Daily Times, April 22, 2005
VIEW: An infrastructure of hope —Pervez Hoodbhoy
Pakistan's options have run out. This is not just because Pakistan is militarily incapable of wresting Kashmir from Indian rule. Its assumption - that keeping the world focused on Kashmir was good - has also turned out to be a miscalculation. In fact, once the world fully understood, the reaction was not at all what Pakistan had in mind
Against the wishes of militant Shiv Sena activists and Pakistan’s Islamist parties, Pakistan and India are talking. General Pervez Musharraf said on his recent visit that military force was “not the option anymore” for settling Kashmir. A year-old ceasefire is holding and the artillery remains stubbornly silent along the LOC as well as on the Siachen glacier. The joyous reception given by Kashmiris to the maiden voyage of the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad buses was a decisive rejection of extremists who had threatened to bomb the bus from Srinagar and kill its passengers. Agreements in New Delhi on encouraging trade and travel add to the opportunities for contact, cooperation and inter-dependence.
These developments are cause for rejoicing. For, just three years ago, gripped by war psychosis, the two countries nearly came to blows. But all the present openings can be closed by either state at a moment’s notice. The real test is: are the two states ready to make meaningful concessions and to make them irreversible? Kashmir is central to this.
General Musharraf insists that a solution to Kashmir must be found expeditiously. This may be public posturing or the expression of genuine conviction. In either case, he surely knows that, just as certain mathematical equations have no solution, the Kashmir problem is unsolvable inside the current solution space. India has categorically rejected the idea of a second partition or a territorial readjustment.
Pakistan’s options have run out. This is not just because Pakistan is militarily incapable of wresting Kashmir from Indian rule. Its assumption — that keeping the world focused on Kashmir was good — has also turned out to be a miscalculation. In fact, once the world fully understood, the reaction was not at all what Pakistan had in mind. The idea of jihadis active in, and supported by, a nuclear-armed state set off alarm bells everywhere, including Washington.
Extremist Islamic groups irreversibly eroded the moral high ground held by Kashmiris. They allowed India, the occupying power in Kashmir, to successfully portray itself as a victim of covert terror. So, in spite of rhetorical denials, Musharraf was forced to put Kashmir on the back burner. He got away with it, thereby demolishing the myth that no Pakistani government that compromises on Kashmir can survive.
Nevertheless, it will be a big mistake for India to declare victory or claim that the present situation vindicates its claim on Kashmir. Over the past two decades India has been morally isolated from Kashmiri Muslims. It continues to incur in the Valley the very considerable costs of an occupation. Indian soldiers continue to needlessly die — and to kill and oppress innocents.
At some point both parties must move boldly to a final solution. The LOC can be fuzzied, made highly permeable, and demilitarised up to some mutually negotiated depth on both sides. True, there will be protests in Pakistan. But if accompanied by appropriate sweeteners, these would not be fatal to Musharraf’s government provided it appropriately negotiates the terms and prepares the Pakistani public.
The path forward is becoming clear. It is time to build a political, social and economic infrastructure of hope and of mutual interests that can sustain the difficult journey to a peaceful future. The reasons for India desiring a rapprochement with Pakistan, and thus ending decades of hostility, are obvious. They need not be re-stated here. The reasons hold also for Pakistan — or at least for its civil society. And then there is one more reason.
In Pakistan the conflict is growing between those who seek to be part of the modern world and those who want to put a beard on every Muslim man and a veil on every Muslim woman. An alliance of Islamic parties (MMA) runs the government in the NWFP and is a coalition partner in Balochistan. It wants to end co-education, segregate women from public life, pass laws banning women from appearing on television and in advertisements, and heap yet more Islamic materials onto schoolbooks. The ferocity of this conflict increases by the day: MMA activists recently went on a rampage to stop girl students from running in a race; the column in Pakistani passports specifying religion has been reinstated; and Pakistani public schools are becoming as grim as madrassas.
Conflict with India fuels religious fervor. The use of jihad by the Pakistan Army as an instrument of foreign policy in Kashmir, and earlier in Afghanistan, profoundly changed Pakistani society. The army expressed concern after Sunni-Shia warfare threatened to engulf the country but woke up only after its senior officers — including General Musharraf himself — repeatedly became the targets of assassination attempts by irate jihadi ex-allies, summarily abandoned after 9/11.
General Musharraf is suspected by the mullahs to be a closet secularist. His international backers in Washington and London hope that the allegations are true. But he is no Ataturk. He has no strong agenda for social reform. Further, he is still a general and his real constituency is the military high command. This puts the army’s institutional interests above all else. The Islamists have discovered, to their great delight, that even mild pressure suffices to make a celebrated commando retreat. Attempts to modify the blasphemy laws, moderate the madrassas, change the curriculum, and remove the religion column in Pakistani passports, have all failed for lack of resolve. This lack of resolve, in turn, comes from wanting to keep options on Kashmir open — the army may again need its former allies.
Peace with India will not instantaneously transform Pakistan into a modern, forward-looking society. But it will go a long way in making this transition possible. The stakes for Pakistan are very high.
The writer teaches at Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad
Thursday, April 21, 2005
Islamist parties in a democratic context
Daily Times, April 22, 2005
COMMENT: Islamist parties in a democratic context —William B Milam
I hope we are not witnessing in Pakistan the Middle Eastern scenario in which the non-religious parties are so marginalised that the Islamist parties become the only real opposition despite the limited appeal of their agenda. That is easily avoided by a little long-term thinking on the part of the government
It has been over six months since my most recent op-ed in Daily Times. Those few readers who have noticed this gap suspect, no doubt, that the long layoff must have been by popular demand. But it was (I swear) my own choice. Op-ed fatigue is the clinical diagnosis, I think — on the part of the writer, not the readers.
Rested and refreshed after six months respite from op-ed rigors, and recharged with topics that I want to write about, I now venture back into (not below, I hope) the fold of Daily Times. The first of these topics is whether Islamist political parties fit in comfortably with democratic political structures. The question really is whether the Islamist agenda is compatible with democracy. A recent Washington think-tank meeting managed to bring it all together for me so that I can extrapolate to the Pakistani context.
In the background of any discussion of Islamism in democratic politics is the implicit judgement that Islamist parties, in general, have a broad civilisational agenda that aims at fundamental change in society and rejects “enlightened” or any other kind of moderation. They seek political power in order to implement their agenda. Most other political parties have less cosmic agendas — political, economic, or development programmes they intend to implement — but they do not intend to bring about changes in the fundamental character of the state or the society.
This means that the inclusion of Islamist parties in a democratic political structure is a tremendous challenge because their civilisational agenda makes democratic politics of compromise and give-and-take very difficult. Yet, ironically, it is the Islamist parties which appear to be the flat-out advocates of democracy. Non-religious parties are often linked to an undemocratic state or government in some way or other, and inadvertently often become identified with an undemocratic order.
There are two interrelated, second-order questions: will the civilisational agenda of Islamist parties be modified in the give-and-take of real democratic politics; and, if not, is there a danger of a majoritarian compulsion on that agenda if an Islamist party gains a majority of votes and is elected democratically in a Muslim country. In other words, will the Islamists, if they are freely and fairly elected, force their civilisational agenda on the polity of a country, or will their agenda be modified in the spirit of democratic compromise.
I have the firm impression that analysis of these questions has to be situational; each case is different. Nonetheless, there are a few general principles that seem to apply across the board. First, we can expect the Islamist parties to be strongly in favour of procedural democracy. It is in their interests. Through the coalitions and compromises that other parties in democratic politics are used to making to get and keep power, the Islamists gain ground and respectability.
Second, their participation in procedural democracy is usually not sufficient to change their agenda. The more important questions which will determine whether they are open to changing their agenda are whether they feel that they can ultimately achieve and keep power by themselves, and whether they are receptive to different ideas to attain power.
Beyond these general principles, there are few conclusive answers to the questions that Islamists’ participation in democracy raises. The one Islamist party that has come to power by election is the JDP in Turkey, and that is still a work in progress. The JDP did modify its agenda, and its rhetoric, before it came to power, and that agenda appears to be continuing to evolve as the JDP deals with the realities of governing.
The example of JDP in Turkey points to another general principle. The critical element is competition, powerful competition, and plenty of it. Islamist parties have to know that there are other parties out there that represent large segments of the population with a very different agenda. It takes meaningful competition between serious parties with different viewpoints to force modification of deeply-held agendas.
There is a broader point about competition. It must be encouraged and stimulated where there isn’t any at present. Because the Islamist parties are often fringe parties, they become the only real opposition when the non-religious parties are held down, or co-opted by a non-democratic government. This is the case all over the Middle East. These governments aim for a high degree of political organisation without democracy. In so doing, they marginalise the non-religious parties, because these are the opposition they fear. When the system opens up however, the marginalised non-religious parties may not be able to provide the necessary competition to the Islamist parties.
Pakistan fits the model in some ways and not in others. There are well-established mass parties that are not religious in orientation — the PPP and PML-N — powerful competition to the Islamists. The government has reached out half-heartedly to these parties with one hand and tried to marginalise them with the other. This despite the clear convergence of their interests in defining and supporting “enlightened moderation”.
These two major parties, themselves, often appear uninterested in a coherent vision that would compete with the Islamists, and often attenuate their role as the Islamists’ natural competitor by joining the Islamist parties for purely cynical political reasons. The traditional tendency of the major political parties to eschew principle for short-term political gain continues to erode their credibility, with the people, and the government.
The Islamists, on the other hand, with their siren song for democratisation may be moving towards becoming the main opposition. In the long-term this could be bad news for a government espousing “enlightened moderation”. But, just like the mainline parties, the government continues to make political decisions on short-term considerations. When it is not in alliance with the Islamists, it often gives way to their demands on the slightest provocation. It is hard to see any difference between the government and the two mainline parties on that score.
Could this be a strategy to see if the Islamists succumb to democratic pressures and compromise? That seems unlikely. Ironically, their electoral paradox — weak support and little possibility of electoral success in most places, strength and better electoral prospects only in the two smaller provinces — gives the Islamist parties little incentive to modify their civilisational agenda.
I hope we are not witnessing in Pakistan the Middle Eastern scenario in which the non-religious parties are so marginalised that the Islamist parties become the only real opposition despite the limited appeal of their agenda. That is easily avoided by a little long-term thinking on the part of both the government and the two mainline parties. If “enlightened moderation” is to be maintained and expanded, they need to construct a workable and enlightened entente cordiale.
William Milam is a former US ambassador to Pakistan and Bangladesh. He is currently at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington DC
COMMENT: Islamist parties in a democratic context —William B Milam
I hope we are not witnessing in Pakistan the Middle Eastern scenario in which the non-religious parties are so marginalised that the Islamist parties become the only real opposition despite the limited appeal of their agenda. That is easily avoided by a little long-term thinking on the part of the government
It has been over six months since my most recent op-ed in Daily Times. Those few readers who have noticed this gap suspect, no doubt, that the long layoff must have been by popular demand. But it was (I swear) my own choice. Op-ed fatigue is the clinical diagnosis, I think — on the part of the writer, not the readers.
Rested and refreshed after six months respite from op-ed rigors, and recharged with topics that I want to write about, I now venture back into (not below, I hope) the fold of Daily Times. The first of these topics is whether Islamist political parties fit in comfortably with democratic political structures. The question really is whether the Islamist agenda is compatible with democracy. A recent Washington think-tank meeting managed to bring it all together for me so that I can extrapolate to the Pakistani context.
In the background of any discussion of Islamism in democratic politics is the implicit judgement that Islamist parties, in general, have a broad civilisational agenda that aims at fundamental change in society and rejects “enlightened” or any other kind of moderation. They seek political power in order to implement their agenda. Most other political parties have less cosmic agendas — political, economic, or development programmes they intend to implement — but they do not intend to bring about changes in the fundamental character of the state or the society.
This means that the inclusion of Islamist parties in a democratic political structure is a tremendous challenge because their civilisational agenda makes democratic politics of compromise and give-and-take very difficult. Yet, ironically, it is the Islamist parties which appear to be the flat-out advocates of democracy. Non-religious parties are often linked to an undemocratic state or government in some way or other, and inadvertently often become identified with an undemocratic order.
