PBA-SCBA meeting convened to block president’s re-election
By Naveed Siddiqui: Daily Times, September 1, 2007
ISLAMABAD: The lawyers’ community has decided to block President General Pervez Musharraf’s re-election from the current assemblies, and has called a joint meeting of the Pakistan Bar Council (PBC) and Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) on Sunday to chalk out a strategy in this regard.
Sources told Daily Times that the lawyers’ community has, in principle, agreed to court arrests as part of their campaign against President Musharraf’s bid for re-election. “SCBA President Munir A Malik, Justice (r) Tariq Mahmood, Ali Ahmed Kurd, and Chaudhry Aitzaz Ahsan—if he leaves the Pakistan People’s Party, which he will if a deal between Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto goes through—will lead lawyers in pressing for court arrests,” the sources said.
However, sources said there were still differences among the lawyers, with some suggesting they should not resort to court arrests in the first phase. Justice (r) Mahmood told Daily Times only one agenda item would be discussed at the PBC-SCBA joint meeting: how to stop Gen Musharraf from extending his military rule for another five years.
He said the lawyers would discuss the modus operandi to be adopted, which could either take the shape of challenging the election in the Supreme Court or launching mass mobilisation and political parties’ sensitisation campaigns.
“We will not let Musharraf get re-elected by the current assemblies nor will we let political parties provide safe passage to a military ruler in this extra-constitutional exercise,” he said.
Justice Mahmood said political parties should refrain from putting the burden of their wrongdoings on the Supreme Court, and must rise up against the unconstitutional re-election of President Musharraf with the support of the public.
“We will start sensitising the political parties by wooing Maulana Fazlur Rehman to dissolve the Balochistan and NWFP provincial assemblies to stop Musharraf from getting re-elected by an incomplete electoral college,” he said.
The PBA and SCBA will challenge the presidential election in the Supreme Court if Musharraf gets himself re-elected from the current assemblies even after the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) majority provincial assemblies are dissolved, Justice Mahmood said.
The two provincial assemblies of Balochistan and NWFP have 260 votes in the Electoral College that would vote on President Musharraf’s re-election for another five-year term, he added.
“The lawyers community will have to make efforts to stop the extension of military rule in the country come what may,” he said. “We will stop the move by hook or by crook,” he added.
Friday, August 31, 2007
Scale of Military Bureaucracy in Pakistan
Steady growth in Army bureaucracy
By Ansar Abbasi: The News, September 1, 2007
ISLAMABAD: The Pakistan Army has presently more than 125 general officers in its strength. While a lot is said and written about the civilian bureaucracy, not many know about the military bureaucracy, which is today far more bloated compared to what it was a few decades back.
Today we have three full four-star generals, 30 three-star generals also called lieutenant generals while the number of two-star generals — major generals — is said to be almost 100. This number, however, includes those serving generals who are also presently occupying civilian posts including the Presidency.
Although the serving general officers currently holding civilian positions are not in a huge number,there are hundreds of retired soldiers including dozens of ex-generals who are now occupying civil service positions including the key posts like ambassadors in Pakistan’s missions abroad, heads of authorities, corporations and departments.
A list of ex-servicemen, serving against the civil posts, last presented before the Parliament and also published by some newspapers included almost 600 names. According to sources, the number of General officers in the pre-1965 Pakistan Army was about 30. But in the aftermath of the 1965 war the military was restructured and new formations were raised that took the number of general officers to almost 60.
The 1971 war yet again resulted into further growth in the number of General officers. However, it was during General Ziaul Haq’s tenure when a major expansion of army was done. During the present military rule, these sources said, the expansion was done in two areas — Army Strategic Force Command and Air Defence System.
Promotions in the army and in the topmost ranks, it is said, are strictly done against the posts that are sanctioned by the government. “There is no such thing that you start promoting the officers and sending them to the civilian side,” a source said adding that besides clear vacancies certain promotions are made against “pool vacancies”.
Unlike the distortions that are characteristics of the civilian bureaucracy and which furthered during the last eight years, the systems in the military have not been played with. While in the civilian bureaucracy no top mandarin gets retired and is generously allowed extension in complete violation of the law and rules, the Pakistan Army, during the last eight years, has seen just three cases of extensions.
These exceptional military extensions include the case of General Musharraf himself who continues to be the Army Chief since 1998. The second extension that the top General granted during his rule was that of his Chief of Staff Lt Gen (retd) Hamid Javaid, who when offered another year’s extension a few years back preferred to hang his boots instead of depending on a leased military life. The third case of extension is that of Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai, who is presently heading the strategic planning division. Kidwai was to retire last year but Musharraf gave him one-year extension reportedly because of his technical assignment.
Amongst the full Generals that we presently have in the military, General Pervez Musharraf, who for being the Chief of Army Staff, tops the list. The two other four star Generals include General Ahsan Saleem Hayat, Vice Chief of Army Staff and General Ehsan ul Haq, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee.
The three star Generals, who are also appointed as Corps Commander, presently serving the Pakistan Army include Lt Gen Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, Director General Strategic Planning Division, Lt Gen Malik Arif Hayat, Director General C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence), Lt Gen Ashfaq Pervez Kiani, Director General Inter-Services Intelligence, Lt Gen Tariq Majeed, Corps Commander Rawalpindi, Lt Gen Safdar Hussain, Chief of Logistics Staff General Headquarters, Lt Gen Salahuddin Satti, Chief of General Staff General Headquarters, Lt Gen Mohammed Sabir, Director General Military Services General Headquarters, Lt Gen Waseem Ahmed Ashraf, Corps Commander Gujranwala, Lt Gen Syed Athar Ali, Director General Joint Staff at Joint Staff Headquarters, Lt Gen Hamid Rab Nawaz, Inspector General Training and Evaluation General Headquarters, Lt Gen Imtiaz Hussain, Adjutant General General Headquarters, Lt Gen Afzal Muzaffar, Quarter Master General, General Headquarters, Lt Gen Syed Sabahat Hussain, Chairman Pakistan Ordnance Factories, Lt Gen Masood Aslam, Corps Commander Peshawar, Lt Gen Shafaatullah Shah, Corps Commander Lahore, Lt Gen Israr Ahmed Ghumman, Director General Heavy Industries Taxila, Lt Gen Raza Muhammad Khan, Corps Commander Bahawalpur, Lt Gen Hamid Khan, President National Defence University, Lt Gen Mushtaq Ahmed Baig, Surgeon General, General Headquarters, Lt Gen Sikandar Afzal, Corps Commander Multan, Lt Gen Sajjad Akram, Corps Commander Mangla, Lt Gen Nadeem Ahmad, Deputy Chairman Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Authority (ERRA), Lt Gen Muhammad Zaki, Director General Infantry General Headquarters, Lt Gen Ahsan Azhar Hayat, Corps Commander Karachi, Lt Gen Ijaz Ahmed Bakhshi, Director General Weapons and Equipment General Headquarters, Lt Gen Mohammad Ashraf Saleem, Commander Army Air Defence Command, Lt Gen Shahid Niaz, Engineer-in-Chief Frontier Works Organisation, Lt Gen Khalid Shameem Wynne, Corps Commander Quetta, Lt Gen Muhammad Yousaf, Vice Chief of General Staff General Headquarters and Lt Gen Syed Absar Hussain, Commander Army Strategic Forces Command.
By Ansar Abbasi: The News, September 1, 2007
ISLAMABAD: The Pakistan Army has presently more than 125 general officers in its strength. While a lot is said and written about the civilian bureaucracy, not many know about the military bureaucracy, which is today far more bloated compared to what it was a few decades back.
Today we have three full four-star generals, 30 three-star generals also called lieutenant generals while the number of two-star generals — major generals — is said to be almost 100. This number, however, includes those serving generals who are also presently occupying civilian posts including the Presidency.
Although the serving general officers currently holding civilian positions are not in a huge number,there are hundreds of retired soldiers including dozens of ex-generals who are now occupying civil service positions including the key posts like ambassadors in Pakistan’s missions abroad, heads of authorities, corporations and departments.
A list of ex-servicemen, serving against the civil posts, last presented before the Parliament and also published by some newspapers included almost 600 names. According to sources, the number of General officers in the pre-1965 Pakistan Army was about 30. But in the aftermath of the 1965 war the military was restructured and new formations were raised that took the number of general officers to almost 60.
The 1971 war yet again resulted into further growth in the number of General officers. However, it was during General Ziaul Haq’s tenure when a major expansion of army was done. During the present military rule, these sources said, the expansion was done in two areas — Army Strategic Force Command and Air Defence System.
Promotions in the army and in the topmost ranks, it is said, are strictly done against the posts that are sanctioned by the government. “There is no such thing that you start promoting the officers and sending them to the civilian side,” a source said adding that besides clear vacancies certain promotions are made against “pool vacancies”.
Unlike the distortions that are characteristics of the civilian bureaucracy and which furthered during the last eight years, the systems in the military have not been played with. While in the civilian bureaucracy no top mandarin gets retired and is generously allowed extension in complete violation of the law and rules, the Pakistan Army, during the last eight years, has seen just three cases of extensions.
These exceptional military extensions include the case of General Musharraf himself who continues to be the Army Chief since 1998. The second extension that the top General granted during his rule was that of his Chief of Staff Lt Gen (retd) Hamid Javaid, who when offered another year’s extension a few years back preferred to hang his boots instead of depending on a leased military life. The third case of extension is that of Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai, who is presently heading the strategic planning division. Kidwai was to retire last year but Musharraf gave him one-year extension reportedly because of his technical assignment.
Amongst the full Generals that we presently have in the military, General Pervez Musharraf, who for being the Chief of Army Staff, tops the list. The two other four star Generals include General Ahsan Saleem Hayat, Vice Chief of Army Staff and General Ehsan ul Haq, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee.
The three star Generals, who are also appointed as Corps Commander, presently serving the Pakistan Army include Lt Gen Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, Director General Strategic Planning Division, Lt Gen Malik Arif Hayat, Director General C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence), Lt Gen Ashfaq Pervez Kiani, Director General Inter-Services Intelligence, Lt Gen Tariq Majeed, Corps Commander Rawalpindi, Lt Gen Safdar Hussain, Chief of Logistics Staff General Headquarters, Lt Gen Salahuddin Satti, Chief of General Staff General Headquarters, Lt Gen Mohammed Sabir, Director General Military Services General Headquarters, Lt Gen Waseem Ahmed Ashraf, Corps Commander Gujranwala, Lt Gen Syed Athar Ali, Director General Joint Staff at Joint Staff Headquarters, Lt Gen Hamid Rab Nawaz, Inspector General Training and Evaluation General Headquarters, Lt Gen Imtiaz Hussain, Adjutant General General Headquarters, Lt Gen Afzal Muzaffar, Quarter Master General, General Headquarters, Lt Gen Syed Sabahat Hussain, Chairman Pakistan Ordnance Factories, Lt Gen Masood Aslam, Corps Commander Peshawar, Lt Gen Shafaatullah Shah, Corps Commander Lahore, Lt Gen Israr Ahmed Ghumman, Director General Heavy Industries Taxila, Lt Gen Raza Muhammad Khan, Corps Commander Bahawalpur, Lt Gen Hamid Khan, President National Defence University, Lt Gen Mushtaq Ahmed Baig, Surgeon General, General Headquarters, Lt Gen Sikandar Afzal, Corps Commander Multan, Lt Gen Sajjad Akram, Corps Commander Mangla, Lt Gen Nadeem Ahmad, Deputy Chairman Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Authority (ERRA), Lt Gen Muhammad Zaki, Director General Infantry General Headquarters, Lt Gen Ahsan Azhar Hayat, Corps Commander Karachi, Lt Gen Ijaz Ahmed Bakhshi, Director General Weapons and Equipment General Headquarters, Lt Gen Mohammad Ashraf Saleem, Commander Army Air Defence Command, Lt Gen Shahid Niaz, Engineer-in-Chief Frontier Works Organisation, Lt Gen Khalid Shameem Wynne, Corps Commander Quetta, Lt Gen Muhammad Yousaf, Vice Chief of General Staff General Headquarters and Lt Gen Syed Absar Hussain, Commander Army Strategic Forces Command.
The Issue of Death Penalty in Pakistan
COMMENT: The death of compassion —Rafia Zakaria
Daily Times, September 1, 2007
On August 28, 2007, Amnesty International issued an urgent alert asking human rights activists around the world to take action against the imminent execution of Muhammad Ali, 45, a Pakistani citizen on death row. Ali was sentenced to death in 1998 and his first and second appeals were rejected by the high courts. In 2006, his final appeal was rejected by the Pakistan Supreme Court. A 15-day stay of execution order expired on August 24, 2007, and it is likely that a new death warrant will be issued in the next two weeks. If Ali’s family is unable to negotiate a settlement with the family of the victim, he will be executed.
News reports suggest that over 7,400 people are on death row in Pakistan which, according to Amnesty International, makes up almost one-third of the entire world’s death row population of 24,000. In addition, Pakistan is one of the few countries left in the world which still executes juveniles. Despite the fact that President General Pervez Musharraf signed the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance in 2000, reports from the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan assert that juveniles continue to be executed. In a particularly appalling case, on November 30, 2004, Rehmat Ali alias Raja from Lodhran, Punjab, was executed despite being only nine years of age.
Advocates of the death penalty in Pakistan cite several reasons for upholding it. Primary among these are the ubiquitous imperatives of revenge and retribution. According to their logic, centred on the adage of an eye for an eye, anyone who has been found guilty of killing someone must face a similar end. Just as the life of the innocent victim was extinguished unceremoniously and unexpectedly, so must the life of the criminal. The more grotesque and cruel the death of the victim, the more deserving the criminal is of this ultimate punishment. In an ironic turn, the argument for respecting the life of the deceased is turned on its head to justify the killing of the accused: to truly respect life, they say, one must be willing to take a life.
The principle of retribution is a universal one, used all over the world to justify the imposition of the death penalty. In the context of the Pakistani justice system, however, specific dimensions of the application of the death penalty need to be evaluated. First among these is the reality that the death penalty is applied unequally across economic classes. The basis of this unequal application of the death penalty have been the Qisas and Diyat Ordinances of 1990-1992 which have made it possible for those who have superior material means to evade facing execution for their crimes. This class dimension is most blatantly obvious in situations where a wealthy person is indicted for killing a poor one: the abject conditions of the poor person’s family make it all but impossible for them to refuse blood money, and once they do, the crime itself is effectively eradicated.
It is not surprising therefore that the vast number of people on death row in Pakistan are the destitute and hapless poor. Nusrat Hussain Mangan, a superintendent at the Central Jail in Karachi, who recently managed to raise enough money to save the lives of three people sentenced to death for separate road accidents, says of the men: “not one was a ‘criminal’. They were so poor that their families could not arrange for the money, and their employers refused to bail them out”. According to another senior prison official, “there are cases that get disposed off even before the crime gets registered in the police station; huge sums are exchanged in connivance with the police and officials”. The efforts of Mangan to raise diyat money to set free poor prisoners illustrate how laws such as Qisas and Diyat, which theoretically could be used to eliminate the death penalty altogether, are used instead as a get out of jail free card by the rich, leaving the poor to face execution. Every time Mangan asks for diyat donations for any one of his 107 death row inmates, he is asked “why do you want to save a murderer?” or “The court has sentenced him...who are you to interfere!”
The questions faced by Mangan and his supporters are indicative of the social resistance toward the idea of abolishing the death penalty. Despite being aware of the inadequacies of the justice system in Pakistan, few people bother to confront the disturbing possibility that many of the 7,400 people facing executions could be innocent. The elite and educated, smug in the knowledge that they will never face such a situation, simply turn their backs to the matter. The inescapable tragedy of an innocent man, languishing in jail for a crime that he did not commit, fails to pull at their heartstrings or make any demands of their moral conscience. After all, their lives are not at stake.
