South Asia Tribune, April 4, 2004
As Zardari Prepares for the Political Plunge, Benazir States Her Conditions
By Shaheen Sehbai
DUBAI, April 6: Days before the Bhutto family takes another political plunge into Pakistan’s murky politics, the mood here in Dubai is adventurous.
Confident and defiant husband Asif Ali Zardari is busy assembling his media teams and packing his bags to return to Pakistan for a daring journey which may again land him behind the bars, should he annoy the Generals a bit too much.
Wife Benazir Bhutto is making faces at the uniformed political negotiators with her own set of tough and politically shrewd pre-conditions for the so called national political reconciliation.
Many PPP jialas, gathered here at the Benazir House, are plotting their strategies to beat the Choudhries of Gujrat and the Punjab Government on the day General Pervez Musharraf lands in New Delhi to watch an Indo-Pak cricket one-dayer. The Bhuttos expect that their Lahore one-day show on April 16 will turn out to be a bigger thriller than Musharraf’s cricket diplomacy.
All strategists agree that if events turn out to be nasty in Lahore, the General will be adequately embarrassed in front of the Indian and the world media.
It another 10 days Zardari will be boarding a flight for Lahore to test General Musharraf’s nerves, and his resolve, to provide the mainstream political parties the space he has vaguely promised as part of the reconciliation charade. Camera crews and newspaper hacks from round the world are trying their best to get on board the Zardari flight as they expect a re-run, although on a yet unknown scale, of Benazir Bhutto’s April 6, 1986 landing in Lahore, exactly19 years ago.
As passing through Dubai I spend a long day with Asif and Benazir sharing their exile, it becomes evident that the environment is charged and cell phones are constantly ringing. Asif is getting minute by minute reports of whatever is going on in Pakistan.
“We just heard that a PIA Boeing 777 rolled back and hit something at Karachi. Somebody from the plane is giving me the details. That may sink PIA Chairman Ahmed Saeed…. My men in Nawabshah have been arrested to stop them from going to Lahore…I just got a “third party” call who told me I will be allowed to hold a public meeting but I cannot stage a rally in Lahore,” he keeps telling me after each call.
And then he adds: “We are going there to hold our show, if they want to arrest me, fine. If they don’t want to arrest me, fine again. If they arrest my men, we are prepared. But our show will go on and thousands of cars will jam Lahore on the D-Day, whether they like it or nor.”
Meeting the hardened politician after 9 years is interesting for me especially in view of our last meeting in July 1996 in Islamabad, which had ended in acrimony. The 9 long years have done some good for both of us. When he came to pick me up from my hotel, we had a huge bear hug on the road, almost as if emotional. We sit down in a mid-Dubai restaurant for a 3 hour lunch which is interrupted many times over by new dishes and new information coming from all over Pakistan. His cell phone is like a newsroom and for a journalist to be getting breaking news every few minutes while enjoying some crispy seafood in a metropolitan tension-free setting is exciting.
Asif looks fit but he has medical problems and will be seeing doctors in the next few days before he flies to a physical ordeal in Lahore. His mind and thinking process is much clearer and sharper. He talks as a mature politician ready to face the odds but also practice the art of the possible and matured he has, as if baked in an oven. He appears flexible ready to take all the chances, walk the talk and test the ropes.
We discuss a lot of strategies that PPP is making, that the Generals may be contemplating and what may or may not work. He says I am ready for jail once again but I am not ready to become a pawn, a “Faisal Saleh Hayat”, meaning he is not falling for the crumbs that may be on offer but wants a proper guaranteed political agreement in which all sides stick to their word, unlike the “guarantees” which duped the political maulanas of MMA.
He clearly hints at some of the “goodies” which have been put on the table but does not discuss details. These goodies are in return for good conduct, joining “them” instead of fighting them.
Benazir Bhutto, in turn, elaborates in detail on what Asif just only hints at. She was preparing to drive to Ras Al-Khaima, about 2 hours from Dubai, for an event commemorating the 26th death anniversary of her father Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. PPP workers have arranged a big gathering there and I join her in her car to have a long discussion on the current situation and events. We drive for almost 3 hours before we get there and she makes a hard hitting speech on her father’s life and death.
What we discuss in the car is off the record but when she speaks to the cheering crowd, she puts on the table her specific conditions for a dialogue with the Generals, foremost among them is the test of sincerity of the regime by allowing Asif to land in Lahore and have his show.
But the more important conditions is whether the Generals will make the upcoming Local Bodies elections as a sample of “free and fair” General Elections that may follow, either this year, in 2006 or 2007.
On the first condition, she mocks the Generals. “They have said they will not allow Asif to hold a rally. How are thousands of PPP supporters supposed to reach the venue, by parachutes if not through trucks and buses. And when hundreds of vehicles move in the same direction for the same destination, raising the same slogans, what does it become – a rally, by whatever name you may call it.”
But her second demand for free and fair Local Bodies Polls has much deeper meaning. She wants the Generals to show they mean business by allowing all parties to run freely in the Local polls. “There should be no agencies interference. No nomination of Nazims and Mayors. No selection of candidates and winners. No stuffing of ballots. No manipulation. If these elections are fair, we will then believe that the General Elections could be better than 2002. If they don’t let us elect our Mayors, how will they let us elect our MNAs, Chief Ministers and Prime Minister. They have to establish their credibility.”
She explains later that in the last Local Bodies polls, PPP had won 28 out of 36 Districts in Punjab but one by one the Establishment plucked them away from PPP, some under duress, others with carrots and yet others with both.
Both Asif and Benazir acknowledge that the political allies of Musharraf, the Choudhries of Punjab, will not allow free and fair polls, neither for Local Bodies not the Parliament. In Punjab the king’s party will be decimated by a combined PPP-PML-N juggernaut. “The Choudhries are driving the Generals into a blind alley as they have no future if reconciliation takes place and the Generals have no future if it does not.”
Benazir and Asif work as a team realizing that most of the political moves by the Generals are ill-intentioned: Aimed at splitting up the political couple to break up the PPP strength.
As an added precaution, they do not even travel together unless absolutely necessary. They did go to Ajmer in India but it was thanksgiving and prayers for the future.
Yet Asif is now poised for a much more intensive political role inside Pakistan as he prepares to practically run a party which has been feeling the pinch of its leader in exile and with no second string leader who could take the entire party along on a national basis, though many bright stars claim their positions at various tiers.
Asif’s new role is to get them all together, organize the party and lead the struggle for democracy, but more importantly, his task is to prepare the ground for the safe and quick return of Benazir Bhutto as Musharraf gets closer to the declared time frame of quitting his uniform.
All realize that Musharraf does not have enough time. He is under pressure from the West to distance himself from the Mullas, ensure that liberal and mainstream parties are allowed their political space and hold free and fair General elections in 2007, if not early.
But Musharraf is worried about his own tenure after 2007 and all political bargaining positions begin and end at that focused outcome. Musharraf wants a deal from Benazir and Asif to stay on even after 2007 but they want their political price, if and when they allow him.
The negotiations and issues are complex and the dialogue is difficult but what is more striking is the lack of will to actually do some “give and take” which essentially is the heart and soul of every negotiation.
“The Generals think that reconciliation means that we should accept everything they say, without question,” Benazir said in one moment of deep thought. “That is not going to happen.”
Tuesday, April 05, 2005
Monday, April 04, 2005
The Debate of Civilizations
Khaleej Times
The debate of civilisations
BY IRFAN HUSAIN
31 March 2005
THE vulnerability of Pakistan's minorities was on display yet again recently when, on 16 March, an imam of an Islamabad mosque led his students in an attack on a group of Christian worshippers in their church in Islamabad.
For years now, Sunnis and Shias have been slaughtering each other in their respective mosques, but apart from the occasional atrocity, Christians had been left alone in their churches. This recent, totally unprovoked, attack underlines the precarious position of non-Muslims in Pakistan.
If it's any consolation, we are not alone in our intolerance. Historically, the dhimmi (or zimmi) have been a people apart in Muslim societies, with special rules and laws to delineate their limitations and obligations as non-Muslim citizens. While we take some pride in the often tolerant treatment they received at the hands of Muslim rulers, Bat Ye'or, a British historian of Egyptian origin, differs strongly. Author of the recently published book Eurabia: the Euro-Arab axis, Ms Ye'or was interviewed recently by the French weekly Le Point (10 March, 2005), and according to her, Europe has 'submitted' to Islam without a struggle.
When asked about her lifelong study of the conditions of the dhimmi in Islamic history, she says: "Very often glossed over, the concept of the dhimmi is fundamental; it is an integral part of the ideology of jihad itself which divides humanity into two camps: the Muslims, representing the side of peace, and the non-believers, those of the lands of the Dar Al Harb, the lands of war. "Invoking the Holy Koran and the hadith (both pillars of Islamic law), jihad places on the Muslim community the obligation to conquer non-Muslim countries, so as to bring them under Islamic law. Jihad can be waged either peacefully (through immigration and conversion), or through war. All resistance to the advance of Islam constitutes a casus belli (resistance to a just cause).
“The dhimmi is the non-believer who, submitting to the sovereignty of Islam without a fight, benefits from the protection of his life and his property. He is entitled to certain limited rights. In exchange, he pays a ransom-tax, the jaziya (Holy Koran 9, 29). This payment is part of various humiliations. The refusal to pay the jaziya is equated to rebellion, and lifts protection, automatically restoring the state of jihad."
Bat Ye'or traces this system back to the earliest days of Islam, and lists the limitations the dhimmi were forced to live under: they were forbidden to carry arms; they were not permitted to repair or build their places of worship; they had to wear patches of coloured fabric on their clothes that identified them as non-Muslims; in the streets, the dhimmi had to walk quickly with downcast eyes, and pass to the left of Muslims; their religious rituals had to be followed soundlessly, and processions were not permitted. "The marriage of a dhimmi with a Muslim woman, as well as blasphemy against Islam, were obviously punished by death." According to Ye'or, millions of African, Asian and European non-Muslims have been subjected to these conditions over the centuries. The historian maintains: "This is a history of violence, of slavery, of suffering, of rape, of deportation, of humiliation."
In the same issue of Le Point, the writer Malek Chebel was asked to respond to Bat Ye'or's interview. Author of Manifesto for an Enlightened Islam, Chebel asserts: "Since the 19th century, the majority of Jewish specialists of Islam like Ignatius Goldziher, Georges Vajda, Samuel Munk, Bernard Lewis, and Maxime Rodinson, have admitted that their co-religionists in Muslim countries, for the entire Islamic period, were never victims of pogroms, of massive deportation, of discrimination or extermination. They were not subjected to the European-style holocaust, or even marginalised, irrespective of what these new theoreticians of 'dhimmitude' might say. On the contrary, many of them occupied eminent positions, honouring the magnanimity of classical Islam, Enlightened Islam, the Islam we love."
This debate is coming to occupy centrestage in Europe as Westerners seek to resolve the contradictions of a secular, tolerant society with the seemingly rigid belief system followed by the ten million Muslims who live in their midst. While these questions have been discussed since 9/11, the debate has assumed greater urgency ever since Turkey was accepted as a future member of the European Union. The vision of 70 million (Muslim) Turks able to come and live in their countries at will is a disturbing one for many Europeans.
In the West, perhaps nothing sets Islam and its followers apart from Western values more than the treatment of women. The last century has witnessed a relentless struggle for women's rights in Europe and America, and for an entire generation of men and women, concepts such as forced marriage, honour killings, and all-enveloping burqas are abhorrent. As the Muslim population in Europe (and elsewhere) is generally growing at a much faster rate than that of non-Muslims, there is a real fear that Europeans in some countries will be outnumbered, and their civilisation eroded. So how to reconcile these huge differences?