There are two interrelated, second-order questions: will the civilisational agenda of Islamist parties be modified in the give-and-take of real democratic politics; and, if not, is there a danger of a majoritarian compulsion on that agenda if an Islamist party gains a majority of votes and is elected democratically in a Muslim country. In other words, will the Islamists, if they are freely and fairly elected, force their civilisational agenda on the polity of a country, or will their agenda be modified in the spirit of democratic compromise.
I have the firm impression that analysis of these questions has to be situational; each case is different. Nonetheless, there are a few general principles that seem to apply across the board. First, we can expect the Islamist parties to be strongly in favour of procedural democracy. It is in their interests. Through the coalitions and compromises that other parties in democratic politics are used to making to get and keep power, the Islamists gain ground and respectability.
Second, their participation in procedural democracy is usually not sufficient to change their agenda. The more important questions which will determine whether they are open to changing their agenda are whether they feel that they can ultimately achieve and keep power by themselves, and whether they are receptive to different ideas to attain power.
Beyond these general principles, there are few conclusive answers to the questions that Islamists’ participation in democracy raises. The one Islamist party that has come to power by election is the JDP in Turkey, and that is still a work in progress. The JDP did modify its agenda, and its rhetoric, before it came to power, and that agenda appears to be continuing to evolve as the JDP deals with the realities of governing.
The example of JDP in Turkey points to another general principle. The critical element is competition, powerful competition, and plenty of it. Islamist parties have to know that there are other parties out there that represent large segments of the population with a very different agenda. It takes meaningful competition between serious parties with different viewpoints to force modification of deeply-held agendas.
There is a broader point about competition. It must be encouraged and stimulated where there isn’t any at present. Because the Islamist parties are often fringe parties, they become the only real opposition when the non-religious parties are held down, or co-opted by a non-democratic government. This is the case all over the Middle East. These governments aim for a high degree of political organisation without democracy. In so doing, they marginalise the non-religious parties, because these are the opposition they fear. When the system opens up however, the marginalised non-religious parties may not be able to provide the necessary competition to the Islamist parties.
Pakistan fits the model in some ways and not in others. There are well-established mass parties that are not religious in orientation — the PPP and PML-N — powerful competition to the Islamists. The government has reached out half-heartedly to these parties with one hand and tried to marginalise them with the other. This despite the clear convergence of their interests in defining and supporting “enlightened moderation”.
These two major parties, themselves, often appear uninterested in a coherent vision that would compete with the Islamists, and often attenuate their role as the Islamists’ natural competitor by joining the Islamist parties for purely cynical political reasons. The traditional tendency of the major political parties to eschew principle for short-term political gain continues to erode their credibility, with the people, and the government.
The Islamists, on the other hand, with their siren song for democratisation may be moving towards becoming the main opposition. In the long-term this could be bad news for a government espousing “enlightened moderation”. But, just like the mainline parties, the government continues to make political decisions on short-term considerations. When it is not in alliance with the Islamists, it often gives way to their demands on the slightest provocation. It is hard to see any difference between the government and the two mainline parties on that score.
Could this be a strategy to see if the Islamists succumb to democratic pressures and compromise? That seems unlikely. Ironically, their electoral paradox — weak support and little possibility of electoral success in most places, strength and better electoral prospects only in the two smaller provinces — gives the Islamist parties little incentive to modify their civilisational agenda.
I hope we are not witnessing in Pakistan the Middle Eastern scenario in which the non-religious parties are so marginalised that the Islamist parties become the only real opposition despite the limited appeal of their agenda. That is easily avoided by a little long-term thinking on the part of both the government and the two mainline parties. If “enlightened moderation” is to be maintained and expanded, they need to construct a workable and enlightened entente cordiale.
William Milam is a former US ambassador to Pakistan and Bangladesh. He is currently at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington DC
The nuclear sage of Pakistan
The News, April 22, 2005
The nuclear sage of Pakistan
Farhatullah Babar
Six years ago on April 22 Munir Ahmad Khan, Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission for nearly two decades (1972 - 1991) died. He remained unsung but the events of the past few years have vindicated him, even though full vindication is yet to come.
Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto recalled him to Pakistan from the International Atomic Energy Agency where he worked for thirteen years and made him Chairman of the PAEC Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission in 1972. If Bhutto was like Nehru in India in having a nuclear dream, Munir Khan was like Dr. Bhabha, who helped shape the political vision of Nehru for nearly two decades of his stewardship of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission.
As Chairman PAEC Munir Khan created a team which gave Pakistan the mastery of complete nuclear fuel cycle, carried out cold nuclear tests in 1983, and built the tunnels in the Chaghai Mountains of Balochistan for tests 15 years later that were to formally declare to the world the country's nuclear status.
He conceived and planned the Kahuta plant, completed the necessary ground work for it, and built the production plant of uranium gas, the critical feed for Kahuta, through indigenous effort. The uranium production capability saved the nuclear programme when Canada unilaterally terminated supply of fuel for the Canadian built Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP).
He also laid the groundwork for the 300 MW nuclear power plant at Chashma. He also started the building of an indigenous power reactor, that was reported to be complete and operational after his death. Apart from strategic nuclear infrastructure he also built a dozen nuclear medical centres and several nuclear agricultural centres throughout the country.
He also set up training centres, which have since produced thousands of highly trained nuclear scientists and engineers, during the past quarter of a century, and made the nuclear programme self reliant -- one of his crowning achievements. The most noteworthy among such centres is the Centre for Nuclear Studies that made the nuclear programme self propelling and independent -- when he died Pakistan did not have to look elsewhere for trained manpower. The Centre has since become a full-fledged University producing hundreds of trained scientists annually in state of the art nuclear technologies.
Munir Khan shunned cheap popularity and believed that the advertising the Commission's achievements was not in national interest. The boos and jeers of detractors could not provoke him into flaunting his achievements. He too could have sought a shortcut to name, fame and fortune through self projection but he resisted the temptation.
As he wrote in a newspaper article in June 1994, no matter what you say about atomic energy, "you are bound to have front page converge almost effortlessly", but he refrained because, "somebody else will pay the bill while you will harvest public attention."
Newspaper headlines quoting political and scientific figures claiming that Pakistan had joined the rank of world nuclear powers irked him. He was opposed to nuclear rhetoric for personal ends and self-glorification. He distrusted those who brandished modest nuclear capability to create and sustain a feeling of invincibility.
He would often give the example of Israel that was a de facto nuclear weapon state with a delivery system but no scientist, general or politician had exploited it for personal or political gain. "No serving or retired government official in India has yet made a revelation about its nuclear capability and from who and how it acquired the nuclear capability. Why must we say, what we are doing?" he asked in another article.
He knew some in Pakistan were doing so. "The martial law government needed props and stilts to stand tall and legitimate. It decided to use Islam and newly acquired nuclear capability. Who could defeat the combination of faith and high technology? You had the best of the two worlds", he once wrote in a newspaper.
Munir Khan called it 'milking the nuclear cow' and "putting a political foot in the nuclear mouth". He cautioned political leaders thus: "Highly experienced public leaders are not expected to transgress certain limits beyond which national interests are compromised."
When deafening silence and ridicule greeted his pleas for sanity, Munir Khan warned, "Sometimes populist politics can damage the best interests of the country even though they may appear to advance the interests of individuals or parties in the short run", reminding us that the thoughtless advertisement of our nuclear capability in the past had resulted in the application of the Pressler amendment.
Arguing that the Pressler law had gravely undermined our economic development and defence preparedness he warned, "We can ill afford to invite similar embargoes again." This earned him the wrath of his powerful detractors who hounded him.
One bizarre incident showing how he was hounded revolves around the publication in the early 80's of a book "Islamic Bomb" by some foreign publisher. It detailed Pakistan's clandestine efforts to make the bomb and made several mentions in a positive way of Munir Ahmad Khan and also of A. Q. Khan.
It was in the bookstores for some time but just when cold nuclear tests had been conducted and Munir Khan was calling for nuclear restraint, army generals, bureaucrats, government leaders and leading scientists were surprised to receive free copies of the book by post. Why would a foreign publisher want to freely distribute the book in Pakistan?
It soon turned out that in the new edition all positive references to Munir Ahmad Khan had been deleted and replaced with derogatory comments. For instance a reference to Munir Khan as "a patriot and a man who would do anything and everything to bring atomic power and atomic weapons to his homeland", in the original edition, read "Mr. Munir Khan is not a patriot, he would do anything to keep atomic weapons away from Pakistan", in the revised edition. This is just one example. There were several other such references in the new edition, not found in the original version.
The publisher was flabbergasted, disowned the new edition which he said was fake and demanded an inquiry. The scandal was brought to the attention of President Ghulam Ishaq Khan as well. The President was aware of the Byzantine intrigues and it seems that he also knew who were behind it. But he did not order an inquiry.
Who published the fictitious version thus remains a mystery, like the mystery of the fire the Ojhri camp ammunition depot in Rawalpindi, 1988, or the mystery of the Mujahideen climbing the Kargil heights a decade later.
Eleven years ago on April 29, 1994 Munir Khan had cautioned, "We must understand that nuclear weapons are not a play thing to be banded publicly. They have to be treated with respect and responsibility." He then sounded a warning that seems prophetic, "While they can destroy the enemy, they can also invite self destruction."
By "bandying nuclear weapons as playthings" some of us claimed to destroy the enemy. The enemy is not destroyed, but by our irresponsibility in the nuclear bazaar, we have "invited self destruction". Truly Munir A. Khan was the nuclear sage of our time.
He also believed that the ultimate control of the nuclear programme and its command must rest in the hands of civilian institutions. He had studied the command and control structures of other countries and knew the dangers to national security when such controls slipped out of civilian hands. But a serpent of doubt always lurked in his heart.
When under the military rule of General Musharraf the control of the nuclear establishments finally slipped from the civilian to the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) and the demise of civilian control was formally sealed, I could not help feeling that the serpent had bit the soul.
On his sixth death anniversary, as I recall the hopes and fears of this nuclear sage, I also pray with trepidation that his warnings about the dangers resulting from the demise of civilian control do not prove half as true as his warning about "inviting self destruction".
There are times when one prays even for the sages to be proved wrong. I never imagined that on his death anniversary I would be secretly nurturing this prayer.
The writer, who belongs to the Pakistan People's Party, is a member of the Defence Committee of the Senate
Email: drkhshan@isb.comsats.net.pk
The nuclear sage of Pakistan
Farhatullah Babar
Six years ago on April 22 Munir Ahmad Khan, Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission for nearly two decades (1972 - 1991) died. He remained unsung but the events of the past few years have vindicated him, even though full vindication is yet to come.
Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto recalled him to Pakistan from the International Atomic Energy Agency where he worked for thirteen years and made him Chairman of the PAEC Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission in 1972. If Bhutto was like Nehru in India in having a nuclear dream, Munir Khan was like Dr. Bhabha, who helped shape the political vision of Nehru for nearly two decades of his stewardship of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission.
As Chairman PAEC Munir Khan created a team which gave Pakistan the mastery of complete nuclear fuel cycle, carried out cold nuclear tests in 1983, and built the tunnels in the Chaghai Mountains of Balochistan for tests 15 years later that were to formally declare to the world the country's nuclear status.
He conceived and planned the Kahuta plant, completed the necessary ground work for it, and built the production plant of uranium gas, the critical feed for Kahuta, through indigenous effort. The uranium production capability saved the nuclear programme when Canada unilaterally terminated supply of fuel for the Canadian built Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP).
He also laid the groundwork for the 300 MW nuclear power plant at Chashma. He also started the building of an indigenous power reactor, that was reported to be complete and operational after his death. Apart from strategic nuclear infrastructure he also built a dozen nuclear medical centres and several nuclear agricultural centres throughout the country.
He also set up training centres, which have since produced thousands of highly trained nuclear scientists and engineers, during the past quarter of a century, and made the nuclear programme self reliant -- one of his crowning achievements. The most noteworthy among such centres is the Centre for Nuclear Studies that made the nuclear programme self propelling and independent -- when he died Pakistan did not have to look elsewhere for trained manpower. The Centre has since become a full-fledged University producing hundreds of trained scientists annually in state of the art nuclear technologies.
