Azad Kashmir and self-governance
By Ershad Mahmud
The News, October 14, 2006
Recently the Human Rights Watch described Azad Kashmir as anything but "Azad" and this invited censure from the Pakistani government. But the fact is there are some contradictions in the constitution itself which go against Pakistan's traditional stand on Kashmir as well as against the spirit of the UNSC resolutions.
Part 2 of section 7 of the constitution says that "no person or political party in Azad Jammu and Kashmir shall be permitted to propagate against or take part in activities prejudicial or detrimental to the ideology of the state's accession to Pakistan". Under section 5 (2) (vii) of the AJK Legislative Assembly Election Ordinance 1970, a person will be disqualified for propagating any opinion or action in any manner prejudicial to the ideology of Pakistan, the ideology of state's accession to Pakistan or the sovereignty and integrity of Pakistan.
Without signing an affidavit of allegiance to Kashmir's accession to Pakistan, nobody is allowed to take part in the state elections. The issue remained obscure as the nationalist parties, which do not believe in accession to Pakistan, did not attempt to participate in the elections until 1996. It, however, surfaced in the two latest elections. Their nominees could not contest elections because they refused to sign the requisite affidavit. Interestingly, it is also a prerequisite to show loyalty to the idea of Kashmir's accession to Pakistan to get government jobs. Although, a number of nationalists are serving in various government departments, the law continues to be on the statute book. This is also contrary to Pakistan's own Constitution whose article 257 holds that the "people of Kashmir will define their relationship with Pakistan after obtaining freedom". It is also contradictory to Islamabad's commitment to the right of self-determination and its demand to implement the UNSC resolutions on Kashmir. Impartial intellectuals as well as the pro-Indian lobby make use of these contradictions at international forums.
Article 53 of the AJK constitution also gives the federal government the power to dismiss an elected government in AJK. This power has been used twice since 1974. But it gives the federal government a leverage to dictate its terms to the ruling elite of the AJK.
In accordance with the AJK constitution, 12 seats have been reserved for displaced persons of the Valley and Jammu to symbolise relationship with them. The reality is that these seats have become a tool of manipulation in the hands of the ruling government in Islamabad, and particularly the Punjab government as almost eight and a half seats fall in its territorial jurisdiction.
Successive federal governments have been gifting these seats to their allies. The ruling parties always use their leverage to ensure their allies' victory. Additionally, a huge number of non-Kashmiris are registered as voters. It is a persistent demand from various circles that the refugee voters' lists should be revised since this would be one way of ensuring free and fair elections on refugee seats.
Another significant issue is the relationship of the northern areas (Gilgit and Baltistan) with Azad Kashmir and Pakistan. It is a historical fact that the federal government assumed the charge of these areas from the AJK government on the ground that Muzaffarabad was unable to govern directly for lack of financial resources and communication system. Secondly, at that time the AJK leadership presumed that the freedom was around the corner and eventually the entire state would join Pakistan through a plebiscite held under the UNSC resolutions. The AJK leadership regarded the transfer of control to Pakistan as a temporary arrangement. Unpredictably, the promise of a plebiscite turned out to be elusive and Islamabad not only continued managing the affairs of Northern Areas (NA) but strengthened its hold gradually. Now, the Northern Areas are considered a part of the formerly united state of Jammu and Kashmir but not of Azad Kashmir. The AJK assembly has unanimously declared that Northern Areas were part of Kashmir and in 1993 the AJK High Court ordered the state government to take over control of Gilgit and Baltistan.
Another bone of contention is Islamabad's appointment of four high-ranking officials to run AJK affairs. At times they act as overlords and not as public servants. The chief secretary heads the entire administration, finance secretary manages budgetary matters, the inspector-general of police takes care of law and order and the accountant-general keeps an eye on all kinds of expenditures. They mostly live in Islamabad and are well paid. In most cases these officers are not from AJK but from elsewhere and this is bad for the morale of the local bureaucrats who feel deprived and frustrated.
Last but not the least, the important area that needs attention is ultra-constitutional interference by the army in the local administrative matters as well as in political management. The army has emerged as an equal stakeholder in the local affairs. It plays a major, albeit informal, role in all decision-making forums. It has a big say even in selection of ministers and other key officers. This creates resentment, promotes ethnicity and paves the way for financially sound individuals to bribe the bigwigs and easily obtain slots in the government.
Way back in 1947-48, there used to be consensus at the level of the political and security establishment to develop AJK as a successor entity of the former Jammu and Kashmir state and government. On this rationale, the AJK government's structure was formed by the local and federal authorities. Keeping this context in view, Islamabad tried hard to project that AJK has the status of a quasi independent state and a role model for Indian-held Kashmir. The instability stemmed out of perpetual military coups in Pakistan, power politics and the lack of initiative on the part of mainstream Kashmiri leadership.
Until the start of uprising in the Valley in 1989, Azad Kashmir was largely considered a remote place on Pakistan's map. Due to the uprising in Occupied Kashmir it shot into prominence. Now it is expected to play a significant role in the years ahead. Recently, the Pakistan government propounded the idea of self-governance for all regions of the formerly united state of Jammu and Kashmir. It generated enthusiasm as well as scepticism. The Kashmiri discourse has certainly focused on its dynamics, raising hopes in some corners that it may play "an instrumental role to shape the future line of action". However, the fundamental distinction between self-governance and internal autonomy is yet to be made clear. In fact, no clear definition of self-governance is available. By and large it suggests that without altering the current territorial status, both parts of Jammu and Kashmir state will enjoy self-rule.
While it is difficult to predict whether such an agreement will finally take place, in such an eventuality there will be no territorial trade-off and Indian and Pakistani sovereignty over their respective areas will remain intact. One point should be clear: the fundamental component of Pakistan's approach must be to arrive at an arrangement that make Kashmiris feel comfortable with Islamabad. This is a serious concern and ignoring it may have serious repercussions both for Kashmiris as well as Islamabad.
The writer works with the Institute of Policy Studies in Islamabad. Email: ershad@islamabad.net
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