According to the leader-writer of Le Point, "This question of individual liberty is at the heart of the debate between Islam and the other religions of the Book. Will the response follow the path of secularism? In any case, this is the necessary path for a religion in Europe that has no concept of the separation of the temporal from the spiritual. But for this to happen, Islam must undergo its own 'cultural revolution'. But it is currently dominated by Saudi Wahabism, the most retrogressive version of the faith, one based on a literal reading of the holy texts and a return to the past. This is the version most Muslim youths in Western slums follow in a search for a new identity."
Each Western country tries to grapple with these issues in its own way, but tension is increasing everywhere. More and more, when Muslims protest against the stereotyping of all Muslims as extremists, and appeal for tolerance, they are being asked why Muslim states do not show the same tolerance they are demanding in the West. Why, they ask, are the Saudis financing the construction of mosques in Western cities, when they do not permit the construction of churches in their own country? And why are Christian worshippers being attacked in a church in the capital of Pakistan?
The debate of civilisations
BY IRFAN HUSAIN
31 March 2005
THE vulnerability of Pakistan's minorities was on display yet again recently when, on 16 March, an imam of an Islamabad mosque led his students in an attack on a group of Christian worshippers in their church in Islamabad.
For years now, Sunnis and Shias have been slaughtering each other in their respective mosques, but apart from the occasional atrocity, Christians had been left alone in their churches. This recent, totally unprovoked, attack underlines the precarious position of non-Muslims in Pakistan.
If it's any consolation, we are not alone in our intolerance. Historically, the dhimmi (or zimmi) have been a people apart in Muslim societies, with special rules and laws to delineate their limitations and obligations as non-Muslim citizens. While we take some pride in the often tolerant treatment they received at the hands of Muslim rulers, Bat Ye'or, a British historian of Egyptian origin, differs strongly. Author of the recently published book Eurabia: the Euro-Arab axis, Ms Ye'or was interviewed recently by the French weekly Le Point (10 March, 2005), and according to her, Europe has 'submitted' to Islam without a struggle.
When asked about her lifelong study of the conditions of the dhimmi in Islamic history, she says: "Very often glossed over, the concept of the dhimmi is fundamental; it is an integral part of the ideology of jihad itself which divides humanity into two camps: the Muslims, representing the side of peace, and the non-believers, those of the lands of the Dar Al Harb, the lands of war. "Invoking the Holy Koran and the hadith (both pillars of Islamic law), jihad places on the Muslim community the obligation to conquer non-Muslim countries, so as to bring them under Islamic law. Jihad can be waged either peacefully (through immigration and conversion), or through war. All resistance to the advance of Islam constitutes a casus belli (resistance to a just cause).
“The dhimmi is the non-believer who, submitting to the sovereignty of Islam without a fight, benefits from the protection of his life and his property. He is entitled to certain limited rights. In exchange, he pays a ransom-tax, the jaziya (Holy Koran 9, 29). This payment is part of various humiliations. The refusal to pay the jaziya is equated to rebellion, and lifts protection, automatically restoring the state of jihad."
Bat Ye'or traces this system back to the earliest days of Islam, and lists the limitations the dhimmi were forced to live under: they were forbidden to carry arms; they were not permitted to repair or build their places of worship; they had to wear patches of coloured fabric on their clothes that identified them as non-Muslims; in the streets, the dhimmi had to walk quickly with downcast eyes, and pass to the left of Muslims; their religious rituals had to be followed soundlessly, and processions were not permitted. "The marriage of a dhimmi with a Muslim woman, as well as blasphemy against Islam, were obviously punished by death." According to Ye'or, millions of African, Asian and European non-Muslims have been subjected to these conditions over the centuries. The historian maintains: "This is a history of violence, of slavery, of suffering, of rape, of deportation, of humiliation."
In the same issue of Le Point, the writer Malek Chebel was asked to respond to Bat Ye'or's interview. Author of Manifesto for an Enlightened Islam, Chebel asserts: "Since the 19th century, the majority of Jewish specialists of Islam like Ignatius Goldziher, Georges Vajda, Samuel Munk, Bernard Lewis, and Maxime Rodinson, have admitted that their co-religionists in Muslim countries, for the entire Islamic period, were never victims of pogroms, of massive deportation, of discrimination or extermination. They were not subjected to the European-style holocaust, or even marginalised, irrespective of what these new theoreticians of 'dhimmitude' might say. On the contrary, many of them occupied eminent positions, honouring the magnanimity of classical Islam, Enlightened Islam, the Islam we love."
This debate is coming to occupy centrestage in Europe as Westerners seek to resolve the contradictions of a secular, tolerant society with the seemingly rigid belief system followed by the ten million Muslims who live in their midst. While these questions have been discussed since 9/11, the debate has assumed greater urgency ever since Turkey was accepted as a future member of the European Union. The vision of 70 million (Muslim) Turks able to come and live in their countries at will is a disturbing one for many Europeans.
In the West, perhaps nothing sets Islam and its followers apart from Western values more than the treatment of women. The last century has witnessed a relentless struggle for women's rights in Europe and America, and for an entire generation of men and women, concepts such as forced marriage, honour killings, and all-enveloping burqas are abhorrent. As the Muslim population in Europe (and elsewhere) is generally growing at a much faster rate than that of non-Muslims, there is a real fear that Europeans in some countries will be outnumbered, and their civilisation eroded. So how to reconcile these huge differences?
According to the leader-writer of Le Point, "This question of individual liberty is at the heart of the debate between Islam and the other religions of the Book. Will the response follow the path of secularism? In any case, this is the necessary path for a religion in Europe that has no concept of the separation of the temporal from the spiritual. But for this to happen, Islam must undergo its own 'cultural revolution'. But it is currently dominated by Saudi Wahabism, the most retrogressive version of the faith, one based on a literal reading of the holy texts and a return to the past. This is the version most Muslim youths in Western slums follow in a search for a new identity."
Each Western country tries to grapple with these issues in its own way, but tension is increasing everywhere. More and more, when Muslims protest against the stereotyping of all Muslims as extremists, and appeal for tolerance, they are being asked why Muslim states do not show the same tolerance they are demanding in the West. Why, they ask, are the Saudis financing the construction of mosques in Western cities, when they do not permit the construction of churches in their own country? And why are Christian worshippers being attacked in a church in the capital of Pakistan?
Pakistan sees major oil and gas shortage by 2010
Daily Times, April 4, 2005
Pakistan sees major oil and gas shortage by 2010
* Pakistan to ask Qatar for 2 bcf a day through pipeline
* Tripartite meeting on April 12 to discuss Daulatabad gas field reserves
* ‘No formal proposal by India on pipeline route’
By Khalid Mustafa
ISLAMABAD: Pakistan will face a shortage of about 20 million tonnes of oil equivalent in five years time, jumping to 100 million tonnes by 2025, Ahmad Waqar, Petroleum and Natural Resources Ministry secretary, said on Monday.
Addressing the inaugural session of a two-day workshop on ‘Oil and gas generation and accumulation in Pakistan’ organised by the Hydrocarbon Development Institute of Pakistan, he said, “There is a need to meet this gap. Gas pipelines will be necessary in addition to indigenous production.”
Mr Waqar said Pakistan had a lot of potential in the oil and gas sector, which needed to be explored, and that the government was trying its best to tap the country’s resources.
He said the government had set a target of drilling 100 exploratory wells this year from an average of 55 to 60 each year previously and planned a major road show in London on April 26 and April 27 to attract investment in this effort.
Later, he told Daily Times that Pakistan would ask Qatar for 2 billion cubic feet (bcf) of natural gas a day through the proposed $1.88 billion Gulf-South Asia (GUSA) pipeline project. Pakistan would make its request to Qatar during a meeting of a Joint Technical Committee in Doha on April 24 and April 25, he added.
Abdullah bin Hamad Al-Attiyah, the second deputy prime minister of Qatar, had earlier refused to provide 2 bcf of gas every day, saying Qatar had too many commitments with other countries and would only provide 1.6 bcf of gas that it had promised Pakistan in 1990.
Mr Waqar said Pakistan would try convincing Qatari authorities to consider the request since gas demand in the country had increased considerably in the wake of increasing economic activity.
He said Pakistan would also negotiate the import of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) to meet the country’s requirements till the formal finalisation of the import of gas through pipelines from Iran, Qatar and Turkmenistan.
The proposed GUSA project will have a 1,610-kilometre-long, 44-inch diameter pipeline running offshore along the Iran-Pakistan coastline up to Jiwani (near Karachi). It will transport 1.6 bcf of natural gas with a daily off-take of 1,000 million cubic feet.
He also said the steering committee meeting on the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) gas pipeline project would be held in Islamabad on April 12 and April 13, which would discuss Turkmenistan’s report on the Daulatabad gas field’s reserves.
He said the steering committee consisting of the energy ministers of the three countries would discuss the issues of gas storage and security in Afghanistan and a modus operandi would be planned to resolve the issues.
Mr Waqar also said, “We have not received any formal proposal from India about the route of the gas pipeline through populated areas to ensure the pipeline’s security.” He said India wanted gas at its border and should not be concerned about the pipeline’s route, as this would be decided by Pakistan.
He said if India wanted the pipeline route according to its wishes, it could be worked out, but India would have to share the additional cost for laying the gas pipeline.
Meanwhile, Petroleum and Natural Resources Minister Amanullah Khan Jadoon said India had not indicated when the Indian oil minister would visit Pakistan to discuss the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline.
He also said Pakistan would finalise which of the three proposed gas pipeline projects to start first by the end 2005.
He said the Asian Development Bank and World Bank were also involved in the pre-feasibility and feasibility reports of the three proposed pipeline projects.
He said Pakistan would not go for just one of the four options to import gas because the country’s demands were high. It would instead try and explore all four options: gas pipelines from Qatar, Turkmenistan and Iran and the import of LNG from Qatar.
Pakistan sees major oil and gas shortage by 2010
* Pakistan to ask Qatar for 2 bcf a day through pipeline
* Tripartite meeting on April 12 to discuss Daulatabad gas field reserves
* ‘No formal proposal by India on pipeline route’
By Khalid Mustafa
ISLAMABAD: Pakistan will face a shortage of about 20 million tonnes of oil equivalent in five years time, jumping to 100 million tonnes by 2025, Ahmad Waqar, Petroleum and Natural Resources Ministry secretary, said on Monday.
Addressing the inaugural session of a two-day workshop on ‘Oil and gas generation and accumulation in Pakistan’ organised by the Hydrocarbon Development Institute of Pakistan, he said, “There is a need to meet this gap. Gas pipelines will be necessary in addition to indigenous production.”
Mr Waqar said Pakistan had a lot of potential in the oil and gas sector, which needed to be explored, and that the government was trying its best to tap the country’s resources.
He said the government had set a target of drilling 100 exploratory wells this year from an average of 55 to 60 each year previously and planned a major road show in London on April 26 and April 27 to attract investment in this effort.
Later, he told Daily Times that Pakistan would ask Qatar for 2 billion cubic feet (bcf) of natural gas a day through the proposed $1.88 billion Gulf-South Asia (GUSA) pipeline project. Pakistan would make its request to Qatar during a meeting of a Joint Technical Committee in Doha on April 24 and April 25, he added.
Abdullah bin Hamad Al-Attiyah, the second deputy prime minister of Qatar, had earlier refused to provide 2 bcf of gas every day, saying Qatar had too many commitments with other countries and would only provide 1.6 bcf of gas that it had promised Pakistan in 1990.