Munir Khan shunned cheap popularity and believed that the advertising the Commission's achievements was not in national interest. The boos and jeers of detractors could not provoke him into flaunting his achievements. He too could have sought a shortcut to name, fame and fortune through self projection but he resisted the temptation.
As he wrote in a newspaper article in June 1994, no matter what you say about atomic energy, "you are bound to have front page converge almost effortlessly", but he refrained because, "somebody else will pay the bill while you will harvest public attention."
Newspaper headlines quoting political and scientific figures claiming that Pakistan had joined the rank of world nuclear powers irked him. He was opposed to nuclear rhetoric for personal ends and self-glorification. He distrusted those who brandished modest nuclear capability to create and sustain a feeling of invincibility.
He would often give the example of Israel that was a de facto nuclear weapon state with a delivery system but no scientist, general or politician had exploited it for personal or political gain. "No serving or retired government official in India has yet made a revelation about its nuclear capability and from who and how it acquired the nuclear capability. Why must we say, what we are doing?" he asked in another article.
He knew some in Pakistan were doing so. "The martial law government needed props and stilts to stand tall and legitimate. It decided to use Islam and newly acquired nuclear capability. Who could defeat the combination of faith and high technology? You had the best of the two worlds", he once wrote in a newspaper.
Munir Khan called it 'milking the nuclear cow' and "putting a political foot in the nuclear mouth". He cautioned political leaders thus: "Highly experienced public leaders are not expected to transgress certain limits beyond which national interests are compromised."
When deafening silence and ridicule greeted his pleas for sanity, Munir Khan warned, "Sometimes populist politics can damage the best interests of the country even though they may appear to advance the interests of individuals or parties in the short run", reminding us that the thoughtless advertisement of our nuclear capability in the past had resulted in the application of the Pressler amendment.
Arguing that the Pressler law had gravely undermined our economic development and defence preparedness he warned, "We can ill afford to invite similar embargoes again." This earned him the wrath of his powerful detractors who hounded him.
One bizarre incident showing how he was hounded revolves around the publication in the early 80's of a book "Islamic Bomb" by some foreign publisher. It detailed Pakistan's clandestine efforts to make the bomb and made several mentions in a positive way of Munir Ahmad Khan and also of A. Q. Khan.
It was in the bookstores for some time but just when cold nuclear tests had been conducted and Munir Khan was calling for nuclear restraint, army generals, bureaucrats, government leaders and leading scientists were surprised to receive free copies of the book by post. Why would a foreign publisher want to freely distribute the book in Pakistan?
It soon turned out that in the new edition all positive references to Munir Ahmad Khan had been deleted and replaced with derogatory comments. For instance a reference to Munir Khan as "a patriot and a man who would do anything and everything to bring atomic power and atomic weapons to his homeland", in the original edition, read "Mr. Munir Khan is not a patriot, he would do anything to keep atomic weapons away from Pakistan", in the revised edition. This is just one example. There were several other such references in the new edition, not found in the original version.
The publisher was flabbergasted, disowned the new edition which he said was fake and demanded an inquiry. The scandal was brought to the attention of President Ghulam Ishaq Khan as well. The President was aware of the Byzantine intrigues and it seems that he also knew who were behind it. But he did not order an inquiry.
Who published the fictitious version thus remains a mystery, like the mystery of the fire the Ojhri camp ammunition depot in Rawalpindi, 1988, or the mystery of the Mujahideen climbing the Kargil heights a decade later.
Eleven years ago on April 29, 1994 Munir Khan had cautioned, "We must understand that nuclear weapons are not a play thing to be banded publicly. They have to be treated with respect and responsibility." He then sounded a warning that seems prophetic, "While they can destroy the enemy, they can also invite self destruction."
By "bandying nuclear weapons as playthings" some of us claimed to destroy the enemy. The enemy is not destroyed, but by our irresponsibility in the nuclear bazaar, we have "invited self destruction". Truly Munir A. Khan was the nuclear sage of our time.
He also believed that the ultimate control of the nuclear programme and its command must rest in the hands of civilian institutions. He had studied the command and control structures of other countries and knew the dangers to national security when such controls slipped out of civilian hands. But a serpent of doubt always lurked in his heart.
When under the military rule of General Musharraf the control of the nuclear establishments finally slipped from the civilian to the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) and the demise of civilian control was formally sealed, I could not help feeling that the serpent had bit the soul.
On his sixth death anniversary, as I recall the hopes and fears of this nuclear sage, I also pray with trepidation that his warnings about the dangers resulting from the demise of civilian control do not prove half as true as his warning about "inviting self destruction".
There are times when one prays even for the sages to be proved wrong. I never imagined that on his death anniversary I would be secretly nurturing this prayer.
The writer, who belongs to the Pakistan People's Party, is a member of the Defence Committee of the Senate
Email: drkhshan@isb.comsats.net.pk
Settling Kashmir issue By Dr. Mubashir Hasan
Dawn, April 21, 2005
Settling Kashmir issue
By Dr Mubashir Hasan
A win, win, win solution of the issue of Kashmir is feasible - a win each for Pakistan and India and a win for the people of the former state of Jammu and Kashmir. Each of the three can settle for more than what they now have in real terms.
The sole mention of Kashmir in the Constitution of Pakistan is: "When the people of the state of Jammu and Kashmir decide to accede to Pakistan, the relationship between Pakistan and the State shall be determined in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State".
Pakistan considers the entire territory of the former State of Jammu and Kashmir as an area under dispute. It does not recognize the Indian jurisdiction over any part of the former state.
However, Pakistan has taken the position that any solution of the dispute which is acceptable to the people of the former state is acceptable to Pakistan. It no longer insists on the enforcement of those parts of the resolutions of the United Nations which would have resulted in the entire state either acceding to Pakistan or India.
General Pervez Musharraf has declared that neither the conversion of the Line of Control into an international border nor independence for the state is acceptable to Pakistan.
Since Pakistan considers the former state of Jammu and Kashmir as a disputed territory, it does not claim sovereignty over any area of the state. The area Pakistan calls Azad Kashmir has its own president, parliament, prime minister, supreme court, high court and other institutions.
It has wide internal autonomy. On behalf of the government of Azad Kashmir, Islamabad is responsible for defence, foreign affairs and immigration questions pertaining to the area.
In such a situation, if a solution can be found which gives Pakistan a certain status in the territory now under India's control and makes legal certain aspects of its authority in the areas lying to the west of the Line of Control, it would be a net gain for Pakistan.
India claims sovereignty over the entire territory of the former state. However, along with the government of Azad Kashmir, Pakistan exercises control over certain areas of the former state which lie to the west and north of the Line of Control.
It is generally believed that should Pakistan and Azad Kashmir agree, India would accept the Line of Control, with minor changes, as the international border - that is, relinquish its sovereign claim over what is with Pakistan and Azad Kashmir as of now.
New Delhi ceded parts of its sovereignty to the state legislature in Srinagar under Article 370 of the Constitution of India. It is generally believed that India is prepared to enhance the autonomous status of the former state as long as it does not amount to independence.
Declared Prime Minister Narasimha Rao of India in 1995: "Independence no, autonomy, sky is the limit". The declaration has been reaffirmed recently by Kanwar Natwar Singh, India's Minister of External Affairs.
In such a situation, if a solution can be found which gives India a certain status in the territory now under Pakistan's control, in lieu of conceding wide autonomy to the state as well as giving Pakistan a certain status in the part of the state now under India's control, it would be a net gain for India.
Apparently, people in large numbers in the former state of Jammu and Kashmir do not wish to be ruled either by India or Pakistan. They would like to be independent. However, neither India nor Pakistan is ready to consider this option as a solution to the dispute.
The opinion in the international community also does not seem to favour the emergence of a new independent state in the region. For the time being, those who are for complete independence may consider fulfilling their aspirations to the extent of the widest possible autonomy. That will be, indeed, a big change in their favour from their present status. The win, win, win solution may be based, therefore, on the following premises:
DEFENCE: Authority to defend a territory with armed might is one of the basic tenets of the exercise of sovereignty. Let India and Pakistan continue to be responsible for the defence of the borders of the former state against any power as they do, and at places they do, today.
India's de facto authority as it exercises today along the Ladakh border becomes de jure. Pakistan does the same along the Khunjrab border in a legally recognized manner. If they wish they may form a consultative body on defence matters of which the government of the state may also be a member.
India and Pakistan agree to enter into a treaty with each other that the two countries shall not prepare for or wage war in the territory of the former state of Jammu and Kashmir.
In so agreeing, the need for defending the Line of Control along almost 800 km ceases to exist and the way is cleared for the withdrawal of their forces stationed along this line.
India and Pakistan agree that the former state shall reunite as an undivided entity. This agreement shall fulfil one of the basic nationalist aspirations of the people of the former state.
The state of Kashmir pledges not to build an army of its own and India and Pakistan agree to relinquish the role of their armies of coming to the aid of civil power in the state. These undertakings shall strengthen the internal autonomy of the administration of the state, much to the relief of the armies of India and Pakistan.
No longer required along the Line of Control and to act in aid of civil power, India and Pakistan agree to withdraw their armies from Kashmir except from the borders of Kashmir with China.
FOREIGN RELATIONS: At present the foreign relations of a part of the former state are conducted by Pakistan and of the other part by India. In the proposed solution, India and Pakistan may jointly be responsible for those aspects of relations which affect the security interests of either country including those of foreign investment, aid and grants. The state may exercise authority in establishing ties with other states in commerce and trade and other matters with the agreement of Pakistan and India.
ACCESS AND TRADE: Citizens of Kashmir acquire the right of entry and of doing business in Pakistan as well as India as if they were citizens of India and Pakistan as well.
The communication, transportation, educational and other infra structural facilities of India and Pakistan may be available to Kashmiris without any discriminatory restrictions.
The produce, manufactures and services of Kashmir should have access to the markets of India and Pakistan without any duties or charges; similarly, Indian and Pakistani produce, manufactures and services should have free access to the markets of Kashmir.
The citizens of India and Pakistan are able to travel throughout the former state without let or hindrance. Since the sights of the two countries are on a visa-free regime within the Saarc areas, a beginning with removing travel restrictions with Kashmir may prove to be auspicious.
These measures will be a big gain for India and Pakistan and an economic boom for the state of Kashmir. The currencies of Pakistan and India may be made legal tender throughout the former state.
PASSPORTS: Passports issued by the state of Kashmir have the status of those issued by the state before 1947. Visas issued by Pakistan and India to be valid for Kashmir.
INDUS WATERS: The status and validity of the Indus Basin Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan remains unchanged.
AUTONOMY: Subject to the foregoing, the legislature of Kashmir, by whatever name called, may exercise full autonomy.
FINANCES: Pakistan and India agree to give substantial budgetary support to the state government for the next 20 years. Pakistan's security will be greatly enhanced.
From the northern and central parts of the Line of Control, Indian army positions will move far away to the east. The need for defending the Line of Control along almost 800 km ceases to exist. Pakistan's defensive position at the Chinese border will remain unchanged.
Pakistan will not only legally acquire certain aspects of sovereignty now available to it in the areas to the west of the Line of Control, but also enhances its status in the areas to the east of the LoC.
Pakistan's right to travel and trade in the entire state and its right to defend the Khunjrab border will acquire legal sanction. The citizens of Pakistan will be free to travel and trade in the areas of the state hitherto inaccessible to them.
India's security concerns will be well protected and its right to defend the Laddakh border remain intact. The need for defending the Line of Control will cease to exist.
Citizens of India will be free to travel and trade in the areas of the state not accessible to them so far. Kashmir will become almost independent with a friendly India and a friendly Pakistan on its sides. The unity of the state will be restored.
It will acquire an identity as an autonomous unit in South Asia. Its defence against China, India and Pakistan will stand guaranteed without any budget expenditure on its part. The Kashmiris will become almost citizens of the three domains.
The gains for Pakistan, India and Kashmiris will be a true gain for South Asia and, indeed, for the whole world. The spectre of nuclear war will be lifted forever. The long-term prospects of peace and prosperity will be greatly enhanced.
Settling Kashmir issue
By Dr Mubashir Hasan
A win, win, win solution of the issue of Kashmir is feasible - a win each for Pakistan and India and a win for the people of the former state of Jammu and Kashmir. Each of the three can settle for more than what they now have in real terms.