This pervasive failure to ignore the continuing travesties of justice surrounding the death penalty in Pakistan is symbolic of an even more macabre condition: the unfortunate and untimely death of compassion in Pakistani society. While the state machinery continues to be implicated in taking the lives of Pakistani citizens — not because they are guilty but because they are poor — the moral and sociological implications of such a disaster remain unquestioned and un-debated upon. So worthless are the lives of these citizens who sit on death row that the vast majority of 160 million Pakistanis continue to ignore their plight.
I began this piece by mentioning the plight of Muhammad Ali, one such Pakistani citizen. The urgent action issued by Amnesty International on his behalf will be distributed internationally and many around the world will write to President Pervez Musharraf asking him to commute the sentence. I can only wonder how many of these will be my fellow Pakistanis.
The details of the action can be found at http://www.amnestyusa.org/actioncenter/actions/uaa20407.pdf
Rafia Zakaria is an attorney living in the United States where she teaches courses on Constitutional Law and Political Philosophy. She can be contacted at rafia.zakaria@gmail.com
Daily Times, September 1, 2007
On August 28, 2007, Amnesty International issued an urgent alert asking human rights activists around the world to take action against the imminent execution of Muhammad Ali, 45, a Pakistani citizen on death row. Ali was sentenced to death in 1998 and his first and second appeals were rejected by the high courts. In 2006, his final appeal was rejected by the Pakistan Supreme Court. A 15-day stay of execution order expired on August 24, 2007, and it is likely that a new death warrant will be issued in the next two weeks. If Ali’s family is unable to negotiate a settlement with the family of the victim, he will be executed.
News reports suggest that over 7,400 people are on death row in Pakistan which, according to Amnesty International, makes up almost one-third of the entire world’s death row population of 24,000. In addition, Pakistan is one of the few countries left in the world which still executes juveniles. Despite the fact that President General Pervez Musharraf signed the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance in 2000, reports from the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan assert that juveniles continue to be executed. In a particularly appalling case, on November 30, 2004, Rehmat Ali alias Raja from Lodhran, Punjab, was executed despite being only nine years of age.
Advocates of the death penalty in Pakistan cite several reasons for upholding it. Primary among these are the ubiquitous imperatives of revenge and retribution. According to their logic, centred on the adage of an eye for an eye, anyone who has been found guilty of killing someone must face a similar end. Just as the life of the innocent victim was extinguished unceremoniously and unexpectedly, so must the life of the criminal. The more grotesque and cruel the death of the victim, the more deserving the criminal is of this ultimate punishment. In an ironic turn, the argument for respecting the life of the deceased is turned on its head to justify the killing of the accused: to truly respect life, they say, one must be willing to take a life.
The principle of retribution is a universal one, used all over the world to justify the imposition of the death penalty. In the context of the Pakistani justice system, however, specific dimensions of the application of the death penalty need to be evaluated. First among these is the reality that the death penalty is applied unequally across economic classes. The basis of this unequal application of the death penalty have been the Qisas and Diyat Ordinances of 1990-1992 which have made it possible for those who have superior material means to evade facing execution for their crimes. This class dimension is most blatantly obvious in situations where a wealthy person is indicted for killing a poor one: the abject conditions of the poor person’s family make it all but impossible for them to refuse blood money, and once they do, the crime itself is effectively eradicated.
It is not surprising therefore that the vast number of people on death row in Pakistan are the destitute and hapless poor. Nusrat Hussain Mangan, a superintendent at the Central Jail in Karachi, who recently managed to raise enough money to save the lives of three people sentenced to death for separate road accidents, says of the men: “not one was a ‘criminal’. They were so poor that their families could not arrange for the money, and their employers refused to bail them out”. According to another senior prison official, “there are cases that get disposed off even before the crime gets registered in the police station; huge sums are exchanged in connivance with the police and officials”. The efforts of Mangan to raise diyat money to set free poor prisoners illustrate how laws such as Qisas and Diyat, which theoretically could be used to eliminate the death penalty altogether, are used instead as a get out of jail free card by the rich, leaving the poor to face execution. Every time Mangan asks for diyat donations for any one of his 107 death row inmates, he is asked “why do you want to save a murderer?” or “The court has sentenced him...who are you to interfere!”
The questions faced by Mangan and his supporters are indicative of the social resistance toward the idea of abolishing the death penalty. Despite being aware of the inadequacies of the justice system in Pakistan, few people bother to confront the disturbing possibility that many of the 7,400 people facing executions could be innocent. The elite and educated, smug in the knowledge that they will never face such a situation, simply turn their backs to the matter. The inescapable tragedy of an innocent man, languishing in jail for a crime that he did not commit, fails to pull at their heartstrings or make any demands of their moral conscience. After all, their lives are not at stake.
This pervasive failure to ignore the continuing travesties of justice surrounding the death penalty in Pakistan is symbolic of an even more macabre condition: the unfortunate and untimely death of compassion in Pakistani society. While the state machinery continues to be implicated in taking the lives of Pakistani citizens — not because they are guilty but because they are poor — the moral and sociological implications of such a disaster remain unquestioned and un-debated upon. So worthless are the lives of these citizens who sit on death row that the vast majority of 160 million Pakistanis continue to ignore their plight.
I began this piece by mentioning the plight of Muhammad Ali, one such Pakistani citizen. The urgent action issued by Amnesty International on his behalf will be distributed internationally and many around the world will write to President Pervez Musharraf asking him to commute the sentence. I can only wonder how many of these will be my fellow Pakistanis.
The details of the action can be found at http://www.amnestyusa.org/actioncenter/actions/uaa20407.pdf
Rafia Zakaria is an attorney living in the United States where she teaches courses on Constitutional Law and Political Philosophy. She can be contacted at rafia.zakaria@gmail.com
Reforming Afghanistan's Police: ICG Report
Reforming Afghanistan's Police
Asia Report N°138: 30 August 2007: International Crisis Group
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Policing goes to the very heart of state building, since a credible national institution that helps provide security and justice for the population is central to government legitimacy. However Afghanistan’s citizens often view the police more as a source of fear than of security. Instead of emphasising their coercive powers, reform should focus on accountability, ethnic representation and professionalism, along with an urgent need to depoliticise and institutionalise appointments and procedures. It is counter-productive to treat police as an auxiliary fighting unit in battling the insurgency, as has been happening with increasing frequency in the troubled south. Afghanistan, like any other democracy, requires police service more than police force.
The state of the Afghan National Police (ANP) nearly six years after the fall of the Taliban reflects the international community’s failure to grasp early on the centrality of comprehensive reform of the law enforcement and justice sectors, despite similar hard-learned lessons in other countries attempting to emerge from years of armed conflict. President Karzai’s government still lacks the political will to tackle a culture of impunity and to end political interference in appointments and operations. Attempts to shortcut institution building are compounded by an exploding narcotics trade – partly symptomatic of the state of policing but even more clearly a major corrupting influence on attempted reforms. At the same time, the challenges of a growing insurgency are pushing quick fixes to the fore.
There have certainly been some changes and improvements. In some urban centres, at least the “hardware” of equipment and buildings is visibly improved; the police have new uniforms and some are better equipped. New systems and structures at the interior ministry (MOI) provide at least a shell of professionalism. However the return on invested human and financial capital is modest.
Rooting out corruption and ensuring operational autonomy – with oversight – are critical if the police are to provide a professional, consistent service to citizens rather than acting as a coercive tool of governing elites. Properly equipping police is important for efficiency and morale but ultimately it is an ethos of community service that can make the real difference by fostering wider trust. A trusted law enforcement institution would assist nearly everything that needs to be achieved in the country from security, through gender rights and minority rights, to building investor confidence and development goals. Part of earning trust and building a true national institution is ensuring that the population is reflected in the make-up of the command and control structures. Both ethnic and gender imbalances also need to be addressed urgently.
Testing and vetting of police leadership through the pay and rank reform (PRR) process is vital to professionalising the service. However, it is proving an uphill battle as factional networks and drug alliances compete for posts, particularly lucrative ones that oversee smuggling routes. These challenges underscore the necessity of depoliticising the service, ensuring professional development and institutionalising command and control. To meet these goals, the reform process should include the appointment of a police commissioner and strengthened civilian oversight. The international community, which provides the funds, has the right – indeed duty to the Afghan people and its own taxpayers – to insist that agreed processes and criteria are followed.
However, the international community’s competing and conflicting visions of reform, with training and numbers often put ahead of more difficult political issues, is undermining progress and highlights the lack of experienced, flexible institutions to oversee police reform. The U.S. decision to give a leading role in its police programs to the Department of Defense has further blurred the distinction between the military and police. Other donor nations and institutions will only be able to assert more influence if they are prepared to step up with commitments, resources and a clear strategic vision. The European Union Police Mission to Afghanistan (EUPOL) has just taken over from Germany as key partner on police reform but so far lacks numbers and a robust mandate. All programs and donor countries must now commit to work together in the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB), make development of an overarching reform strategy a priority and back that strategy by multi-year financial pledges with disbursement of funds conditioned to measurable progress.
It is promising that the international community recognises the vital need for reform but the urgency is driven by the growing insecurity, and the police are being asked to take on roles for which they are neither equipped nor trained. As a result, police casualties are increasing, even as counter-insurgency responsibilities undermine their main task of working with and protecting communities. Kabul and its partners need to acknowledge that different security arms of the state have different roles. The creation of an auxiliary police has further blurred distinctions between the security agencies and prioritised boots on the ground – any boots – over building quality. Good policing is vital for democracy, and democratic functioning is vital for counter-insurgency; the two are not and must not be seen as mutually exclusive. If police reform in Afghanistan is to succeed, the goal should be creation of a trusted, civilian service, which enforces – and is accountable to – the rule of law.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Government of Afghanistan and the International Community:
1. Reshape fundamentally the approach to policing by creating and strengthening bodies to depoliticise the service and provide civilian review, including:
(a) a police commissioner and clear lines of authority down to district level, so that the police service is at operational arm’s length from the executive;
(b) a national-level police liaison board, with representatives of civil society, including academics, lawyers and human rights activists, including meaningful female representation, to advise on community needs;
(c) provincial community police liaison boards to inform local police of local priorities and problems, report on local trends to the national police liaison board and oversee local civic education campaigns on citizens’ rights and police responsibilities;
(d) an independent police ombudsman, appointed by the president on recommendation of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) to investigate serious cases of police abuse, including deaths in custody and excessive use of force; and
(e) a reinforced police internal affairs department.
To the Wolesi Jirga (the lower house of the National Assembly):
2. Hold widely-advertised public hearings, consult technical experts and prioritise passage of the Police Law, which should create the new bodies listed above and include:
(a) clear delineation of authorities and responsibilities in relation to other security agencies and judicial organs; and
(b) an emphasis on accountability and respect for constitutionalism, rule of law and international human rights principles.
3. Create a policing subcommittee consisting of members of the internal affairs, defence, justice and women’s affairs, civil society and human rights committees and including at least one-third female membership, with functions including:
(a) questioning the police commissioner and other officials on policing matter; and
(b) holding public hearings on annual reports by the police commissioner, the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB), the Police Liaison Board and the independent police ombudsman, as well as on the police organisational staffing plan (tashkeel).
4. Bar parliamentarians under the rules of procedure from attempting to influence police appointments, operations or investigations and impose stiff penalties.
To the President’s Office:
5. Ensure police professionalism through the pay and rank reform (PRR) process and vetting of appointments by the Afghanistan Advisory Board on Senior Appointments where appropriate.
6. Refrain from interfering in police operational matters and direct governors likewise not to interfere.
7. Help raise police prestige and morale by visiting those wounded and families of those killed in the line of duty and publicly recognising acts of bravery.
For complete report, click here
Nawaz to land in Islamabad — on Sept 10 & BB-Musharraf Deal on the Verge of Collapse
Nawaz to land in Islamabad — on Sept 10
By M. Ziauddin: August 31, 2007 - Dawn
LONDON, Aug 30: Announcing that he along with brother Shahbaz Sharif will return to Pakistan on Sept 10, former prime minister Nawaz Sharif advised President General Pervez Musharraf to hand over power to the Senate chairman forthwith and go home.
He said his entourage would land at Islamabad and then proceed to Lahore taking the GT road.
Mr Nawaz Sharif made this announcement at a crowded press conference here on Thursday in the lobby of a four-star hotel in Central London. He was accompanied by Mr Shahbaz Sharif, Raja Zafarul Haq, Iqbal Zafar Jhagra and Ahsan Iqbal.
Mr Nawaz said his party in consultation with the All Pakistan Democratic Movement (APDM) had decided that the time had now come for the exiled PML-N leadership to return home and launch a decisive struggle against what he called the eight-year dictatorship and pave the way for genuine and lasting democracy.
Answering questions, he said he was not afraid of what he said the empty threats of being arrested on landing or re-packed in a plane and sent to Saudi Arabia.
He dismissed these threats as trite and sort of whistling in the dark by a terrified government on its way out.
When asked if he had a plan B to cope with the situation in case he was arrested, Mr Nawaz said the people would then come out on the streets and, under the banner of APDM, would carry on the struggle until the dictator was finally sent home.
He said he was going back home to help his countrymen in their ongoing struggle to restore the rule of law and the 1973 Constitution as it stood on October 12 1999, and bring about a balance in the powers of various institutions of the state and finally send the army back to barracks for all times to come.
Strongly condemning efforts by PPP chairperson Benazir Bhutto to what he said save ‘a military dictator on his way out’, Mr Nawaz said Ms Bhutto was violating the Charter of Democracy which she had countersigned along with other members of ARD.
He sidestepped a question about how did he reconcile with the idea of sitting with Maulana Fazlur Rehman’s JUI which is a partner of the dictatorial set-up and at the same time criticising Ms Bhutto for negotiating a deal for transfer of power from the army to an elected civilian set-up.
When asked would he not be destablising the country by going back and launching street agitation, Mr Nawaz said it was Gen Musharraf who had destabilised the country by usurping power from an elected government and then ruling all these years illegitimately, caring two hoots about the Constitution and the rule of law.
In his opening remarks, Nawaz said Musharraf’s uniform was not the issue, “the issue is his
illegal rule, the issue is those illegal amendments he made in the Constitution to prolong his rule and the issue is his pathetic attempts to get himself elected for another five years”.
Answering a question about Musharraf’s insistence that he should abide by the deal he had signed and which was underwritten by an eminent personality of Saudi Arabia, Nawaz said that such utterings only betrayed the contemptuous attitude of Musharraf towards the Supreme Court ruling which had said that he could come back any time and had instructed the government not to put any impediments in the way of his return.
When asked how would the army as an institution react to his return, Nawaz said the rank and file of the army also wanted restoration of the rule of law “and since we are on the side of the 160 million Pakistanis all of whom want Musharraf to go, they (the rank and file of the army) would have no reservations about my return home.”
When asked if despite his opposition Musharraf got himself elected for a five-year term from the present assemblies, or for that matter from the next one, what would happen, he said “anything can happen, the country would be severely destabilised and the people will come out on the streets in protest”.
He said his party would consider the return to the party fold of all those who would publicly announce not to vote for Musharraf and those who in the last eight years did not do anything to harm the interests of PML-N or had not actively participated in persecuting members of the party.
Later, senior party members said that the central executive committee would meet on Friday to chalk out details of plans for departure from London and reception plan in Islamabad, Lahore and other cities which the Nawaz caravan would touch on the way.
“We will decide tomorrow which of the leaders now in exile with the Sharifs, like Ghous Ali Shah etc, would accompany the Sharif brothers and also invite those international mediapersons who would like to accompany the entourage to contact the party’s headquarters at the earliest.” said a PML-N source
Since there would be limited seats on the commercial flight the Sharif brothers would be taking, the party is expected to allocate seats on the first come first served basis, they said.