Mr Waqar said Pakistan would try convincing Qatari authorities to consider the request since gas demand in the country had increased considerably in the wake of increasing economic activity.
He said Pakistan would also negotiate the import of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) to meet the country’s requirements till the formal finalisation of the import of gas through pipelines from Iran, Qatar and Turkmenistan.
The proposed GUSA project will have a 1,610-kilometre-long, 44-inch diameter pipeline running offshore along the Iran-Pakistan coastline up to Jiwani (near Karachi). It will transport 1.6 bcf of natural gas with a daily off-take of 1,000 million cubic feet.
He also said the steering committee meeting on the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) gas pipeline project would be held in Islamabad on April 12 and April 13, which would discuss Turkmenistan’s report on the Daulatabad gas field’s reserves.
He said the steering committee consisting of the energy ministers of the three countries would discuss the issues of gas storage and security in Afghanistan and a modus operandi would be planned to resolve the issues.
Mr Waqar also said, “We have not received any formal proposal from India about the route of the gas pipeline through populated areas to ensure the pipeline’s security.” He said India wanted gas at its border and should not be concerned about the pipeline’s route, as this would be decided by Pakistan.
He said if India wanted the pipeline route according to its wishes, it could be worked out, but India would have to share the additional cost for laying the gas pipeline.
Meanwhile, Petroleum and Natural Resources Minister Amanullah Khan Jadoon said India had not indicated when the Indian oil minister would visit Pakistan to discuss the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline.
He also said Pakistan would finalise which of the three proposed gas pipeline projects to start first by the end 2005.
He said the Asian Development Bank and World Bank were also involved in the pre-feasibility and feasibility reports of the three proposed pipeline projects.
He said Pakistan would not go for just one of the four options to import gas because the country’s demands were high. It would instead try and explore all four options: gas pipelines from Qatar, Turkmenistan and Iran and the import of LNG from Qatar.
"US Spy" in Waziristan killed
Daily Times, April 4, 2005
‘US spy’ killed in Miranshah
MIRANSHAH: Suspected Islamic militants opened fire on a man in a crowded bazaar in this tribal town on Monday, killing him before fleeing, an intelligence official said.
No one claimed responsibility for the shooting in Miranshah, the main town in North Waziristan. The official, on condition of anonymity, said that authorities found some evidence suggesting the man may have been killed on suspicion that he was spying for the United States on militants in the area.
The 35-year-old local tribesman, identified as Fazal Rahman, was shot twice in the head by fire from an AK-47 rifle. No one was arrested and a probe into the shooting has been started, he said. ap
‘US spy’ killed in Miranshah
MIRANSHAH: Suspected Islamic militants opened fire on a man in a crowded bazaar in this tribal town on Monday, killing him before fleeing, an intelligence official said.
No one claimed responsibility for the shooting in Miranshah, the main town in North Waziristan. The official, on condition of anonymity, said that authorities found some evidence suggesting the man may have been killed on suspicion that he was spying for the United States on militants in the area.
The 35-year-old local tribesman, identified as Fazal Rahman, was shot twice in the head by fire from an AK-47 rifle. No one was arrested and a probe into the shooting has been started, he said. ap
Women's marathon: Mullahs' reaction
Dawn, April 4, 2005
MMA men disrupt women's marathon
By Akram Malik
GUJRANWALA, April 3: Declaring girls' participation in public sports as an un-Islamic act, hundreds of activists of the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal, led by a member of the National Assembly, disrupted a mini-marathon here on Sunday.
They set on fire 19 vehicles outside the Jinnah Stadium and damaged other property.
Over a dozen MMA activists, including MNA Maulana Qazi Hamidullah and his son Maulana Kafaitullah, and three policemen were injured in a clash which erupted when police tried to prevent them from disrupting the event. Police later arrested the MNA and about 20 other people.
The district administration had been asked by the local leadership of the alliance to drop girls' event from the 3km marathon. The administration, however, went ahead with the plan, but failed to take adequate security measures. A similar event had been held in Lahore last month amid tight security.
The trouble started when about 800 MMA activists who had gathered outside the stadium were informed that the girls' race had started from the Divisional Public School. By that time the men's race, which begun half an hour earlier, had reached the stadium.
According to officials, the activists, who were armed with 'petrol bombs', clubs and bricks, attacked the participants of the men's race, police and district administration personnel.
They torched 12 cars and seven motorcycles and smashed window-panes of the stadium and adjacent buildings and shops. Police resorted to a baton-charge, but after failing to disperse the violent crowd they started firing in the air.
Cars belonging to Punjab Transport Minister Rana Shamshad Ahmad Khan, MPA Mohammad Ashraf Butt, Tehsil Municipal Administrator Chaudhry Zubair Nat, Pakistan Muslim League District president Chaudhry Zafarullah and the executive district officer, revenue, were among those set on fire.
The girls' race was stopped half way. Some officials said that people responsible for the violence might face trial under the Anti-Terrorism Act. MMA leaders blamed the administration for the incident and said they had warned the organizers no to hold the girls' marathon on the GT Road.
A press note issued by District Coordination Officer Fazeel Asghar alleged that the assailants had also used petrol bombs and fired at the main gate of the stadium with automatic weapons. MNA Hamidullah denied the allegation.
MMA men disrupt women's marathon
By Akram Malik
GUJRANWALA, April 3: Declaring girls' participation in public sports as an un-Islamic act, hundreds of activists of the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal, led by a member of the National Assembly, disrupted a mini-marathon here on Sunday.
They set on fire 19 vehicles outside the Jinnah Stadium and damaged other property.
Over a dozen MMA activists, including MNA Maulana Qazi Hamidullah and his son Maulana Kafaitullah, and three policemen were injured in a clash which erupted when police tried to prevent them from disrupting the event. Police later arrested the MNA and about 20 other people.
The district administration had been asked by the local leadership of the alliance to drop girls' event from the 3km marathon. The administration, however, went ahead with the plan, but failed to take adequate security measures. A similar event had been held in Lahore last month amid tight security.
The trouble started when about 800 MMA activists who had gathered outside the stadium were informed that the girls' race had started from the Divisional Public School. By that time the men's race, which begun half an hour earlier, had reached the stadium.
According to officials, the activists, who were armed with 'petrol bombs', clubs and bricks, attacked the participants of the men's race, police and district administration personnel.
They torched 12 cars and seven motorcycles and smashed window-panes of the stadium and adjacent buildings and shops. Police resorted to a baton-charge, but after failing to disperse the violent crowd they started firing in the air.
Cars belonging to Punjab Transport Minister Rana Shamshad Ahmad Khan, MPA Mohammad Ashraf Butt, Tehsil Municipal Administrator Chaudhry Zubair Nat, Pakistan Muslim League District president Chaudhry Zafarullah and the executive district officer, revenue, were among those set on fire.
The girls' race was stopped half way. Some officials said that people responsible for the violence might face trial under the Anti-Terrorism Act. MMA leaders blamed the administration for the incident and said they had warned the organizers no to hold the girls' marathon on the GT Road.
A press note issued by District Coordination Officer Fazeel Asghar alleged that the assailants had also used petrol bombs and fired at the main gate of the stadium with automatic weapons. MNA Hamidullah denied the allegation.
Sunday, April 03, 2005
How did they murder Bhutto
Nation, Lahore
April 4, 2005
How did they murder Bhutto
By Major General (Retd) Ahsan Ahmed
On completion of five years of his government Shaheed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the first elected Prime Minister of Pakistan, announced on January 1977 that general elections would be held in March same year. No one was surprised as charismatic Bhutto and his Pakistan Peoples Party were immensely popular in the country.
The subsequent victory of PPP was also not unexpected. However it was some “more loyal than the king” kind of politicians and bureaucrats whose misdeeds cast shadow on these results. Even the worst enemies of Bhutto knew that he would have got simple majority without such misadventures on about thirty-five National Assembly seats.
When Bhutto sat down with the opposition leaders following street demonstrations, it was agreed that elections would be held in these disputed constituencies. The agreement was reached on the night of 4th July, 77 and was scheduled to be signed the next day. The information got leaked. General Ziaul Haq the Chief of Army Staff staged a coup d’_tat on night 4-5thJuly’77 with Zia announcing that fresh elections would be held within ninety days.
Z.A. Bhutto was arrested and taken to Murree. He was released on 28th July ’77 and he flew to Lahore. A sea of people advanced towards Lahore airport. In spite of strict restrictions by martial law authorities, hundreds of thousands of people surrounded the airport giving their verdict loud and clear.
The first amongst those arrested on the night of the coup were Masood Mehmood Director General Federal Security Force and Rao Rasheed Chief of Intelligence Bureau. On 6 August 77, Mian Abbas one of the Directors of FSF was also arrested. Zia started a non-stop malicious campaign against ZAB and his government. Simultaneously, he announced punishments like chopping the hands of thieves, giving lashes on conviction to a number of crimes etc. At least three were hanged in public while number of those who were flogged in public rose to hundreds including journalists and political opponents. When the public was terrified to the limits, Bhutto was re-arrested in early hours of 3, September, 77.
He was kept in a bungalow in complete darkness and was prevented from sleep as the soldiers kept on marching around with long boots on. He could meet his lawyers after two days. On 5, September, 77, he was shifted to Kot Lakhpat jail and was produced before Justice Samdani on 13 September on allegation of conspiracy to murder. This charge was made up using a FIR lodged by Ahmed Raza Kasuri in 1974 alleging that some people fired at his car on night of 10, November 74 with the intention to kill him but his father sitting next to him got killed.
Kasuri was a mawkish MNA who alleged that his speeches in the parliament annoyed Bhutto so much that he conspired to murder him and instead his father got killed. In fact, he was keen to be taken in the cabinet but ZAB disappointed him as he thought Kasuri lacked the required ability and temperament. The case was based on statements of Masood Mehmood and Mian Abbas who had become state’s approved witnesses. Justice Samdani gave the judgement that evidence in the case being insufficient and contradictory, Mr Bhutto is to be released forthwith and not to be re-arrested unless ordered by the court. He was released amongst scenes of tremendous excitement and joy of party workers and the public.
Bhutto was celebrating Eidul Fitr on 16, September 77, in his ancestral home in Larkana when the army personnel armed with automatic weapons entered ‘Al Murtaza.’ ZAB was re-arrested against the orders of Justice Samdani under Martial Law Regulation No: 12, which empowered Chief Martial Law Administrator to arrest any person even without an allegation for a period of three months with provision to extend such imprisonment further. Bhutto ended up again in Kot Lakhpat jail. The same case, in which Justice Samdani had, bailed him out was again produced in sessions court and speedily transferred to Lahore High Court against all norms of justice as ZAB was refused his right to appeal against sessions court verdict if he would have been convicted.
He was thus devoid of one stage of appeal. The election campaign started on 18 September, 77, and the very first public meeting addressed by Begum Nusrat Bhutto made it clear beyond doubt that PPP would win the elections. On 30 September, 77, Zia cancelled the elections indefinitely without bothering that Agha Shahi had assured the UN General Assembly only two days earlier that election would be held as announced. The party based elections were held after eleven years in 1988 only after the death of Zia.
In addition to the murder charge, more than sixty cases were registered against ZAB. He wrote a hundred page documents in his defence and produced it in the court on oath. However, while the entire print and electronic media was blasting government propaganda at full volume, Bhutto’s defence documents were not allowed to be published. Later media was banned from even mentioning his name. The military dictator was scared to death from a civilian politician par excellence rotting in jail on trumped up charges. It is amazing how history is repeating itself in the next generation. Those who do not learn from history are condemned to repeat it.
