Peace accord with militants
By Rahimullah Yusufzai
The News, September 15, 2006
It is never easy to make everybody happy. President General Pervez Musharraf is trying to do just that and it is obvious that he isn't succeeding. The US and all 37 western nations with troops in Afghanistan want him to do more to tackle al-Qaeda and the Taliban so that their soldiers are protected. The over-sensitive Hamid Karzai government, dependent on foreign forces for its survival, is not even ready to listen to the factual comment by the president that the Taliban are a bigger threat than Al Qaeda because they have roots in the Afghan people.
Our plain-talking president often ends up annoying people and governments. His combative style, which he seems to have adopted due to his training as an army commando, could also be irritating. In his enthusiasm, he sometimes makes comments that are best avoided. His recent statements in Kabul and Brussels would be alright if made by a scholar. But such forthcoming utterances aren't appreciated and taken in the spirit in which they are made. Nations and governments mostly conduct business through the use of diplomatic jargon and niceties.
President Musharraf has already found out that his government's peace agreement with the Utmanzai tribes and some of their more militant members in North Waziristan would be hard to sell to western governments. It appears that most of his energy during his ongoing visit to Europe and the US will be spent defending the agreement. He faced the same challenge when he paid a two-day visit to Afghanistan last week. Even at home, liberal and progressive forces are worried that the accord would make it easier for the tribal militants and their "guest fighters" from Arab and Central Asian countries to maintain sanctuaries in North Waziristan and enforce their strict code of Islam, which rightly or wrongly has come to be known as Talibanisation.
From Pakistan's point of view, the agreement is the best under the circumstances. If the purpose is to peacefully resolve disputes that are largely political and economic in nature, the way to do it is to negotiate with parties to the conflict. As President Musharraf has been lately arguing, there cannot be a military solution to such disputes. In his view, the military "buys time" and facilitates a political solution. It is sad that this realisation has dawned on the president and his government after loss of so many precious lives of our soldiers and tribes' people and irreparable damage to the fragile economy of Waziristan. Better late than never, one can only hope this will be the guiding principle of the Pakistan Army and the government in future while tackling these and similar disputes, including the one in which Balochistan is presently embroiled.
In fact, the North Waziristan peace accord should serve as a model for achieving peace and stability in Balochistan, which has been adrift after the unwarranted killing of Baloch nationalist politician Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti in a military operation in Kohlu district. Both President Musharraf and the NWFP Governor Lt Gen (r) Ali Mohammad Jan Aurakzai have suggested to the Afghan government to negotiate with their own Taliban and replicate the North Waziristan accord to achieve lasting peace in Afghanistan. President Hamid Karzai, and more importantly the US government, may not heed the advice but no one is stopping the Musharraf government from talking to the Baloch nationalists and removing their grievances. One cannot defend governments and armies that use jets and gunship helicopters to attack their own people and as a consequence face landmine explosions, rocketing and suicide bombings. The use of force to settle domestic disputes amounts to collective failure of the state apparatus and its various planks.
Jirgas are a time-honoured tradition in our tribal borderlands and are capable of resolving complex issues at a minimum cost and time. The jirgas still deliver results even if materialism, modernism, politicking and official interference have diluted their authority and credibility. The 45-member loya jirga, or grand tribal council, that was drawn up from all seven tribal agencies, known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and six Frontier Regions (FRs) came up with a solution of the complex issue in two months' time. Going by tradition, it obtained "wak" (authority) from the government and the tribal militants before starting its mediation efforts. It bound both sides beforehand to accept all the decisions of the jirga. The lesson to be learnt from this mode of problem-solving is that one must respect local traditions and customs while resolving disputes. Imposing alien solutions to a place still steeped in tradition and conservatism cannot be expected to be durable.
The government may be technically right when it says that it signed the peace agreement with the Utmanzai tribes inhabiting North Waziristan. Its viewpoint is that tribal militants, or Taliban as they are often referred to, became part of the accord because they belong to the Utmanzai tribes. However, the written agreement clearly states that the agreement is between two parties: the political agent of North Waziristan representing the federal government and the governor of NWFP, and the tribal elders of North Waziristan, local mujahideen, students and ulema from Utmanzai tribes. The "students" mentioned above are the local Taliban and so are the "mujahideen". The ulema are mostly pro-Taliban religious scholars. In fact, only the political agent and seven militants, who represented the local Taliban shura and its three top leaders Hafiz Gul Bahadur, Maulana Sadiq Noor and Maulana Abdul Khaliq, were signatories to the agreement. It is clearly a peace accord with the militants, who showed their military muscle and forced the government to accept their power and negotiate an agreement with them. President Musharraf too should stop claiming that his government signed the peace accord with "moderate" tribes rather than with the militants.
Those critical of the North Waziristan peace agreement should remember that the same government concluded similar treaties with militants in South Waziristan. The first one in Shakai in April 2004 was between the Pakistan Army and late commander Nek Mohammad. It was a verbal agreement and was aborted when the two sides interpreted it their own way while deciding the fate of foreign militants hiding in the area. The US military also played a role in scuttling the accord by killing Nek Mohammad in a village near Wana an attack by a laser-guided missile fired from a pilotless Predator spy plane. The second peace accord between the government and commander Baitullah Mahsud in Srarogha village last year is still holding. The third agreement, concluded in Wana in 2005 between the government and the five commanders loyal to Nek Mohammad, is also in place. No doubt the North Waziristan peace accord is comprehensive and was reached through the efforts and guarantees of a respected loya jirga. It is an improvement on previous peace accords and a mechanism has been put in place to monitor and implement the loya jirga's decisions.
It is another matter if this peace agreement will deliver all that the government has been aiming for. On the surface, it seems to be a temporary way out to tackle a ticklish issue. None of the peace accords until now have stopped target killings of pro-government tribal elders and those allegedly spying for the US. This one too may not put an end to such mysterious assassinations. The question of foreign militants could re-emerge and the US may go ahead with its missile strikes in Pakistani tribal territory to eliminate anyone it deems dangerous. Such a move would sabotage the peace accord and once again destabilise Waziristan. Cross-border infiltration into Afghanistan also poses risks, more so in the prevailing circumstances when the US, NATO and Afghan forces are increasingly being targeted by the resurgent Afghan Taliban. It seems the major threat to the durability of the North Waziristan peace accord would be the attitude of the US and its allies. The government, the Utmanzai tribes and the militants would have to avoid mistakes to deny any opportunity to outsiders to torpedo the accord and destroy the hard won peace in North Waziristan.
The writer is an executive editor of The News International based in Peshawar. Email: bbc@pes.comsats.net.pk
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