The sole mention of Kashmir in the Constitution of Pakistan is: "When the people of the state of Jammu and Kashmir decide to accede to Pakistan, the relationship between Pakistan and the State shall be determined in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State".
Pakistan considers the entire territory of the former State of Jammu and Kashmir as an area under dispute. It does not recognize the Indian jurisdiction over any part of the former state.
However, Pakistan has taken the position that any solution of the dispute which is acceptable to the people of the former state is acceptable to Pakistan. It no longer insists on the enforcement of those parts of the resolutions of the United Nations which would have resulted in the entire state either acceding to Pakistan or India.
General Pervez Musharraf has declared that neither the conversion of the Line of Control into an international border nor independence for the state is acceptable to Pakistan.
Since Pakistan considers the former state of Jammu and Kashmir as a disputed territory, it does not claim sovereignty over any area of the state. The area Pakistan calls Azad Kashmir has its own president, parliament, prime minister, supreme court, high court and other institutions.
It has wide internal autonomy. On behalf of the government of Azad Kashmir, Islamabad is responsible for defence, foreign affairs and immigration questions pertaining to the area.
In such a situation, if a solution can be found which gives Pakistan a certain status in the territory now under India's control and makes legal certain aspects of its authority in the areas lying to the west of the Line of Control, it would be a net gain for Pakistan.
India claims sovereignty over the entire territory of the former state. However, along with the government of Azad Kashmir, Pakistan exercises control over certain areas of the former state which lie to the west and north of the Line of Control.
It is generally believed that should Pakistan and Azad Kashmir agree, India would accept the Line of Control, with minor changes, as the international border - that is, relinquish its sovereign claim over what is with Pakistan and Azad Kashmir as of now.
New Delhi ceded parts of its sovereignty to the state legislature in Srinagar under Article 370 of the Constitution of India. It is generally believed that India is prepared to enhance the autonomous status of the former state as long as it does not amount to independence.
Declared Prime Minister Narasimha Rao of India in 1995: "Independence no, autonomy, sky is the limit". The declaration has been reaffirmed recently by Kanwar Natwar Singh, India's Minister of External Affairs.
In such a situation, if a solution can be found which gives India a certain status in the territory now under Pakistan's control, in lieu of conceding wide autonomy to the state as well as giving Pakistan a certain status in the part of the state now under India's control, it would be a net gain for India.
Apparently, people in large numbers in the former state of Jammu and Kashmir do not wish to be ruled either by India or Pakistan. They would like to be independent. However, neither India nor Pakistan is ready to consider this option as a solution to the dispute.
The opinion in the international community also does not seem to favour the emergence of a new independent state in the region. For the time being, those who are for complete independence may consider fulfilling their aspirations to the extent of the widest possible autonomy. That will be, indeed, a big change in their favour from their present status. The win, win, win solution may be based, therefore, on the following premises:
DEFENCE: Authority to defend a territory with armed might is one of the basic tenets of the exercise of sovereignty. Let India and Pakistan continue to be responsible for the defence of the borders of the former state against any power as they do, and at places they do, today.
India's de facto authority as it exercises today along the Ladakh border becomes de jure. Pakistan does the same along the Khunjrab border in a legally recognized manner. If they wish they may form a consultative body on defence matters of which the government of the state may also be a member.
India and Pakistan agree to enter into a treaty with each other that the two countries shall not prepare for or wage war in the territory of the former state of Jammu and Kashmir.
In so agreeing, the need for defending the Line of Control along almost 800 km ceases to exist and the way is cleared for the withdrawal of their forces stationed along this line.
India and Pakistan agree that the former state shall reunite as an undivided entity. This agreement shall fulfil one of the basic nationalist aspirations of the people of the former state.
The state of Kashmir pledges not to build an army of its own and India and Pakistan agree to relinquish the role of their armies of coming to the aid of civil power in the state. These undertakings shall strengthen the internal autonomy of the administration of the state, much to the relief of the armies of India and Pakistan.
No longer required along the Line of Control and to act in aid of civil power, India and Pakistan agree to withdraw their armies from Kashmir except from the borders of Kashmir with China.
FOREIGN RELATIONS: At present the foreign relations of a part of the former state are conducted by Pakistan and of the other part by India. In the proposed solution, India and Pakistan may jointly be responsible for those aspects of relations which affect the security interests of either country including those of foreign investment, aid and grants. The state may exercise authority in establishing ties with other states in commerce and trade and other matters with the agreement of Pakistan and India.
ACCESS AND TRADE: Citizens of Kashmir acquire the right of entry and of doing business in Pakistan as well as India as if they were citizens of India and Pakistan as well.
The communication, transportation, educational and other infra structural facilities of India and Pakistan may be available to Kashmiris without any discriminatory restrictions.
The produce, manufactures and services of Kashmir should have access to the markets of India and Pakistan without any duties or charges; similarly, Indian and Pakistani produce, manufactures and services should have free access to the markets of Kashmir.
The citizens of India and Pakistan are able to travel throughout the former state without let or hindrance. Since the sights of the two countries are on a visa-free regime within the Saarc areas, a beginning with removing travel restrictions with Kashmir may prove to be auspicious.
These measures will be a big gain for India and Pakistan and an economic boom for the state of Kashmir. The currencies of Pakistan and India may be made legal tender throughout the former state.
PASSPORTS: Passports issued by the state of Kashmir have the status of those issued by the state before 1947. Visas issued by Pakistan and India to be valid for Kashmir.
INDUS WATERS: The status and validity of the Indus Basin Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan remains unchanged.
AUTONOMY: Subject to the foregoing, the legislature of Kashmir, by whatever name called, may exercise full autonomy.
FINANCES: Pakistan and India agree to give substantial budgetary support to the state government for the next 20 years. Pakistan's security will be greatly enhanced.
From the northern and central parts of the Line of Control, Indian army positions will move far away to the east. The need for defending the Line of Control along almost 800 km ceases to exist. Pakistan's defensive position at the Chinese border will remain unchanged.
Pakistan will not only legally acquire certain aspects of sovereignty now available to it in the areas to the west of the Line of Control, but also enhances its status in the areas to the east of the LoC.
Pakistan's right to travel and trade in the entire state and its right to defend the Khunjrab border will acquire legal sanction. The citizens of Pakistan will be free to travel and trade in the areas of the state hitherto inaccessible to them.
India's security concerns will be well protected and its right to defend the Laddakh border remain intact. The need for defending the Line of Control will cease to exist.
Citizens of India will be free to travel and trade in the areas of the state not accessible to them so far. Kashmir will become almost independent with a friendly India and a friendly Pakistan on its sides. The unity of the state will be restored.
It will acquire an identity as an autonomous unit in South Asia. Its defence against China, India and Pakistan will stand guaranteed without any budget expenditure on its part. The Kashmiris will become almost citizens of the three domains.
The gains for Pakistan, India and Kashmiris will be a true gain for South Asia and, indeed, for the whole world. The spectre of nuclear war will be lifted forever. The long-term prospects of peace and prosperity will be greatly enhanced.
Wednesday, April 20, 2005
A new book on Sardars of Baluchistan
Dawn, April
EXCERPTS: The sardars of Balochistan
By Taj Mohammad Breseeg
James Bill wrote that in the Middle East "the politics of development and modernization is profoundly influenced by the patterns and process that mark group and class relationships". Even in the late 19th century when modernization and urbanization had reduced the importance of tribes and tribal organizations, the influence of tribal patterns was not destroyed. The existing tribal patterns and processes continued to influence development and modernization in the rural areas in the Middle East. The same has been the case with Balochistan where the informal, paternalistic patterns of control through family networks (the tribes) have continued to have relevance - particularly since tribal support or lack of it has been crucial to the success or failure of nationalist movements.
Dr Nek Buzdar, a specialist in international economic development, is of the view that the Baloch society, by and large, adheres to a traditional way of life. He believes that despite the emergence of political parties in Balochistan, tribal organization and political leadership still play a dominant role in the local and provincial administration. The tribes in Balochistan are divided into the shahri (sedentary) and the nomadic. The shahris have been the backbone of the feudal order predominant in central and southern Balochistan (Makran), while the nomads have been the cornerstones of the tribal order in the northern tribal areas.
Both groups, however, were bound together by a set of historically evolved relationships based on economic, social, political, military and lingual interactions. Possibly, this separation of the tribes between the nomad (warrior nobility) and the sedentary shahris (peasants) had led many to conclude that the sedentary population may have been the original inhabitants of the land who were conquered by nomads who arrived later.
The Baloch tribal system is segmentary. Describing this system, Salzman wrote, "By the 'segmentary system' we mean a set of equal lineages allied relatively and contingently for political action, decisions being made by assemblies and councils, with no offices and hierarchy of authority, and thus no top."
Thus a centralized authority is absent in such a system. The tribes are constituted from a number of kindred groups. There are many sub-divisions or clans who claim to have blood relations with one another through common ancestors. Kinship, which has its characteristic form in clan and family structure, provides the basic ordering mechanism for society. Thus it is a major factor in regulating and systemizing individual behaviour, which in turn influences the formation and sustenance of the socio-political organization of the entire tribe.
While the colonial government exercised control over the Baloch tribes, the British themselves were light on the ground, and in return for the chieftains' loyalty gave them a free hand to keep the tribal way of life largely unchanged. But the position began to change in the last decades of the Raj. The creation of Pakistan and the annexation of the western part of Balochistan by Iran changed the situation. Furthermore, the growth of education, market forces and electoral politics drew the Baloch into regional and national networks both in Iran and in Pakistan. However, the tribal power structure is still very important in Baloch rural society. Selig Harrison counted 17 major tribal groupings in Balochistan in 1981. Each of them was headed by a sardar (chieftain), selected usually from the male lineage of the ruling clan in each tribe. Harrison mentions some 400 tribal sub-groupings headed by lesser sardars.
Probably the most widely known and generally loathed features of Baloch society are the sardari and the jirga institutions of tribal organization and leadership. Under the traditional administrative set-up of Baloch tribes, every tribe had its separate jirga (council of elders), which acted as a court of law. Then this system presented itself at all the administrative tiers of the tribe. The jirga at the tribe's level operated under the leadership of the sardar.
All other personalities of the tribe's administration like muqaddam, wadera and motaber were its members. Besides, at all the administrative tiers of the tribe, the jirga functioned above the tribal head. The jirga dealt with important matters concerning the tribes and disputes arising among them, the election of a new khan or the inevitable external threats. The head of the confederacy himself was the head of this jirga.
Providing the Baloch society a historical, social and political structure, the jirga remained intact for a long period and helped the Baloch cope with anarchy, chaos and an emergency situation. However, under the British rule in the 19th century, the traditional pattern of the Baloch jirga began to change. Having masterminded the political set-up of the Baloch country, Sir Robert Sandeman introduced a new kind of jirga, the "shahi jirga" (Grand Council or the council of the main tribal sardars) where only sardars and aristocrats could sit. The shahi jirga was held at Quetta, Sibi and Fort Munro once or twice a year. The new jirga could impose taxes on property and labour; while only the Political Agent could review its decisions. As described by Janmahmad, the shahi jirga was a shrewd mechanism of indirect rule with powers vested in a few carefully selected tribal elders loyal to the British and ready to act against their own people.
The other well-established and widely known institution in Baloch society is the sardari system. This system appears to have had its origins in the Mughal period of Indian history, but is believed to have assumed its present shape rather late, during the period of British colonial rule. In contrast to the marked egalitarianism that pervades tribal organizations among the neighbouring Pakhtoons, the sardari system is highly centralized and hierarchical. At the apex of the system is the sardar, the hereditary central chief from whom power flows downward to waderas, the section chiefs, and beyond them to the subordinate clan and sub-clan leaders of the lesser tribal units. The sardar's extraordinary authority within this structure probably stems from the essentially military character of early Baloch tribal society. This authority may also have originated in the requirements of the Baloch pastoral economy. The tribesmen's seasonal migrations and isolation in scattered small camps would seem to have justified the emergence of a powerful and respected central figure who could obtain pasture lands and water, arrange safe passage through hostile territory for herdsmen and their flocks, and in other ways provide a shield against an unusually harsh environment.
Modernization has changed much of the tribal system. It was first challenged by the demarcation of international boundaries at the end of the 19th century. The new frontiers partitioned Balochistan between three states, dividing some of the large tribes between countries and prohibiting the traditional summer and winter migrations of nomads and semi-nomads. The Naruis, the Sanjaranis, the Rikis and the Brahuis were divided among Iran, Afghanistan and British Balochistan. The second challenge occurred between the world wars, when the British and the Persians largely pacified Balochistan. From 1928, Tehran used its army to forcibly subdue the Baloch, often exterminating whole tribes in the process.
The termination of the traditional nomadic economic system devastated the tribes. In the case of Iranian Balochistan, to force sedentarization, Reza Shah introduced land registration. Land which had previously been considered the property of the tribe as a whole, became the sole property of the tribal chief in whose name the land was registered. The chiefs, with income from rents, could now move into cities and towns. This increased their distance from the tribe.
The sedentary farmers, tied to the land through debts and contracts, could no longer align themselves with rival chieftains. This increased the landlord's control over the peasant, but the peasant's loyalty to the landlord decreased as monetary ties replaced ties of sanguinity or of mutual self-interest. Baloch society lost its cohesiveness, and both landlord and rentier turned to the central government for protection of their "rights".
Simultaneously with the decline and disintegration of tribalism in Iranian Balochistan, the sardars also lost their base of power and influence there. This has been the case particularly during the 1960s and the 1970s, as the rapid growth in urbanization, expansion of modern means of communications, spread of modern education, and economic modernization in the province began to drastically undermine the tribal socioeconomic structure. These changes in turn brought with them a new Baloch elite identified with the middle class. It must be borne in mind that the cooperation of the sardars with the Shah's regime representing "Shiite Gajars", also served to undermine their traditional legitimacy among their peasant and nomadic followers politically.
Over the course of time, therefore, the traditional social organization of the Baloch to a great extent has changed. There is now a widespread Baloch national consciousness that cuts across tribal divisions. Islamabad and Tehran, however, ignoring this emergence of nationalism, tend to think of Baloch society solely in terms of its traditional tribal character and organizational patterns. Most sardars have attempted to safeguard their privileges by avoiding direct identification with the nationalist movement, while keeping the door open for supporting the nationalist cause in times of confrontation between the Baloch and the central government, as in the case of the 1973-7 insurgency. Similarly, the Iranian revolution of 1979 inflicted the most significant blow to the influence of the sardars in western Balochistan.
However, in a traditional tribal society a political ideology such as Baloch nationalism would be unable to gain support, because loyalties of tribal members do not extend to entities rather than individual tribes. The failure of the tribes to unite for the cause of Baloch nationalism is a replay of tribal behaviour in both the Pakistani and Iranian Baloch revolts. Within the tribes, an individual's identity is based on his belonging to a larger group. This larger group is not the nation but the tribe. However, the importance of the rise of a non-tribal movement over more tribal structures should not be underestimated. In this respect the Baloch movements of the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s provide us a good example.
In the post-colonial period a visible change in Baloch society was the rise of the urban population mainly due to the detribalization and to some extent the land reforms under Ayub Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The differentiation and specialization in urban economies introduced new social strata. A small Baloch working class formed in the mine industry, construction, and a few factories. Small workshops required auto mechanics, electricians, mechanics, plumbers and painters, while services and transport employed many others. A modern bourgeoisie emerged, comprising mainly professionals rather than entrepreneurs - doctors, nurses, engineers, teachers, bank managers, lawyers and journalists. Migrant labour travelled as far as the Gulf States.
Thus, with the appearance of the Baloch middle class, even though small, and the decrease of the traditional role of the sardars, the modern Baloch intelligentsia seems to be more eager to assume a political role of its own. Highlighting the new changes in Baloch society, in 1993, Mahmud Ali, a specialist on South Asian politics, wrote, "In the absence of traditional leaders, the dynamic of socio-economic change has precipitated a new kind of leader - younger men of 'common', i.e. non-sardari, descent". The Baloch have devised a nationalist ideology, but realize that tribal support remains a crucial ingredient to any potential success of a national movement. By accepting the support of the tribes, the nationalists fall vulnerable to tribal rivalries.
Economic development
In 1892, Lord Curzon stated that in the greater part of Balochistan, the Baloch were sedentary and pastoral. Despite the passage of almost one hundred years and the increase in urbanization, Curzon's view is still fairly accurate (although there are more farmers and fewer shepherds). Describing the Baloch economy in the early 1980s, a prominent authority on the subject of Baloch nationalism, Selig S. Harrison wrote, "Instead of relying solely on either nomadic pastoralism or on settled agriculture, most Baloch practise a mixture of the two in order to survive."
The economic grievances of the Baloch are dated from the British era. As the British developed industries and agriculture in Sindh, Punjab, and the NWFP, they ignored Balochistan. Thus there is a widely held view that the British rulers neglected the economic development of Balochistan. Perhaps it was not merely a case of neglect, but what might be called purposeful sidetracking, even suppression. Of course the British had their own imperial interests to protect.
This is a case study in nationalism which focuses on the Baloch. It probes into the question of whether the Baloch have a national consciousness and if it is expressed as their will to maintain their national identity.
Excerpted with permission from Baloch Nationalism: its Origin and Development
By Taj Mohammad Breseeg
Royal Book Company, Karachi, Pakistan
EXCERPTS: The sardars of Balochistan
By Taj Mohammad Breseeg
James Bill wrote that in the Middle East "the politics of development and modernization is profoundly influenced by the patterns and process that mark group and class relationships". Even in the late 19th century when modernization and urbanization had reduced the importance of tribes and tribal organizations, the influence of tribal patterns was not destroyed. The existing tribal patterns and processes continued to influence development and modernization in the rural areas in the Middle East. The same has been the case with Balochistan where the informal, paternalistic patterns of control through family networks (the tribes) have continued to have relevance - particularly since tribal support or lack of it has been crucial to the success or failure of nationalist movements.
Dr Nek Buzdar, a specialist in international economic development, is of the view that the Baloch society, by and large, adheres to a traditional way of life. He believes that despite the emergence of political parties in Balochistan, tribal organization and political leadership still play a dominant role in the local and provincial administration. The tribes in Balochistan are divided into the shahri (sedentary) and the nomadic. The shahris have been the backbone of the feudal order predominant in central and southern Balochistan (Makran), while the nomads have been the cornerstones of the tribal order in the northern tribal areas.
Both groups, however, were bound together by a set of historically evolved relationships based on economic, social, political, military and lingual interactions. Possibly, this separation of the tribes between the nomad (warrior nobility) and the sedentary shahris (peasants) had led many to conclude that the sedentary population may have been the original inhabitants of the land who were conquered by nomads who arrived later.
The Baloch tribal system is segmentary. Describing this system, Salzman wrote, "By the 'segmentary system' we mean a set of equal lineages allied relatively and contingently for political action, decisions being made by assemblies and councils, with no offices and hierarchy of authority, and thus no top."
Thus a centralized authority is absent in such a system. The tribes are constituted from a number of kindred groups. There are many sub-divisions or clans who claim to have blood relations with one another through common ancestors. Kinship, which has its characteristic form in clan and family structure, provides the basic ordering mechanism for society. Thus it is a major factor in regulating and systemizing individual behaviour, which in turn influences the formation and sustenance of the socio-political organization of the entire tribe.
While the colonial government exercised control over the Baloch tribes, the British themselves were light on the ground, and in return for the chieftains' loyalty gave them a free hand to keep the tribal way of life largely unchanged. But the position began to change in the last decades of the Raj. The creation of Pakistan and the annexation of the western part of Balochistan by Iran changed the situation. Furthermore, the growth of education, market forces and electoral politics drew the Baloch into regional and national networks both in Iran and in Pakistan. However, the tribal power structure is still very important in Baloch rural society. Selig Harrison counted 17 major tribal groupings in Balochistan in 1981. Each of them was headed by a sardar (chieftain), selected usually from the male lineage of the ruling clan in each tribe. Harrison mentions some 400 tribal sub-groupings headed by lesser sardars.
Probably the most widely known and generally loathed features of Baloch society are the sardari and the jirga institutions of tribal organization and leadership. Under the traditional administrative set-up of Baloch tribes, every tribe had its separate jirga (council of elders), which acted as a court of law. Then this system presented itself at all the administrative tiers of the tribe. The jirga at the tribe's level operated under the leadership of the sardar.
All other personalities of the tribe's administration like muqaddam, wadera and motaber were its members. Besides, at all the administrative tiers of the tribe, the jirga functioned above the tribal head. The jirga dealt with important matters concerning the tribes and disputes arising among them, the election of a new khan or the inevitable external threats. The head of the confederacy himself was the head of this jirga.
Providing the Baloch society a historical, social and political structure, the jirga remained intact for a long period and helped the Baloch cope with anarchy, chaos and an emergency situation. However, under the British rule in the 19th century, the traditional pattern of the Baloch jirga began to change. Having masterminded the political set-up of the Baloch country, Sir Robert Sandeman introduced a new kind of jirga, the "shahi jirga" (Grand Council or the council of the main tribal sardars) where only sardars and aristocrats could sit. The shahi jirga was held at Quetta, Sibi and Fort Munro once or twice a year. The new jirga could impose taxes on property and labour; while only the Political Agent could review its decisions. As described by Janmahmad, the shahi jirga was a shrewd mechanism of indirect rule with powers vested in a few carefully selected tribal elders loyal to the British and ready to act against their own people.
The other well-established and widely known institution in Baloch society is the sardari system. This system appears to have had its origins in the Mughal period of Indian history, but is believed to have assumed its present shape rather late, during the period of British colonial rule. In contrast to the marked egalitarianism that pervades tribal organizations among the neighbouring Pakhtoons, the sardari system is highly centralized and hierarchical. At the apex of the system is the sardar, the hereditary central chief from whom power flows downward to waderas, the section chiefs, and beyond them to the subordinate clan and sub-clan leaders of the lesser tribal units. The sardar's extraordinary authority within this structure probably stems from the essentially military character of early Baloch tribal society. This authority may also have originated in the requirements of the Baloch pastoral economy. The tribesmen's seasonal migrations and isolation in scattered small camps would seem to have justified the emergence of a powerful and respected central figure who could obtain pasture lands and water, arrange safe passage through hostile territory for herdsmen and their flocks, and in other ways provide a shield against an unusually harsh environment.
Modernization has changed much of the tribal system. It was first challenged by the demarcation of international boundaries at the end of the 19th century. The new frontiers partitioned Balochistan between three states, dividing some of the large tribes between countries and prohibiting the traditional summer and winter migrations of nomads and semi-nomads. The Naruis, the Sanjaranis, the Rikis and the Brahuis were divided among Iran, Afghanistan and British Balochistan. The second challenge occurred between the world wars, when the British and the Persians largely pacified Balochistan. From 1928, Tehran used its army to forcibly subdue the Baloch, often exterminating whole tribes in the process.
The termination of the traditional nomadic economic system devastated the tribes. In the case of Iranian Balochistan, to force sedentarization, Reza Shah introduced land registration. Land which had previously been considered the property of the tribe as a whole, became the sole property of the tribal chief in whose name the land was registered. The chiefs, with income from rents, could now move into cities and towns. This increased their distance from the tribe.
The sedentary farmers, tied to the land through debts and contracts, could no longer align themselves with rival chieftains. This increased the landlord's control over the peasant, but the peasant's loyalty to the landlord decreased as monetary ties replaced ties of sanguinity or of mutual self-interest. Baloch society lost its cohesiveness, and both landlord and rentier turned to the central government for protection of their "rights".
Simultaneously with the decline and disintegration of tribalism in Iranian Balochistan, the sardars also lost their base of power and influence there. This has been the case particularly during the 1960s and the 1970s, as the rapid growth in urbanization, expansion of modern means of communications, spread of modern education, and economic modernization in the province began to drastically undermine the tribal socioeconomic structure. These changes in turn brought with them a new Baloch elite identified with the middle class. It must be borne in mind that the cooperation of the sardars with the Shah's regime representing "Shiite Gajars", also served to undermine their traditional legitimacy among their peasant and nomadic followers politically.