Acting Chief Justice Moulvi Mushtaq was superseded during Bhutto’s rule and had personal animosity against him. It is imperative to note that Justice Mushtaq was also made Chief Election Commissioner while holding the post of Acting CJ LHC. One does not have to hold a law degree to realise that under these circumstances, Justice Mushtaq should not have been on this bench what to talk about heading it. He made no efforts to show his contempt towards ZAB often passing abrasive remarks about him during the proceedings. At one stage, Bhutto boycotted the proceedings in protest against unending personal slights from the CJ. The other members of the bench included Justice Aftab Hussain having open links with Jamaat-e-Islami. Justice Zakiuddin Pal was known for his anti-Bhutto views. Justice Gulbaz Khan and Justice M. S. H. Qureshi were bureaucrats. The two judges who had given relief to ZAB earlier were excluded from the bench.
The proceedings started in LHC on 11 October, ’77. A large number of well-known lawyers from abroad attended the court from time to time. One famous barrister from UK attended the court in November 77 and wrote “whenever some part of evidence given by a prosecution witness started to go in favour of the accused, the bench would stop him then and there. The typist would not record the evidence simultaneously as the witness would speak but the bench would dictate to the typist when the witness would stop speaking. The CJ kept on loosing his temper from time to time. If there would have been no political motives and if the accused would not have been ZAB, such a weak case should not have been brought to the High Court in the first instance.”
Due to unhygienic conditions in the jail, Bhutto’s health started deteriorating. He kept on getting frequent bouts of flu and malaria. At one point, he became so ill, he couldn’t attend the court for many days. As per law, an accused facing the charge of murder/conspiracy to murder has to be present in the court all the time when evidence is being recorded. In this case, however, evidence of fifteen witnesses was recorded in the absence of ZAB due to illness.
At one stage, CJ even held a press conference about this case thus tearing to pieces all norms of justice and fair play. When Bhutto was allowed to speak in his defence, the bench suddenly announced that proceedings would be held in camera barring the public and foreign lawyers to listen to his defence.
On 18 March 78, LHC gave a unanimous decision of capital punishment to ZAB. The time allowed to file appeal was only seven days instead of ninety days allowed under the rules. Begum Nusrat Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto remained under house arrest in Lahore and Karachi respectively. A Supreme Court bench consisting of nine judges started to hear the appeal. It was headed by Justice Anwar ul Haq who had earlier given the judgement in favour of imposition of martial law immediately after being appointed as CJ. He had migrated from Julhander (India) just like Justice Moulvi Mushtaq of LHC, Gen Zia ul Haq & Gen Chishti, the right hand person of the dictator. Justice Qaiser Khan got his retirement orders on 30 July 78. He was the only judge who was an expert in criminal law.
Although, he could have been kept on the bench as an ad hoc judge till completion of the appeal, this was not done because by that time it had become clear that he was hearing the appeal with a non-partisan mind. Justice Waheeduddin who had shown similar trends got sick. Although he sent a message that he would like to hear the appeal after getting fit, the CJ decided to continue the proceedings without him. Unfortunately, he remained sick for the rest of the period. ZAB thus lost two crucial votes on the bench.
The military government published two “white papers” in July and August 78 consisting of one thousand pages and containing a long description of numerous misdeeds allegedly committed by Bhutto’s government. It was a brazenly open attempt to interfere in a subjudiced case but SC failed to take any suo motto action. Bhutto wrote a massive rejoinder to these so-called white papers, which was smuggled out of the jail and published abroad in the form of a booklet titled “If I am assassinated.”
On 6 February 79, SC announced the judgement rejecting the appeal. It was a divided judgement of 4-3. As per norms of practiced law, capital punishment is not given on divided judgements. Of course, the dilemma of the military dictator was that the accused person was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the living legend and founder of PPP. If the two judges, who got removed from the bench for different reasons, had been on the bench, Bhutto would have won the appeal by a 5-4 decision.
The whole world was shocked to hear the verdict. Mr Ramsay Clark former Attorney General of USA who had attended part of proceedings wrote in his article “Even if the entire evidence given against Mr Bhutto is accepted, the verdict given is not justified.” Mr Robert Boduetere, famous lawyer of France who also witnessed the proceedings wrote, “Only history will judge these judges.”
ZAB remained in solitary confinement for one year and six & a half months. The door and window of his cell had no wooden planks or shutters except the iron bars, which could neither stop the mosquitoes in summer nor the chilling winds of the winters in Punjab. These harsh, subhuman conditions affected his health adversely. He lost forty pounds of weight. In addition to frequent attacks of malaria and flu, he developed serious intestinal problems. His gums got swollen to the extent that he could not eat. He had episodes of vomiting blood and bleeding from nose. The recommendation of a medical board to shift him to the hospital was promptly rejected. In this physical condition, he was made to sleep on a bed with broken iron springs for many months before a mattress was allowed. At one juncture, he was kept in chains for twenty-three hours without any reason.
The entire world appealed for Bhutto including heads of governments of USA, USSR, CHINA, and UK etc. The defence lawyers lodged an appeal for revision in SC. It was rejected on 24 March, 79. ZAB refused to lodge mercy appeal to General Zia and ordered his family not to do so. Begum Nusrat Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto, still in custody, were brought for the last meeting but were not allowed to enter his cell. They sat across the door of iron bars on a wooden bench, holding Bhutto’s hands through the gaps between the bars. Benazir’s request to be allowed to hug and kiss his father for the last time, was rejected.
The time for execution was fixed at 5:00 AM but ZAB was aroused at 1:00 AM. He shaved, took bath, changed clothes & had a cup of tea. He picked up his wedding ring & wore it. He walked to the gallows holding his head high. Standing on the gallows with his hands bound behind his back, he said in loud and clear voice “Let the people of my country and the world know that I am innocent.” He recited Kalama and told his executioner “Let’s get over with it.”
By the time a large number of journalists and cameramen reached the jail at the given time i.e. 5:00 AM, he was already buried without his widow and daughter being asked/allowed to see his face for the last time. They came to know about his execution through the press like the rest of the country. The story of the last days of Shaheed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto is so excruciatingly painful, whenever it would be narrated, the eyes are bound to shade tears like never before; yours while reading it; mine while writing it.
April 4, 2005
How did they murder Bhutto
By Major General (Retd) Ahsan Ahmed
On completion of five years of his government Shaheed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the first elected Prime Minister of Pakistan, announced on January 1977 that general elections would be held in March same year. No one was surprised as charismatic Bhutto and his Pakistan Peoples Party were immensely popular in the country.
The subsequent victory of PPP was also not unexpected. However it was some “more loyal than the king” kind of politicians and bureaucrats whose misdeeds cast shadow on these results. Even the worst enemies of Bhutto knew that he would have got simple majority without such misadventures on about thirty-five National Assembly seats.
When Bhutto sat down with the opposition leaders following street demonstrations, it was agreed that elections would be held in these disputed constituencies. The agreement was reached on the night of 4th July, 77 and was scheduled to be signed the next day. The information got leaked. General Ziaul Haq the Chief of Army Staff staged a coup d’_tat on night 4-5thJuly’77 with Zia announcing that fresh elections would be held within ninety days.
Z.A. Bhutto was arrested and taken to Murree. He was released on 28th July ’77 and he flew to Lahore. A sea of people advanced towards Lahore airport. In spite of strict restrictions by martial law authorities, hundreds of thousands of people surrounded the airport giving their verdict loud and clear.
The first amongst those arrested on the night of the coup were Masood Mehmood Director General Federal Security Force and Rao Rasheed Chief of Intelligence Bureau. On 6 August 77, Mian Abbas one of the Directors of FSF was also arrested. Zia started a non-stop malicious campaign against ZAB and his government. Simultaneously, he announced punishments like chopping the hands of thieves, giving lashes on conviction to a number of crimes etc. At least three were hanged in public while number of those who were flogged in public rose to hundreds including journalists and political opponents. When the public was terrified to the limits, Bhutto was re-arrested in early hours of 3, September, 77.
He was kept in a bungalow in complete darkness and was prevented from sleep as the soldiers kept on marching around with long boots on. He could meet his lawyers after two days. On 5, September, 77, he was shifted to Kot Lakhpat jail and was produced before Justice Samdani on 13 September on allegation of conspiracy to murder. This charge was made up using a FIR lodged by Ahmed Raza Kasuri in 1974 alleging that some people fired at his car on night of 10, November 74 with the intention to kill him but his father sitting next to him got killed.
Kasuri was a mawkish MNA who alleged that his speeches in the parliament annoyed Bhutto so much that he conspired to murder him and instead his father got killed. In fact, he was keen to be taken in the cabinet but ZAB disappointed him as he thought Kasuri lacked the required ability and temperament. The case was based on statements of Masood Mehmood and Mian Abbas who had become state’s approved witnesses. Justice Samdani gave the judgement that evidence in the case being insufficient and contradictory, Mr Bhutto is to be released forthwith and not to be re-arrested unless ordered by the court. He was released amongst scenes of tremendous excitement and joy of party workers and the public.
Bhutto was celebrating Eidul Fitr on 16, September 77, in his ancestral home in Larkana when the army personnel armed with automatic weapons entered ‘Al Murtaza.’ ZAB was re-arrested against the orders of Justice Samdani under Martial Law Regulation No: 12, which empowered Chief Martial Law Administrator to arrest any person even without an allegation for a period of three months with provision to extend such imprisonment further. Bhutto ended up again in Kot Lakhpat jail. The same case, in which Justice Samdani had, bailed him out was again produced in sessions court and speedily transferred to Lahore High Court against all norms of justice as ZAB was refused his right to appeal against sessions court verdict if he would have been convicted.
He was thus devoid of one stage of appeal. The election campaign started on 18 September, 77, and the very first public meeting addressed by Begum Nusrat Bhutto made it clear beyond doubt that PPP would win the elections. On 30 September, 77, Zia cancelled the elections indefinitely without bothering that Agha Shahi had assured the UN General Assembly only two days earlier that election would be held as announced. The party based elections were held after eleven years in 1988 only after the death of Zia.
In addition to the murder charge, more than sixty cases were registered against ZAB. He wrote a hundred page documents in his defence and produced it in the court on oath. However, while the entire print and electronic media was blasting government propaganda at full volume, Bhutto’s defence documents were not allowed to be published. Later media was banned from even mentioning his name. The military dictator was scared to death from a civilian politician par excellence rotting in jail on trumped up charges. It is amazing how history is repeating itself in the next generation. Those who do not learn from history are condemned to repeat it.
Acting Chief Justice Moulvi Mushtaq was superseded during Bhutto’s rule and had personal animosity against him. It is imperative to note that Justice Mushtaq was also made Chief Election Commissioner while holding the post of Acting CJ LHC. One does not have to hold a law degree to realise that under these circumstances, Justice Mushtaq should not have been on this bench what to talk about heading it. He made no efforts to show his contempt towards ZAB often passing abrasive remarks about him during the proceedings. At one stage, Bhutto boycotted the proceedings in protest against unending personal slights from the CJ. The other members of the bench included Justice Aftab Hussain having open links with Jamaat-e-Islami. Justice Zakiuddin Pal was known for his anti-Bhutto views. Justice Gulbaz Khan and Justice M. S. H. Qureshi were bureaucrats. The two judges who had given relief to ZAB earlier were excluded from the bench.
