Choices for Musharraf

VIEW: Restricted choices for Musharraf —Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi
Daily Times, October 8, 2006
Senior former army officers are now more critical of Musharraf’s decision to combine the two offices than was the case two years ago. This is a significant change and reinforces the demand by the political circles that Musharraf separate the two offices

The conventional perspective on Pakistani politics suggests that a civil or military ruler — more often the latter — is better placed to cope with domestic political pressures if he enjoys the blessings of the United States Administration or if Washington is not overtly hostile to Islamabad.

President General Pervez Musharraf’s recent visit to Washington showed that the US President and his administration viewed him as a credible partner for their war against terrorism in the Pakistan-Afghanistan area. President George Bush made more positive comments about his Pakistani counterpart in the latest joint press conference than was the case when they jointly addressed the press in Islamabad in early March.

Despite the apparent US support, President Musharraf faces a very difficult political situation at home. The political arrangements installed in November 2002 appear to have gone awry. In addition to the growing hostility of the opposition parties, the rumblings among his co-opted civilian supporters and military circles constitute a serious threat to his personalised and centralised rule. As Musharraf completes the seventh year of rule in a couple of days, he no longer enjoys the confidence of the politically active circles as he did when he assumed power.

The evolving problems are caused mainly by over-confidence and a refusal by Musharraf and his close associates to recognise the changed ground realities. They appear to be confident that a combination of American blessings, the army’s support, loyalty of the co-opted political leadership (i.e. PML and its allies) and manipulation of the divided opposition leaders can sustain the political status quo in Islamabad.

The current political realities are shaped partly by Musharraf’s indiscreet treatment of many issues in his autobiography. He could have avoided many controversies by adopting a sober approach. His book’s comparison with Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan’s Friends, Not Masters shows that Ayub Khan was more careful in writing his memoirs, although his book also caused some controversy when it was published in 1967.

Musharraf’s treatment of the Kargil war evoked negative reaction not only in India but also in Pakistan, where many civilians and retired military people have objected to the narrative. The PMLN and some other political elements have revived the demand for an independent inquiry into the Kargil episode. Similarly, the detailed treatment of Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan’s role in nuclear proliferation raises the question about the credibility of the official stance that the army and the intelligence agencies did not know about his activities. Dr Khan’s daughter has questioned many aspects of this narrative. Several other comments in the book have been questioned by the political circles. So, the book has added to Musharraf’s domestic political problems.

On October 1, Musharraf initiated another controversy to the displeasure of the ISI and the army by admitting that some retired ISI people might be “assisting” the Taliban “with their links somewhere here and there”. This statement revived the debate at the international level that some “rogue” elements in the ISI and the army were supporting the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan and that the Pakistani authorities were unable or unwilling to stop such activities. They argue that Pakistan supports the Taliban to help the Pashtun cause in Afghanistan. It also wants to pressure the Karzai government for disregarding Pakistan’s concern over increased activities of Indian intelligence agencies against Pakistan from Afghanistan.

It was not surprising that two former ISI chiefs took a strong exception to Musharraf’s statement. Lt-General (retd) Hamid Gul, known for his Islamist disposition and opposition to Pakistan’s involvement in the US-led global war against terrorism, said that “General Musharraf was a distinct type of team captain who was scoring goals against his own team by accusing his own people”. Another former ISI chief, Lt-General (red) Asad Durani was equally critical of General Pervez Musharraf. He said that the statement was “highly speculative” and that it “would not serve any interest of Pakistan”.

Despite the Musharraf government’s liberal policy of offering material rewards to ex-service personnel, a number of retired senior army officers appear to be unhappy with some aspects of his policies, especially the continued combining of the Presidency with the command of the army. They are of the view that the combining of the two offices exposes the army to criticism from civilian and political circles.

In July this year, seven retired senior Army officers joined 11 eminent civilians to address a letter to the president, asking him, among other things, to quit one of the two offices because the combining of two offices “politicises” the office of army chief “as well as the army”. Some of these officers had held important assignments in Musharraf’s military government.

One retired Lt-General, Sallahuddin Tirmazi, joined the PMLN and criticised the Musharraf government’s policies. Earlier, a former air force chief, Air Marshal Nur Khan also talked of disengagement of the military from politics and the separation of the presidency from the command of the army.

On October 3 and 4, an English-language national daily carried the rejoinder of Lt-General (retd) Ali Kuli Khan to some comments about him in General Musharraf’s book. He also criticised General Musharraf on the conduct of the Kargil war, declaring it to be a “flawed” operation that “damaged the Kashmir cause. It was a disaster bigger than the East Pakistan tragedy”.

Senior former army officers are now more critical of Musharraf’s decision to combine the two offices than was the case two years ago. This is a significant change and reinforces the demand by the political circles that Musharraf separate the two offices.

When these developments are combined with the growing impatience among the opposition to take on the government in the streets, the ground realities become troubling, if not alarming. The ARD and the MMA may not fully work together due to ideological differences, controversy on the amendments to the Hudood Laws and the latter’s desire to protect its power interests in NWFP and Balochistan, but they are expected to challenge the government after the month of Ramzan. They can partially paralyse the government and by doing so further undermine its performance.

The political landscape becomes murky if one takes into account intra-PML conflict and the PML’s troubled relations with a coalition partner, MQM. The PML can face a major internal revolt against its top leadership if Musharraf stops endorsing them. The PML views with concern the MQM efforts to set up its organisation in the Punjab. The PML leaders in the Punjab do not expect the MQM to break into their vote bank in any significant way. However, what concerns them is the apprehension that the presidency may decide to accommodate the MQM in the Punjab in the next general elections. The PML leadership plans to counter this possibility by cultivating the MMA, especially the JUIF, which is opposed to the MQM.

President Musharraf’s policy of manipulation of the political forces may not produce the desired results because of the growing polarisation and confusion in the political system. A political settlement with the PPP would not salvage his position, although it would produce political realignments across the political landscape. However, this arrangement cannot materialise unless Musharraf is willing to step back from his overwhelming political role and quits as the army chief.

Musharraf will have to make difficult choices in the next couple of months. The changed domestic realities will make it increasingly difficult for him to sustain his commanding position by an exclusive reliance on the state apparatus and the manipulation of political forces. The changing political realities are expected to restrict his political choices.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst