Rethinking U.S. Strategy Toward Pakistan: Washington Quarterly

When $10 Billion Is Not Enough: Rethinking U.S. Strategy toward Pakistan
Craig Cohen and Derek Chollet
Washington Quarterly, Volume 30, No. 2: Spring 2007

In the five years since Pakistani president General Pervez Musharraf announced his intention to cut ties with the Taliban and join the war on terrorism, U.S. policy toward Pakistan has been one of unstinting support. That approach has brought some genuine gains: more al Qaeda members have been captured and killed in Pakistan than anywhere else in the world since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Yet today, it is worth asking whether U.S. policy has reached its limits and if it is now being guided more by inertia than strategy. Washington’s close alliance with Musharraf may now have run its course….

For all the talk of the United States’ global dominance and despite considerable U.S. support to the Pakistani military, Washington finds itself with relatively little leverage to influence events in Pakistan. During the past five years, the United States has given Pakistan more than $10 billion in assistance, channeled primarily through the Pakistani military. What Pakistan gives in return may be only enough to keep the money coming. After the September 11 attacks, many U.S. policymakers believed that Pakistan was one place where they were justified in saying, “You are either with us or against us.” Nevertheless, despite the billions of dollars spent, the United States has not made the necessary commitment to solidify the relationship for the long term. This is not merely a function of the scale of assistance, but of its type. U.S. engagement with Pakistan is highly militarized and centralized, with very little reaching the vast majority of Pakistanis.

More problematic still, U.S. assistance does not so much reflect a coherent strategy as it does a legacy of the initial, transactional quid pro quo established in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks and a familiar menu of what the United States was already organized to provide. U.S. soft power in Pakistan, the ability to influence by attraction and persuasion, is far lower than it could be, considering the historic, economic, and personal bonds that unite the two countries.

Is it possible for the United States to convince Pakistanis that it is interested in a serious, long-term partnership rather than merely a short-term alliance of convenience? Doing so will require a better understanding of Pakistan and an assistance strategy more aligned with the needs of average Pakistanis….A closer look at the numbers for U.S. assistance to Pakistan since the September 11 attacks may spark a broader discussion of long-term objectives. Money is not everything, but it often sends a clearer signal of our priorities than official statements. Elections and transitions offer the opportunity to rethink U.S. interests and policy options. If Washington squanders the chance and allows its approach to Pakistan to be governed by little more than blind faith, both Musharraf and U.S. policy are sure to remain in the line of fire for the foreseeable future.

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