By M. Ziauddin: August 31, 2007 - Dawn
LONDON, Aug 30: Announcing that he along with brother Shahbaz Sharif will return to Pakistan on Sept 10, former prime minister Nawaz Sharif advised President General Pervez Musharraf to hand over power to the Senate chairman forthwith and go home.
He said his entourage would land at Islamabad and then proceed to Lahore taking the GT road.
Mr Nawaz Sharif made this announcement at a crowded press conference here on Thursday in the lobby of a four-star hotel in Central London. He was accompanied by Mr Shahbaz Sharif, Raja Zafarul Haq, Iqbal Zafar Jhagra and Ahsan Iqbal.
Mr Nawaz said his party in consultation with the All Pakistan Democratic Movement (APDM) had decided that the time had now come for the exiled PML-N leadership to return home and launch a decisive struggle against what he called the eight-year dictatorship and pave the way for genuine and lasting democracy.
Answering questions, he said he was not afraid of what he said the empty threats of being arrested on landing or re-packed in a plane and sent to Saudi Arabia.
He dismissed these threats as trite and sort of whistling in the dark by a terrified government on its way out.
When asked if he had a plan B to cope with the situation in case he was arrested, Mr Nawaz said the people would then come out on the streets and, under the banner of APDM, would carry on the struggle until the dictator was finally sent home.
He said he was going back home to help his countrymen in their ongoing struggle to restore the rule of law and the 1973 Constitution as it stood on October 12 1999, and bring about a balance in the powers of various institutions of the state and finally send the army back to barracks for all times to come.
Strongly condemning efforts by PPP chairperson Benazir Bhutto to what he said save ‘a military dictator on his way out’, Mr Nawaz said Ms Bhutto was violating the Charter of Democracy which she had countersigned along with other members of ARD.
He sidestepped a question about how did he reconcile with the idea of sitting with Maulana Fazlur Rehman’s JUI which is a partner of the dictatorial set-up and at the same time criticising Ms Bhutto for negotiating a deal for transfer of power from the army to an elected civilian set-up.
When asked would he not be destablising the country by going back and launching street agitation, Mr Nawaz said it was Gen Musharraf who had destabilised the country by usurping power from an elected government and then ruling all these years illegitimately, caring two hoots about the Constitution and the rule of law.
In his opening remarks, Nawaz said Musharraf’s uniform was not the issue, “the issue is his
illegal rule, the issue is those illegal amendments he made in the Constitution to prolong his rule and the issue is his pathetic attempts to get himself elected for another five years”.
Answering a question about Musharraf’s insistence that he should abide by the deal he had signed and which was underwritten by an eminent personality of Saudi Arabia, Nawaz said that such utterings only betrayed the contemptuous attitude of Musharraf towards the Supreme Court ruling which had said that he could come back any time and had instructed the government not to put any impediments in the way of his return.
When asked how would the army as an institution react to his return, Nawaz said the rank and file of the army also wanted restoration of the rule of law “and since we are on the side of the 160 million Pakistanis all of whom want Musharraf to go, they (the rank and file of the army) would have no reservations about my return home.”
When asked if despite his opposition Musharraf got himself elected for a five-year term from the present assemblies, or for that matter from the next one, what would happen, he said “anything can happen, the country would be severely destabilised and the people will come out on the streets in protest”.
He said his party would consider the return to the party fold of all those who would publicly announce not to vote for Musharraf and those who in the last eight years did not do anything to harm the interests of PML-N or had not actively participated in persecuting members of the party.
Later, senior party members said that the central executive committee would meet on Friday to chalk out details of plans for departure from London and reception plan in Islamabad, Lahore and other cities which the Nawaz caravan would touch on the way.
“We will decide tomorrow which of the leaders now in exile with the Sharifs, like Ghous Ali Shah etc, would accompany the Sharif brothers and also invite those international mediapersons who would like to accompany the entourage to contact the party’s headquarters at the earliest.” said a PML-N source
Since there would be limited seats on the commercial flight the Sharif brothers would be taking, the party is expected to allocate seats on the first come first served basis, they said.
Photo the Bangladesh army cannot stand: BBC
Photo the Bangladesh army cannot stand
By John Sudworth: BBC News, Dhaka: August 28, 2007
If a single image can sum up the thorny mess into which Bangladesh has once again stumbled, then this perhaps is it.
A sandaled demonstrator in mid-air kick and a hatless army officer in terrified retreat.
In the background, bystanders hurry away. Out of shot, a military vehicle burns and the security forces are in danger of losing control to the angry mob.
The photo gives a momentary glimpse of just how bad things got during three days of violent protest that rocked cities across Bangladesh last week.
But the picture is significant for another reason. As we found out on the first night of the curfew imposed to contain the trouble it was an image that deeply upset the Bangladeshi rank and file.
Its publication was seen as a humiliation, every bit as great as if that flying sandaled foot had been aimed at the behind of the army chief himself.
Shortly after the curfew came into effect on Wednesday night, the BBC team was out filming.
No one was sure whether the media would be allowed to move freely.
Dhaka's streets, normally a round-the-clock festival of noise, were deserted.
Road blocks and checkpoints were being manned by the paramilitaries and the army was on patrol.
'Wrong message'
Sure enough our presence was soon noticed.
Two army jeeps pulled up sharply and a young officer jumped out. We were ordered to drop the camera as he radioed back to his base.
After a tense stand-off the message was relayed that we could continue filming "as long as we didn't give the wrong message to the country".
But in true Bangladeshi style the officer and I were soon the best of friends.
In the middle of a deserted city I was invited to sit on the kerb with him, while his troops waited restlessly in their trucks.
He offered me a smoke and then, with his arm round me, he told me of his time training in the UK, of his sense of duty and his love of his country.
He told me of the dark forces at work behind the rioting.
And most of all he told me how he hated that photo, and how irresponsible it had been of the newspaper to publish it.
We shook hands and parted on good terms. But then I have a white face and an international press card.
It's impossible to know whether it was this same officer and the same troops, but on that same evening a group of Bangladeshi journalists were left in little doubt about what the army thought about the role of the media.
Masud Parvez was one of a group of reporters from a national internet news service standing outside their office.
Two army jeeps pulled up and the reporters identified themselves as local newsmen.
"So what," came the reply.
Masud was given a prolonged beating on the steps of his office. He has an injury to his hand where he tried to fend off a rifle butt.
Some soldiers hit him with hockey sticks that they'd been carrying for exactly this kind of occasion.
Deepening rift
"I told them we were journalists from bdnews24.com. But despite giving our identity they started hitting us," he told me.
"It was a terrible experience. I can't make you understand how scared I was at the time."
Masud is just one of a number of reporters and cameramen beaten by the security forces over the period of the curfew.
The Bangladesh Federal Union of Journalists puts the number at 30 or more.
Of course none of this can be blamed on a single image. But the photograph, and the reaction to it, gives a wider sense of a deepening rift between the military-backed authorities and civil society.
The army top brass has blamed what it calls evil forces and political opportunists for prolonging last week's rioting.
Five senior university professors, all distinguished academics, have been picked up by the army and detained.
One of them, Professor Anwar Hossain, is general secretary of the Dhaka University Teachers' Association.
His son, Sanjeeb, was at home when the army called in the early hours of the morning.
"It takes on a very sinister tone," he tells me.
"The teachers of Dhaka University are considered the heart and soul of this nation.
"It's a very unfortunate situation when teachers are being interrogated and actually taken away in the middle of the night."
An unknown number of students are also in custody. We visited one address, very close to where the photograph was taken, shortly after an army raid.
A dozen or so students had been arrested, and we saw clear evidence that a number of people had been interrogated and harshly beaten.
'Retribution and arrests'
This government came to power in January with the backing of the military on a wave of popular support vowing to reform politics and stamp out corruption.
But its reputation has been tarnished. A slum demolition programme, an attempt to exile two former prime ministers and its inability to contain the spiralling cost of food have all added to a growing sense of frustration.
Many newspapers have taken the view that the violence last week was a genuine expression of anger and frustration, rather than the work of shadowy forces of evil.
"Instead of retribution and arrests we suggest that dialogue be opened between teachers and students on the one hand and the caretaker government on the other," read one newspaper editorial this week.
Meanwhile, military intelligence units appear to be using media images to find and arrest those involved in the violence.
As for the photo that so upset the army, luckily for him at least, the protester doing the kicking is difficult to identify.
But they are looking for him.
Both the editor who published the image, and the photographer who took it, have been visited and questioned by the army.
Thursday, August 30, 2007
A moment of truth in Pakistan: Benazir Bhutto
A moment of truth in Pakistan
For the sake of the civilized world, democracy must overcome extremism.
By Benazir Bhutto: August 30, 2007: Los Angeles Times
LONDON -- There are moments in history that prove decisive and mark a turning point for the future. The Civil War was such a moment in the United States. The fall of the Berlin Wall was such a moment for Germany and the European Union. Today is Pakistan's moment of truth. Decisions made now will determine whether extremism and terrorism can be contained to save Pakistan from internal collapse. The stability of not just Pakistan but the civilized world is at stake.
In a democratic Pakistan, extremist movements have been minimal. In all democratic elections, extremist religious parties never have garnered more than 11% of the vote. But under dictators -- most notably Gen. Zia ul-Haq in the 1980s, but unfortunately also Gen. Pervez Musharraf during this decade -- religious extremism has gained a foothold in my homeland.
Whether leaders like Zia exploited religion for their own political ends, or dictatorships inherently induce deprivation and desperation, the fact remains that extremism has emerged as a threat to my nation, to the region and to the world. These extremists are the petri dish of international terrorism. It need not be so. It must be reversed. And it can be done.
In both of my tenures as prime minister, my government imposed the rule of law on all areas of Pakistan -- our four provinces and also the federally administered tribal areas, including Waziristan. With the support of the people of those tribal areas, we managed to uproot an international drug cartel that had operated with impunity under dictatorship.
Today, however, the international drug barons have morphed into religious extremists and terrorists. The current government of Pakistan has ceded large areas of our nation to the pro-Taliban and Al Qaeda forces, claiming that these areas are ungovernable. I believe that they are governable and that a democratic government can better restore the authority of the state.
We must be realistic about the history and politics of Pakistan. In a perfect world, perhaps the military would not play a role in politics. But Pakistan is less than perfect in this regard. The security forces fundamentally have served as a political institution in Pakistan, ruling either directly, through generals, or indirectly, by manipulating and ultimately sacking democratic governments.
I know that some people have been surprised that I have been negotiating a transition to democracy and talking about the future of Pakistan with Musharraf. On dictatorship, there can be no compromise. The parliament must be supreme. That's why I have made it clear to Musharraf that my party, the Pakistan People's Party, supports the constitution, which requires that the president be a civilian who is legitimately selected by the parliament and provincial assemblies. After much negotiating, I announced on Wednesday that Musharraf had decided to resign as army chief.
But that is not the only issue. The ban on twice-elected prime ministers, like myself, holding office again was not part of Pakistan's constitution and must be abolished.
All members of parliament and public officials elected before the military coup of 1999 who have not been convicted of any offense must also be granted immunity from politically inspired charges. All parties and all party leaders must be allowed to freely contest elections. A neutral caretaker government, pursuant to our constitution, must be empowered to oversee the nation before the upcoming elections, and an independent election commission, with the participation of all political parties, must be constituted.
Election rolls must be free from political manipulation. Balloting must be transparent, counting must be free from political intervention, and the entire process must be monitored by international observers to ensure its sanctity and validity.
But free and fair elections alone are not enough to solve the problems of Pakistan. We must have free, fair and effective governing. And that requires that all responsible, moderate forces in the country be mobilized, working for the same plan, reading from the same page.
Musharraf continues to enjoy the support of the international community and the armed forces of Pakistan. But such support is no substitute for the will of the people who are now disempowered and disenchanted. Growing poverty and unemployment make it clear that in the absence of democracy, the people's needs cannot be met. I believe that unless the people of Pakistan are empowered through the ballot, extremists will continue to exploit this discontent to their advantage.
I believe that democracy and moderation go together. Like many Pakistanis, I am pained that part of our land in the tribal areas has been ceded to terrorists.
Some argue that through cease-fires and peace treaties, one can get the extremists into the mainstream and moderate them. But the experience in Pakistan proves otherwise. Every cease-fire and peace treaty has emboldened the militants and terrorists. Nowhere was this more profoundly demonstrated than during the siege of the Red Mosque in Islamabad this summer.
The militants who holed up in the mosque had tried to impose their own laws over and above the laws of Pakistan. They kidnapped women and police officials. They intimidated and shut down entertainment shops. Their vigilante squads terrorized the women who drove cars in the capital city. Six long months of negotiations with them failed, and a bloody result ensued when the army tried to overcome the mutiny. More than 100 people were killed.
The Red Mosque incident demonstrated that no deals can be struck with religious fanatics.
Pakistan is at the crossroads. Our success can be a signal to 1 billion Muslims all over the world that Islam is compatible with democracy, modernity and moderation. I go back to Pakistan this autumn knowing that there will be difficult days ahead. But I put my faith in the people and my fate in the hands of God. I am not afraid. Yes, we are at a turning point, but I know that time, justice and the forces of history are on our side.
Benazir Bhutto was twice prime minister of Pakistan.
For the sake of the civilized world, democracy must overcome extremism.
By Benazir Bhutto: August 30, 2007: Los Angeles Times
LONDON -- There are moments in history that prove decisive and mark a turning point for the future. The Civil War was such a moment in the United States. The fall of the Berlin Wall was such a moment for Germany and the European Union. Today is Pakistan's moment of truth. Decisions made now will determine whether extremism and terrorism can be contained to save Pakistan from internal collapse. The stability of not just Pakistan but the civilized world is at stake.
In a democratic Pakistan, extremist movements have been minimal. In all democratic elections, extremist religious parties never have garnered more than 11% of the vote. But under dictators -- most notably Gen. Zia ul-Haq in the 1980s, but unfortunately also Gen. Pervez Musharraf during this decade -- religious extremism has gained a foothold in my homeland.
Whether leaders like Zia exploited religion for their own political ends, or dictatorships inherently induce deprivation and desperation, the fact remains that extremism has emerged as a threat to my nation, to the region and to the world. These extremists are the petri dish of international terrorism. It need not be so. It must be reversed. And it can be done.
In both of my tenures as prime minister, my government imposed the rule of law on all areas of Pakistan -- our four provinces and also the federally administered tribal areas, including Waziristan. With the support of the people of those tribal areas, we managed to uproot an international drug cartel that had operated with impunity under dictatorship.
Today, however, the international drug barons have morphed into religious extremists and terrorists. The current government of Pakistan has ceded large areas of our nation to the pro-Taliban and Al Qaeda forces, claiming that these areas are ungovernable. I believe that they are governable and that a democratic government can better restore the authority of the state.
We must be realistic about the history and politics of Pakistan. In a perfect world, perhaps the military would not play a role in politics. But Pakistan is less than perfect in this regard. The security forces fundamentally have served as a political institution in Pakistan, ruling either directly, through generals, or indirectly, by manipulating and ultimately sacking democratic governments.
I know that some people have been surprised that I have been negotiating a transition to democracy and talking about the future of Pakistan with Musharraf. On dictatorship, there can be no compromise. The parliament must be supreme. That's why I have made it clear to Musharraf that my party, the Pakistan People's Party, supports the constitution, which requires that the president be a civilian who is legitimately selected by the parliament and provincial assemblies. After much negotiating, I announced on Wednesday that Musharraf had decided to resign as army chief.
But that is not the only issue. The ban on twice-elected prime ministers, like myself, holding office again was not part of Pakistan's constitution and must be abolished.
