‘Military has no exit strategy’By Khalid Hasan
Daily Times, March 9, 2007
WASHINGTON: The Pakistan military has no “exit strategy” because it views itself as critical to Pakistan’s internal stability and its external security, a meeting was told here on Wednesday.
Prof Hasan Askari Rizvi, who is currently teaching at the Johns Hopkins University’s School for Advanced International Studies, told a meeting on Pakistan at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace that since President Gen Pervez Musharraf’s arrival on the scene, the army had expanded its role and presence, and while it was willing to co-opt political forces, it was unwilling to transfer power to them in any meaningful sense. He said that the Pakistan Army was a formidable and unified entity and it was not likely to permit any political leader to have a free hand, but co-option on the military’s terms was always available.
He said Musharraf’s source of power was the army, which was why he was not willing to step down as the chief of army staff. Musharraf enjoyed the full support of his corps commanders, and he had seen to it that the army’s interests – both professional and commercial – were looked after and catered for, he said, adding that the president took all major policy decisions in consultation with his senior commanders and intelligence chiefs.
Rizvi said that the Pakistan Army came to assume an important position right from the very inception of Pakistan because of threats to the new-born state’s very survival. More than 70 percent of Pakistan’s first budget was earmarked for defence. The conclusion of defence pacts with the US further strengthened the military’s position, creating institutional imbalances that have increased and solidified with time.
He said that since 1958, Pakistan’s first military takeover, there had been “no going back” for the Pakistan Army, despite several civilian government interludes.
He said that the Pakistan Army saw itself as playing a “guardian role” as well as serving by way of a modernising force. The only civilian leader who was able to gain primacy – although not for long – was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. It was during Ziaul Haq’s rule that a linkage was established – because of the Afghan war – between the army and Islamic groups. It was also the first time that the army claimed to be the protector of Pakistan’s geographical and “ideological” frontiers. Zia’s regime provided encouragement and strength to right-wing religious and revivalist groups such as the Tableeghi Jamaat and the Jamaat-e-Islami. Zia saw the military as the only institution that could “Islamise” Pakistan.
Rizvi said the thinking of Islamist groups and elements in the defence establishment was still frozen in the Afghan experience against the Soviet Union, a resistance movement financed and backed by the West and certain Arab governments. After the end of the Afghan war, the diversion of these forces and such thinking to Kashmir was only logical. The civilian governments that followed Zia, also permitted the Kashmir “jihad” to be carried out by the ISI, which had gained a lot of experience and expertise during the Afghan war against the Soviets. He said Musharraf had pursued the same policy. The post-9/11 role that Pakistan found itself playing had opened up a debate on fundamental issues that continued. The questions being asked are: “Is jihad an instrument or a goal in itself? Is the use of militant groups outdated or should they be put on hold for the ‘rainy day’?”
In Rizvi’s view, for Musharraf, who has declared enlightened moderation as his policy and goal, it will be difficult to ensure its success unless he broadens his political base. The success of his anti-terrorism policy is also dependent on that. Liberal and democratic groups question Musharraf’s legitimacy. They also feel alienated, having been kept out of power and decision-making. Musharraf’s political ally – the PML-Q – does not openly support his moderate policy. The hard line groups are dead set against his enlightened moderation. The MMA is now looking for an “Islamic issue” on which to take on Musharraf in the streets – a confrontation the government is keen to avoid – thus leaving open plenty of political space for Islamist forces.
Rizvi said Musharraf’s anti-terrorism policy thus lacks lacked backing by both his allies and his enemies. While the higher levels of the military were one with Musharraf, at lower levels there was sympathy for what were viewed as Islamic causes, he added. He said that there was also uncertainty as to the agenda Musharraf was pushing. “Is it a Pakistani agenda or is it an American agenda, is the question being asked?” he said that the action taken by the army in the tribal areas was thus controversial. The army is reluctant to go in again in full force as it has done in the past. The action was heavy-handed. It inconvenienced the locals and it destroyed established political mechanisms. Musharraf is well aware of this absence of a consensus. Rizvi said that Musharraf’s attempts to satisfy both sides were not likely to succeed. The recent spate of suicide bombings right inside settled areas, including the capital itself, has created a new and difficult situation for the Pakistani leader. His government is no longer in a position to do more than it has done in the war against terrorism. Growing US pressure was going to further undermine the government’s ability to deliver what the US wanted, he added. “With three elections due in the coming months, including Musharraf’s own, he is not in a position to do more,” predicted Rizvi.
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