United States; and, of course, how India reacts to the changing political dynamic in Islamabad.
Any of these issues could lead to the military's return. Pakistan might be moving into the hands of civilians, but half a century of political culture does not die easily.
Aug 31, 2007: STRATFOR
Summary
It no longer is a matter of if, but of when Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf will leave the helm in Islamabad. The judiciary and the man he ousted from power, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, are threatening to throw a monkey wrench into his evasive maneuvers. The issue, however, now turns from the day-to-day drama of internal Pakistani politics to the much deeper issue of whether Musharraf's fall from grace will be paralleled by that of the Pakistani military as a whole.
Analysis
Former Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced Aug. 30 that he will return to Pakistan from forced exile Sept. 10. The same day, another exiled former leader, Benazir Bhutto, announced breakthroughs in negotiations with President Gen. Pervez Musharraf that would ease the general out of power. Meanwhile, the country's Supreme Court began proceedings on petitions challenging on constitutional grounds Musharraf's bid to seek re-election.
Stratfor forecast months ago that Musharraf would have to concede his position as military chief if he intended to stay on as a civilian president, and that he would have no choice but to work out a political agreement with Pakistan's opposition parties, specifically Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party. Prompted by advice from his closest aides, Musharraf is now quietly working toward securing an honorable exit from the scene. He could be forced to throw in the towel sometime after the appointment of a successor military chief on or around Oct. 8.
Once Musharraf vacates the presidency, events will pretty much unfold as per the constitution -- the way they did when the death in 1988 of Pakistan's last military dictator, Gen. Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq, created a power vacuum. A caretaker government headed by an acting president and an interim premier will be charged with holding fresh legislative elections, which will likely produce a highly divided parliament resulting in a coalition government.
Beyond the change in political personalities and groups, a far more important shift will take place in Pakistan in the coming months. For the first time since the army took control of the state in 1958 under Field Marshal Ayub Khan, the military's grip on the reins of the state is in the process of weakening.
This did not happen even when Pakistan's second military dictator, Gen. Yahya Khan, stepped down in 1971 after civil war led to the secession of a major chunk of the country and the surrender of some 100,000 troops to Indian forces. Neither did it happen when Zia-ul-Haq and his top generals died in a mysterious plane crash, ending his 11-year stint. In both cases, the military merely went into the background for some years -- only to return when the politicians could not agree to disagree. Even when the army was not directly ruling, the civilian leaders had to look over their shoulders continuously to see whether the generals were still with them nearly each step of the way.
That was in the past, however, when there were essentially two players in Pakistan -- the army and the political parties. Today, a vibrant civil society and increasingly independent and assertive judiciary have emerged within the country.
The empowerment of Pakistan's civil society was catalyzed by Musharraf's ill-fated decision to sack Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry in March. Chaudhry, breaking with tradition, would not fold, which set in motion a series of events that, within a matter of days, energized bar associations across the country. In turn, this emboldened the judiciary to assert its independence and challenge the military's hold on power.
The Supreme Court already has asserted its power, reversing a number of the Musharraf regime's decisions. The court reinstated the chief justice, released a top Musharraf opponent who was jailed on charges of treason and ensured Sharif's right of return. The judiciary also has taken steps to limit interference by the military and the intelligence agencies in matters of governance.
Meanwhile, the country's media, particularly the private television news channels, also have emerged as a powerful driver of events. In the wake of the judicial crisis, Musharraf tried June 4 to place restrictions on the electronic media through new ordinances empowering the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) to block transmissions, suspend licenses and confiscate equipment of electronic media organizations deemed in violation of the new laws. But five days later, under intense domestic and international pressure, he was forced to withdraw the controversial restrictions.
Pakistan also has witnessed an unprecedented surge in civil society activism. Instead of the political parties that historically have led protests, civil society groups -- especially the legal syndicates -- drove the protests during the legal crisis. There also has been an unprecedented outbreak of social debate on national issues, not only regarding the military's role in politics but also on the issue of rule of law. This debate has included criticism of men in uniform, as well as politicians.
All of this has been made possible by several structural changes that took shape mostly during the first seven years of Musharraf's rule. In order to counter the perception that he was a military dictator, Musharraf created a hybrid political system with a significant civilian component. Despite having manipulated the constitution on a number of occasions, he relied heavily on it to strengthen his grip on authority. In the process, he inadvertently strengthened the country's constitutional roots, which is now weakening the very power he consolidated.
Even within the military, Musharraf's repeated reshuffling of positions has contributed to his own undoing. It has brought to the fore a junior crop of generals that is inexperienced in politics and government. For a long time, this worked to his advantage by preventing any of his subordinates from rising up to challenge him. Now, however, as he faces challenges from Pakistan's civilian sectors, his top generals are unable and/or unwilling to support him.
In essence, the law of unintended consequences has worked against Musharraf. Moreover, it has weakened the military's ability to dominate the state. For now, this is limited to the political sphere. Eventually, the judicial branch can be expected to empower the legislative branch by forcing the military and the intelligence community to open up their books to parliamentary scrutiny. The weakening of the military's hold over the country's economic sector will be the next stage in the ongoing systemic change.
The question moving forward is: How far will the military's grip slacken before arrestors force the generals to take a firmer role? For now, the trend is running against the military -- and historical positions are being reversed. As the civilians entrench their power, it is the military -- not the civilian politicians -- that will mostly have to contend with limitations imposed by the judiciary. And civil society will serve as the watchdog.
And yet, there are plenty of issues that have the potential to topple this emerging civilian structure, such as the ability of Sharif and Bhutto to get along with one another and cooperate in order to check the military's power; the Islamists' level of power in the political system; the level of security in the country's Northwest; the status of the war on terrorism; the amount of pressure from the United States; and, of course, how India reacts to the changing political dynamic in Islamabad.
Any of these issues could lead to the military's return. Pakistan might be moving into the hands of civilians, but half a century of political culture does not die easily.
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