Is terror Pakistan’s state brand?

Is terror Pakistan’s state brand?
By Babar Sattar
Dawn, October 15, 2006

‘A RISING tide lifts all boats’, we were told recently at an International Trade Council meeting in Geneva. Building a good national brand and image facilitates economic development and thus the intense focus of countries to market themselves in a manner that is attractive to governments, businesses and intermediaries across the globe. ‘Incredible India’ is the brand being popularised by our neighbour, to establish its credentials not just as the ‘largest democracy of the world’ but as a magical place that offers extraordinary cultural and business opportunities. Through ‘Italy – Life in I Style’, the Italian government is trying to make the brand ‘Made in Italy’ synonymous to quality as well as style.

These days, individuals, firms, cities, regions, countries, and even continents all market themselves professionally, often through aggressive ”sales techniques”. Indeed, having a bad reputation or none at all is a serious handicap for a state seeking to remain competitive in the international arena. A state with a negative brand faces difficulties in attracting world’s economic and political attention. Image and reputation are thus becoming essential part of a state's strategic equity. We talk about a state's personality in the same way we discuss the products we consume, describing it as friendly, credible, pleasant or unreliable, hazardous or dangerous. A brand reflects a customer's idea about a product. A state’s brand is a total sum of the outside world's ideas about a particular country.

Globalisation and the media revolution have made each state more aware of itself, its image and reputation or its brand. What is Pakistan’s brand ? Here, General Musharraf has produced In the Line of Fire which brags about the fact that Pakistan’s president holds ‘the world’s most dangerous job’. The book brings a renewed focus on Pakistan as a hotbed of terrorist activity. One wonders why the general needed to produce a 352-page memoir focusing largely on his fight with terrorism in Pakistan and beyond at a time when seldom a minute goes by that the country is not mentioned in the context of the war on terror by the world media. Even as the Musharraf regime was gloating over its effort in foiling a major terror plot to blow up planes using liquid bombs a couple of months back, political analysts on international networks continued to take jibes at Pakistan for somehow being linked to all terror plots/plotters.

‘In the Line of Fire’ is a continuation of Musharraf regime’s long-standing branding and marketing strategy for himself and for Pakistan. The title itself underscores the status of Pakistan as part of the problem of terrorism confronting the ‘civilised world’, and Gen Musharraf as the solitary warrior combating the scourge of terror. Pakistan is widely perceived in the West as a quasi-terrorist state where a truly representative system would rein-in a Taliban-style fundamentalist government. And the general is seen as the last glimmer of hope standing between Pakistan and Talibanisation, whose fall would remove the last obstacle preventing extremism from taking charge of Pakistan.

Jon Stewart was only reflecting this widely shared US perception when he asked Gen Musharraf on his Daily Show who -- President Bush or Osama Bin Laden -- was likely to be elected to the Mayor’s Office in Karachi if those were the two candidates competing in an election. How Pakistan has come to be branded as a problem state by the US and the western world is not simply an inadvertent consequence of the events taking place since 9/11. It is partly a by-product of Gen Musharraf’s self-promotion campaign in the US that positions him as the only liberal force in Pakistan capable of halting Pakistan’s drift into obscurantism.

The role of effective strategising and posturing can never be underestimated in politics, and Gen Musharraf has undoubtedly established himself as a PR guru. Unfortunately he has marketed himself in a manner that he continues to look good so long as his country remains the ‘world’s most dangerous place’. Musharraf’s political and marketing strategy is based on an apt understanding of US interests and goals in the region and the amoral hierarchy of such interests. Winning the war on terror is America’s top priority that trumps all other goals, including strengthening and exporting democracy as a long-standing political goal or opposing the denial of civil liberties by national governments as a humanitarian goal.

The US has learnt from recent history that in today’s highly polarised world democracy is not synonymous with capitalist, liberal, pro-western governments. And Iran and Venezuela are the cases in point. The last thing US wishes Pakistan to produce is a homegrown Ahmedinejad or Chavez. Thus, so long as the US continues to believe that a genuine democracy might bring into power a populist anti-US government in Pakistan, which is likely to impede the US war on terror in Afghanistan and around the globe, Musharraf regime will continue to be seen as the only force in Pakistan capable of being a US ally during its war against terror.

But it is not the fear of emergence of a populist anti-US government alone that accounts for America’s unqualified support for the general. The US is cognisant of Pakistan army’s superiority over all other state institutions and has long maintained direct institutional links with the military even at the cost of undermining representative institutions in Pakistan. The US understands that even during democratic interludes, Pakistan’s security policy (including the nuclear policy) as well as foreign policy vis-à-vis important countries such as India, China, Iran, Afghanistan and the US, fell within the exclusive domain of the military.

The US needs Pakistan army to do its bidding in the war on terror. Giving up the longstanding policy of expediency and support for Musharraf in favour of a principled pro-democracy policy towards Pakistan offers no immediate dividends. The US is also aware of Pakistan military’s decisive influence over all aspects of national life and realises that as long as it wishes to be in business with Pakistan, it will need to work with Pakistan army and the army chief. And Gen Musharraf knows that the US would not disturb this power equation. He also knows that the moment a new army chief is sworn in, there will be another viable option for the US to do business with. Little wonder, the general views the loss of his uniform as an irreparable damage to his bargaining position with domestic politicians as well as the US.

The warm Musharraf-US relationship is likely to continue as long as the US maintains its current approach in pursuing its war on terror continues. Any attempt to reform societies by force and planting there alien brands of democracy that can produce predictable pro-US regimes in Muslim countries will not produce lasting results if the deep-rooted causes of violence and extremism are ignored.

What is also bewildering is why our mainstream political parties led by Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif do not seem to understand the fundamentals of the US-Musharraf relationship, how it aids the immediate-term interests of the US and the Musharraf regime and why it is unlikely to change despite their exhibition of unreserved loyalty to the US. No amount of lobbying or pleading will convince the Bush administration about the need for offering patronage to civilian political forces in Pakistan so long as the institutional balance within the country stays titled strongly in favour of the military. The mainstream political parties need to fight their political battles within the country and not in Washington, and if Chavez and Ahmedinejad have one worthy lesson to offer, it is that no amount of external assistance is a replacement for genuine public support.

Pakistan must start investing in the development of a national brand that reflects the genius of its people and projects the country as an engine of economic growth for the region and the world. But a marketing strategy in itself is worth nothing if there is no genuinely decent product to sell. We need to fight the forces of obscurantism and despotism within the country that have caused the world to view Pakistan as a sanctuary for terror. As a nation we are not religious extremists secretly chanting prayers for Osama bin Laden and as a polity we are not eagerly awaiting our first opportunity to vote a Taliban-style religious government into power. Unfortunately the world is unlikely to realise any of this while reading In the Line of Fire.