All members of parliament and public officials elected before the military coup of 1999 who have not been convicted of any offense must also be granted immunity from politically inspired charges. All parties and all party leaders must be allowed to freely contest elections. A neutral caretaker government, pursuant to our constitution, must be empowered to oversee the nation before the upcoming elections, and an independent election commission, with the participation of all political parties, must be constituted.
Election rolls must be free from political manipulation. Balloting must be transparent, counting must be free from political intervention, and the entire process must be monitored by international observers to ensure its sanctity and validity.
But free and fair elections alone are not enough to solve the problems of Pakistan. We must have free, fair and effective governing. And that requires that all responsible, moderate forces in the country be mobilized, working for the same plan, reading from the same page.
Musharraf continues to enjoy the support of the international community and the armed forces of Pakistan. But such support is no substitute for the will of the people who are now disempowered and disenchanted. Growing poverty and unemployment make it clear that in the absence of democracy, the people's needs cannot be met. I believe that unless the people of Pakistan are empowered through the ballot, extremists will continue to exploit this discontent to their advantage.
I believe that democracy and moderation go together. Like many Pakistanis, I am pained that part of our land in the tribal areas has been ceded to terrorists.
Some argue that through cease-fires and peace treaties, one can get the extremists into the mainstream and moderate them. But the experience in Pakistan proves otherwise. Every cease-fire and peace treaty has emboldened the militants and terrorists. Nowhere was this more profoundly demonstrated than during the siege of the Red Mosque in Islamabad this summer.
The militants who holed up in the mosque had tried to impose their own laws over and above the laws of Pakistan. They kidnapped women and police officials. They intimidated and shut down entertainment shops. Their vigilante squads terrorized the women who drove cars in the capital city. Six long months of negotiations with them failed, and a bloody result ensued when the army tried to overcome the mutiny. More than 100 people were killed.
The Red Mosque incident demonstrated that no deals can be struck with religious fanatics.
Pakistan is at the crossroads. Our success can be a signal to 1 billion Muslims all over the world that Islam is compatible with democracy, modernity and moderation. I go back to Pakistan this autumn knowing that there will be difficult days ahead. But I put my faith in the people and my fate in the hands of God. I am not afraid. Yes, we are at a turning point, but I know that time, justice and the forces of history are on our side.
Benazir Bhutto was twice prime minister of Pakistan.
Elite consensus under strain in Pakistan
Elite consensus under strain
By Tasneem Siddiqui: Dawn, August 30, 2007
IF you watch television these days or read the newspapers, you will find nothing but heated discussions and screaming headlines about political bargains, predictions and pronouncements about the return of the exiled leaders. Excited discussants make us believe that some sort of a revolution is round the corner.
To an outsider, issues like ‘deal’ or ‘no deal’, the difference between ‘agreement’ and ‘understanding’, the president’s election in uniform or without it, would appear quite amusing, if not surrealistic. But to those who know the Pakistani political scene well, it is nauseating to watch retired generals talk about the pernicious effects of military rule in Pakistan, or former civil servants become hysterical about the virtues of democracy.
Would these stalwarts have the courage to say that Pakistan was achieved through a democratic process and was supposed to be a social welfare state? That it soon was converted into a national security state? Would they also admit that it was they and their predecessors who were responsible for derailing the process, losing half the country and bringing the other half to the brink of disaster?
What were the dreams of the teeming millions of undivided India? They looked forward to a future free from the tyranny of the ruling classes and the oppression of the feudals. They had hoped for justice and fair play in a state that would provide equal opportunities to the people and take care of their basic necessities like health, education, housing, drinking water and sanitation. But what did they get in the bargain? A garrison state spending most of the resources on defence and making the poor poorer.
This came about because our founding fathers opted for the viceregal system where decision-making was concentrated in the hands of a few. Before long, a coterie of people assumed power to rule the country in the same old colonial mould. The ‘gora sahib’ was replaced by the ‘brown sahib’ (who, unfortunately, was more arrogant and inaccessible than the former). For the downtrodden and disadvantaged, nothing changed.
How did the elite oligarchs seize control and how did they operate? It is a well known fact that the Muslim League was not an organised political party but a movement of people of all shades and colours. Its leadership mainly came from the landed gentry, but in UP, which was its home, and in Bengal, it no doubt had some leaders belonging to the professional classes as well.
The jagirdars, feudal lords, tribal chiefs and pirs initially opposed the idea of Pakistan but joined Mr Jinnah when Pakistan became a reality. He had no choice but to accept them if the Muslim League was to consolidate itself.
Sensing the weakness of the Muslim League leaders, the British-trained officer corps seized the opportunity to gradually assume all powers. Forming a sort of a supra-cabinet, where all important decisions were taken before they were placed before the cabinet, these oligarchs also became self-styled guardians of the ‘ideological’ frontiers of Pakistan. They were basically mercenaries and careerists working for their colonial masters and failed to develop a nationalistic outlook even in the post-1947 years.
Initially, there was a nexus between the bureaucracy, military and the feudal politicians. Handpicked industrialists and businessmen later joined the club. Professional classes, the mullahs and newspaper barons were the last ones to be co-opted. This oligarchy included almost all vested interests. The class divide was total with those in a position to exploit the resources of the new country ranged against the teeming millions who were powerless.
India may not have been a good neighbour, but the hype of enmity and permanent hostility was deliberately created. As a result, the social sectors were relegated to the lowest priority and most of the resources were diverted to nonproductive uses. In our first budget, over 60 per cent of income was allocated to defence, and in Oct 1947 Mr Jinnah requested the US government to sanction a loan of three billion dollars to modernise the Pakistan army.
It may be debatable whether Pakistan was supposed to be an Islamic or a secular state, but there is no doubt that it was meant to be an egalitarian state, with its federating units assured of autonomy. Having assumed all powers, the generals and senior bureaucrats started hobnobbing with the Pentagon and volunteered their services in the Cold War and became an American satellite. This relationship has continued ever since in one shape or another.
Internally, this oligarchy created an atmosphere of intimidation, harassment and coercion. On the economic front, they adopted a policy which concentrated all economic power in a few hands. Dr Ishrat Hussain (exgovernor State Bank) has given a graphic description of this approach in his book ‘Pakistan, The Economy of an Elitist State’, in which he has admonished military regimes for colluding with other elite groups to monopolise the state’s resources.
Intriguingly, his perception of the military seems to have undergone a dramatic shift since he wrote his book, as pointed out by Dr Ayesha Siddiqa in her recent book ‘Military Inc.’ Ishrat Hussain appears to have completely abandoned his earlier standpoint on the policies of military dictators after he joined the Musharraf government in 2000.
Starting from 1947, we have had all types of governments, both civilian and military dictatorships. But those who have remained in power are the same people and groups with changing names. Their policies have remained unchanged, the same old wine in new bottles.
For example, if Benazir or Nawaz Sharif come to power again, as is expected, will anything change? Will the provinces become autonomous? Will there be no arbitrariness in decision-making? Will there be rule of law? Will antioor policies and regressive tax structures change? Will there be laws to improve working conditions for workers, peasants, landless haris, and those employed in the informal sector? Will our heavy reliance on foreign loans come to an end? Will the National Assembly discuss the defence budget and redefine the role of the ubiquitous intelligence agencies?
Unfortunately, we do not see any signs of the political parties having done their homework in this regard.
Does this sound too dismal? It does but one should not lose heart. There are some silver linings visible. Firstly, the above description relates to the ruling oligarchy which is a small part of the total population. Although it has power and resources, and is well entrenched, it is gradually losing control. Leaving aside the middle classes, which are about 20 per cent of the population, there are 75 per cent people who are surviving not because of the state, but in spite of the state. They are yearning for change. They are bitter and angry and are waiting for a chance to show their strength. They only need social organisation and leadership.
Secondly, for the first time in 60 years, the elite consensus is under heavy strain as one of its major partners, the judiciary, has declared its independence. At least for the time being, it is not listening to the establishment.
Thirdly, people from Punjab are openly raising their voice against the military’s role in politics. If this trend becomes allit will change the nature of Pakistani politics for all times to come. Fourthly, there are very strong antiAmerican feelings across the board. Those leaders who want to remain in power only with American support, will find it increasingly difficult to survive.
And lastly, civil society, though still weak and disorganised, is slowly realising the importance of its role in making the government accountable. This trend is likely to increase and more people will follow the lead given by the black coats. In sum, the country seems to be reaching out to the future.
By Tasneem Siddiqui: Dawn, August 30, 2007
IF you watch television these days or read the newspapers, you will find nothing but heated discussions and screaming headlines about political bargains, predictions and pronouncements about the return of the exiled leaders. Excited discussants make us believe that some sort of a revolution is round the corner.
To an outsider, issues like ‘deal’ or ‘no deal’, the difference between ‘agreement’ and ‘understanding’, the president’s election in uniform or without it, would appear quite amusing, if not surrealistic. But to those who know the Pakistani political scene well, it is nauseating to watch retired generals talk about the pernicious effects of military rule in Pakistan, or former civil servants become hysterical about the virtues of democracy.
Would these stalwarts have the courage to say that Pakistan was achieved through a democratic process and was supposed to be a social welfare state? That it soon was converted into a national security state? Would they also admit that it was they and their predecessors who were responsible for derailing the process, losing half the country and bringing the other half to the brink of disaster?
What were the dreams of the teeming millions of undivided India? They looked forward to a future free from the tyranny of the ruling classes and the oppression of the feudals. They had hoped for justice and fair play in a state that would provide equal opportunities to the people and take care of their basic necessities like health, education, housing, drinking water and sanitation. But what did they get in the bargain? A garrison state spending most of the resources on defence and making the poor poorer.
This came about because our founding fathers opted for the viceregal system where decision-making was concentrated in the hands of a few. Before long, a coterie of people assumed power to rule the country in the same old colonial mould. The ‘gora sahib’ was replaced by the ‘brown sahib’ (who, unfortunately, was more arrogant and inaccessible than the former). For the downtrodden and disadvantaged, nothing changed.
How did the elite oligarchs seize control and how did they operate? It is a well known fact that the Muslim League was not an organised political party but a movement of people of all shades and colours. Its leadership mainly came from the landed gentry, but in UP, which was its home, and in Bengal, it no doubt had some leaders belonging to the professional classes as well.
The jagirdars, feudal lords, tribal chiefs and pirs initially opposed the idea of Pakistan but joined Mr Jinnah when Pakistan became a reality. He had no choice but to accept them if the Muslim League was to consolidate itself.
Sensing the weakness of the Muslim League leaders, the British-trained officer corps seized the opportunity to gradually assume all powers. Forming a sort of a supra-cabinet, where all important decisions were taken before they were placed before the cabinet, these oligarchs also became self-styled guardians of the ‘ideological’ frontiers of Pakistan. They were basically mercenaries and careerists working for their colonial masters and failed to develop a nationalistic outlook even in the post-1947 years.
Initially, there was a nexus between the bureaucracy, military and the feudal politicians. Handpicked industrialists and businessmen later joined the club. Professional classes, the mullahs and newspaper barons were the last ones to be co-opted. This oligarchy included almost all vested interests. The class divide was total with those in a position to exploit the resources of the new country ranged against the teeming millions who were powerless.
India may not have been a good neighbour, but the hype of enmity and permanent hostility was deliberately created. As a result, the social sectors were relegated to the lowest priority and most of the resources were diverted to nonproductive uses. In our first budget, over 60 per cent of income was allocated to defence, and in Oct 1947 Mr Jinnah requested the US government to sanction a loan of three billion dollars to modernise the Pakistan army.
It may be debatable whether Pakistan was supposed to be an Islamic or a secular state, but there is no doubt that it was meant to be an egalitarian state, with its federating units assured of autonomy. Having assumed all powers, the generals and senior bureaucrats started hobnobbing with the Pentagon and volunteered their services in the Cold War and became an American satellite. This relationship has continued ever since in one shape or another.
Internally, this oligarchy created an atmosphere of intimidation, harassment and coercion. On the economic front, they adopted a policy which concentrated all economic power in a few hands. Dr Ishrat Hussain (exgovernor State Bank) has given a graphic description of this approach in his book ‘Pakistan, The Economy of an Elitist State’, in which he has admonished military regimes for colluding with other elite groups to monopolise the state’s resources.
Intriguingly, his perception of the military seems to have undergone a dramatic shift since he wrote his book, as pointed out by Dr Ayesha Siddiqa in her recent book ‘Military Inc.’ Ishrat Hussain appears to have completely abandoned his earlier standpoint on the policies of military dictators after he joined the Musharraf government in 2000.
Starting from 1947, we have had all types of governments, both civilian and military dictatorships. But those who have remained in power are the same people and groups with changing names. Their policies have remained unchanged, the same old wine in new bottles.
For example, if Benazir or Nawaz Sharif come to power again, as is expected, will anything change? Will the provinces become autonomous? Will there be no arbitrariness in decision-making? Will there be rule of law? Will antioor policies and regressive tax structures change? Will there be laws to improve working conditions for workers, peasants, landless haris, and those employed in the informal sector? Will our heavy reliance on foreign loans come to an end? Will the National Assembly discuss the defence budget and redefine the role of the ubiquitous intelligence agencies?
Unfortunately, we do not see any signs of the political parties having done their homework in this regard.
Does this sound too dismal? It does but one should not lose heart. There are some silver linings visible. Firstly, the above description relates to the ruling oligarchy which is a small part of the total population. Although it has power and resources, and is well entrenched, it is gradually losing control. Leaving aside the middle classes, which are about 20 per cent of the population, there are 75 per cent people who are surviving not because of the state, but in spite of the state. They are yearning for change. They are bitter and angry and are waiting for a chance to show their strength. They only need social organisation and leadership.
Secondly, for the first time in 60 years, the elite consensus is under heavy strain as one of its major partners, the judiciary, has declared its independence. At least for the time being, it is not listening to the establishment.
Thirdly, people from Punjab are openly raising their voice against the military’s role in politics. If this trend becomes allit will change the nature of Pakistani politics for all times to come. Fourthly, there are very strong antiAmerican feelings across the board. Those leaders who want to remain in power only with American support, will find it increasingly difficult to survive.
And lastly, civil society, though still weak and disorganised, is slowly realising the importance of its role in making the government accountable. This trend is likely to increase and more people will follow the lead given by the black coats. In sum, the country seems to be reaching out to the future.
Bugti's shadow on Musharraf's future: Adil Najam
Bugti's shadow on Musharraf's future By Prof Adil Najam
The News, August 28, 2007
August 26 marked the one-year anniversary of the death of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti. There was a partly successful strike in parts of Balochistan, some reported clashes that left a number of people injured and property damaged, and a general sense of relief amongst the authorities that things did not get as out of hand as they had feared. However, while the immediate apprehensions and anxieties about this anniversary might have passed, the shadow of what happened on August 26, 2006 in the hills of Kohlu's Tartani area remains large on Pakistan's politics and the significance of this date must not go uncommemorated.
Of course, the most important element of this 'shadow' is the growing ethnic unrest that preceded, precipitated and has followed the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti. August 26 has become -- and is likely to remain -- an iconic date for Baloch nationalists. Although this unrest is eminently evident in our daily headlines, it goes largely uncommented upon. This could be because so much of the rest of the politics of the country is so very engrossing at the moment. But it is also because the rest of Pakistan seems uninterested in the grievances of Baloch nationalists. It is convenient to ignore them as rants of a small bunch of 'separatists.' To delegitimize even those concerns that are based on fact. To label all nationalists as 'traitors.' And to act as if simply ignoring them will make them go away.
It will not. Indeed, ignoring these concerns will only magnify their volume and intensify the demands. Not all nationalists are separatists, but labelling them as such will turn more of the former into the latter. And herein lies the real long-term danger.