Over the course of time, therefore, the traditional social organization of the Baloch to a great extent has changed. There is now a widespread Baloch national consciousness that cuts across tribal divisions. Islamabad and Tehran, however, ignoring this emergence of nationalism, tend to think of Baloch society solely in terms of its traditional tribal character and organizational patterns. Most sardars have attempted to safeguard their privileges by avoiding direct identification with the nationalist movement, while keeping the door open for supporting the nationalist cause in times of confrontation between the Baloch and the central government, as in the case of the 1973-7 insurgency. Similarly, the Iranian revolution of 1979 inflicted the most significant blow to the influence of the sardars in western Balochistan.
However, in a traditional tribal society a political ideology such as Baloch nationalism would be unable to gain support, because loyalties of tribal members do not extend to entities rather than individual tribes. The failure of the tribes to unite for the cause of Baloch nationalism is a replay of tribal behaviour in both the Pakistani and Iranian Baloch revolts. Within the tribes, an individual's identity is based on his belonging to a larger group. This larger group is not the nation but the tribe. However, the importance of the rise of a non-tribal movement over more tribal structures should not be underestimated. In this respect the Baloch movements of the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s provide us a good example.
In the post-colonial period a visible change in Baloch society was the rise of the urban population mainly due to the detribalization and to some extent the land reforms under Ayub Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The differentiation and specialization in urban economies introduced new social strata. A small Baloch working class formed in the mine industry, construction, and a few factories. Small workshops required auto mechanics, electricians, mechanics, plumbers and painters, while services and transport employed many others. A modern bourgeoisie emerged, comprising mainly professionals rather than entrepreneurs - doctors, nurses, engineers, teachers, bank managers, lawyers and journalists. Migrant labour travelled as far as the Gulf States.
Thus, with the appearance of the Baloch middle class, even though small, and the decrease of the traditional role of the sardars, the modern Baloch intelligentsia seems to be more eager to assume a political role of its own. Highlighting the new changes in Baloch society, in 1993, Mahmud Ali, a specialist on South Asian politics, wrote, "In the absence of traditional leaders, the dynamic of socio-economic change has precipitated a new kind of leader - younger men of 'common', i.e. non-sardari, descent". The Baloch have devised a nationalist ideology, but realize that tribal support remains a crucial ingredient to any potential success of a national movement. By accepting the support of the tribes, the nationalists fall vulnerable to tribal rivalries.
Economic development
In 1892, Lord Curzon stated that in the greater part of Balochistan, the Baloch were sedentary and pastoral. Despite the passage of almost one hundred years and the increase in urbanization, Curzon's view is still fairly accurate (although there are more farmers and fewer shepherds). Describing the Baloch economy in the early 1980s, a prominent authority on the subject of Baloch nationalism, Selig S. Harrison wrote, "Instead of relying solely on either nomadic pastoralism or on settled agriculture, most Baloch practise a mixture of the two in order to survive."
The economic grievances of the Baloch are dated from the British era. As the British developed industries and agriculture in Sindh, Punjab, and the NWFP, they ignored Balochistan. Thus there is a widely held view that the British rulers neglected the economic development of Balochistan. Perhaps it was not merely a case of neglect, but what might be called purposeful sidetracking, even suppression. Of course the British had their own imperial interests to protect.
This is a case study in nationalism which focuses on the Baloch. It probes into the question of whether the Baloch have a national consciousness and if it is expressed as their will to maintain their national identity.
Excerpted with permission from Baloch Nationalism: its Origin and Development
By Taj Mohammad Breseeg
Royal Book Company, Karachi, Pakistan
US commander’s remarks highly irresponsible: Lt. Gen. Safdar
The News, April 21, 2005
US commander’s remarks highly irresponsible: Safdar
By Behroz Khan
PESHAWAR: Describing as "highly irresponsible" remarks reportedly made by Lt-Gen David Barno, commander of the American forces in Afghanistan that Pakistan planning a new offensive against militants along the border, Corps Commander Peshawar Lt-Gen Safdar Hussain said on Wednesday it was not true.
"It is only speculation that terrorists are in North Waziristan. We are gathering intelligence but there is no report on the basis of which I can begin an operation," Safdar told reporters. Safdar said the US general had no jurisdiction to interfere in our affairs. "This is an outcome of his own imagination that preparations for military operation are going on in North Waziristan Agency." He said there was no such preparation and there is no need for it because we don’t have any information about the presence of any foreign terrorists in North Waziristan.
Safdar said he condemned the statement of the US commander and considers it unwarranted and irresponsible. He said all hideouts of the terrorists have been busted and they are on the run.
He said that Barno had been informed about the infiltration and smuggling of weapons and ammunition from Afghanistan and asked to increase the number of troops on the Afghan side to effectively check the trend.
"There is no organised base of terrorists. They are on the run. I will not let them reorganise," Safdar said. Safdar said there was hardly any area in the entire tribal belt lacking the presence of Pakistan armed forces. He ruled out the possibility of Osama bin Laden’s presence on the Pakistani side of the Pak-Afghan border.
"He (Osama) is not here. His security network is not capable of hiding him from us. And our deployment is so effective that no terrorist could risk hiding on our side of the border," said Safdar. Pakistan Army, he said, has established as many as 669 posts on this side of the border to check infiltration from Afghanistan.
US commander’s remarks highly irresponsible: Safdar
By Behroz Khan
PESHAWAR: Describing as "highly irresponsible" remarks reportedly made by Lt-Gen David Barno, commander of the American forces in Afghanistan that Pakistan planning a new offensive against militants along the border, Corps Commander Peshawar Lt-Gen Safdar Hussain said on Wednesday it was not true.
"It is only speculation that terrorists are in North Waziristan. We are gathering intelligence but there is no report on the basis of which I can begin an operation," Safdar told reporters. Safdar said the US general had no jurisdiction to interfere in our affairs. "This is an outcome of his own imagination that preparations for military operation are going on in North Waziristan Agency." He said there was no such preparation and there is no need for it because we don’t have any information about the presence of any foreign terrorists in North Waziristan.
Safdar said he condemned the statement of the US commander and considers it unwarranted and irresponsible. He said all hideouts of the terrorists have been busted and they are on the run.
He said that Barno had been informed about the infiltration and smuggling of weapons and ammunition from Afghanistan and asked to increase the number of troops on the Afghan side to effectively check the trend.
"There is no organised base of terrorists. They are on the run. I will not let them reorganise," Safdar said. Safdar said there was hardly any area in the entire tribal belt lacking the presence of Pakistan armed forces. He ruled out the possibility of Osama bin Laden’s presence on the Pakistani side of the Pak-Afghan border.
"He (Osama) is not here. His security network is not capable of hiding him from us. And our deployment is so effective that no terrorist could risk hiding on our side of the border," said Safdar. Pakistan Army, he said, has established as many as 669 posts on this side of the border to check infiltration from Afghanistan.
A Sequel for India and Pakistan: Christian Science Monitor
Christian Science Monitor
April 20, 2005
A Sequel for India and Pakistan
The Monitor's View
One touching scene went largely unnoticed at this week's groundbreaking summit between India and Pakistan.
India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who was born in what is today Pakistan, was given a photo of his home village. And Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf received a painting of his childhood home in Delhi.
The scene was not only a reminder of the wrenching partition of British India in 1947 but a signal that the two nations, which have had five decades of enmity and three wars, are beginning to realize closer ties are inevitable.
The scene was similar to many in recent Indian films - which are popular in Pakistan - that depict a reuniting of Indian and Pakistani families. The impact of those films on the recent warming between these two nuclear-tipped rivals cannot be underestimated.
The power of Indian cinema is just one explanation. The two peoples are seeing the world less through nationalist eyes, forcing the ground to shift under Indian and Pakistani leaders, who have often felt strong nationalist pressures over Kashmir and other issues. "The world has changed very much, especially after 9/11," Pakistani President Musharraf told Indian journalists at the summit.
Both Musharraf and Singh say they want "out of the box" solutions to end the bilateral rivalry. Both sides are acting to create a "soft border" between their nations through various exchanges - before tackling the issue of the "hard border" in Kashmir.
Joint cricket games have helped break the ice, as has the opening of a cross-border bus route. Trade will flow for the first time across Kashmir's so-called Line of Control. And the two will talk about building a pipeline through Pakistan to bring natural gas from Iran to India. And notably, the two leaders declared their steps toward peace - most of all, efforts to end the Kashmir territorial dispute - "irreversible."
The Pakistan military's support of terrorists in Kashmir has dwindled after Musharraf himself was attacked by Islamic terrorists. Pakistan has joined the US in the hunt for Al Qaeda members and appears to now accept that building ties with India is the best way to ultimately settle the Kashmir issue.
India can't let this moment slip, nor just string Pakistan along. It must make trust-building concessions, such as on a proposed dam that would restrict water flow to Pakistan. Largely Hindu India must eventually be flexible in redefining the status of largely Muslim Kashmir.
And Musharraf must move to full democracy, otherwise these peace moves won't be rooted in popular will.
Conflict, so easily supported in the past by India and Pakistan, isn't as desirable to these two in an increasingly borderless, democratic world.
April 20, 2005
A Sequel for India and Pakistan
The Monitor's View
One touching scene went largely unnoticed at this week's groundbreaking summit between India and Pakistan.
India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who was born in what is today Pakistan, was given a photo of his home village. And Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf received a painting of his childhood home in Delhi.
The scene was not only a reminder of the wrenching partition of British India in 1947 but a signal that the two nations, which have had five decades of enmity and three wars, are beginning to realize closer ties are inevitable.
The scene was similar to many in recent Indian films - which are popular in Pakistan - that depict a reuniting of Indian and Pakistani families. The impact of those films on the recent warming between these two nuclear-tipped rivals cannot be underestimated.
The power of Indian cinema is just one explanation. The two peoples are seeing the world less through nationalist eyes, forcing the ground to shift under Indian and Pakistani leaders, who have often felt strong nationalist pressures over Kashmir and other issues. "The world has changed very much, especially after 9/11," Pakistani President Musharraf told Indian journalists at the summit.
Both Musharraf and Singh say they want "out of the box" solutions to end the bilateral rivalry. Both sides are acting to create a "soft border" between their nations through various exchanges - before tackling the issue of the "hard border" in Kashmir.
Joint cricket games have helped break the ice, as has the opening of a cross-border bus route. Trade will flow for the first time across Kashmir's so-called Line of Control. And the two will talk about building a pipeline through Pakistan to bring natural gas from Iran to India. And notably, the two leaders declared their steps toward peace - most of all, efforts to end the Kashmir territorial dispute - "irreversible."
The Pakistan military's support of terrorists in Kashmir has dwindled after Musharraf himself was attacked by Islamic terrorists. Pakistan has joined the US in the hunt for Al Qaeda members and appears to now accept that building ties with India is the best way to ultimately settle the Kashmir issue.
India can't let this moment slip, nor just string Pakistan along. It must make trust-building concessions, such as on a proposed dam that would restrict water flow to Pakistan. Largely Hindu India must eventually be flexible in redefining the status of largely Muslim Kashmir.
And Musharraf must move to full democracy, otherwise these peace moves won't be rooted in popular will.
Conflict, so easily supported in the past by India and Pakistan, isn't as desirable to these two in an increasingly borderless, democratic world.
Canada selects Pakistan as key development partner
Daily Times, April 21, 2005
Canada selects Pakistan as key development partner
ISLAMABAD: Canada has selected Pakistan as one of 25 development partners in the country’s first fully integrated International Policy Statement tabled by Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Pierre Pettigrew in Ottawa on April 19, a press release said on Wednesday.
“Highlighting Pakistan as a development partner will build upon Canada’s long history of assistance to this country, and will strengthen the impact and effectiveness of future development cooperation,” said Canadian High Commissioner to Pakistan Margaret Huber.
The policy statement sets out a new framework for maximising the effectiveness of Canadian aid. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) will concentrate its bilateral assistance in 25 developing countries, including Pakistan. Overall, Canada’s international assistance will double by 2010 from its 2001-2002 level.
