Will it work in Waziristan?

Will it work in Waziristan?
By Amir Usman
Dawn, September 22, 2006

THE accord signed at Miramshah on September 5, could have been achieved much earlier and without the enormous loss of life, property and the bad blood generated by the military operation against foreign militants.

What has been agreed to now meets the demand of the parties to the conflict. The agreement did not take place before because of the lack of goodwill and understanding and meddling by ignorant and unconcerned agencies and persons.

When General Ali Muhammad Jan Aurakzai was appointed as the governor of the Frontier Province in May this year, I, along with many others, had welcomed his appointment because he was considered “the right man for the right job”. My optimism was based on his past record as corps commander in Peshawar where, backed by his solid tribal background, he had developed an excellent rapport with the tribesmen. However in a previous article in this paper, I had expressed my apprehensions that if the new governor was not given a free hand, and if meddling by Islamabad continued, he would not succeed despite his excellent credentials. But it seems that the hostile parties have come to an amicable settlement through the time-tested mechanism of an inter-tribal jirga.

Before assessing the impact of the agreement on the current situation, it is pertinent to examine the various clauses of the agreement. The accord consists of a total of 16 clauses and four sub-clauses.

From the government side, the political agent who signed the agreement gave a commitment that the persons arrested during the last two years would be released and all their privileges restored. The government would strive to solve all differences not through the use of force but according to tribal tradition. All new checkposts would be abolished and the remaining ones manned by tribal forces and not by the military. Adequate compensation would be paid to the tribesmen for loss of life and property. The military would be withdrawn and confined to its forts and bases while all confiscated vehicles, weapons and other assets would be returned to their lawful owners. Under the agreement, the ban on the carrying of weapons would be lifted although tribesmen would not be allowed to display heavy arms.

The terms accepted by the militants include a commitment not to attack law enforcement agencies, government installations or military men. No parallel administration would be established and the writ of the government would be accepted and honoured. Nobody would be allowed to launch any attack across the border into Afghanistan from Pakistani territory. However, there would be no ban on tribesmen to carry on their usual trade and business with Afghanistan and they would be free to meet their relatives across the border.

The tribesmen would desist from interfering in districts adjoining North Waziristan. All non-Pakistanis would leave North Waziristan. Those who were not in a position to do so for some valid reason would be required to live peacefully and respect the existing laws and the terms of the agreement. All governments assets, vehicles, wireless sets, etc would be returned to government agencies.

By and large, the agreement is balanced as it meets the demands of both parties. However, much will depend on its faithful implementation. Although a 10-member committee consisting of government representatives, local elders and ulema has been constituted to oversee the implementation of the agreement, much will depend on the goodwill and determination of the parties. In this regard, restoring the authority and prestige of the political agent is a welcome development.

While welcoming the accord, one should not lose sight of some of the hurdles and imponderables. For instance, how will the government deal with the very sensitive issue of growing religiosity in the area? This is being spearheaded by students of local madressahs who call themselves Mujahideen or Taliban, and who are bent upon introducing shariah laws in the region. This mindset also provides the impetus for jihad against those perceived to be aggressors and infidels in Afghanistan.

The government’s task has also been complicated by the fact that over a period of time the maliks and elders, who were solid pillars of the tribal system, have become almost irrelevant. The leadership is now in the hands of hot-blooded youth who do not accept any authority. The attitude of those whose dear ones have been killed in skirmishes with the army has also to be considered in the implementation of the agreement.

I am particularly referring to followers and kin of stalwarts like Commander Nek Muhammad, Commander Abdullah Masud, journalist Hayatullah Khan and scores of influential maliks, religious leaders and notables who have been victims of the army action. As their representatives are not a party to the agreement, they have the potential to scuttle it.

Equally important would be the reaction of other tribes and sub-tribes as the agreement has been signed only with the Utmanzai tribe. Also as the agreement only covers the tribes of North Waziristan, how will the government deal with the situation in South Waziristan where the insurgency was just as intense if not more. The agreement is totally silent on this important issue. And lastly, it is the attitude of the Americans and the Afghans which could prove a determining factor in its implementation, unless the government of Pakistan takes a resolute stand.

The Americans, who were responsible for sabotaging earlier agreements (e.g. the Shakai agreement of 2004) have already started making holes in the agreement. For instance, one of their spokesmen hinted at the possibility of Osama bin Laden being given sanctuary in Waziristan as a result of the agreement. Another spokesperson while cautiously welcoming the agreement said that Washington would like to see Pakistan in full control of the territory thus hinting that government control would be loosened as a result of the agreement. If the insurgency continues or increases, Kabul will blame Pakistan and the agreement and we will be back to square one.

All said and done, the agreement signed at Miramshah on September 5 in the presence of hundreds of tribal elders, ulema and notables, is the best under the circumstances. At least it gives the parties some breathing space to ponder over their past conduct and chalk out a course of action which will usher in an era of lasting peace and order in the region.

The writer is a former ambassador.