But August 26, 2006, also has another -- more immediate -- significance to contemporary Pakistan politics. It marks, in my view, the beginning of the end of Gen. Pervez Musharraf's rule. Let me be quite clear here. It is not that the general had not already sowed the seeds of his ultimate demise well before this date -- most importantly, with his original usurpation of power. Nor is it that his departure is now a done deal. He prides himself for being a survivor and he may well drag on and even survive all the current crises he faces; either in uniform or without.
My point merely is that if one looks back and seeks the one turning point of political inflection in General Pervez Musharraf's rule; that point will be the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti on August 26, 2006. From that moment on it was clear that Gen Musharraf was on his way out. It was not clear --- and still is not -- exactly when or exactly how he would go. But suddenly there was the sense that his departure was not only likely, but imminent. Something dramatic happened that day. It was not just Nawab Akbar Bugti who died but also the silent consensus that had propped up Gen. Musharraf's military rule in Pakistan the previous five years. From then on Gen. Musharraf has been on a downwards trajectory and it is clear that his personal survival can come only at increasing costs to him and to the country.
Up to that point there was a sense that even if there was not a majority that actually supported his rule, there was in fact a plurality of Pakistanis who were willing to tolerate it. Or, at the least, were not actively opposed to it. This is what really changed on August 26, 2006. The killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti -- or, more precisely, the manner in which he was killed and the government's reaction to it -- forced many people who were willing to sit on the sidelines to actually choose sides. Invariably, they choose to distance themselves from the general. There was a clear sense that a line had been crossed. It was obviously not the first time that line had been crossed, but it was one crossing too many. Like the proverbial last straw on the camel's back, this was the one decision that decided the issues for the then undecideds.
Much like those who would later march for the reinstatement of the Chief Justice were moved to do so not because they 'liked' the Chief Justice but because they vehemently disliked the way he was treated by Gen. Musharraf. Similarly, many of those who were repulsed by the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti were moved not because they approved of Bugti's agenda or tactics, they were revolted by the arrogance of power that was evident in the manner of his removal. It is this recognition of the arrogance of power, the obvious desire to retain that power at all costs and for purely personal satisfaction that has turned the tide against Gen. Musharraf. And the tide was turned on August 26, 2006.
If, indeed, I am correct that August 26, 2006, marked the beginning of the end of Gen. Musharraf's rule, does this mean that his departure is now imminent? Most likely, but not necessarily. As suggested above, the general is a survivor and may survive longer yet. There are many avenues of survival. Three, in particular, are important. You can 'facilitate' it, you can 'buy' it, or you can 'enforce' it.
He could, for example, 'facilitate' his own survival by nurturing the notion that there is no viable alternative to him and by inducing infighting amongst the opposition to validate such a claim. Alternatively, he could 'buy' survival by lavishing rewards and resources upon those who would continue to support him. Another strategy of survival would be to use sticks instead of carrots and to 'enforce' survival by clamping down on the media, declaring a real emergency, or imposing Martial Law.
These and other strategies for survival are always open. But each imposes heavy costs on him, on the government, and on the country. If we look back at the last year we find that he has, in fact, tried variants of all three of these strategies, but with very limited success. This is not surprising. It turns out that the more unpopular a leader is, the more costly it is to either 'facilitate,' 'buy,' or 'enforce' survival. Invariably, you have to dish out a lot of carrots or use a lot of sticks. Sooner or later, you will either run out of carrots or people will get so fed up with the sticks that they will rise despite the infliction.
Given Pakistan's politics today, Gen Musharraf may be running into both limits simultaneously. He could try pushing more at these limits, but it will not be for very long, not by very much, and not without great costs.
The writer is a Professor of International Negotiation and Diplomacy at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, USA, and the founding editor of Pakistaniat.com
The News, August 28, 2007
August 26 marked the one-year anniversary of the death of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti. There was a partly successful strike in parts of Balochistan, some reported clashes that left a number of people injured and property damaged, and a general sense of relief amongst the authorities that things did not get as out of hand as they had feared. However, while the immediate apprehensions and anxieties about this anniversary might have passed, the shadow of what happened on August 26, 2006 in the hills of Kohlu's Tartani area remains large on Pakistan's politics and the significance of this date must not go uncommemorated.
Of course, the most important element of this 'shadow' is the growing ethnic unrest that preceded, precipitated and has followed the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti. August 26 has become -- and is likely to remain -- an iconic date for Baloch nationalists. Although this unrest is eminently evident in our daily headlines, it goes largely uncommented upon. This could be because so much of the rest of the politics of the country is so very engrossing at the moment. But it is also because the rest of Pakistan seems uninterested in the grievances of Baloch nationalists. It is convenient to ignore them as rants of a small bunch of 'separatists.' To delegitimize even those concerns that are based on fact. To label all nationalists as 'traitors.' And to act as if simply ignoring them will make them go away.
It will not. Indeed, ignoring these concerns will only magnify their volume and intensify the demands. Not all nationalists are separatists, but labelling them as such will turn more of the former into the latter. And herein lies the real long-term danger.
But August 26, 2006, also has another -- more immediate -- significance to contemporary Pakistan politics. It marks, in my view, the beginning of the end of Gen. Pervez Musharraf's rule. Let me be quite clear here. It is not that the general had not already sowed the seeds of his ultimate demise well before this date -- most importantly, with his original usurpation of power. Nor is it that his departure is now a done deal. He prides himself for being a survivor and he may well drag on and even survive all the current crises he faces; either in uniform or without.
My point merely is that if one looks back and seeks the one turning point of political inflection in General Pervez Musharraf's rule; that point will be the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti on August 26, 2006. From that moment on it was clear that Gen Musharraf was on his way out. It was not clear --- and still is not -- exactly when or exactly how he would go. But suddenly there was the sense that his departure was not only likely, but imminent. Something dramatic happened that day. It was not just Nawab Akbar Bugti who died but also the silent consensus that had propped up Gen. Musharraf's military rule in Pakistan the previous five years. From then on Gen. Musharraf has been on a downwards trajectory and it is clear that his personal survival can come only at increasing costs to him and to the country.
Up to that point there was a sense that even if there was not a majority that actually supported his rule, there was in fact a plurality of Pakistanis who were willing to tolerate it. Or, at the least, were not actively opposed to it. This is what really changed on August 26, 2006. The killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti -- or, more precisely, the manner in which he was killed and the government's reaction to it -- forced many people who were willing to sit on the sidelines to actually choose sides. Invariably, they choose to distance themselves from the general. There was a clear sense that a line had been crossed. It was obviously not the first time that line had been crossed, but it was one crossing too many. Like the proverbial last straw on the camel's back, this was the one decision that decided the issues for the then undecideds.
Much like those who would later march for the reinstatement of the Chief Justice were moved to do so not because they 'liked' the Chief Justice but because they vehemently disliked the way he was treated by Gen. Musharraf. Similarly, many of those who were repulsed by the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti were moved not because they approved of Bugti's agenda or tactics, they were revolted by the arrogance of power that was evident in the manner of his removal. It is this recognition of the arrogance of power, the obvious desire to retain that power at all costs and for purely personal satisfaction that has turned the tide against Gen. Musharraf. And the tide was turned on August 26, 2006.
If, indeed, I am correct that August 26, 2006, marked the beginning of the end of Gen. Musharraf's rule, does this mean that his departure is now imminent? Most likely, but not necessarily. As suggested above, the general is a survivor and may survive longer yet. There are many avenues of survival. Three, in particular, are important. You can 'facilitate' it, you can 'buy' it, or you can 'enforce' it.
He could, for example, 'facilitate' his own survival by nurturing the notion that there is no viable alternative to him and by inducing infighting amongst the opposition to validate such a claim. Alternatively, he could 'buy' survival by lavishing rewards and resources upon those who would continue to support him. Another strategy of survival would be to use sticks instead of carrots and to 'enforce' survival by clamping down on the media, declaring a real emergency, or imposing Martial Law.
These and other strategies for survival are always open. But each imposes heavy costs on him, on the government, and on the country. If we look back at the last year we find that he has, in fact, tried variants of all three of these strategies, but with very limited success. This is not surprising. It turns out that the more unpopular a leader is, the more costly it is to either 'facilitate,' 'buy,' or 'enforce' survival. Invariably, you have to dish out a lot of carrots or use a lot of sticks. Sooner or later, you will either run out of carrots or people will get so fed up with the sticks that they will rise despite the infliction.
Given Pakistan's politics today, Gen Musharraf may be running into both limits simultaneously. He could try pushing more at these limits, but it will not be for very long, not by very much, and not without great costs.
The writer is a Professor of International Negotiation and Diplomacy at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, USA, and the founding editor of Pakistaniat.com
Wednesday, August 29, 2007
Iran Versus Saudi Arabia in Iraq
Iraq: Iran Versus Saudi Arabia, Minus the United States?
Aug 28, 2007: Stratfor
Summary
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on Aug. 28 warned that a power vacuum is imminent in Iraq and said Iran is ready to help fill the gap. This statement represents the shift Stratfor was expecting in Iranian behavior toward Iraq, wherein Tehran is no longer interested in negotiating with the United States because it expects Washington to withdraw from the country. This does not mean the road to Baghdad is clear for the Iranians, which explains why they have said they would work with regional Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia.
Analysis
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said Aug. 28 that his country is ready to fill the power vacuum in Iraq. Addressing a press conference in Tehran, Ahmadinejad said, "The political power of the occupiers is collapsing rapidly. Soon, we will see a huge power vacuum in the region. Of course, we are prepared to fill the gap, with the help of neighbors and regional friends like Saudi Arabia, and with the help of the Iraqi nation."
The Iranians are reacting to the emerging situation in Washington, which is leading the United States to effect a military drawdown of sorts in Iraq. As we have said, this leaves the Iranians with no incentive to negotiate with Washington over the future of Iraq. Instead, Iran is moving to take advantage of the expected security vacuum in Iraq and consolidate itself as the major power broker there.
But the Iranians are well aware that such a move will not be easy to pull off and will require Saudi cooperation. The Iranians intend to secure the Arab states' acknowledgement of Tehran's dominant role in Iraq -- a goal that will not come easily, to say the very least. Moreover, the United States is not about to allow Iran the space it needs to secure its interests in Iraq, as evidenced in the Bush administration's evolving Iraq policy, which we see shifting to a military strategy that will leave a residual force focused primarily on countering Iranian expansion in Iraq. Ahmadinejad's message to the Saudis is essentially stating that the inevitable U.S. withdrawal from Iraq will leave the Iranians in a prime position to dominate the country, and that their historical Arab/Sunni rivals in Riyadh will have no choice but to sue for peace -- on Tehran's terms.
Essentially, we are looking at the beginning of a full-scale and direct geopolitical struggle between Tehran and Riyadh over Baghdad as the United States redefines its mission in Iraq.
Tuesday, August 28, 2007
Musharraf's Changing Tactics
Musharraf may trade army post for re-election
By M. Ziauddin: Dawn, August 28, 2007
LONDON, Aug 27: President Gen Pervez Musharraf’s team of emissaries, led by ISI chief Lt Gen Ashfaq Kiani, and PPP Chairperson Benazir Bhutto are understood to have discussed, at a ‘final meeting’ here on Monday, the possibilities of convening an all-party conference for achieving a ‘grand national reconciliation’.
According to sources, President Musharraf has offered to doff the uniform even before the presidential elections. But in the trade-off, he wants all political parties to agree to elect him president for the next five years after the new assemblies come into being following the next general election.
He, however, is said to want the powers of the office of the president to remain untouched _ at least up to the end of his new term.
According to the sources, the package of offers being discussed at the meeting includes formation of a national government, which would then appoint a chief election commissioner by consensus.
The government’s negotiating team comprised, besides the ISI chief, the Secretary-General of National Security Council (NSC), President’s Chief of Staff Hamid Javed and the country’s LPG king Iqbal Z Ahmed.
The PPP team included, besides the chairperson, Makhdoom Amin Fahim and policeman-turned- business tycoon Rehman Malik.
The change of tack on the part of the government is said to have been forced by circumstances obtaining in the country after July 20 and now it is said to be trying desperately to retrieve the situation fearing that President Musharraf’s attempt to get himself re-elected in uniform by the present assemblies would be blocked by the judiciary and that such a development would present to the politically rehabilitated and highly charged Nawaz Sharif the chance of a lifetime to lead an agitation that could disrupt election plans and leave the army with no option but to impose martial law minus Gen Musharraf.
The package discussed at the meeting is understood to have also included Benazir Bhutto’s demand of a general amnesty for all political leaders and removal of the ban on two-time prime ministers and the president’s trade-off condition that the constitutional hurdles in the way of his candidature would also be removed.
CHANGE OF MIND: PPP insiders said that Ms Bhutto was gradually coming round to the thinking of most of her party’s senior members who believe that any power-sharing pact with the president at this juncture would greatly damage the party’s electoral chances.
The PPP sources said she seemed to have realised that by continuing her negotiations with Gen Musharraf, she was alienating most of the moderates in the country, most of whom have become hostile to the US after 9/11 and since the presidential move against the chief justice, do not want to see Gen Musharraf occupying the presidency any more.
“There is no way the two could help each other any more. Now by continuing to cling to each other they are only dragging themselves further down the drain,” said a PPP stalwart who was opposed to the deal from the very beginning.
He blamed the Americans for, what he said, delivering Ms Bhutto to Gen Musharraf and breaking up the ARD, which was ‘the most potent and winning political combination’. “The two (Ms Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif) would have received the widest national acclaim and support had they landed in Pakistan together and started implementing the Charter of Democracy, which is perhaps the best document ever produced by Pakistani politicians,” he remarked.
Also See: Bhutto: Musharraf to quit Pakistan Army: Telegraph, London
By M. Ziauddin: Dawn, August 28, 2007
LONDON, Aug 27: President Gen Pervez Musharraf’s team of emissaries, led by ISI chief Lt Gen Ashfaq Kiani, and PPP Chairperson Benazir Bhutto are understood to have discussed, at a ‘final meeting’ here on Monday, the possibilities of convening an all-party conference for achieving a ‘grand national reconciliation’.
According to sources, President Musharraf has offered to doff the uniform even before the presidential elections. But in the trade-off, he wants all political parties to agree to elect him president for the next five years after the new assemblies come into being following the next general election.
He, however, is said to want the powers of the office of the president to remain untouched _ at least up to the end of his new term.
According to the sources, the package of offers being discussed at the meeting includes formation of a national government, which would then appoint a chief election commissioner by consensus.
The government’s negotiating team comprised, besides the ISI chief, the Secretary-General of National Security Council (NSC), President’s Chief of Staff Hamid Javed and the country’s LPG king Iqbal Z Ahmed.
The PPP team included, besides the chairperson, Makhdoom Amin Fahim and policeman-turned- business tycoon Rehman Malik.
The change of tack on the part of the government is said to have been forced by circumstances obtaining in the country after July 20 and now it is said to be trying desperately to retrieve the situation fearing that President Musharraf’s attempt to get himself re-elected in uniform by the present assemblies would be blocked by the judiciary and that such a development would present to the politically rehabilitated and highly charged Nawaz Sharif the chance of a lifetime to lead an agitation that could disrupt election plans and leave the army with no option but to impose martial law minus Gen Musharraf.
The package discussed at the meeting is understood to have also included Benazir Bhutto’s demand of a general amnesty for all political leaders and removal of the ban on two-time prime ministers and the president’s trade-off condition that the constitutional hurdles in the way of his candidature would also be removed.
CHANGE OF MIND: PPP insiders said that Ms Bhutto was gradually coming round to the thinking of most of her party’s senior members who believe that any power-sharing pact with the president at this juncture would greatly damage the party’s electoral chances.
The PPP sources said she seemed to have realised that by continuing her negotiations with Gen Musharraf, she was alienating most of the moderates in the country, most of whom have become hostile to the US after 9/11 and since the presidential move against the chief justice, do not want to see Gen Musharraf occupying the presidency any more.