Canada’s development partnership with Pakistan will target poverty reduction by focusing on good governance, health (including HIV/AIDS), basic education, private sector development and environmental sustainability. Gender equality remains a crosscutting theme throughout Canada’s development cooperation efforts. Development partners are selected based on ability to use aid effectively and greatest need, said the press statement. pr
Canada selects Pakistan as key development partner
ISLAMABAD: Canada has selected Pakistan as one of 25 development partners in the country’s first fully integrated International Policy Statement tabled by Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Pierre Pettigrew in Ottawa on April 19, a press release said on Wednesday.
“Highlighting Pakistan as a development partner will build upon Canada’s long history of assistance to this country, and will strengthen the impact and effectiveness of future development cooperation,” said Canadian High Commissioner to Pakistan Margaret Huber.
The policy statement sets out a new framework for maximising the effectiveness of Canadian aid. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) will concentrate its bilateral assistance in 25 developing countries, including Pakistan. Overall, Canada’s international assistance will double by 2010 from its 2001-2002 level.
Canada’s development partnership with Pakistan will target poverty reduction by focusing on good governance, health (including HIV/AIDS), basic education, private sector development and environmental sustainability. Gender equality remains a crosscutting theme throughout Canada’s development cooperation efforts. Development partners are selected based on ability to use aid effectively and greatest need, said the press statement. pr
Jihadi graffiti gone from walls, but ....
Daily Times, April 21, 2005
Jihadi graffiti gone from walls, but there’s still a fire down below!
By Mohammed Rizwan
LAHORE: The city of Lahore, gradually but surely, has been changing its skin for the last several months as the jihadi slogans and donation appeal campaigns by the right-wing and jihadi parties littered on the walls and thoroughfares have disappeared, making way for corporate ads and city businesses advertisements.
But the government’s anti-jihadi campaign’s message took its time to reach Lahore.
The jihadi organizations claim that the campaigns may have been wiped off the walls of Lahore, but campaigns to collect funds and jihad campaigns continue underground. However, a senior city police official tasked with countering jihadi activities claims the government’s vigorous crackdown on these outfits has managed to rid Lahore of its ‘jihadi face’.
“Still I can’t say that we have a permanent solution at hand as these organizations keep resurfacing again and again. But the major operational outfits like Sipah-i-Sahaba, Sipah-e-Mohammad, Hizbul Mujajideen, Hizbut Tehrir and Lashkar-e-Taiba have been dismantled and dispersed. They are on the run and they can’t continue openly what they have been doing,” said the police officer.
However, the religious organization that sponsor donation camps and jihadi campaigns say that they are still doing what they were doing and have only changed strategy. “If someone thinks we have stopped, that’s wrong. We have not budged an inch from our point of view on jihad and Kashmir,” said Yahya Mujahid, spokesman for Jamaatul Da’waa, formerly known as Lashkar-e-Taiba, the banned jihadi outfit.
“All you can say is that we are keeping a low-profile on our activities as the government has cracked down on us, but we’ll never accept what is happening between India and Pakistan,” said Mujahid. “Lashkar-e-Taiba is being run by our brothers in Kashmir and they demonstrated with attacks on the Kashmir bus that policy has not changed,” added Mujahid.
“There is lot of support for Jamaatul Da’waa here in Pakistan and we are sure that the momentum in Kashmir will pick up,” said Mujahid. Jamaat-e-Islami’s city leader Ameerul Azeem echoed these views. “We have just changed our strategy from donation camps to door-to-door campaigns. We still do the wall chalking etc but the government’s crackdown makes us campaign door-to-door. We won’t change our point of view nor policy on Kashmir or jihad,” said Azeem.
Hafiz Riaz, a central leader of JUI (Fazl), another religious organization that has never been involved in Kashmir but led the resistance against Soviets and Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, said that his group has never been involved in graffiti nor donation campaigns for jihad in Kashmir. However, Riaz tried to sum up the issue: “Look, these campaign were run by government institutions and now they are being closed down by the government itself. So, what’s the big deal?”
Jihadi graffiti gone from walls, but there’s still a fire down below!
By Mohammed Rizwan
LAHORE: The city of Lahore, gradually but surely, has been changing its skin for the last several months as the jihadi slogans and donation appeal campaigns by the right-wing and jihadi parties littered on the walls and thoroughfares have disappeared, making way for corporate ads and city businesses advertisements.
But the government’s anti-jihadi campaign’s message took its time to reach Lahore.
The jihadi organizations claim that the campaigns may have been wiped off the walls of Lahore, but campaigns to collect funds and jihad campaigns continue underground. However, a senior city police official tasked with countering jihadi activities claims the government’s vigorous crackdown on these outfits has managed to rid Lahore of its ‘jihadi face’.
“Still I can’t say that we have a permanent solution at hand as these organizations keep resurfacing again and again. But the major operational outfits like Sipah-i-Sahaba, Sipah-e-Mohammad, Hizbul Mujajideen, Hizbut Tehrir and Lashkar-e-Taiba have been dismantled and dispersed. They are on the run and they can’t continue openly what they have been doing,” said the police officer.
However, the religious organization that sponsor donation camps and jihadi campaigns say that they are still doing what they were doing and have only changed strategy. “If someone thinks we have stopped, that’s wrong. We have not budged an inch from our point of view on jihad and Kashmir,” said Yahya Mujahid, spokesman for Jamaatul Da’waa, formerly known as Lashkar-e-Taiba, the banned jihadi outfit.
“All you can say is that we are keeping a low-profile on our activities as the government has cracked down on us, but we’ll never accept what is happening between India and Pakistan,” said Mujahid. “Lashkar-e-Taiba is being run by our brothers in Kashmir and they demonstrated with attacks on the Kashmir bus that policy has not changed,” added Mujahid.
“There is lot of support for Jamaatul Da’waa here in Pakistan and we are sure that the momentum in Kashmir will pick up,” said Mujahid. Jamaat-e-Islami’s city leader Ameerul Azeem echoed these views. “We have just changed our strategy from donation camps to door-to-door campaigns. We still do the wall chalking etc but the government’s crackdown makes us campaign door-to-door. We won’t change our point of view nor policy on Kashmir or jihad,” said Azeem.
Hafiz Riaz, a central leader of JUI (Fazl), another religious organization that has never been involved in Kashmir but led the resistance against Soviets and Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, said that his group has never been involved in graffiti nor donation campaigns for jihad in Kashmir. However, Riaz tried to sum up the issue: “Look, these campaign were run by government institutions and now they are being closed down by the government itself. So, what’s the big deal?”
Tuesday, April 19, 2005
Omar Saeed Sheikh Speaks from Jail
Newsline
April 2005
The Mystery Thickens
Recent arrests and fresh evidence that emerged blow holes in the government's case against Omar Shaikh - the primary accused in Daniel Pearl's murder.
By Massoud Ansari
British-born Ahmed Omar Saeed Shaikh, convicted for the kidnap-slaying of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl, has admitted to having met Bin Laden twice in Afghanistan, but says he is more committed to the one-eyed Taliban spiritual supremo, Mulla Omar, whom he considers "the overall leader of all mujahideen."
In his first-ever interview given from Adiala jail, which was perforce conducted surreptitiously, with the questionaire being smuggled in and out, Omar said he admires the "grief" Bin Laden maintains in his heart for the "plight of Muslims world-wide" and the sacrifices he has made, but said he doesn't necessarily agree entirely with the methods he has chosen to achieve his ends.
Shaikh Omar, who was arrested in February 2002 and declared a "dangerous prisoner", was shifted from the Karachi Central Jail to a more secure colonial-built jail in Hyderabad in April 2002 because the authorities feared his comrades-in-arm may attempt to break into the Karachi prison and whisk him away.
On July 15, 2002, he was sentenced to hang by a one-judge Anti-Terrorism Court after he was found guilty in the case relating to the kidnapping of the 38-year-old American, Pearl, on January 23, 2002, and his subsequent murder.
In the accompanying interview with Newsline, Omar admits to "involvement" in the kidnapping of foreigners in India in 1994 for which he served time in that country, and the abduction of Wall Street Journal South-Asia bureau chief, Daniel Pearl, but adds that he "didn't [physically] take part in the actual events."
This claim ties in with new evidence unearthed by the authorities in which it was revealed that while Omar was part of the conspiracy to kidnap Pearl - which included luring the reporter to the site of the abduction by e-mail, he was not physically present either at the time of the kidnapping, or his murder. However, Omar is believed to have played the role of advisor to the kidnappers, reportedly orchestrating from the background how best to get maximum mileage from the scheme.
Police insiders disclose that local authorities have arrested almost 90 per cent of the militants who took part in the abduction and slaying of Pearl, but since the former have already made a case against Shaikh Omar and four others who are charged along with him, and the new evidence, if pursued, would mean a retrial and the possible opening up of a Pandora's box, none of the men - not even those who have confessed to involvement in the crime - have been charged to date.
Last month, police in Karachi announced they had arrested Sohail alias Habib, who they say co-conspired with Omar in the kidnapping and murder of Pearl. Sohail is believed to have told interrogators that Shaikh had given him the Polaroid camera which was used to take pictures of Pearl, taught him how to use it and gave him the list of demands to be released to the media for Pearl's safe release. Sohail, has, however not been charged with the crime because, according to Pakistani police sources, the government believes that reopening of the case would reveal how badly Pakistan bungled the original investigation.
These sources disclosed that the group of militants who have been picked up over the last one-and-a half-years - roughly a dozen men which include veteran militants Fazal Karim, Qari Asad and Imtiaz Siddiqui - were actually arrested for drug-trafficking and other crimes unrelated to Pearl's death.
After interrogating the men, however, the authorities learnt the men had links to the Pearl abduction and murder. Several of them were familiar with intimate details of Pearl's kidnapping which had not been made public - for example, that he was not forcibly taken from a restaurant but willingly went with his abductors in the hope of an interview with a jihadi leader named Mubarak Shah Gillani; how he was given English reading material during his captivity and how he had made at least one escape attempt three days before he was killed. "He tried to scale the wall but couldn't because both his hands were tied. He was caught and chained," one of the militants reportedly told police.
According to their confessional statements the detained militants have revealed that three men including senior Al-Qaeda member Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (now in custody in the US), Abdul Rahman and Nasrullah - both Kuwaiti nationals fluent in Arabic, Balochi and Persian - arrived at the scene at the behest of Saud Memon, who is believed to be Al-Qaeda's chief financier in Pakistan and who owned the house where Pearl was held and took over the operation. The authorities are reportedly still searching for the Kuwaitis.
On the day Pearl died, two Pakistani men acting as guards were also present: Ali Khan, arrested several months ago, and Fazal Karim, an employee of Saud Memon. During questioning, one of the men reportedly told interrogators how before murdering him, the Arabs tried to sedate Pearl, first by injection, then by doctoring his tea. However, the reporter did not cooperate. "I think he understood that he was going to be killed; he refused to drink the tea. He also resisted being injected," said the guard.
His assailants also forced Pearl to acknowledge his Jewish background and express sympathy with the detainees in Guantánamo Bay before taking the knife to his throat - all this on camera. However, the actual act of slitting Pearl's throat had to be reenacted after the actual event, according to the guard, because of a malfunction in the camera.
"When they were slaughtering him it seemed like a bad dream. I had seen goats and chickens being slaughtered many times, never a human being," he added. The gruesome film of the murder was, of course, subsequently seen across the globe, courtesy the internet.
Some of the information extracted under interrogation from Pearl's abductors is particularly poignant For example, they revealed how the reporter's efforts to converse with his captors were limited since the latter spoke only broken English and Pearl had no Urdu or Arabic. "However, he made clear that he was a Jew and his wife a Buddhist. In fact, he used to imitate the way she prayed, and sing hymns and songs whenever he thought about her," disclosed one of the kidnappers.
The men reportedly also gave interrogators other chilling details of the case that Islamabad would certainly not want the public to hear. Police sources disclosed that senior government officials are petrified if the militants are charged they might reveal information demonstrating how the case against Shaikh Omar, whom Islamabad identified as the ringleader of Pearl's killers, was substantially spurious, since Sheikh's testimony, in which he denied direct involvement in the Pearl case has now been corroborated by the independent accounts of several of the men in custody. In fact, the police now allegedly believe that Pearl's kidnappers actually had planned to release him after receiving the ransom payment. "Conspiring to kidnap is a heinous crime under Pakistani law and is punishable [with] life imprisonment," says one Pakistani legal expert familiar with the case. However, Sheikh has been charged with far more serious crimes, which carry the death penalty.