The proceedings started in LHC on 11 October, ’77. A large number of well-known lawyers from abroad attended the court from time to time. One famous barrister from UK attended the court in November 77 and wrote “whenever some part of evidence given by a prosecution witness started to go in favour of the accused, the bench would stop him then and there. The typist would not record the evidence simultaneously as the witness would speak but the bench would dictate to the typist when the witness would stop speaking. The CJ kept on loosing his temper from time to time. If there would have been no political motives and if the accused would not have been ZAB, such a weak case should not have been brought to the High Court in the first instance.”
Due to unhygienic conditions in the jail, Bhutto’s health started deteriorating. He kept on getting frequent bouts of flu and malaria. At one point, he became so ill, he couldn’t attend the court for many days. As per law, an accused facing the charge of murder/conspiracy to murder has to be present in the court all the time when evidence is being recorded. In this case, however, evidence of fifteen witnesses was recorded in the absence of ZAB due to illness.
At one stage, CJ even held a press conference about this case thus tearing to pieces all norms of justice and fair play. When Bhutto was allowed to speak in his defence, the bench suddenly announced that proceedings would be held in camera barring the public and foreign lawyers to listen to his defence.
On 18 March 78, LHC gave a unanimous decision of capital punishment to ZAB. The time allowed to file appeal was only seven days instead of ninety days allowed under the rules. Begum Nusrat Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto remained under house arrest in Lahore and Karachi respectively. A Supreme Court bench consisting of nine judges started to hear the appeal. It was headed by Justice Anwar ul Haq who had earlier given the judgement in favour of imposition of martial law immediately after being appointed as CJ. He had migrated from Julhander (India) just like Justice Moulvi Mushtaq of LHC, Gen Zia ul Haq & Gen Chishti, the right hand person of the dictator. Justice Qaiser Khan got his retirement orders on 30 July 78. He was the only judge who was an expert in criminal law.
Although, he could have been kept on the bench as an ad hoc judge till completion of the appeal, this was not done because by that time it had become clear that he was hearing the appeal with a non-partisan mind. Justice Waheeduddin who had shown similar trends got sick. Although he sent a message that he would like to hear the appeal after getting fit, the CJ decided to continue the proceedings without him. Unfortunately, he remained sick for the rest of the period. ZAB thus lost two crucial votes on the bench.
The military government published two “white papers” in July and August 78 consisting of one thousand pages and containing a long description of numerous misdeeds allegedly committed by Bhutto’s government. It was a brazenly open attempt to interfere in a subjudiced case but SC failed to take any suo motto action. Bhutto wrote a massive rejoinder to these so-called white papers, which was smuggled out of the jail and published abroad in the form of a booklet titled “If I am assassinated.”
On 6 February 79, SC announced the judgement rejecting the appeal. It was a divided judgement of 4-3. As per norms of practiced law, capital punishment is not given on divided judgements. Of course, the dilemma of the military dictator was that the accused person was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the living legend and founder of PPP. If the two judges, who got removed from the bench for different reasons, had been on the bench, Bhutto would have won the appeal by a 5-4 decision.
The whole world was shocked to hear the verdict. Mr Ramsay Clark former Attorney General of USA who had attended part of proceedings wrote in his article “Even if the entire evidence given against Mr Bhutto is accepted, the verdict given is not justified.” Mr Robert Boduetere, famous lawyer of France who also witnessed the proceedings wrote, “Only history will judge these judges.”
ZAB remained in solitary confinement for one year and six & a half months. The door and window of his cell had no wooden planks or shutters except the iron bars, which could neither stop the mosquitoes in summer nor the chilling winds of the winters in Punjab. These harsh, subhuman conditions affected his health adversely. He lost forty pounds of weight. In addition to frequent attacks of malaria and flu, he developed serious intestinal problems. His gums got swollen to the extent that he could not eat. He had episodes of vomiting blood and bleeding from nose. The recommendation of a medical board to shift him to the hospital was promptly rejected. In this physical condition, he was made to sleep on a bed with broken iron springs for many months before a mattress was allowed. At one juncture, he was kept in chains for twenty-three hours without any reason.
The entire world appealed for Bhutto including heads of governments of USA, USSR, CHINA, and UK etc. The defence lawyers lodged an appeal for revision in SC. It was rejected on 24 March, 79. ZAB refused to lodge mercy appeal to General Zia and ordered his family not to do so. Begum Nusrat Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto, still in custody, were brought for the last meeting but were not allowed to enter his cell. They sat across the door of iron bars on a wooden bench, holding Bhutto’s hands through the gaps between the bars. Benazir’s request to be allowed to hug and kiss his father for the last time, was rejected.
The time for execution was fixed at 5:00 AM but ZAB was aroused at 1:00 AM. He shaved, took bath, changed clothes & had a cup of tea. He picked up his wedding ring & wore it. He walked to the gallows holding his head high. Standing on the gallows with his hands bound behind his back, he said in loud and clear voice “Let the people of my country and the world know that I am innocent.” He recited Kalama and told his executioner “Let’s get over with it.”
By the time a large number of journalists and cameramen reached the jail at the given time i.e. 5:00 AM, he was already buried without his widow and daughter being asked/allowed to see his face for the last time. They came to know about his execution through the press like the rest of the country. The story of the last days of Shaheed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto is so excruciatingly painful, whenever it would be narrated, the eyes are bound to shade tears like never before; yours while reading it; mine while writing it.
The real odds against Pakistan
The News, April 3, 2005
The real odds against Pakistan
Iqbal Mustafa
A joke goes like this. When an insect falls into a mug of beer an Englishman throws his mug away and walks out; an American takes the insect out and drinks the beer; a Chinese eats the insect and throws the beer away; an Indian sells the beer to the American and insect to the Chinese and gets a new mug of beer; a Pakistani accuses the Indian of throwing the insect into his beer, relates the issue to Kashmir, asks the Chinese for military aid and takes a loan from the American to buy a new mug of beer.
Of course, this never happened in Pakistan because alcohol is prohibited here and only non-Muslims drink. But, like most good jokes, it captures a truth which cannot be spoken without a wrapping of innocuous humour. In ‘the Mayor of Casterbridge’ Thomas Hardy fictionalises a timeless concept, that one’s character is one’s fate. This holds true for nations and countries too. I am beginning to fear that, like Michael Henchard, Pakistan may be infected with germs of decay that keep neutralising its innate strengths.
It may be intellectually unfashionable and politically incorrect to take a psycho-philosophical approach in understanding Pakistan’s unending dilemmas and perpetual crisis — especially since the ‘ideology of Pakistan’ provides a pseudo-immunity from self-doubts — but I am going to risk my neck and talk about fundamental factors that keep contributing to the peculiar conundrums the country faces.
The plethora of diverse issues we seem to create out of nowhere make Murphy sound like an optimist. As problems intensify, so do the inane platitudes of the officials. Problems on the Afghan border, in Balochistan, between provinces about resource sharing, between opposition and the government on constitutional interpretation, polarisation between civilians and the military, widening gap between rich and poor, cities and villages and so forth. As old problems become chronic, new ones emerge with unsettling regularity — crash of stock markets being the latest. Collapse of dangerously bloated urban land prices and agricultural commodity markets (wheat first?) are waiting in line.
While at the list, I might as well mention the neutralisation of Pakistan’s military might vis-a-vis India by the USA writing a script in which Pakistan is being forced to accept a junior position at a cost it cannot afford. With increasing authority, US is making offers that Pakistan cannot refuse. The slope down the pit of neo-colonisation is too slippery for Pakistan to negotiate.
All these crises have their own specific genesis and operational dynamics but they all share a common fundamental cure, which is a need for ‘men of substance’. All these failures can be traced back to lack of vision and professional expertise. There is a myth in our society, even fostered by intellectually sophisticated circles, that the leadership alone holds the key to salvation, which can be brought about rapidly once the right person is in the driving seat. The national obsession with scrutinising individuals is naïve because in today’s highly structured world, it is the ‘rank and file’ that matters far more than adept leaders.
Leaders, if they have to make a difference, must begin with building the intellectual, professional and moral fibre of the ‘rank and file’, the down-the-ladder team workers. No leader in Pakistan has even begun to think in these organisational terms; they have all been busy trying to make quick gains with stagnant human resources. The civilian rulers were always racing against time before democratic windows shut down on them while the military rulers suffer delusions that the military establishment has all the human resources required to become a super-super power of the world. Cocksureness has been a fatal flaw of our military personnel. It serves well for military combat but it is lethal for national planning with a need to balance many contradicting compulsions.
The family and school environment in which children grow up in our society is not conducive to producing open-minded and rational individuals. Parents impose an unquestionable submission to authority and the schools teach a distorted version of history and ideological grandeur of the state for which no evidence exists — especially in this age of advanced media. In the process, children suffer confusion between hype and reality and resolve the existential contradiction by adopting hypocrisy as second nature — things to say and things to do are not to be mixed up. Parents, peers and social archetypes further reinforce this dichotomy of character as children grow up to experience the real world.
In the professional arena, success is contingent upon ability to manipulate the ‘system’, not upon hard work, efficiency and delivery. When the Chief Minister of a province proclaims merit as basis of employment and offers 100 jobs in Police to every MPA on the same day, people are not outraged by the duplicity; they mutely appreciate his political shrewdness. Pakistan is suffering a huge crisis of ‘realism’ at the top and ‘professional efficiency’ at lower cadres. It is not a matter of bland statistics of formal education or lack of doctorates in higher cadres.
We have a society where organisations cannot function effectively unless they operate within a narrow ambit of family economic interests. Private sector organisations spend more time policing staff and circumventing official dues; public sector organisations are primarily in the skimming and skiving business. Pakistan, as an economic entity, is uncompetitive. Inefficiency is not distributed equitably and hence the sense of gross injustices in society. Therefore, collectively we have developed awesome skills of survival under adverse conditions. Unfortunately, the rest of the world does not operate with such chicanery of intent; so we find ourselves progressively marginalised while we come up with new tricks to leverage our strategic advantages.
The real odds against Pakistan are not external, circumstantial, or diplomatic; the odds lie within us. We have to re-evaluate, re-prioritise and re-condition our psychic makeup that champions all the virtues of Islamic faith but practices survival tactics of a street urchin. Perhaps then, wags will not draw the uncomplimentary caricature of the ‘fly in the beer joke’ for us.
The writer is a consultant for agro-economy and organisational management to public and private sectors.
Email: mustafa@hujra.com
archives at www.hujra.com
The real odds against Pakistan
Iqbal Mustafa
A joke goes like this. When an insect falls into a mug of beer an Englishman throws his mug away and walks out; an American takes the insect out and drinks the beer; a Chinese eats the insect and throws the beer away; an Indian sells the beer to the American and insect to the Chinese and gets a new mug of beer; a Pakistani accuses the Indian of throwing the insect into his beer, relates the issue to Kashmir, asks the Chinese for military aid and takes a loan from the American to buy a new mug of beer.
Of course, this never happened in Pakistan because alcohol is prohibited here and only non-Muslims drink. But, like most good jokes, it captures a truth which cannot be spoken without a wrapping of innocuous humour. In ‘the Mayor of Casterbridge’ Thomas Hardy fictionalises a timeless concept, that one’s character is one’s fate. This holds true for nations and countries too. I am beginning to fear that, like Michael Henchard, Pakistan may be infected with germs of decay that keep neutralising its innate strengths.
It may be intellectually unfashionable and politically incorrect to take a psycho-philosophical approach in understanding Pakistan’s unending dilemmas and perpetual crisis — especially since the ‘ideology of Pakistan’ provides a pseudo-immunity from self-doubts — but I am going to risk my neck and talk about fundamental factors that keep contributing to the peculiar conundrums the country faces.