“There is no way the two could help each other any more. Now by continuing to cling to each other they are only dragging themselves further down the drain,” said a PPP stalwart who was opposed to the deal from the very beginning.
He blamed the Americans for, what he said, delivering Ms Bhutto to Gen Musharraf and breaking up the ARD, which was ‘the most potent and winning political combination’. “The two (Ms Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif) would have received the widest national acclaim and support had they landed in Pakistan together and started implementing the Charter of Democracy, which is perhaps the best document ever produced by Pakistani politicians,” he remarked.
Also See: Bhutto: Musharraf to quit Pakistan Army: Telegraph, London
Iran Resolves Plutonium issues with IAEA: Reuters
Iran resolves plutonium issues under atom pact - IAEA
Tue Aug 28, 2007: Reuters
By Mark Heinrich
VIENNA (Reuters) - Iran has resolved U.N. questions about tests with plutonium, a key fuel for atomic bombs, and the International Atomic Energy Agency considers the matter closed, according to the text of an IAEA-Iran accord released on Monday.
It would be the first major issue relating to the scope of Iran's disputed nuclear programme closed by the U.N. nuclear watchdog in a four-year investigation stonewalled up to now, with other questions to be settled within the next few months.
Iran and the IAEA reached a deal on Aug. 21 meant to clarify questions about indications of illicit attempts to make atomic bombs in Iran's declared drive for peaceful nuclear energy -- suspicions that helped lead to U.N. sanctions against Tehran.
The plan's other goal is to ensure regular, effective access for IAEA inspectors to Iran's underground uranium enrichment plant where it plans industrial production of nuclear fuel.
But Western diplomats said the plan was flawed for not committing Iran to resume observing the IAEA's Additional Protocol, which permits wider-ranging, short-notice inspections of sites not declared to be nuclear.
Western powers embroiled in a standoff with Iran over its refusal to heed U.N. resolutions demanding it stop nuclear work say there is no way to rule out the risk Iran might have a covert military nuclear facility without the Protocol in place.
And the plan also declares that once Iran had clarified the issues listed, the IAEA would declare there were "no remaining questions and ambiguities" about Iran's past activity, a gesture analysts called problematic without more sweeping inspections.
Iran has insisted that it seeks only electricity, not explosives, from enriched uranium.
The plan's text said IAEA officials judged last week that information given by Iran this summer abut its plutonium experiments was consistent with inspectors' findings.
"Thus this matter is resolved. This will be communicated officially by the Agency to Iran through a letter," it said, without specifying exactly how suspicions were defused.
Iran and the IAEA also agreed to forge a legally binding accord governing inspections at the expanding, underground Natanz enrichment complex by the end of September.
SHADOWY CENTRIFUGE RESEARCH
Iran would then explain shadowy efforts to build advanced P-2 centrifuges, which can enrich uranium 2-3 times as fast as the outmoded, breakdown-prone P-1 model it now uses. Iran committed to resolving the P-2 issue by November.
Iran committed to settling questions surrounding particles of weapons-grade enriched uranium found in Tehran's Technical University once the centrifuge matter was closed.
Other questions about Iranian activity to be closed, but without a deadline spelled out in the plan, included:
* What Iran did with a black-market document in Iran's possession describing how to machine uranium metal into hemisphere shapes suitable for the core of a bomb.
* Western intelligence about secret, administrative links between uranium processing, high explosives tests and a missile warhead design. Iran agreed, "as a sign of goodwill and cooperation", to examine the evidence that it previously rejected as "politically motivated and baseless allegations".
The IAEA has touted the plan as a "milestone" for having secured Iranian agreement to a timetable for transparency.
But a Western diplomat accredited to the IAEA said a weakness of the plan was its failure to spell out steps Iran would take to provide access "to people, places and documentation" needed for closure.
"The IAEA's (35-nation) board of governors has an obligation to ensure that, apart from resolving outstanding issues, confidence in Iran's nuclear program is rebuilt -- and that will take time, beyond December, and an Additional Protocol."
U.S. nuclear analyst David Albright told Reuters: "This plan looks problematic. Nothing in Iran justifies the IAEA pulling its punches without the Additional Protocol. You should never give up the right to ask further questions and follow up."
Also See, ISIS report (pdf) on the subject by clicking here
International Herald Tribune News analysis by clicking here
On Human Rights Issues in Iran, see
A Quiet Battle for Rights in Iran By Fotini Christia in Washington Post, August 28, 2007
New Political Hero of Pakistan
Justice and the general
Aug 27th 2007: From Economist.com
Our correspondent meets Ms Bhutto's best advocate
Monday: SOMETHING is eating Aitzaz Ahsan. He is a new star, a hero of a trampled-upon democracy—the most popular man in Pakistan, some say. With an election looming, Mr Ahsan, a lawyer and member of the opposition Pakistan People's Party (PPP), should be pitching for greatness. So why, sitting in his charmingly chaotic chambers in Lahore, amid stacks of paper smelling faintly of mildew in the monsoon air, does Mr Ahsan look so glum?
First, some background. Mr Ahsan acted for Pakistan's chief justice, Iftikhar Chaudhry, in a legal stand-off with General Pervez Musharraf that may have changed Pakistani history. In March General Musharraf tried to sack Mr Chaudhry. It seems he wanted a pliable top judge, which Mr Chaudhry, a vain and stubborn man, was not. But, in an act of civilian defiance previously unknown in Pakistan, Mr Chaudhry refused to go.
Cheering up slightly, Mr Ahsan proffers, unrequested, a few photographs of the scenes that ensued. After filing a challenge to his marching orders in the Supreme Court, Mr Chaudhry went on a grand tour. That is, he accepted invitations to address various of the country's bar associations. For this was not—you understand—a political protest.
Nonetheless, Mr Ahsan made sure that Mr Chaudhry visited, on the same day, every bar association to be found along Pakistan's main roads. In a twenty-hour crawl from Islamabad to Lahore—ostensibly to address bar associations en route – over 100,000 people turned out to cheer Mr Chaudhry.
Mr Ahsan displays photographs of that day. The chief justice—or "CJ", as Pakistanis call him—is barely visible behind a wind-screen strewn with pink rose-petals. A few lawyers, in their funereal uniform of black jacket, black tie and white shirt, dance upon his car's bonnet. A throng of thousands presses in from the sides, waving Pakistani flags, PPP flags, the flags of all Pakistan's put-upon political parties.
Mr Ahsan suffered that day. He says he lost 8 pounds (3.5 kg) in sweat, after the car's air-conditioner became choked with petals. Yet he looks well on it—in a chiselled photo of himself superimposed upon another of the flag-waving throng, using a dreamscape technique popular in Communist regimes and Bollywood.
The photo shows Mr Ahsan microphone in hand, denouncing General Musharraf's rule. And indeed, it was he who took the CJ's battle to the masses. Mr Chaudhry, his lawyer concedes, is not much of a public speaker. Mr Ahsan is. And for this reason alone, no one won richer congratulations than he last month when the CJ was reinstated by his peers. So why the long face, Mr Ahsan?
For one, rather like Maximus Decimus Meridius (Russell Crowe) in the film Gladiator, Mr Ahsan may have made himself a little too popular for his caesar's liking. His caesar is Benazir Bhutto, the PPP's leader, a former prime minister and the exiled daughter of the party's martyred former leader, Zulfiqar Ali.
Well, that is the conjecture, widely-believed in Pakistan. What is certain, however, is that even as Mr Ahsan was denouncing the "dictatorship" of General Musharraf, Ms Bhutto was negotiating a power-sharing deal with him.
Here is a glory of Pakistani politics. Even during two stints at the helm of Pakistan, Ms Bhutto, the leader of Pakistan's biggest and most liberal party, was willing to co-operate with the generals who man its guns. Now marooned, a fugitive in Dubai for almost a decade, she has looked ready to compromise again—if General Musharraf would only let her clamber back on-board.
America and Britain, important allies of the general, like the look of this accord. They want General Musharraf to remain in charge, at a time of Islamist strife in Pakistan. But they also want him to have more plausibly democratic and liberal support. That is to say, Ms Bhutto.
And here is another glory. Ms Bhutto, educated at Harvard and Oxford, sells herself as a die-hard liberal. And no doubt, in her personal beliefs, she is. Yet most liberal—which is to say, Westernised—Pakistanis, who mostly vote PPP, nonetheless grimace to hear her name.
There is nothing liberal about Ms Bhutto's running of her party, which she lords over like the Sindhi feudal leader that she is. During her eight years of absence from Pakistan, it has fallen into decline. Yet she has refused to countenance handing power to another leader.
Nor did Ms Bhutto's performance in power do much to inspire confidence. Even enemies of General Musharraf—of whom there are now many in Pakistan—tend not to demur when he accuses her of having looted the country.
Yet the problem for many liberal Pakistanis is the other guy—Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan's other exiled ex-prime-minister. As leader of the opposition Pakistan Muslim League party (Nawaz), Mr Sharif presided over regimes that were about as corrupt as Ms Bhutto's, and more vindictive.
On his watch, dissidents were locked up and beaten. At the time that Mr Sharif was removed by General Musharraf in a coup, in 1999, he was trying to introduce sharia law—of which he was to be the final arbiter.
Now both Ms Bhutto and Mr Sharif are contemplating returning to Pakistan. And General Musharraf is looking weaker by the day—not least because of the judgements that the CJ has been dishing out. Last week, for example, he decreed that Mr Sharif was free to return home from exile, though General Musharraf had said he was not.
If Mr Sharif does return—and he says that he will do so within days—Ms Bhutto might quickly follow him. There might then be no deal between herself and General Musharraf. Instead, there will be more showers of pink petals and heady talk of democracy restored. That would be good for Pakistan, most of its inhabitants agree. But Mr Ahsan will not be alone in his discomfort.
Changing Political Scenario in Pakistan
VIEW: Confrontation or reconciliation? —Rasul Bakhsh Rais
Daily Times, August 28, 2007
Three decisions of the Supreme Court of Pakistan — restoration of the chief justice; the missing persons’ case; and the Sharifs’ right of return to Pakistan — have rapidly changed Pakistan’s political scene. None of these decisions have made President General Pervez Musharraf and his political allies happy. Indeed, the political fallout of the independence of the judiciary, which these decisions amply demonstrate, has vitiated the environment for the regime.
The regime has faced continuous shocks since the refusal of the chief justice to step down on March 9 when he was summoned to the president’s camp office and asked to resign. In taking the decision to send the CJ home and later compounding that folly, the regime and its advisors utterly failed to understand the anger of the people over the dismissal of the chief justice and his public humiliation by security officials.
While public resentment against the regime was already accumulating and ran much deeper than the judiciary issue, it had earlier found little in terms of a political outlet. The CJ became a political event, a figure in the rallies organised by the lawyers’ community and an opportunity for the public to participate in them. And they did, in numbers that even a current political leader in Pakistan wouldn’t expect.
The rallies led by the lawyers damaged the regime in a number of ways. It exposed the most significant weaknesses of the regime; notably that it had no support in the enlightened and moderate civil society of Pakistan, which by any standard has been supportive of human rights, constitutionalism and democracy in the country. It is better to refer to these rallies as a social movement because it involved all other liberal sectors of society and politics on the sidelines, playing a very meaningful role. Each successful rally softened the political atmosphere, keeping the regime defensive and its supporters apologetic; even treasury members shied away from openly supporting the president’s decision against the CJ knowing it would amount to political hara-kiri.
While trying to defuse the situation as best he could, Musharraf, with his eyes set on re-election, turned to Benazir Bhutto using common local and foreign friends to broker a political deal. Both leaders, after some initial understanding, began to highlight in their statements and speeches that the political confrontation in Pakistan is between the moderate, enlightened sectors and the religious extremists. Many of us believe that extremism in Pakistan, whether ethnic, sectarian or religious, is not an independent factor but one of the adverse consequences of suffocating politics through an autocratic party system and prolonged political manipulations by the military. Musharraf has failed to convince any reasonable Pakistani that the emerging confrontation is not between the democratic forces and the military dictatorship.
If not Bhutto herself, her party leaders at the middle rung of the hierarchy do understand the real political challenge that Pakistan faces today: making a transition to democratic, constitutional rule and pushing the military back to the barracks.
Despite efforts to hide from the public the kind of political deal Bhutto has been negotiating, many believe is more about her personal concerns than the long-term interests of democracy or her Pakistan People’s Party. Her party workers, who have carried on the anti-establishment, progressive legacy, know how they would lose out to their political rivals even with the slightest hint of any alignment with Musharraf. Already, rumours of a political deal and the Abu Dhabi meeting between Bhutto and Musharraf have damaged the public standing of the PPP.
On the other hand, the Sharif brothers who many had written off, at least for the next general elections, have risen, phoenix-like from their ashes in the wake of the SC decision which has confirmed their rights as Pakistani citizens to return to the country. Anyone with the most basic understanding of the constitution would know that a citizen cannot contract himself out of rights granted by the constitution. But the government and its attorney general, himself a former high court judge, kept insisting that the Sharif brothers had a contractual obligation to stay out of the country for ten years. This was yet another confused and botched up response to an issue of fundamental constitutional rights.
The political tide in Pakistan has turned decisively against the regime and in favour of the Sharif brothers. The public mood in Pakistan, more in Punjab than perhaps the other provinces, favours Sharif because of the uncompromising line he has taken against the regime. The extent to which he is willing to push his hard line is not clear, though. He has sent mixed signals on reconciliation, extending an olive branch to the regime on the condition that Musharraf would not be a presidential candidate. This amounts to asking Musharraf to surrender, which may force the latter’s hand into upsetting normal politics. That could plunge the country into a deadly confrontation.
The fast-evolving political situation of the country has exciting possibilities of peaceful transition as well as frightening prospects of political confrontation. The responsibility for peaceful change rests on all major actors: the judiciary; the military leadership; and the leaders of the two major political parties.
Sharif is caught between the temptation to take the high tide and the fear that confrontation could lead to serious consequences. While he appears indecisive, his hawkish party leaders are upbeat and insist that he return immediately. Nawaz Sharif, now a major actor in this political drama, carries more responsibility than others. The political choices and the moves he makes will largely determine whether there is a peaceful transition or confrontation.
The author is a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at rasul@lums.edu.pk
Daily Times, August 28, 2007
Three decisions of the Supreme Court of Pakistan — restoration of the chief justice; the missing persons’ case; and the Sharifs’ right of return to Pakistan — have rapidly changed Pakistan’s political scene. None of these decisions have made President General Pervez Musharraf and his political allies happy. Indeed, the political fallout of the independence of the judiciary, which these decisions amply demonstrate, has vitiated the environment for the regime.
The regime has faced continuous shocks since the refusal of the chief justice to step down on March 9 when he was summoned to the president’s camp office and asked to resign. In taking the decision to send the CJ home and later compounding that folly, the regime and its advisors utterly failed to understand the anger of the people over the dismissal of the chief justice and his public humiliation by security officials.
While public resentment against the regime was already accumulating and ran much deeper than the judiciary issue, it had earlier found little in terms of a political outlet. The CJ became a political event, a figure in the rallies organised by the lawyers’ community and an opportunity for the public to participate in them. And they did, in numbers that even a current political leader in Pakistan wouldn’t expect.
The rallies led by the lawyers damaged the regime in a number of ways. It exposed the most significant weaknesses of the regime; notably that it had no support in the enlightened and moderate civil society of Pakistan, which by any standard has been supportive of human rights, constitutionalism and democracy in the country. It is better to refer to these rallies as a social movement because it involved all other liberal sectors of society and politics on the sidelines, playing a very meaningful role. Each successful rally softened the political atmosphere, keeping the regime defensive and its supporters apologetic; even treasury members shied away from openly supporting the president’s decision against the CJ knowing it would amount to political hara-kiri.
