The threat of all threats

Dawn: Books and Authors: August 06, 2006
The threat of all threats

This book is a collection of 22 papers presented at an international seminar on terrorism which was organised jointly by the Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad and the Hanns Seidel Foundation, Munich


Excerpts from Global Terrorism: Genesis, Implications, Remedial and Countermeasures


There is no silver bullet that can address global terrorism in all its complexity, writes Dr Maleeha Lodhi

In a globalised world of interconnected threats and challenges, terrorism poses a clear and present danger to peace and security, more menacing than ever in the past.

This threat has grown more urgent since 9/11; the attacks on the United States dramatised the increased lethality of terrorism and marked a watershed in the history of terrorism.

Every continent has seen acts of terrorism. Perpetrators belong to diverse backgrounds, ethnicities and faiths. Since 1968, there have been at least 8,000 serious incidents of terrorism across the world. About 70 countries have been affected by the activities of as many as an estimated 100 terrorist entities.

The level of the threat today is much more strategic. Some have called this a more destructive wave of terrorism the “first war of the 21st century”, “the threat of all threats”, the “new terrorism” or “mass terrorism”.

Whether practised by an individual, group or state, modern terrorism is a threat which defies national boundaries and can strike anyone, virtually anywhere, posing a threat to all.

It is nevertheless important to put this threat in perspective. The 2004 report of the high-level panel appointed by the UN Secretary General to examine “Threats, Challenges and Change,” lists six clusters of threats to the world, of which terrorism is one. The other five are:

• Economic and social, including poverty
• Interstate conflict
• Internal conflict
• The proliferation, loss or use of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical weapons)
• Transnational organised crime.

In so doing, the report reminds us that the priority and urgency accorded to threats is a function of wealth, power and geography.

But it also underlines the interrelated nature of the threats we face, highlighting that a threat to one is a threat to all. The mutual vulnerability of the weak and the strong, the poor and the rich has never been more evident.

Every threat to international security enhances the risk of other threats. Take the most dramatic example. The escalating terrorist threat has exacerbated fears about the danger of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD), reflecting both doomsday scenarios as well as “real world” assessments.

So, has asymmetrical strife between states and non-state foes become the dominant form of conflict in the 21st century? Is what we are witnessing only the latest variant in the history of irregular warfare?

While terrorism is an old phenomenon that has existed since antiquity, today we face a novel and far more complex variant.

Terrorism has changed its character and meaning in time and space. What was true for one terrorist group in a certain place at a certain time does not necessarily apply to another in a different country, at another time, reflecting different politics and traditions.

As a result, consensus has been elusive over a universally accepted definition of terrorism. The conceptual problem posed over the years is best reflected in the famous statement: “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.”

Terrorism has been a hotly contested concept, not unlike “democracy” or “imperialism”. Over the years, many countries, especially developing states, have objected to the concept being used to constrain national liberation movements from waging their legitimate struggles for their right to self-determination against colonialism, racism and imperialism.

The absence of a universally agreed definition, however, has not meant lack of definitions, or criminalisation of terrorist acts in national jurisdictions. But others, for example political historian Walter Laqueur, gave up on trying to define it because of the diversity of contexts in which this kind of violence appeared through history and the many and often competing political causes whose advocates had used it.

Nine-eleven created a new international dynamic that sought to de-legitimise any political violence aimed at civilians, irrespective of context and unwilling to distinguish this from resistance to state terrorism or foreign occupation. Resolution 1373 adopted by the UN Security Council on September 28, 2001, imposed wide-ranging obligations on member states to combat terrorism in the absence of a definition of terrorism. Such ambiguity has served to emphasise the role of domestic legislation to criminalise terrorist offences.

International counterterrorism measures have not been prevented by a lack of definition of terrorism. The United Nations has adopted 13 major international conventions or protocols (between 1963 and 2005) in addition to regional legal instruments to provide the legal framework to outlaw various forms of terrorist behaviour. Also, a raft of Security Council resolutions adopted post 9/11 have imposed a host of binding obligations on the 191 member states of the UN.

However, it remains a complex issue to criminalise an “offence” as “terrorist” particularly in situations of international armed conflict including foreign occupation and alien domination. Recent attempts to extend protection from terrorist offences to “non-combatants” have also compounded the problems. Adding to this complexity is the nature of the right of self-determination, particularly the right to resist foreign occupation and alien domination, which has been subject to differing interpretations.

The concept of “state terrorism” has been rejected by many western countries on the grounds that the actions of states are already governed by rules of international law relating to state responsibility. This view has been endorsed by the UN Secretary General as well as the Report of his High-level Panel. But for many the question of states flouting international law remains an important and real one.

Sharp disagreements, mainly between the OIC and western countries, have marked negotiations both on the new Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism and the Draft Outcome document being deliberated upon by the General Assembly in New York.

The latter contains the following definition: “Any action, which is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a government or an international organisation to do or to abstain from any act.”

Any definition that is not backed by a solid consensus can have a divisive effect and set back international counterterrorism efforts. It would leave unsettled a number of issues: how to define “noncombatants”, how to deal with situations of armed conflict, including foreign occupation and alien domination, how to regulate acts of terrorism committed by or on behalf of states particularly in situations of foreign occupation for suppressing legitimate movements of peoples for self-determination and national liberation and how to avoid de-emphasising the political and socio-economic context of terrorism.

This of course reflects a long and emotive historical debate on these issues, which has usually seen the developed and developing countries take divergent positions. To turn now to the nature of the terrorist threat the world confronts today.

What is different about contemporary terrorism that differentiates it from its antecedents? Its transnational character and global reach. Technology has enhanced the lethality and agility of terrorists over the past decade. Today’s threat is faceless and anonymous — but pervasive.