The plethora of diverse issues we seem to create out of nowhere make Murphy sound like an optimist. As problems intensify, so do the inane platitudes of the officials. Problems on the Afghan border, in Balochistan, between provinces about resource sharing, between opposition and the government on constitutional interpretation, polarisation between civilians and the military, widening gap between rich and poor, cities and villages and so forth. As old problems become chronic, new ones emerge with unsettling regularity — crash of stock markets being the latest. Collapse of dangerously bloated urban land prices and agricultural commodity markets (wheat first?) are waiting in line.
While at the list, I might as well mention the neutralisation of Pakistan’s military might vis-a-vis India by the USA writing a script in which Pakistan is being forced to accept a junior position at a cost it cannot afford. With increasing authority, US is making offers that Pakistan cannot refuse. The slope down the pit of neo-colonisation is too slippery for Pakistan to negotiate.
All these crises have their own specific genesis and operational dynamics but they all share a common fundamental cure, which is a need for ‘men of substance’. All these failures can be traced back to lack of vision and professional expertise. There is a myth in our society, even fostered by intellectually sophisticated circles, that the leadership alone holds the key to salvation, which can be brought about rapidly once the right person is in the driving seat. The national obsession with scrutinising individuals is naïve because in today’s highly structured world, it is the ‘rank and file’ that matters far more than adept leaders.
Leaders, if they have to make a difference, must begin with building the intellectual, professional and moral fibre of the ‘rank and file’, the down-the-ladder team workers. No leader in Pakistan has even begun to think in these organisational terms; they have all been busy trying to make quick gains with stagnant human resources. The civilian rulers were always racing against time before democratic windows shut down on them while the military rulers suffer delusions that the military establishment has all the human resources required to become a super-super power of the world. Cocksureness has been a fatal flaw of our military personnel. It serves well for military combat but it is lethal for national planning with a need to balance many contradicting compulsions.
The family and school environment in which children grow up in our society is not conducive to producing open-minded and rational individuals. Parents impose an unquestionable submission to authority and the schools teach a distorted version of history and ideological grandeur of the state for which no evidence exists — especially in this age of advanced media. In the process, children suffer confusion between hype and reality and resolve the existential contradiction by adopting hypocrisy as second nature — things to say and things to do are not to be mixed up. Parents, peers and social archetypes further reinforce this dichotomy of character as children grow up to experience the real world.
In the professional arena, success is contingent upon ability to manipulate the ‘system’, not upon hard work, efficiency and delivery. When the Chief Minister of a province proclaims merit as basis of employment and offers 100 jobs in Police to every MPA on the same day, people are not outraged by the duplicity; they mutely appreciate his political shrewdness. Pakistan is suffering a huge crisis of ‘realism’ at the top and ‘professional efficiency’ at lower cadres. It is not a matter of bland statistics of formal education or lack of doctorates in higher cadres.
We have a society where organisations cannot function effectively unless they operate within a narrow ambit of family economic interests. Private sector organisations spend more time policing staff and circumventing official dues; public sector organisations are primarily in the skimming and skiving business. Pakistan, as an economic entity, is uncompetitive. Inefficiency is not distributed equitably and hence the sense of gross injustices in society. Therefore, collectively we have developed awesome skills of survival under adverse conditions. Unfortunately, the rest of the world does not operate with such chicanery of intent; so we find ourselves progressively marginalised while we come up with new tricks to leverage our strategic advantages.
The real odds against Pakistan are not external, circumstantial, or diplomatic; the odds lie within us. We have to re-evaluate, re-prioritise and re-condition our psychic makeup that champions all the virtues of Islamic faith but practices survival tactics of a street urchin. Perhaps then, wags will not draw the uncomplimentary caricature of the ‘fly in the beer joke’ for us.
The writer is a consultant for agro-economy and organisational management to public and private sectors.
Email: mustafa@hujra.com
archives at www.hujra.com
Are US allies growing poppy?
The News, April 3, 2005
Capital Suggestion
Are US allies growing poppy?
Dr Farrukh Saleem
Taliban-ruled Afghanistan had 4,163 acres planted with poppies. Under General John Abizaid, 510,766 acres in Afghanistan are being used for poppy cultivation (both figures from the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy). The Taliban produced 40 metric tons of opium, or the equivalent of five metric tons of heroin. Under the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Central Command, Afghanistan produces 5,000 metric tons of opium, or the equivalent of 600 metric tons of heroin.
In 2001, Afghanistan’s entire heroin stock was worth $600 million on the streets of Frankfurt and Rotterdam. Last year’s crop could fetch upwards of $50 billion on the same streets (roughly two-third of Pakistan’s annual GDP).
Afghanistan has six neighbours; Pakistan, Tajikistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and China. Of the six, the Pak-Afghan border — at 2,430 km — is the longest and the most porous. According to Major-General Nadeem Ahmed, DG Pakistan’s Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF), some "70 percent of the narcotics manufactured in Afghanistan [are] either smuggled to, or transited through Pakistan."
Poppy is cultivated across the border in Afghanistan but most labs are at the border on Pakistani territory. The ‘Opium Expressway’ has three corridors: The Southern Corridor of the ‘Golden Crescent’ is through Islamabad, Sialkot, Sukkur, Karachi and into the Arabian Sea (there is a fork that goes into India). The Western Corridor takes a route between Tehran and Esfahan and further West or through Turkey and into Europe. The Northern Corridor is into Turkmenistan and through the Caspian Sea.
In 1979, Pakistan had a near zero heroin-addict population. Our current annual consumption is estimated at 100 metric tons with a million chronic heroin addicts (some estimates have up to three million drug addicts). The price at Rs50 a gram is cheap; our rate of addiction is double that of the U.S. and most Pakistani addicts are between the ages of 20 and 35.
General Tommy Franks, General Abizaid’s predecessor, recruited every Afghan warlord he could rent, bigger ones at up to a million dollars a month. The warlords took Tommy’s dollars, bought more guns, increased the size of their militia and brought more territory under their control. They took the dollars, fought the Taliban and then went for even more dollars by growing tons of poppies on territory under their control. Most CIA human assets in Afghanistan also went into the business of sowing seeds. America’s ‘war on drugs’ became subordinated to her ‘war on terrorism’ and what we have is a record high opium production (America’s budget for the ‘war on drugs’ is $19 billion while Congressional Budget Office’s estimate for the ‘war on terrorism’ falls in the neighbourhood of $200 billion).
Afghanistan’s heroin is the purest there is and it remains Afghanistan’s alternative currency. Warlords, farmers and traders all store heroin as others around the globe stash money in the bank. If the world produces a thousand metric tons of pure heroin at least 600 metric tons of that is produced in Afghanistan and some 400 metric tons of that passes through Pakistan. That’s the equivalent of Euro 30 billion (European retail price) worth of product passing through Pakistan (our annual GDP is roughly Euro 60 billion).
Not too long ago, two tons of heroin hidden in footballs was seized in Sialkot. And residential land in Islamabad is now more expensive than Beverley Hills. Is there a connection between the record high opium production across the border and Islamabad prices going through the roof?
Hamid Karzai may be the president of Kabul but drug barons closely allied to American forces are the real rulers of Afghanistan. Is Afghanistan about to become a narco-state? Why should General John Abizaid worry? The White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (a component of the Executive Office of the President) says, "little Afghan heroin has ended up on U.S. streets, with most Afghan heroin marketed to neighbouring countries and Europe." Once again, as was the case during the war against the Soviets, CIA assets in Afghanistan now control the Golden Crescent’s heroin trade.
The writer is an Islamabad-based freelance columnist Email: farrukh15@hotmail.com
Capital Suggestion
Are US allies growing poppy?
Dr Farrukh Saleem
Taliban-ruled Afghanistan had 4,163 acres planted with poppies. Under General John Abizaid, 510,766 acres in Afghanistan are being used for poppy cultivation (both figures from the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy). The Taliban produced 40 metric tons of opium, or the equivalent of five metric tons of heroin. Under the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Central Command, Afghanistan produces 5,000 metric tons of opium, or the equivalent of 600 metric tons of heroin.
In 2001, Afghanistan’s entire heroin stock was worth $600 million on the streets of Frankfurt and Rotterdam. Last year’s crop could fetch upwards of $50 billion on the same streets (roughly two-third of Pakistan’s annual GDP).
Afghanistan has six neighbours; Pakistan, Tajikistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and China. Of the six, the Pak-Afghan border — at 2,430 km — is the longest and the most porous. According to Major-General Nadeem Ahmed, DG Pakistan’s Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF), some "70 percent of the narcotics manufactured in Afghanistan [are] either smuggled to, or transited through Pakistan."
Poppy is cultivated across the border in Afghanistan but most labs are at the border on Pakistani territory. The ‘Opium Expressway’ has three corridors: The Southern Corridor of the ‘Golden Crescent’ is through Islamabad, Sialkot, Sukkur, Karachi and into the Arabian Sea (there is a fork that goes into India). The Western Corridor takes a route between Tehran and Esfahan and further West or through Turkey and into Europe. The Northern Corridor is into Turkmenistan and through the Caspian Sea.
In 1979, Pakistan had a near zero heroin-addict population. Our current annual consumption is estimated at 100 metric tons with a million chronic heroin addicts (some estimates have up to three million drug addicts). The price at Rs50 a gram is cheap; our rate of addiction is double that of the U.S. and most Pakistani addicts are between the ages of 20 and 35.
General Tommy Franks, General Abizaid’s predecessor, recruited every Afghan warlord he could rent, bigger ones at up to a million dollars a month. The warlords took Tommy’s dollars, bought more guns, increased the size of their militia and brought more territory under their control. They took the dollars, fought the Taliban and then went for even more dollars by growing tons of poppies on territory under their control. Most CIA human assets in Afghanistan also went into the business of sowing seeds. America’s ‘war on drugs’ became subordinated to her ‘war on terrorism’ and what we have is a record high opium production (America’s budget for the ‘war on drugs’ is $19 billion while Congressional Budget Office’s estimate for the ‘war on terrorism’ falls in the neighbourhood of $200 billion).
Afghanistan’s heroin is the purest there is and it remains Afghanistan’s alternative currency. Warlords, farmers and traders all store heroin as others around the globe stash money in the bank. If the world produces a thousand metric tons of pure heroin at least 600 metric tons of that is produced in Afghanistan and some 400 metric tons of that passes through Pakistan. That’s the equivalent of Euro 30 billion (European retail price) worth of product passing through Pakistan (our annual GDP is roughly Euro 60 billion).
Not too long ago, two tons of heroin hidden in footballs was seized in Sialkot. And residential land in Islamabad is now more expensive than Beverley Hills. Is there a connection between the record high opium production across the border and Islamabad prices going through the roof?
Hamid Karzai may be the president of Kabul but drug barons closely allied to American forces are the real rulers of Afghanistan. Is Afghanistan about to become a narco-state? Why should General John Abizaid worry? The White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (a component of the Executive Office of the President) says, "little Afghan heroin has ended up on U.S. streets, with most Afghan heroin marketed to neighbouring countries and Europe." Once again, as was the case during the war against the Soviets, CIA assets in Afghanistan now control the Golden Crescent’s heroin trade.
The writer is an Islamabad-based freelance columnist Email: farrukh15@hotmail.com
Friday, April 01, 2005
Clueless Caesars, unintended consequences
Dawn, April 1, 2005
Clueless Caesars, unintended consequences
By Ayaz Amir
Nothing more vividly illustrates the gulf/disconnect between Islamabad and the rest of the country than the manufactured hype over F-16s. While official wizards, obliged to sing off-key hymns to super patriotism, are ecstatic, ordinary Pakistanis - hit by something more powerful than all the F-16s in the world, out-of-control inflation - couldn't give a damn.