While trying to defuse the situation as best he could, Musharraf, with his eyes set on re-election, turned to Benazir Bhutto using common local and foreign friends to broker a political deal. Both leaders, after some initial understanding, began to highlight in their statements and speeches that the political confrontation in Pakistan is between the moderate, enlightened sectors and the religious extremists. Many of us believe that extremism in Pakistan, whether ethnic, sectarian or religious, is not an independent factor but one of the adverse consequences of suffocating politics through an autocratic party system and prolonged political manipulations by the military. Musharraf has failed to convince any reasonable Pakistani that the emerging confrontation is not between the democratic forces and the military dictatorship.
If not Bhutto herself, her party leaders at the middle rung of the hierarchy do understand the real political challenge that Pakistan faces today: making a transition to democratic, constitutional rule and pushing the military back to the barracks.
Despite efforts to hide from the public the kind of political deal Bhutto has been negotiating, many believe is more about her personal concerns than the long-term interests of democracy or her Pakistan People’s Party. Her party workers, who have carried on the anti-establishment, progressive legacy, know how they would lose out to their political rivals even with the slightest hint of any alignment with Musharraf. Already, rumours of a political deal and the Abu Dhabi meeting between Bhutto and Musharraf have damaged the public standing of the PPP.
On the other hand, the Sharif brothers who many had written off, at least for the next general elections, have risen, phoenix-like from their ashes in the wake of the SC decision which has confirmed their rights as Pakistani citizens to return to the country. Anyone with the most basic understanding of the constitution would know that a citizen cannot contract himself out of rights granted by the constitution. But the government and its attorney general, himself a former high court judge, kept insisting that the Sharif brothers had a contractual obligation to stay out of the country for ten years. This was yet another confused and botched up response to an issue of fundamental constitutional rights.
The political tide in Pakistan has turned decisively against the regime and in favour of the Sharif brothers. The public mood in Pakistan, more in Punjab than perhaps the other provinces, favours Sharif because of the uncompromising line he has taken against the regime. The extent to which he is willing to push his hard line is not clear, though. He has sent mixed signals on reconciliation, extending an olive branch to the regime on the condition that Musharraf would not be a presidential candidate. This amounts to asking Musharraf to surrender, which may force the latter’s hand into upsetting normal politics. That could plunge the country into a deadly confrontation.
The fast-evolving political situation of the country has exciting possibilities of peaceful transition as well as frightening prospects of political confrontation. The responsibility for peaceful change rests on all major actors: the judiciary; the military leadership; and the leaders of the two major political parties.
Sharif is caught between the temptation to take the high tide and the fear that confrontation could lead to serious consequences. While he appears indecisive, his hawkish party leaders are upbeat and insist that he return immediately. Nawaz Sharif, now a major actor in this political drama, carries more responsibility than others. The political choices and the moves he makes will largely determine whether there is a peaceful transition or confrontation.
The author is a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at rasul@lums.edu.pk
Record Production of Opium in Afghanistan: Who is Responsible?
UN reports record production of opium in Afghanistan
By Masood Haider: Dawn, August 28, 2007
UNITED NATIONS, Aug 27: Opium production in Afghanistan has hit a record $3 billion this year, accounting for more than 90 per cent of the world’s illegal output, a United Nations report said on Monday.
The production concentrated mainly in the strife-torn south of the country, where the Taliban, who once banned poppy cultivation, now profited from the drug trade, the report alleged.
The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) showed that the area under opium cultivation rose to 193,000 hectares from 165,000 in 2006, while the harvest soared by more than a third to 8,200 tons from 6,100 tons.
The amount of Afghan land used for growing opium was larger than the total under coca cultivation in Latin America, it said.
No other country has produced narcotics on such a scale since China in the 19th century, the report said.
But the number of opium-free provinces in the centre and north of the country more than doubled from six to 13, revealing an intensification of markedly divergent trends between the north and south.
UNODC Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa called for a more determined effort by the Afghan government and the international community to combat the threats of drugs and insurgency by building upon promising developments in the north and reacting to the dismal failures in the south.
In the centre and north, where the government has increased its authority and presence, cultivation is dropping. In Balkh province cultivation collapsed from 7,200 hectares last year to zero.
By contrast, 80 per cent of opium poppies were grown in a handful of southern provinces along the border with Pakistan.
In Helmand, cultivation rose by 48 per cent to 102,770 hectares. With a population of 2.5 million, Helmand has become the world’s biggest source of illicit drugs, surpassing the output of entire countries like Colombia (coca), Morocco (cannabis) and Myanmar (opium).
Poverty could not be used as an excuse for growing poppy, Mr Costa said. Some of the most fertile regions in the south had become the opium-producing heartland while poorer provinces in the centre and north, where per capita income was half that of the south, were opium-free.
“Opium cultivation is inversely related to the degree of government control. Where anti-government forces reign, poppies flourish,” he said, noting that the Taliban had reversed their edict of 2000 banning cultivation. “What used to be considered a sin is now being encouraged.” But UNODC village surveys indicated that the main reason farmers chose not to grow poppies was that they consider it against Islam. “Only 14 per cent of the population is involved in opium cultivation. The vast majority of Afghans want to turn their country away from drugs and crime. They deserve our support,” Mr Costa said. He called for higher rewards for non-opium farmers.
“Assistance is plentiful but not being disbursed fast enough. I see a risk of some provinces sliding back to poppy cultivation,” he noted.
He underlined the need for greater deterrents to dissuade farmers from planting opium, and an end to collusion that enabled rich landlords to evade eradication. A no-opium pledge should be embedded in all development aid programmes. He also urged the Afghan government to get tough on corruption.
By Masood Haider: Dawn, August 28, 2007
UNITED NATIONS, Aug 27: Opium production in Afghanistan has hit a record $3 billion this year, accounting for more than 90 per cent of the world’s illegal output, a United Nations report said on Monday.
The production concentrated mainly in the strife-torn south of the country, where the Taliban, who once banned poppy cultivation, now profited from the drug trade, the report alleged.
The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) showed that the area under opium cultivation rose to 193,000 hectares from 165,000 in 2006, while the harvest soared by more than a third to 8,200 tons from 6,100 tons.
The amount of Afghan land used for growing opium was larger than the total under coca cultivation in Latin America, it said.
No other country has produced narcotics on such a scale since China in the 19th century, the report said.
But the number of opium-free provinces in the centre and north of the country more than doubled from six to 13, revealing an intensification of markedly divergent trends between the north and south.
UNODC Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa called for a more determined effort by the Afghan government and the international community to combat the threats of drugs and insurgency by building upon promising developments in the north and reacting to the dismal failures in the south.
In the centre and north, where the government has increased its authority and presence, cultivation is dropping. In Balkh province cultivation collapsed from 7,200 hectares last year to zero.
By contrast, 80 per cent of opium poppies were grown in a handful of southern provinces along the border with Pakistan.
In Helmand, cultivation rose by 48 per cent to 102,770 hectares. With a population of 2.5 million, Helmand has become the world’s biggest source of illicit drugs, surpassing the output of entire countries like Colombia (coca), Morocco (cannabis) and Myanmar (opium).
Poverty could not be used as an excuse for growing poppy, Mr Costa said. Some of the most fertile regions in the south had become the opium-producing heartland while poorer provinces in the centre and north, where per capita income was half that of the south, were opium-free.
“Opium cultivation is inversely related to the degree of government control. Where anti-government forces reign, poppies flourish,” he said, noting that the Taliban had reversed their edict of 2000 banning cultivation. “What used to be considered a sin is now being encouraged.” But UNODC village surveys indicated that the main reason farmers chose not to grow poppies was that they consider it against Islam. “Only 14 per cent of the population is involved in opium cultivation. The vast majority of Afghans want to turn their country away from drugs and crime. They deserve our support,” Mr Costa said. He called for higher rewards for non-opium farmers.
“Assistance is plentiful but not being disbursed fast enough. I see a risk of some provinces sliding back to poppy cultivation,” he noted.
He underlined the need for greater deterrents to dissuade farmers from planting opium, and an end to collusion that enabled rich landlords to evade eradication. A no-opium pledge should be embedded in all development aid programmes. He also urged the Afghan government to get tough on corruption.
Monday, August 27, 2007
Winning Hearts and Minds of Muslims: The US Military Needs Help!
US military regrets ‘blasphemous’ ball for Afghans
Daily Times, August 28, 2007
KABUL: The US military in Afghanistan on Monday expressed regret for a publicity campaign aimed at winning hearts and minds that offended scores of Muslims.
US troops on Friday dropped dozens of free footballs for soccer-mad Afghan children from helicopters in an area of southeastern Afghanistan, all marked with flags of various countries.
But some of the balls depicted the Saudi Arabian flag, which features the Islamic declaration of faith and includes the names of Allah and the Holy Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him). The idea of kicking something bearing their names is considered deeply offensive to Muslims.
“This ball...carries a message with it which, like an atom bomb, can cause carnage and insecurity in all parts of Afghanistan,” a leading Afghan private daily, Cheragh, said on Monday.
Fawad Ahmad, a shopkeeper in Kabul, said, “Americans themselves create insecurity by ignoring religious sensitivity, it is against Islam.” A spokeswoman for the US military in Afghanistan said the ball distribution was part of a “goodwill humanitarian aid mission...for the enjoyment of Afghan children”. Captain Vanessa Bowman said the military had been unaware of the sensitivity of the issue. “We do regret any disturbances caused,” she added.
In the past few years Afghans have staged sometimes-bloody protests against the desecration of copies of the Quran by US soldiers at Guantanamo bay, the printing of cartoons featuring the Holy Prophet (PBUH) in Western media and the spiriting-away of an Afghan Christian convert after intervention from Western rulers. reuters
Daily Times, August 28, 2007
KABUL: The US military in Afghanistan on Monday expressed regret for a publicity campaign aimed at winning hearts and minds that offended scores of Muslims.
US troops on Friday dropped dozens of free footballs for soccer-mad Afghan children from helicopters in an area of southeastern Afghanistan, all marked with flags of various countries.
But some of the balls depicted the Saudi Arabian flag, which features the Islamic declaration of faith and includes the names of Allah and the Holy Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him). The idea of kicking something bearing their names is considered deeply offensive to Muslims.
“This ball...carries a message with it which, like an atom bomb, can cause carnage and insecurity in all parts of Afghanistan,” a leading Afghan private daily, Cheragh, said on Monday.
Fawad Ahmad, a shopkeeper in Kabul, said, “Americans themselves create insecurity by ignoring religious sensitivity, it is against Islam.” A spokeswoman for the US military in Afghanistan said the ball distribution was part of a “goodwill humanitarian aid mission...for the enjoyment of Afghan children”. Captain Vanessa Bowman said the military had been unaware of the sensitivity of the issue. “We do regret any disturbances caused,” she added.
In the past few years Afghans have staged sometimes-bloody protests against the desecration of copies of the Quran by US soldiers at Guantanamo bay, the printing of cartoons featuring the Holy Prophet (PBUH) in Western media and the spiriting-away of an Afghan Christian convert after intervention from Western rulers. reuters
The Case of Karachi
‘The Case of Karachi’ seminar: A minority should not rule Sindh: former CJP
Staff Report: Daily Times, August 27, 2007
KARACHI: A minority wants to rule the majority, as far as the problem of Karachi in particular and Sindh in general is concerned, argued former Chief Justice of Pakistan Justice (retired) Sajjad Ali Shah, while cautioning that earlier Bangladesh had separated because a minority wanted to rule a majority. “Karachi can’t live without Sindh.”
Justice Sajjad Ali Shah was one of the 22 old residents of Karachi who were invited by the Karachi Shehri Ittehad to speak on ‘The Case of Karachi’ at a local hotel Sunday. Illahi Bux Soomro, Justice Rashid A Rizvi and Hussain Haroon also offered input.
Justice Sajjad Ali Shah suggested that the number of seats in the National Assembly should be the same all the provinces, a policy that would address a sense of deprivation such as that Balochistan is feeling while it has reached “a point of separation”. “The doctrine of necessity should be abolished for ever and the work of secret agencies should be under the fold of the law,” he added.
Justice Rashid A Rizvi argued that the problems Karachi faces didn’t start in 2007. “They are from 1947 when migration started,” he said, adding that people from across Pakistan stopped coming to Karachi after terrorism peaked in the 1980s, but at that time the police and local administration were against the terrorists. He was extremely critical of the way May 12 unfolded as far as today’s administration was concerned.
Furthermore, the country’s problems can’t be resolved till military dictatorships did not end. He argued that the Rangers were working under the command of those who were against Karachi and thus they should go back to their original duties.
Former National Assembly speaker Illahi Bux Soomro told the audience that when he was in charge of Karachi’s development before 1970, a town planning team called from the United Nations and prepared a map fixing the boundaries of Karachi. They said that Karachi should not expand beyond them but that plan was thrown in the dustbin, he said. He added that the “authority of the Chief Minister of Sindh has been reduced and that post has become a joke now”.
Pakistan FisherFolk Forum’s Mohammad Ali Shah argued that Karachi was being deprived of its historical right in the name of development. He gave the example of the graves of the Moriro brothers at Gulbai.
Journalist Sabihuddin Ghausi pointed out that the Rangers had occupied the city for the last 15 years. Visitor from Mumbai Vishandas said that one would find that the people’s blood was the same on both sides. “If the Berlin Wall can be destroyed than why not the same with us,” he said while referring to the difficulties people had in traveling between both countries.
Staff Report: Daily Times, August 27, 2007
KARACHI: A minority wants to rule the majority, as far as the problem of Karachi in particular and Sindh in general is concerned, argued former Chief Justice of Pakistan Justice (retired) Sajjad Ali Shah, while cautioning that earlier Bangladesh had separated because a minority wanted to rule a majority. “Karachi can’t live without Sindh.”
Justice Sajjad Ali Shah was one of the 22 old residents of Karachi who were invited by the Karachi Shehri Ittehad to speak on ‘The Case of Karachi’ at a local hotel Sunday. Illahi Bux Soomro, Justice Rashid A Rizvi and Hussain Haroon also offered input.
Justice Sajjad Ali Shah suggested that the number of seats in the National Assembly should be the same all the provinces, a policy that would address a sense of deprivation such as that Balochistan is feeling while it has reached “a point of separation”. “The doctrine of necessity should be abolished for ever and the work of secret agencies should be under the fold of the law,” he added.
Justice Rashid A Rizvi argued that the problems Karachi faces didn’t start in 2007. “They are from 1947 when migration started,” he said, adding that people from across Pakistan stopped coming to Karachi after terrorism peaked in the 1980s, but at that time the police and local administration were against the terrorists. He was extremely critical of the way May 12 unfolded as far as today’s administration was concerned.
Furthermore, the country’s problems can’t be resolved till military dictatorships did not end. He argued that the Rangers were working under the command of those who were against Karachi and thus they should go back to their original duties.
Former National Assembly speaker Illahi Bux Soomro told the audience that when he was in charge of Karachi’s development before 1970, a town planning team called from the United Nations and prepared a map fixing the boundaries of Karachi. They said that Karachi should not expand beyond them but that plan was thrown in the dustbin, he said. He added that the “authority of the Chief Minister of Sindh has been reduced and that post has become a joke now”.
Pakistan FisherFolk Forum’s Mohammad Ali Shah argued that Karachi was being deprived of its historical right in the name of development. He gave the example of the graves of the Moriro brothers at Gulbai.
Journalist Sabihuddin Ghausi pointed out that the Rangers had occupied the city for the last 15 years. Visitor from Mumbai Vishandas said that one would find that the people’s blood was the same on both sides. “If the Berlin Wall can be destroyed than why not the same with us,” he said while referring to the difficulties people had in traveling between both countries.
Is Pakistan Army an Efficient Institution?
