Resolving Iran's Nuclear Crisis

A Way Out of Iran's Nuclear Impasse? By Walter Isaacson
Time, Wednesday, Mar. 14, 2007

Javad Zarif, Iran's polished U.N. ambassador, is noted for being unexpectedly jovial for a person with such a difficult job. But soon after I arrive for a visit to his Manhattan office a few days ago, he turns rather serious and nods at a pad of paper for me to take notes. He wants to go on the record, which is unusual.

When he invited me to see him, I thought it was to say farewell. A law professor turned diplomat, he is not a supporter of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Instead, he has been aligned with the more pragmatic elements in Iran, and last month he was told that he was being recalled. But upon arriving, I find that he has been given a reprieve (or, perhaps, an extension of his sentence) by leaders in Tehran. They want him to stay for one last attempt to resolve the dispute over Iran's nuclear program.

The U.S. insists there should be no direct negotiations until Iran suspends its uranium-enrichment program. To break that impasse, Zarif argues that both sides should discuss what their final aims would be. "We could start with two premises," he says. "One, that Iran has the right to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Two, that Iran should never move in the direction of building nuclear weapons."

Yes, but how to guarantee that the technology is not used for illicit purposes? Zarif builds on an approach that Iran floated last October. "Iran could agree that its nuclear facilities, including all of its enrichment plants, could be jointly owned by an international consortium. All countries with concerns, including the U.S., could participate in that consortium. Their people and other foreign nationals could come and go to work at the facilities, which would allow for the best type of monitoring."

An agreement could also have other elements the U.S. would want. "You can put in a legal agreement that Iran could not withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," which it ratified in 1970. In addition, he said, there could be protocols for intrusive monitoring.

The consortium proposal is the key to Zarif's plan, because it could provide the best way to prevent cheating. "Because many countries would own and operate the plants, there would be built-in safeguards against nationalization or cheating," he says. From Iran's perspective, this would be less offensive than just having inspectors. "It is an issue of respect," Zarif explains. "Of course you are monitoring as you do this, but you are doing it with respect as owners and operators."

One problem with such a plan is that Iran might use both the knowledge and the enriched uranium from consortium plants to pursue a secret bomb-making program. That is why any such outcome should be accompanied by other safeguards: involvement by the international consortium in all Iranian nuclear facilities rather than just the enrichment sites, an agreement that there can be snap intrusive inspections of any facility, a verifiable cap on Iran's production of enriched uranium and a requirement that no facilities be hidden or buried.

Washington's position is that none of these ideas should be discussed until Iran again suspends enrichment. But given the pressure Iran now clearly feels, which may account for its eagerness to talk, it may be time to take Ambassador Zarif's plan seriously — and try one last time to see if all sides can agree on what a comprehensive and verifiable final deal could look like.