If the tidings about the planes were such good news, oil tankers, protesting against the never-ending rise in fuel prices, wouldn't be on strike and the mullah leadership of the MMA, with their permanent lien on the patriotic corner, wouldn't be calling a national strike on April 2.
And the government - military core, civilian facade - wouldn't be looking so off-colour. This is a government not so much beleaguered, for that would be painting it too thick, but one increasingly clueless about how to plough ahead.
Cluelessness on a grand scale or, to put it in terms better understood by the general staff, strategic cluelessness, an alarming sign of having lost the favour of the gods. For remember, whom the gods wish to teach a lesson, they first deprive one of ordinary eyesight.
What's the general staff's answer to this growing sense of losing the script? F-16s. Smack in the midst of the F-16 drumbeat comes news of Pakistan's readiness to send 'used' centrifuges to the IAEA in Vienna.
What's going on? First we said no centrifuges going anywhere, now this amazing flexibility. A nation inheriting a fair amount of confusion at its birth, turned into a playground of confusion by its rulers.
Our problem is not external aggression, never was, but internal lack of cohesiveness and direction, absence of political stability, the military's stubborn refusal to get off the nation's back. How do F-16s address this problem?
Suppose instead of the two dozen or so F-16s our military geniuses are thinking of buying, we get 300. How does that translate into political stability, our foremost need?
Even as far as the details of the proposed deal are concerned, how foolish can anyone get? Examine this from the Washington Post: "The Bush administration's decision to sell F-16 fighter planes to Pakistan is likely to be as warmly greeted in Fort Worth as it is in (Islamabad).
That's because Lockheed Martin Corp. has said it needs new orders for the jet before this fall, or it will have to take action to close the production line there that employs about 5,000 workers."
So it wasn't just philanthropy but to a great extent American self-interest behind the decision to sell us F-16s. The American ambassador in Islamabad helpfully suggests that Islamabad can use the three billion dollar package - our rent for services rendered - for buying the F-16s.
Brilliant. What the US gives with one hand, it takes with the other. Meanwhile Pakistan keeps toeing the American line above and beyond the call of duty. Front-line ally: say that again.
If we had our wits about us, instead of getting caught in an un winnable arms race with India, we could have said thanks but no thanks to the Americans if their generosity also meant selling F-16s to India.
Consider, for every single F-16 coming to us, America is prepared to sell three to India. Not only that. The American goodies on offer to India include the far superior F-18 fighter planes and Patriot missiles. How does this work to Pakistan's advantage?
If at the end of it all, Pakistan has about 28 new F-16s and India more than three or four times that number - always assuming that India is foolish enough to be taken in by America's sales pitch - where does that leave us or the conventional imbalance in the subcontinent?
Foreign Minister Kasuri says that the US decision regarding the F-16s is a foreign policy success for Pakistan. If this is success, it would be good to know what failure looks like.
Breaking out of American thralldom, for the American connection has done us more harm than good, is another of Pakistan's fundamental problems (ranking almost as high as the elusive quest for political stability). A devil's deal like the one about the F-16s further reinforces the American presence in this country, as if any more reinforcing was necessary.
Of course, our air force needs planes. But how about a more realistic definition of deterrence which allows us to search for cheaper alternatives and a more reliable supplier than America has proved to be?
The old Soviet Union was militarily powerful but politically bankrupt, the absence of political reform in turn hampering the quest for economic reform. Under Gorbachev the wimp, one of the greatest disasters in Russian history, these contradictions came to a head, in the end proving more powerful than Hitler's armies.
Whereas Hitler, even though knocking at the gates of Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad, failed to destroy the Soviet Union, what he couldn't achieve the lack of political reform did.
Thanks to military rule, Pakistan is beginning to look like a minor Soviet-style republic, heavily armed and militarized, with a nuclear capability to boot, but for lack of political reform, inwardly hollow.
That's why nothing on the political front clicks, why Pakistanis are the world's heaviest investors in cynicism and gloom-and-doom theories. There is nothing much wrong with the people of Pakistan but everything wrong with their environment which, because of militarism and democratic failure, nourishes negativism on a vast scale.
A political government would be more sensitive to popular needs and less sure of itself when making patently absurd claims. Of what use better macro-economic indicators and fat foreign exchange reserves when jobs continue to be scarce and inflation reaches back-breaking proportions?
The government's idea of poverty reduction - sorry, alleviation, that being the fashionable term - comes down to more consumer finance - auto-finance, credit cards, etc - for the middle classes. Don't be surprised if the poor and the left-out don't appreciate the joke.
In the hallowed precincts of Army House and General Headquarters does no one realize how the clock is ticking, how time is running out? Musharraf is lucky, his haphazard political experiment surviving for five and a half years. But this system - president in uniform, toothless prime minister, huge cabinet, a ruling party incapable of standing up to the elements if deprived of military support, parliament without relevance or power - is simply not sustainable over the long term.
If the president wants another five-year term, and if he wants to spare the army the embarrassment of large-scale electoral rigging and manipulation, he will have to reach out to the mainstream parties, PPP and N League, not out of abstract goodwill but for wholly pragmatic reasons. From now on, he needs them more than they need him. But there is a joker pack in the form of mullah power, expanding rather than diminishing, thanks to confusion and dithering in Army House. With Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif out of the country, Musharraf still not summoning up the courage to allow them back, the mullahs are filling the vacuum on the national horizon. They have held rallies in Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar and now look with confidence to the outcome of their call for a wheel-jam strike on April 2 (tomorrow).
From what little I can judge of the situation from the trenches of Chakwal, the strike call is having some effect not because mullahs or their agenda are suddenly popular but because there is a general sense of disquiet and uneasiness arising from (1) inflation, (2) the dismal law-and-order situation and (3) the unabashed pro-Americanism of the Musharraf regime.
As anyone could have predicted, the government's precipitate retreat on the passport non-issue - succumbing to the absurd demand for a religious column - far from appeasing the mullahs has only whetted their appetite for more.
They approach their strike call with renewed vigour. The age of 'enlightened moderation' was supposed to lead to the retreat of obscurantism and the triumph of 'liberalism'. Yet because Musharraf's political priorities remain skewed and he has yet to take the decisive - sorry, strategic - steps leading to real national reconciliation, he remains stuck in a hole, speaking of expansive goals but in reality hostage to pressures suddenly too big for him.
Clueless Caesars, unintended consequences
By Ayaz Amir
Nothing more vividly illustrates the gulf/disconnect between Islamabad and the rest of the country than the manufactured hype over F-16s. While official wizards, obliged to sing off-key hymns to super patriotism, are ecstatic, ordinary Pakistanis - hit by something more powerful than all the F-16s in the world, out-of-control inflation - couldn't give a damn.
If the tidings about the planes were such good news, oil tankers, protesting against the never-ending rise in fuel prices, wouldn't be on strike and the mullah leadership of the MMA, with their permanent lien on the patriotic corner, wouldn't be calling a national strike on April 2.
And the government - military core, civilian facade - wouldn't be looking so off-colour. This is a government not so much beleaguered, for that would be painting it too thick, but one increasingly clueless about how to plough ahead.
Cluelessness on a grand scale or, to put it in terms better understood by the general staff, strategic cluelessness, an alarming sign of having lost the favour of the gods. For remember, whom the gods wish to teach a lesson, they first deprive one of ordinary eyesight.
What's the general staff's answer to this growing sense of losing the script? F-16s. Smack in the midst of the F-16 drumbeat comes news of Pakistan's readiness to send 'used' centrifuges to the IAEA in Vienna.
What's going on? First we said no centrifuges going anywhere, now this amazing flexibility. A nation inheriting a fair amount of confusion at its birth, turned into a playground of confusion by its rulers.
Our problem is not external aggression, never was, but internal lack of cohesiveness and direction, absence of political stability, the military's stubborn refusal to get off the nation's back. How do F-16s address this problem?
Suppose instead of the two dozen or so F-16s our military geniuses are thinking of buying, we get 300. How does that translate into political stability, our foremost need?
Even as far as the details of the proposed deal are concerned, how foolish can anyone get? Examine this from the Washington Post: "The Bush administration's decision to sell F-16 fighter planes to Pakistan is likely to be as warmly greeted in Fort Worth as it is in (Islamabad).
That's because Lockheed Martin Corp. has said it needs new orders for the jet before this fall, or it will have to take action to close the production line there that employs about 5,000 workers."
So it wasn't just philanthropy but to a great extent American self-interest behind the decision to sell us F-16s. The American ambassador in Islamabad helpfully suggests that Islamabad can use the three billion dollar package - our rent for services rendered - for buying the F-16s.
Brilliant. What the US gives with one hand, it takes with the other. Meanwhile Pakistan keeps toeing the American line above and beyond the call of duty. Front-line ally: say that again.
If we had our wits about us, instead of getting caught in an un winnable arms race with India, we could have said thanks but no thanks to the Americans if their generosity also meant selling F-16s to India.
Consider, for every single F-16 coming to us, America is prepared to sell three to India. Not only that. The American goodies on offer to India include the far superior F-18 fighter planes and Patriot missiles. How does this work to Pakistan's advantage?
If at the end of it all, Pakistan has about 28 new F-16s and India more than three or four times that number - always assuming that India is foolish enough to be taken in by America's sales pitch - where does that leave us or the conventional imbalance in the subcontinent?
Foreign Minister Kasuri says that the US decision regarding the F-16s is a foreign policy success for Pakistan. If this is success, it would be good to know what failure looks like.
Breaking out of American thralldom, for the American connection has done us more harm than good, is another of Pakistan's fundamental problems (ranking almost as high as the elusive quest for political stability). A devil's deal like the one about the F-16s further reinforces the American presence in this country, as if any more reinforcing was necessary.
Of course, our air force needs planes. But how about a more realistic definition of deterrence which allows us to search for cheaper alternatives and a more reliable supplier than America has proved to be?
The old Soviet Union was militarily powerful but politically bankrupt, the absence of political reform in turn hampering the quest for economic reform. Under Gorbachev the wimp, one of the greatest disasters in Russian history, these contradictions came to a head, in the end proving more powerful than Hitler's armies.
Whereas Hitler, even though knocking at the gates of Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad, failed to destroy the Soviet Union, what he couldn't achieve the lack of political reform did.
Thanks to military rule, Pakistan is beginning to look like a minor Soviet-style republic, heavily armed and militarized, with a nuclear capability to boot, but for lack of political reform, inwardly hollow.
That's why nothing on the political front clicks, why Pakistanis are the world's heaviest investors in cynicism and gloom-and-doom theories. There is nothing much wrong with the people of Pakistan but everything wrong with their environment which, because of militarism and democratic failure, nourishes negativism on a vast scale.
A political government would be more sensitive to popular needs and less sure of itself when making patently absurd claims. Of what use better macro-economic indicators and fat foreign exchange reserves when jobs continue to be scarce and inflation reaches back-breaking proportions?
The government's idea of poverty reduction - sorry, alleviation, that being the fashionable term - comes down to more consumer finance - auto-finance, credit cards, etc - for the middle classes. Don't be surprised if the poor and the left-out don't appreciate the joke.
In the hallowed precincts of Army House and General Headquarters does no one realize how the clock is ticking, how time is running out? Musharraf is lucky, his haphazard political experiment surviving for five and a half years. But this system - president in uniform, toothless prime minister, huge cabinet, a ruling party incapable of standing up to the elements if deprived of military support, parliament without relevance or power - is simply not sustainable over the long term.
