Return of the Taliban?

WASHINGTON DIARY: Return of the Taliban? —Dr Manzur Ejaz
Daily Times, October 11, 2006

It is highly unlikely that President Musharraf would sign an agreement with the Taliban contrary to US wishes immediately before visiting the US and meeting his sole admirer and sponsor, President Bush

The blame game in Afghanistan has just started. NATO commanders asking to get tough with Pakistan while conceding that they cannot prevail over the Taliban point towards things to come: the US and NATO will dump their self-inflicted failure on Pakistan — there has to be a fall guy in such fiascos. In response, the Pakistan army, patting it’s own back for having superior insight into Afghan affairs, will slip into the old quagmire and isolation. India, growing fast but not yet a mature world or regional power, will join the bandwagon of Pakistan’s accusers and try to settle scores.

I am still convinced that Pakistan’s agreement with Waziristan elders, allegedly backed by the Taliban, was initiated at the behest of the United States. Gen John Abi-Zaid was in Islamabad three days before the agreement was signed. It is highly unlikely that President Musharraf would sign any agreement contrary to US wishes immediately before visiting the US and meeting his sole admirer and sponsor, President Bush.

The US confessions of NATO and its own failures in Afghanistan have come from multiple directions. Canadian Defence Minister, Gordon O’Connor, gave the opening shots from Australia when he declared that NATO could not defeat the Taliban on the battlefield. The British Foreign Office also pointed to the same when it declared that the Waziristan agreement could be a model for the entire Afghanistan. Bill Frist, leader of the US Senate, declared the final US defeat in Afghanistan when he told soldiers in Qalat, Afghanistan, that the Taliban are too many and very popular among the Afghans. Hence they could not be defeated militarily; they should be included in the Kabul government, he added.

Therefore, the return of the Taliban to Kabul is a forgone conclusion. Their cohabiting with the Karzai set-up will not last very long, however, and in the way the US is envisaging the scheme. Besides the ideological gulf between Karzai and Taliban, the former has no power base while the latter are emerging as the victors and victors never respect or honour defeated parties.

Pakistan army is obviously pleased with the outcome because, in their view, their approach towards Afghanistan and Taliban has been exonerated. Some of them genuinely feel that the Taliban cannot come back to rule Kabul. Pakistan’s Ambassador to Washington, General Mahmud Ali Durrani, reacted very emotionally to the question of what Pakistan’s policy will be when the Taliban return to Kabul. He was confident that the Taliban could not make a comeback. While this seems wishful thinking and I am sure many in the Pakistani establishment share his views, the reality indicates otherwise.

The Pakistan military’s Afghan policy has been a great disaster. In search of ‘strategic depth’, Pakistan fell into ‘strategic death’ as some cynics claimed. Even if this is a harsh judgment, no one can deny that Pakistan’s support for the Taliban undermined its own security and communal harmony; 9/11 was just an exogenous variable that saved Pakistan from falling into a deeper hole. But the return of the Taliban will bring back old problems, leaving Pakistan isolated, helpless, and agonised. That is, if the Musharraf government does not act prudently.

After defeating the superpower and its NATO allies, the Taliban will come back and enforce the same Islamic code that they had put in place pre-9/11. They will prohibit female education and professional work. They will marginalise religious minorities and destroy their sacred historical places. Their zeal to boost the international Islamic revolution will be manifested with a vengeance because world jihadis have contributed towards their victory and thus training centres for jihadis will proliferate. In short, the Taliban will be the same in character and ideology.

Pakistan, smitten by its Pashtun politics, will placate the Taliban and stay engaged. For some time, the Bush administration will be understanding and appreciative of Pakistani efforts as was reflected in the Bush-Musharraf meeting. However, after the November election in the US, when the Bushies expedite the ‘cut-and run’ process in Afghanistan, the blame game will start. Democrats will blame the Republicans for the defeat and everyone will accuse Pakistan for helping the Taliban. India, still an immature power, obsessed with Pakistan, will join the course to get even.

Pakistani rulers should be prepared to face the music. No one will care to analyse the real factors or remember why NATO and the US failed in Afghanistan: everyone will unload their anger on Pakistan. At that point, the Taliban won’t help Pakistan and the world won’t understand.

But Musharraf can save the day by letting major political parties and their leaders function properly. On that in the future.

The writer can be reached at manzurejaz@yahoo.com