Police officials contend that if the government allows the group of men to testify, their evidence could not only possibly exonerate Omar of the murder, but also reveal how once Omar was arrested, the Pakistani police stopped looking for other suspects, stumbling upon the band of men now held only by accident. It is being conjectured in some quarters that the Pakistani government may even have fabricated evidence linking Omar to the killing.
Thus, this line of thought goes, to cover its tracks it is now allegedly releasing some of those men who were recently arrested in order to avoid prosecuting them and subjecting itself to evidence emerging in the event that might incriminate or embarrass it. In fact, two men have reportedly already been released, "because all we had on them was a case of possessing illegal weapons and other minor charges," says a police official who is privy to the investigation. Others have been charged with crimes like narcotics smuggling or sectarian violence, and while they may be sentenced for these crimes, police sources say that none will ever be charged for their involvement in Pearl's murder.
Shaikh, for his part, has challenged in the Sindh High Court the verdict to execute him. His appeal has been pending for the past two years. He recently confided to a source that he would like to talk to the media and reveal all the details of the Pearl case at some stage, but said he has "been quiet till now" because his father has strictly asked him "to remain silent."
Omar is presently detained in an isolation ward in Hyderabad Jail, where jail officials maintain he is being guarded round-the-clock. According to these officials, the guards stationed outside his cell are rotated almost daily, because he is the kind of person who has the ability to "influence" anyone he meets.
Prison insiders revealed that Shaikh actually managed to "convert" the first four police constables who were stationed outside his cell, with all of them growing beards - considered a sunnat, or one of the symbols of Islam - within days after they were assigned to guard his ward. "If we don't rotate the constables outside his cell every day, he is capable of converting the entire jail staff," remarked a prison official.
His questionable role in the Pearl case apart, the authorities suspect that Omar has links with the two suicide bombers who blew themselves up to assassinate Pakistani President, Pervez Musharraf. They believe that the assassination attempt owed to the death penalty awarded to Omar.
Omar's interrogators describe him as both, "tough" and "temperamental." "Sometimes he will be very cooperative, but when he is not in the right mood, he will refuse to talk to anyone," said one of his interrogators, adding, "and once he refuses, he will not open his mouth even under severe physical torture." The same official recalled an incident when Omar insisted that his interrogators follow him in prayer, failing which, he threatened, he would disclose nothing. "He finally compelled all of us to say our prayers after him," said the official.
According to jail officials, Omar is presently trying to learn Arabic and translate the Holy Quran into English. Shaikh is also reading books on history, particularly on World War-I and II, the Cold War and the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. "I'm also reading up on economics and issues dealing with the day to day problems of people," says Omar.
Omar's present motto, in his own words, is to "talk less, eat less and sleep less." And he now believes the most important thing to learn is "time management." "A person will succeed or fail depending on how well he uses his time," he maintains. While he refuses to divulge the name of his most recent mentor, investigators reveal that Omar revered Asim Ghafoor - a local militant and activist of the Jaish-e-Mohammed, who died in a shootout about two months ago in Karachi and was responsible for orchestrating the hijacking of an Indian airliner in December 2000
April 2005
The Mystery Thickens
Recent arrests and fresh evidence that emerged blow holes in the government's case against Omar Shaikh - the primary accused in Daniel Pearl's murder.
By Massoud Ansari
British-born Ahmed Omar Saeed Shaikh, convicted for the kidnap-slaying of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl, has admitted to having met Bin Laden twice in Afghanistan, but says he is more committed to the one-eyed Taliban spiritual supremo, Mulla Omar, whom he considers "the overall leader of all mujahideen."
In his first-ever interview given from Adiala jail, which was perforce conducted surreptitiously, with the questionaire being smuggled in and out, Omar said he admires the "grief" Bin Laden maintains in his heart for the "plight of Muslims world-wide" and the sacrifices he has made, but said he doesn't necessarily agree entirely with the methods he has chosen to achieve his ends.
Shaikh Omar, who was arrested in February 2002 and declared a "dangerous prisoner", was shifted from the Karachi Central Jail to a more secure colonial-built jail in Hyderabad in April 2002 because the authorities feared his comrades-in-arm may attempt to break into the Karachi prison and whisk him away.
On July 15, 2002, he was sentenced to hang by a one-judge Anti-Terrorism Court after he was found guilty in the case relating to the kidnapping of the 38-year-old American, Pearl, on January 23, 2002, and his subsequent murder.
In the accompanying interview with Newsline, Omar admits to "involvement" in the kidnapping of foreigners in India in 1994 for which he served time in that country, and the abduction of Wall Street Journal South-Asia bureau chief, Daniel Pearl, but adds that he "didn't [physically] take part in the actual events."
This claim ties in with new evidence unearthed by the authorities in which it was revealed that while Omar was part of the conspiracy to kidnap Pearl - which included luring the reporter to the site of the abduction by e-mail, he was not physically present either at the time of the kidnapping, or his murder. However, Omar is believed to have played the role of advisor to the kidnappers, reportedly orchestrating from the background how best to get maximum mileage from the scheme.
Police insiders disclose that local authorities have arrested almost 90 per cent of the militants who took part in the abduction and slaying of Pearl, but since the former have already made a case against Shaikh Omar and four others who are charged along with him, and the new evidence, if pursued, would mean a retrial and the possible opening up of a Pandora's box, none of the men - not even those who have confessed to involvement in the crime - have been charged to date.
Last month, police in Karachi announced they had arrested Sohail alias Habib, who they say co-conspired with Omar in the kidnapping and murder of Pearl. Sohail is believed to have told interrogators that Shaikh had given him the Polaroid camera which was used to take pictures of Pearl, taught him how to use it and gave him the list of demands to be released to the media for Pearl's safe release. Sohail, has, however not been charged with the crime because, according to Pakistani police sources, the government believes that reopening of the case would reveal how badly Pakistan bungled the original investigation.
These sources disclosed that the group of militants who have been picked up over the last one-and-a half-years - roughly a dozen men which include veteran militants Fazal Karim, Qari Asad and Imtiaz Siddiqui - were actually arrested for drug-trafficking and other crimes unrelated to Pearl's death.
After interrogating the men, however, the authorities learnt the men had links to the Pearl abduction and murder. Several of them were familiar with intimate details of Pearl's kidnapping which had not been made public - for example, that he was not forcibly taken from a restaurant but willingly went with his abductors in the hope of an interview with a jihadi leader named Mubarak Shah Gillani; how he was given English reading material during his captivity and how he had made at least one escape attempt three days before he was killed. "He tried to scale the wall but couldn't because both his hands were tied. He was caught and chained," one of the militants reportedly told police.
According to their confessional statements the detained militants have revealed that three men including senior Al-Qaeda member Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (now in custody in the US), Abdul Rahman and Nasrullah - both Kuwaiti nationals fluent in Arabic, Balochi and Persian - arrived at the scene at the behest of Saud Memon, who is believed to be Al-Qaeda's chief financier in Pakistan and who owned the house where Pearl was held and took over the operation. The authorities are reportedly still searching for the Kuwaitis.
On the day Pearl died, two Pakistani men acting as guards were also present: Ali Khan, arrested several months ago, and Fazal Karim, an employee of Saud Memon. During questioning, one of the men reportedly told interrogators how before murdering him, the Arabs tried to sedate Pearl, first by injection, then by doctoring his tea. However, the reporter did not cooperate. "I think he understood that he was going to be killed; he refused to drink the tea. He also resisted being injected," said the guard.
His assailants also forced Pearl to acknowledge his Jewish background and express sympathy with the detainees in Guantánamo Bay before taking the knife to his throat - all this on camera. However, the actual act of slitting Pearl's throat had to be reenacted after the actual event, according to the guard, because of a malfunction in the camera.
"When they were slaughtering him it seemed like a bad dream. I had seen goats and chickens being slaughtered many times, never a human being," he added. The gruesome film of the murder was, of course, subsequently seen across the globe, courtesy the internet.
Some of the information extracted under interrogation from Pearl's abductors is particularly poignant For example, they revealed how the reporter's efforts to converse with his captors were limited since the latter spoke only broken English and Pearl had no Urdu or Arabic. "However, he made clear that he was a Jew and his wife a Buddhist. In fact, he used to imitate the way she prayed, and sing hymns and songs whenever he thought about her," disclosed one of the kidnappers.
The men reportedly also gave interrogators other chilling details of the case that Islamabad would certainly not want the public to hear. Police sources disclosed that senior government officials are petrified if the militants are charged they might reveal information demonstrating how the case against Shaikh Omar, whom Islamabad identified as the ringleader of Pearl's killers, was substantially spurious, since Sheikh's testimony, in which he denied direct involvement in the Pearl case has now been corroborated by the independent accounts of several of the men in custody. In fact, the police now allegedly believe that Pearl's kidnappers actually had planned to release him after receiving the ransom payment. "Conspiring to kidnap is a heinous crime under Pakistani law and is punishable [with] life imprisonment," says one Pakistani legal expert familiar with the case. However, Sheikh has been charged with far more serious crimes, which carry the death penalty.
Police officials contend that if the government allows the group of men to testify, their evidence could not only possibly exonerate Omar of the murder, but also reveal how once Omar was arrested, the Pakistani police stopped looking for other suspects, stumbling upon the band of men now held only by accident. It is being conjectured in some quarters that the Pakistani government may even have fabricated evidence linking Omar to the killing.
Thus, this line of thought goes, to cover its tracks it is now allegedly releasing some of those men who were recently arrested in order to avoid prosecuting them and subjecting itself to evidence emerging in the event that might incriminate or embarrass it. In fact, two men have reportedly already been released, "because all we had on them was a case of possessing illegal weapons and other minor charges," says a police official who is privy to the investigation. Others have been charged with crimes like narcotics smuggling or sectarian violence, and while they may be sentenced for these crimes, police sources say that none will ever be charged for their involvement in Pearl's murder.
Shaikh, for his part, has challenged in the Sindh High Court the verdict to execute him. His appeal has been pending for the past two years. He recently confided to a source that he would like to talk to the media and reveal all the details of the Pearl case at some stage, but said he has "been quiet till now" because his father has strictly asked him "to remain silent."
Omar is presently detained in an isolation ward in Hyderabad Jail, where jail officials maintain he is being guarded round-the-clock. According to these officials, the guards stationed outside his cell are rotated almost daily, because he is the kind of person who has the ability to "influence" anyone he meets.
Prison insiders revealed that Shaikh actually managed to "convert" the first four police constables who were stationed outside his cell, with all of them growing beards - considered a sunnat, or one of the symbols of Islam - within days after they were assigned to guard his ward. "If we don't rotate the constables outside his cell every day, he is capable of converting the entire jail staff," remarked a prison official.
His questionable role in the Pearl case apart, the authorities suspect that Omar has links with the two suicide bombers who blew themselves up to assassinate Pakistani President, Pervez Musharraf. They believe that the assassination attempt owed to the death penalty awarded to Omar.
Omar's interrogators describe him as both, "tough" and "temperamental." "Sometimes he will be very cooperative, but when he is not in the right mood, he will refuse to talk to anyone," said one of his interrogators, adding, "and once he refuses, he will not open his mouth even under severe physical torture." The same official recalled an incident when Omar insisted that his interrogators follow him in prayer, failing which, he threatened, he would disclose nothing. "He finally compelled all of us to say our prayers after him," said the official.
According to jail officials, Omar is presently trying to learn Arabic and translate the Holy Quran into English. Shaikh is also reading books on history, particularly on World War-I and II, the Cold War and the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. "I'm also reading up on economics and issues dealing with the day to day problems of people," says Omar.
Omar's present motto, in his own words, is to "talk less, eat less and sleep less." And he now believes the most important thing to learn is "time management." "A person will succeed or fail depending on how well he uses his time," he maintains. While he refuses to divulge the name of his most recent mentor, investigators reveal that Omar revered Asim Ghafoor - a local militant and activist of the Jaish-e-Mohammed, who died in a shootout about two months ago in Karachi and was responsible for orchestrating the hijacking of an Indian airliner in December 2000
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