If the president wants another five-year term, and if he wants to spare the army the embarrassment of large-scale electoral rigging and manipulation, he will have to reach out to the mainstream parties, PPP and N League, not out of abstract goodwill but for wholly pragmatic reasons. From now on, he needs them more than they need him. But there is a joker pack in the form of mullah power, expanding rather than diminishing, thanks to confusion and dithering in Army House. With Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif out of the country, Musharraf still not summoning up the courage to allow them back, the mullahs are filling the vacuum on the national horizon. They have held rallies in Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar and now look with confidence to the outcome of their call for a wheel-jam strike on April 2 (tomorrow).
From what little I can judge of the situation from the trenches of Chakwal, the strike call is having some effect not because mullahs or their agenda are suddenly popular but because there is a general sense of disquiet and uneasiness arising from (1) inflation, (2) the dismal law-and-order situation and (3) the unabashed pro-Americanism of the Musharraf regime.
As anyone could have predicted, the government's precipitate retreat on the passport non-issue - succumbing to the absurd demand for a religious column - far from appeasing the mullahs has only whetted their appetite for more.
They approach their strike call with renewed vigour. The age of 'enlightened moderation' was supposed to lead to the retreat of obscurantism and the triumph of 'liberalism'. Yet because Musharraf's political priorities remain skewed and he has yet to take the decisive - sorry, strategic - steps leading to real national reconciliation, he remains stuck in a hole, speaking of expansive goals but in reality hostage to pressures suddenly too big for him.
Which is the real pipeline for peace?
Dawn, April 1, 2005
Which is the real pipeline for peace?
By Kamal Siddiqi
American insistence on the international isolation of Iran seems to have become the sticking point in the proposed Iran to India gas pipeline project despite the fact that the project has immense economic and political benefits for the region.
Surprisingly, American concerns come weeks after crossing of what most people saw as the biggest hurdle - making India and Pakistan agree in principle on the project and getting them to start talking about it.
There are some who say that American action and words on peace in the subcontinent remain contradictory. On the one hand, while America promotes dialogue between India and Pakistan and is a strong supporter of the on-going composite dialogue process, it is finalizing deals to sell arms (F-16 and 18) to both countries.
In the same vein, America is opposing the biggest confidence-building measure that Pakistan and India can undertake, which is the Iran to India gas pipeline project.
To be fair, American opposition to the Iran gas pipeline project is not something new. In 1979 the United States imposed sanctions against Iran in response to the seizure of the US embassy by students, marking the beginning of the Iranian hostage crisis.
Since then, Washington has imposed various sanctions against Tehran, accusing the Iranian government of developing nuclear weapons and sponsoring and funding terrorism abroad.
The sanctions block US-based oil companies from operating in Iran, giving the US a strong incentive to generalize the sanctions and block US firms' foreign competitors from operating there as well.
The US administration has been consistent in its policy of trying to economically strangle Iran into submission. While this has not worked, the biggest victims have been companies and entities that have interests in Iran and that do business with the US as well.
These third party companies, mostly European but also including an Australian oil and gas giant, have backed off from doing business with Iran since they do not want to upset their business interests in other parts of the world.
In some instances where they have not shut down operations, these companies have certainly reduced their operations in Iran or have in some way cut back on their involvement there.
The decision of the American government to turn the screws on third party companies comes after American firms protested that they were being put at a disadvantage because of the economic sanctions, Iran gas pipeline project being a case in point.
Keeping in mind the problems faced by international companies, Iran at one point offered Pakistan that it had the expertise to build the gas pipeline up to its borders from the South Paras gas field where it will be sourced.
Iranian diplomatic officials have floated this idea as one possible way to break the deadlock that American sanction may create. The proposal would involve a joint Iran-India-Pakistan consortium with different companies building different portions of the pipeline. But these are modalities that need to be worked out.
No talk on a gas pipeline project to Pakistan and Iran can be complete without mentioning the alternative project proposed by American oil giant, Unocal. This company has some very powerful friends in Washington as well as in different parts of the world. Even Afghan president Hamid Karzai was once a Unocal consultant. Unocal has been working on a proposal to pipe gas all the way from Turkmenistan.
Unocal was instrumental in proposing the Central Asia gas pipeline project in 1995 and in forming the seven-member Cent Gas consortium in October 1997. The consortium was formed to evaluate and, if found feasible, to participate in the future construction of a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to natural gas markets in Pakistan and, potentially, in India.
But in 1998, as a result of sharply deteriorating political situation in the region (primarily US cruise missile attacks in Afghanistan), Unocal, which was the lead manager for the Central Asia Gas (Cent Gas) pipeline consortium, suspended all activities involving the proposed pipeline project in Afghanistan.
The Unocal project was equally appealing to Pakistan and India, except that the pipeline would travel through Afghanistan, where the security situation remains volatile and uncertain.
The condition in Afghanistan has not improved much with the change in government in Kabul and there is little likelihood that the writ of the Karzai government would extend to parts through which the proposed pipeline is expected to pass through.
For the Americans, therefore, this is a double predicament. On the one hand, the Iran pipeline would help that country break out of the economic isolation that the US has been carefully building around it, and on the other, this project would be built at the expense of a lucrative American project. Hence the reservations shown by the US.
The question that needs to be asked is whether India and Pakistan are willing to resist American pressures and go ahead with the project. Last week, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz said that Pakistan had to choose one option by December.
Keeping this in mind, at this stage, India and Pakistan are much closer than before to an agreement on the gas pipeline from Iran. According to India's Petroleum Minister, Mani Shankar Aiyar, who is being credited with overcoming Indian reservations, the project is now set to go ahead.
The plan, according to Aiyar, is for Iran to hammer out two separate agreements with India and Pakistan, thus bypassing the pitfalls of direct negotiations between Delhi and Islamabad. Under this agreement, Pakistan would earn at least 500 million dollars a year in transit fees.
Aiyar is being seen as a man of action in oil and gas circles. One week before making progress on the Iranian project, he persuaded his counterparts in Bangladesh and Burma to agree in principle to a pipeline that would bring Burma's natural gas to India via Bangladesh.
The deal, which could be hammered out by April and the pipeline built within two years, puts an end to years of Bangladeshi prevarication over whether to sell its own gas to India.
Under the agreement, Dhaka can decide whether to feed its own gas into the Burma-India pipeline without triggering the old fear of creating too much of a dependency on India. But there is much difference between the deal being concluded with Bangladesh and Burma on one side and with Iran and Pakistan on the other. While India-Pakistan rivalry has been the biggest obstacle, the fact that America wants to plug its own project and, at the same time, keep out Iran seems to have made things more complicated than what India has bargained for.
Which is the real pipeline for peace?
By Kamal Siddiqi
American insistence on the international isolation of Iran seems to have become the sticking point in the proposed Iran to India gas pipeline project despite the fact that the project has immense economic and political benefits for the region.
Surprisingly, American concerns come weeks after crossing of what most people saw as the biggest hurdle - making India and Pakistan agree in principle on the project and getting them to start talking about it.
There are some who say that American action and words on peace in the subcontinent remain contradictory. On the one hand, while America promotes dialogue between India and Pakistan and is a strong supporter of the on-going composite dialogue process, it is finalizing deals to sell arms (F-16 and 18) to both countries.
In the same vein, America is opposing the biggest confidence-building measure that Pakistan and India can undertake, which is the Iran to India gas pipeline project.
To be fair, American opposition to the Iran gas pipeline project is not something new. In 1979 the United States imposed sanctions against Iran in response to the seizure of the US embassy by students, marking the beginning of the Iranian hostage crisis.
Since then, Washington has imposed various sanctions against Tehran, accusing the Iranian government of developing nuclear weapons and sponsoring and funding terrorism abroad.
The sanctions block US-based oil companies from operating in Iran, giving the US a strong incentive to generalize the sanctions and block US firms' foreign competitors from operating there as well.
The US administration has been consistent in its policy of trying to economically strangle Iran into submission. While this has not worked, the biggest victims have been companies and entities that have interests in Iran and that do business with the US as well.
These third party companies, mostly European but also including an Australian oil and gas giant, have backed off from doing business with Iran since they do not want to upset their business interests in other parts of the world.
In some instances where they have not shut down operations, these companies have certainly reduced their operations in Iran or have in some way cut back on their involvement there.
The decision of the American government to turn the screws on third party companies comes after American firms protested that they were being put at a disadvantage because of the economic sanctions, Iran gas pipeline project being a case in point.
Keeping in mind the problems faced by international companies, Iran at one point offered Pakistan that it had the expertise to build the gas pipeline up to its borders from the South Paras gas field where it will be sourced.
Iranian diplomatic officials have floated this idea as one possible way to break the deadlock that American sanction may create. The proposal would involve a joint Iran-India-Pakistan consortium with different companies building different portions of the pipeline. But these are modalities that need to be worked out.
No talk on a gas pipeline project to Pakistan and Iran can be complete without mentioning the alternative project proposed by American oil giant, Unocal. This company has some very powerful friends in Washington as well as in different parts of the world. Even Afghan president Hamid Karzai was once a Unocal consultant. Unocal has been working on a proposal to pipe gas all the way from Turkmenistan.
Unocal was instrumental in proposing the Central Asia gas pipeline project in 1995 and in forming the seven-member Cent Gas consortium in October 1997. The consortium was formed to evaluate and, if found feasible, to participate in the future construction of a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to natural gas markets in Pakistan and, potentially, in India.
But in 1998, as a result of sharply deteriorating political situation in the region (primarily US cruise missile attacks in Afghanistan), Unocal, which was the lead manager for the Central Asia Gas (Cent Gas) pipeline consortium, suspended all activities involving the proposed pipeline project in Afghanistan.
The Unocal project was equally appealing to Pakistan and India, except that the pipeline would travel through Afghanistan, where the security situation remains volatile and uncertain.
The condition in Afghanistan has not improved much with the change in government in Kabul and there is little likelihood that the writ of the Karzai government would extend to parts through which the proposed pipeline is expected to pass through.
For the Americans, therefore, this is a double predicament. On the one hand, the Iran pipeline would help that country break out of the economic isolation that the US has been carefully building around it, and on the other, this project would be built at the expense of a lucrative American project. Hence the reservations shown by the US.
The question that needs to be asked is whether India and Pakistan are willing to resist American pressures and go ahead with the project. Last week, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz said that Pakistan had to choose one option by December.
Keeping this in mind, at this stage, India and Pakistan are much closer than before to an agreement on the gas pipeline from Iran. According to India's Petroleum Minister, Mani Shankar Aiyar, who is being credited with overcoming Indian reservations, the project is now set to go ahead.
The plan, according to Aiyar, is for Iran to hammer out two separate agreements with India and Pakistan, thus bypassing the pitfalls of direct negotiations between Delhi and Islamabad. Under this agreement, Pakistan would earn at least 500 million dollars a year in transit fees.
Aiyar is being seen as a man of action in oil and gas circles. One week before making progress on the Iranian project, he persuaded his counterparts in Bangladesh and Burma to agree in principle to a pipeline that would bring Burma's natural gas to India via Bangladesh.
The deal, which could be hammered out by April and the pipeline built within two years, puts an end to years of Bangladeshi prevarication over whether to sell its own gas to India.
Under the agreement, Dhaka can decide whether to feed its own gas into the Burma-India pipeline without triggering the old fear of creating too much of a dependency on India. But there is much difference between the deal being concluded with Bangladesh and Burma on one side and with Iran and Pakistan on the other. While India-Pakistan rivalry has been the biggest obstacle, the fact that America wants to plug its own project and, at the same time, keep out Iran seems to have made things more complicated than what India has bargained for.
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