Military Inc. author feels safer in Karachi not Islamabad
By Urooj Zia: Daily Times, August 27, 2007
KARACHI: Karachi looks like a much safer city, observed best-selling military analyst Dr Ayesha Siddiqa Agha, whose new book ‘Military Inc. – Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy’ sold 10,000 copies within its first month. “I think all cities of Pakistan where ‘people’ live, are much safer. I spent almost my entire life in Lahore and I felt much safer there than I do in Islamabad.”
The military analyst, who argues that it is high time the military was sent back to the barracks, talked about her book and answered questions on the military business at a discussion organised Saturday evening at The Second Floor.
‘Military Inc.’ was effectively ‘banned’ by the government even before it was released on May 31. Oxford University Press (OUP) director Amina Saiyid spoke about how difficult it had been to book any public place in Islamabad to host the launch. Siddiqa added how the book is being touted as part of a larger conspiracy to malign the armed forces and destroy the image of Pakistan. “Of course, my claim is that I intend to do none of this. You need a much stronger person for this – I can’t.”
What instead, the best-selling military analyst has tried to do, is understand the political structure of Pakistan, and understand why the military has always remained so powerful for 60 years. The book took her up to five years to write.
‘Military Inc.’ talks about the concept of military capital. As military capital has grown, so has the military’s need to stay in power, politically. The military engaged in economics because of its political power, and not vice versa. The reason why the military in Pakistan tries to maintain power, however, is rooted in political economy, and the fact that economic laws are made according to the preferences [and for the benefit of] the ruling elite.
One argument is that if Musharraf were not in power, who would be? The other options, people claim, are corrupt political leaders. “We have to see the opportunity cost of keeping the military in power – of subsidising its capital, mainly through taxpayers’ money,” Dr Siddiqa argued.
The defence budget is one minor portion of the entire military capital that has become extremely visible, especially in the past 15 to 20 years. Along with this has grown the corporate image of the military. This corporate image, Dr Siddiqa said, has a formal presence (in the form of the five welfare foundations), as well as an informal one, and then there are individual members at the third level, and this is where political power is “critical”.
“The last I heard, they’re even running a beauty parlour. I think they should start looking at marriage bureaus now – that should be a step too,” she quipped.
These interests are run by the ‘military fraternity’ of serving members, retired members, as well as members of civil society directly dependent on military businesses. “Military capital is part of a ‘kleptocratic’ distribution of resources – distribution among the military fraternity. And I would like to underscore that this includes significant members of civil society as well,” Dr Siddiqa said. The size of this capital is not determinable, however, because of limited transparency.
Among the biggest excuses used by the military is that this is done for welfare, the price all countries pay for defence. But what exactly should be the price paid, and secondly, who determines what is ‘enough’? “[’The military] is no longer a benign, subservient institution. It is a powerful institution which is demanding a pound of flesh – an equal share in policy-making and the State itself.”
In the book, Dr Siddiqa said, she has attempted to create a third category of “how militaries are”. “There exists literature about two kinds of militaries. I’ve come up with a third kind – to define the military in Pakistan, Turkey and Indonesia. This is what I call a ‘parent-guardian’ military. It calls up, creates and generates stories, not just in the economy but also in politics,” she said. It uses its partnership and creates constitutional and legal mannerisms to continue to remain in power. Examples include Article 58 – 2 (b), etc, which give it equal status with decision-making bodies. So there’s no concept of ‘returning to the barracks.’ When you ask it to return to the barracks, you have to be very specific.”
Her beef with them is over the argument that they are very efficient, they use what she calls the ‘national saviour paradigm’: Because the military is more efficient, it cares more about the sovereignty of the State, so it is a comparatively better organisation to be at the helm of affairs. The book shows, however, that the military is not as efficient as it claims to be. “A greater concern, however, is the opportunity cost of military economy. They give rise to ‘cronyism’ – because you have to reward your own kind, you allow other significant groups to reward themselves too; the cause and affect of ‘cronyism’,” Dr Siddiqa explained. “Is it a coincidence that every time the issue of real estate being awarded to generals is brought up, you immediately have a soft response, with housing schemes coming up for the judiciary, civil bureaucracy, the journalists, etc? Basically, it is like saying is that if I give you the same thing, you cannot point a finger at me… And this is happening in a country that has about 20 million landless peasants; a country [with] a shortage of four million houses. This is kleptocracy as its best.”
This also deepens the military’s political interest to remain in power. “I tell you, if the military is generous, it will at least admit that my book has at least brought them together,” Dr Siddiqa said. The reason for this sudden unity is to maintain the hegemony of the organisation – to allow it to remain at the helm of affairs; to allow it to dictate the distribution of resources. “Why then would this power be reduced? Why would they want to see that power brought down? And that is the more real opportunity cost.”
In order to bring this power down, Dr Siddiqa proposed two ‘conservative’ conclusions. “There has to be a mass movement, with the help from outside. The other hypothesis is that is it just a coincidence that in all three countries (Pakistan, Turkey and Indonesia), an increase in military power has come side by side with an increase in religious conservatism?”
She hastened to add that she never claimed to have all the answers. The book is just a researcher’s effort and a work in progress. Over the next couple of years, Pakistan has to answer one question: how do we get them to go back to the barracks?
Siddiqa’s talk was followed by a discussion about whether milbus (military business) was “business as usual”. Political economist Dr Asad Sayeed and Engro Chemicals CEO Asad Umer presented their arguments about the book. Four important points were put up: whether milbus distracts the military from its main function, whether it creates an incentive for the military to remain in power, whether it creates an uneven playing field for competing business ventures, and whether milbus results in the non-transparent allocation of taxpayer resources.
During the Q&A session, Dr Siddiqa was repeatedly asked to clarify her notion of “mass movement”. One questioner asked whether the military could be made to let go of its capital ventures and sent back to the barracks under capitalism. However, for several reasons none of these and related questions could be answered fully.
By Urooj Zia: Daily Times, August 27, 2007
KARACHI: Karachi looks like a much safer city, observed best-selling military analyst Dr Ayesha Siddiqa Agha, whose new book ‘Military Inc. – Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy’ sold 10,000 copies within its first month. “I think all cities of Pakistan where ‘people’ live, are much safer. I spent almost my entire life in Lahore and I felt much safer there than I do in Islamabad.”
The military analyst, who argues that it is high time the military was sent back to the barracks, talked about her book and answered questions on the military business at a discussion organised Saturday evening at The Second Floor.
‘Military Inc.’ was effectively ‘banned’ by the government even before it was released on May 31. Oxford University Press (OUP) director Amina Saiyid spoke about how difficult it had been to book any public place in Islamabad to host the launch. Siddiqa added how the book is being touted as part of a larger conspiracy to malign the armed forces and destroy the image of Pakistan. “Of course, my claim is that I intend to do none of this. You need a much stronger person for this – I can’t.”
What instead, the best-selling military analyst has tried to do, is understand the political structure of Pakistan, and understand why the military has always remained so powerful for 60 years. The book took her up to five years to write.
‘Military Inc.’ talks about the concept of military capital. As military capital has grown, so has the military’s need to stay in power, politically. The military engaged in economics because of its political power, and not vice versa. The reason why the military in Pakistan tries to maintain power, however, is rooted in political economy, and the fact that economic laws are made according to the preferences [and for the benefit of] the ruling elite.
One argument is that if Musharraf were not in power, who would be? The other options, people claim, are corrupt political leaders. “We have to see the opportunity cost of keeping the military in power – of subsidising its capital, mainly through taxpayers’ money,” Dr Siddiqa argued.
The defence budget is one minor portion of the entire military capital that has become extremely visible, especially in the past 15 to 20 years. Along with this has grown the corporate image of the military. This corporate image, Dr Siddiqa said, has a formal presence (in the form of the five welfare foundations), as well as an informal one, and then there are individual members at the third level, and this is where political power is “critical”.
“The last I heard, they’re even running a beauty parlour. I think they should start looking at marriage bureaus now – that should be a step too,” she quipped.
These interests are run by the ‘military fraternity’ of serving members, retired members, as well as members of civil society directly dependent on military businesses. “Military capital is part of a ‘kleptocratic’ distribution of resources – distribution among the military fraternity. And I would like to underscore that this includes significant members of civil society as well,” Dr Siddiqa said. The size of this capital is not determinable, however, because of limited transparency.
Among the biggest excuses used by the military is that this is done for welfare, the price all countries pay for defence. But what exactly should be the price paid, and secondly, who determines what is ‘enough’? “[’The military] is no longer a benign, subservient institution. It is a powerful institution which is demanding a pound of flesh – an equal share in policy-making and the State itself.”
In the book, Dr Siddiqa said, she has attempted to create a third category of “how militaries are”. “There exists literature about two kinds of militaries. I’ve come up with a third kind – to define the military in Pakistan, Turkey and Indonesia. This is what I call a ‘parent-guardian’ military. It calls up, creates and generates stories, not just in the economy but also in politics,” she said. It uses its partnership and creates constitutional and legal mannerisms to continue to remain in power. Examples include Article 58 – 2 (b), etc, which give it equal status with decision-making bodies. So there’s no concept of ‘returning to the barracks.’ When you ask it to return to the barracks, you have to be very specific.”
Her beef with them is over the argument that they are very efficient, they use what she calls the ‘national saviour paradigm’: Because the military is more efficient, it cares more about the sovereignty of the State, so it is a comparatively better organisation to be at the helm of affairs. The book shows, however, that the military is not as efficient as it claims to be. “A greater concern, however, is the opportunity cost of military economy. They give rise to ‘cronyism’ – because you have to reward your own kind, you allow other significant groups to reward themselves too; the cause and affect of ‘cronyism’,” Dr Siddiqa explained. “Is it a coincidence that every time the issue of real estate being awarded to generals is brought up, you immediately have a soft response, with housing schemes coming up for the judiciary, civil bureaucracy, the journalists, etc? Basically, it is like saying is that if I give you the same thing, you cannot point a finger at me… And this is happening in a country that has about 20 million landless peasants; a country [with] a shortage of four million houses. This is kleptocracy as its best.”
This also deepens the military’s political interest to remain in power. “I tell you, if the military is generous, it will at least admit that my book has at least brought them together,” Dr Siddiqa said. The reason for this sudden unity is to maintain the hegemony of the organisation – to allow it to remain at the helm of affairs; to allow it to dictate the distribution of resources. “Why then would this power be reduced? Why would they want to see that power brought down? And that is the more real opportunity cost.”
In order to bring this power down, Dr Siddiqa proposed two ‘conservative’ conclusions. “There has to be a mass movement, with the help from outside. The other hypothesis is that is it just a coincidence that in all three countries (Pakistan, Turkey and Indonesia), an increase in military power has come side by side with an increase in religious conservatism?”
She hastened to add that she never claimed to have all the answers. The book is just a researcher’s effort and a work in progress. Over the next couple of years, Pakistan has to answer one question: how do we get them to go back to the barracks?
Siddiqa’s talk was followed by a discussion about whether milbus (military business) was “business as usual”. Political economist Dr Asad Sayeed and Engro Chemicals CEO Asad Umer presented their arguments about the book. Four important points were put up: whether milbus distracts the military from its main function, whether it creates an incentive for the military to remain in power, whether it creates an uneven playing field for competing business ventures, and whether milbus results in the non-transparent allocation of taxpayer resources.
During the Q&A session, Dr Siddiqa was repeatedly asked to clarify her notion of “mass movement”. One questioner asked whether the military could be made to let go of its capital ventures and sent back to the barracks under capitalism. However, for several reasons none of these and related questions could be answered fully.
"Women's Rule is a Curse" - Highly Condemnable Statement from Musharraf's Political Ally Arbab Ghulam Rahim (Chief Minister Sindh)
Woman’s rule is ‘unlucky’, says Arbab
Daily Times: August 27, 2007
LAHORE: Sindh Chief Minister Arbab Ghulam Rahim said on Sunday that a woman’s rule was “vicious” and people should avoid it, reported Geo News.
Addressing a public meeting near Thatha, Rahim said he was expressing his views with apologies to the women present in the meeting.
According to the channel, Rahim said it was regrettable, but fact nevertheless that a woman’s rule was “vicious” and that people should try to avoid it at all cost.
Commenting on Rahim’s views, Pakistan Human Rights Commission Chairwoman Asma Jahangir said it was surprising that Rahim was representing a moderate and enlightened government and saying a woman’s rule was vicious.
She said why Rahim did not have the same views when he was in the Pakistan People’s Party. She said Rahim was a “cruel landlord” from deep inside Sindh and was notorious for crushing the poor women of his constituency.
Arbab Ghulam must apologize to the nation particularly women, says Farzana Raja Online News Agency - August 27, 2007
ISLAMABAD: While reacting on the statement of Chief Minister Sindh, Arbab Ghulam Rahim, Secretary Information Pakistan Peoples Party Punjab, Farzana Raja said that Sindh Province had been victim of various disasters after the induction of cursed Chief Minister Arbab Ghulam Rahim.
In a statement issued on Monday, she said that it was a sign of unfortunate particularly for Sindh Province and generally for Pakistan that such a person is ruling as a chief minister of Sindh, who is not only involved in the murder of a journalist, but he is also involved in smuggling of poor innocent women, setting up private jails in Thar and accused of water theft.
She said on the one hand present government preach enlightened moderation on the other hand people like Arbab Ghulam Rahim, represents a moderate and enlightened governments, terms the rule of woman as curse, which shows the double standard of present hypocrite government.
While criticizing Sindh Chief Minister’s statement, Farzana Raja said that Arbab’s statement shows his poor state of mind and his exploitative nature against women, adding that Rahim represents cruel landlord from deep inside Sindh.
She further added that Arbab Ghulam Rahim, through his irresponsible statement has deviated the sprit of Islam, who secured the rights of women adding that Chief Minister sindh should apologize to the nation particularly 52 percent of population, which consists on women.
Daily Times: August 27, 2007
LAHORE: Sindh Chief Minister Arbab Ghulam Rahim said on Sunday that a woman’s rule was “vicious” and people should avoid it, reported Geo News.
Addressing a public meeting near Thatha, Rahim said he was expressing his views with apologies to the women present in the meeting.
According to the channel, Rahim said it was regrettable, but fact nevertheless that a woman’s rule was “vicious” and that people should try to avoid it at all cost.
Commenting on Rahim’s views, Pakistan Human Rights Commission Chairwoman Asma Jahangir said it was surprising that Rahim was representing a moderate and enlightened government and saying a woman’s rule was vicious.
She said why Rahim did not have the same views when he was in the Pakistan People’s Party. She said Rahim was a “cruel landlord” from deep inside Sindh and was notorious for crushing the poor women of his constituency.
Arbab Ghulam must apologize to the nation particularly women, says Farzana Raja Online News Agency - August 27, 2007
ISLAMABAD: While reacting on the statement of Chief Minister Sindh, Arbab Ghulam Rahim, Secretary Information Pakistan Peoples Party Punjab, Farzana Raja said that Sindh Province had been victim of various disasters after the induction of cursed Chief Minister Arbab Ghulam Rahim.
In a statement issued on Monday, she said that it was a sign of unfortunate particularly for Sindh Province and generally for Pakistan that such a person is ruling as a chief minister of Sindh, who is not only involved in the murder of a journalist, but he is also involved in smuggling of poor innocent women, setting up private jails in Thar and accused of water theft.
She said on the one hand present government preach enlightened moderation on the other hand people like Arbab Ghulam Rahim, represents a moderate and enlightened governments, terms the rule of woman as curse, which shows the double standard of present hypocrite government.
While criticizing Sindh Chief Minister’s statement, Farzana Raja said that Arbab’s statement shows his poor state of mind and his exploitative nature against women, adding that Rahim represents cruel landlord from deep inside Sindh.
She further added that Arbab Ghulam Rahim, through his irresponsible statement has deviated the sprit of Islam, who secured the rights of women adding that Chief Minister sindh should apologize to the nation particularly 52 percent of population, which consists on women.
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