Washington's New Question for Pakistani Political Analysts

Washington's new question
By Adil Najam: The News, May 10, 2007

It used to be that the one question that Pakistani political analysts visiting Washington were most likely to get asked was: "What will happen if General Musharraf loses control of Pakistan?" Today Washington has a new question for Pakistanis: "Is General Musharraf in control?"

These are profoundly different questions and they signify a rather critical shift in how the United States is now viewing not just General Musharraf, but also Pakistan. Of course, like all political questions, it is not the question but the implied answer and the assumptions behind it that require analytical attention.

The first question stemmed from the assumption that General Musharraf was, in fact, in control of Pakistan but also that something terrible would happen if he were to ever lose control. This was a good question for the General but not a good question for Pakistan. It portrayed General Musharraf as someone who was not only useful (for the United States and, presumably, for Pakistan) but also as someone who was 'necessary.' However, the 'necessity' stemmed from the view that without General Musharraf at the helm Pakistan would descend into chaos, extremism, anarchy and mayhem. Unfortunately, this particular variant of the 'doctrine of necessity' has helped fuel Pakistan's murky image in Washington and elsewhere.

The question, of course, was an attractive one for Washington's policy crowd. Their interest in Pakistan has been tied nearly entirely to the 'war on terror,' in which General Musharraf has become a key player. But the question was also cultivated rather deliberately by General Musharraf and his media advisors who have fuelled Washington's fears about Pakistan's 'terrible realities' -- i.e., religious extremism, sectarian strife, civil violence, economic turmoil, etc. -- in making the case for why General Musharraf's regime (as opposed to Pakistan) must be supported fully even if that means overlooking the general's democratic lapses.

But all of this is where we used to be. Today, Washington has a new question: "Is General Musharraf in control?" This is a much more dangerous question; both for General Musharraf and for Pakistan. This new question holds all the assumptions about Pakistan's 'terrible realities' constant, but then implies that maybe the General is no longer in control. The logical prognosis becomes rather frightening.

Of course, Pakistanis understand that things were never really as simple or straightforward as General Musharraf made them out to be. In all honesty, however, one cannot blame Washington too much. After being told for years that mayhem will break out if General Musharraf was ever to lose control, they now see exactly that happening and their natural reaction is to hold tight to their seats and wait for something horrific to be unleashed. This sense of freefall partly explains Washington's renewed interest in the 'Benazir card.' But more on that some other time.

To the outside observer, the images coming from Jamia Hafsa and Lal Masjid in the Federal Capital, the unending armed occupation of a children's library in Islamabad, and daily news reports of local Taliban burning music CDs, harassing shop owners, and intimidating citizens are far more frightening than scenes of processions in support of a beleaguered chief justice. Indeed, the one thing even more frightening is the general sense of acceptance with which the government, the media and the public seems to have internalised this radicalisation: as if this militant fundamentalism right at the centre of the Capital is nothing more serious than a minor irritant; something that is not comfortable, but can be accommodated; unfortunate, but not really important.

There are those who argue that the passivity of the government's reaction is merely a tactic of distraction. It may well be. But if so, it seems not to be working. Domestically, it has failed miserably in distracting public attention -- the public and the media are more glued to the chief justice debacle than ever. Internationally, it has placed the government in a double bind -- General Musharraf is being seen not only as being incapable of controlling religious militants but is now seen as accommodating them.

Meanwhile, General Musharraf continues to use tactics that have served him well in the past, telling Washington, "you don't realise just how serious this is, let me handle it my own way so that it does not become any bigger than it needs to be". The only problem is that this time Washington is not buying it. Nor, for that matter, are people in Pakistan.

For its part, Washington is willing to take a 'wait and see' approach for the time being. It looks lustfully at the potential benefits of a Benazir-Musharraf hook-up, but continues to explore other options, including those that have no 'Musharraf' attached to them. It remains patient, but makes clear to all that its patience cannot be counted on indefinitely.

All in all, General Musharraf's carefully crafted message is spinning out of control. On the one hand, his friends in Washington now see the 'terrible realities' of Pakistan as being much more terrible than they actually are. On the other, they view him as being in much less control of things than he actually is. The lesson for General Musharraf is: beware of the media messages you spin.

It is time for General Musharraf, the great survivor, to rethink strategy. He needs to change not only the answers that Washington and others are arriving at, but also the questions that they are asking. In particular, he has to stop arguing that he is 'necessary' because of Pakistan's 'terrible realities.' At the current moment this argument imperils not only his own survival but Pakistan's international standing.

As General Musharraf ponders on the related challenges of (a) growing domestic unease over his handling of the chief justice crisis, (b) the frightening rise of militant radicals a la Lal Masjid and elsewhere, and (c) growing nervousness amongst his most important international ally, maybe he needs to revisit his own original slogan -- 'Pakistan first.' It was never a bad slogan. And were it to be implemented honestly, it would make good policy too. 'Pakistan first' could also be the starting point for thinking seriously about his own political future as well as about what he might do about each of these three challenges.

The writer teaches International Negotiation and Diplomacy at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, US. He is the founding editor of Pakistaniat.com. Email: adil.najam@ tufts.edu