Post-modern terrorism is different from traditional terrorism in many respects but especially in its global domain and both in its capacity and intent to inflict mass casualties. By and large, older forms of terrorism were discriminate, often selecting victims carefully and seeking mass publicity, not necessarily mass harm. That is why it was often referred to as “propaganda by deed”. As one expert has said: terrorist groups in the 1970s wanted “a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead.” Contemporary terrorists seem to want both.

Global terrorism established itself as a phenomenon in the 1990s, by effectively harnessing the forces of globalisation. This is true even of groups that are more local and domestic in their orientation and practice but have leveraged their geographically dispersed network of support to raise funds:

Terrorist groups have also increasingly become more decentralised and loosely structured to enhance their mobility and flexibility and to rapidly adapt to new security paradigms.

The Al Qaeda has been described as the most potent terrorist threat today, not so much in the sense of a discrete, coherent entity, but as a loose network of supporters, groups and cells. Assessments of the Al Qaeda claim it has been recruiting from 50 to 60 existing organisations in over 50 countries. Its ideological militancy forged by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 has had an appeal resonating for over a decade.

The threat therefore is not from a hierarchial or coherent organisation, but from the ideas and ideology that its leaders have advocated, which are taken up transnationally by others, who use the tools of globalisation to further their aims. These tools are the Internet, mobile communications, the media and the ease and speed of travel. Consequently the threat is not just global, but fluid and fairly unpredictable.

With Al Qaeda’s command and control capacities seriously undermined, it has mutated into an even more loose network, and adapted by spreading its ideology to a lot of local groups, often acting independently or as “franchises” and recruiting globally. Often the link is inspirational and not operational.

As a result of this dispersal, ad hoc cells intermingle groups and personnel in an unpredictable pattern. In some cases it is only after an attack that a new group’s existence has come to light. Some groups also claim association with the Al Qaeda to “enhance” their credentials.

Activities are more and more driven, apart from ideology, by the Internet. As a knowledgeable journalist recently wrote: “Nearly four years after the ouster of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Al Qaeda has become the first guerilla movement in history to migrate from physical space to cyberspace.” He goes on to say that what western terrorism experts call the “global jihad movement” sometimes led by Al Qaeda fugitives, but increasingly made up of diverse “groups and ad hoc cells” has become a “web directed phenomenon”.

This has greatly magnified the challenge. Against this backdrop, the recent disclosure by US officials that Washington was reframing the global war on terrorism as a struggle against violent extremism has come as little surprise. Wars after all are fought primarily by military means, while the complex, multifaceted challenge posed by terrorism warrants a broader strategy encompassing politics, economics and diplomacy in addition to security and intelligence measures.

Understanding motivation and objectives is more important in confronting the challenge than simply a focus on means. And winning hearts and minds is an essential part of isolating Al Qaeda’s ideology and its proponents.

Whether this shift in language will translate into a rethink of strategy is to be seen. But it will certainly add a new dimension to the challenge of evolving an internationally agreed approach to fight terrorism that deals with “causes” as well as “symptoms”.

This is easier said than done. Especially as there are divergences between what the US and its western allies identify as underlying causes of violent extremism and terrorism and how the rest, especially the Muslim world, conceptualises “root causes”.

Having already flagged the divergent approaches on issues including “state terrorism” and the “right to resist foreign occupation” this is an even more problematic area. Not only can this constrain a global consensus on future strategy but also affect relations between the West and the Muslim world.

Both mean different things by “underlying factors” or systemic causes. The West generally takes a behavioural approach, while non-Western nations take a structuralist view. For the US and its allies, the key “incubators” are a lack of democracy in the Middle East and social and economic stagnation which fuels frustrated political and economic aspirations. The failure of regimes to provide for peaceful political protest and change, and the inability of economies to keep pace with population growth and demands for more equitably distributed benefits can provide fertile ground for violent extremism. For this reason the US sees promoting political and economic reform as a means of reducing the potential for terrorism.

A key factor in the perception gap is the burden of history, i.e. differing interpretations of history in terms of the western role in the Middle East. The Muslim world sees unresolved political disputes and dispossession of the Palestinian people as the principal source of terrorism. This is compounded by western actions in Iraq and the lack of balance in their policies in the Middle East. Long festering disputes, Palestine, Kashmir, lack of stabilisation in Iraq and continued turmoil in Chechnya provide flashpoints for local and international terrorism. Policies aimed at dealing with the politics of historical grievance therefore need to be pursued.

But this view is not readily accepted by others who tend to see the Palestinian dispute as a symbol and a catalyst of Muslim rage rather than the cause; many governments in the West identify these as among the “excuses” that terrorists use. Muslim countries argue that even if these are excuses, it is important to deprive terrorists of this “oxygen”.

Root causes, Muslim states argue, do not justify terrorism but they explain it and such understanding and agreement on the causes is essential to the success of counterterrorism. The “causes” include foreign occupation; denial of the right of self-determination, political and economic injustices, as well as cultural social, economic and political marginalisation and alienation. This means addressing the geopolitical problems that agitate the Muslim street.

While the Muslim world would like the major powers to review their policies as a means of “draining the swamp”, the West has of late tended to emphasise the need for Muslims to reform their practices. Most controversially this has included the idea that a “reformation” of Islam is needed, because Muslims must “make peace with modernity”.

In any case as “Islam” has been hijacked by the men of violence, Muslims ought to develop a powerful “alternative view”. In other words the responsibility for the misuse of Islam lies squarely with political and religious leaders in the Muslim world and they must “reclaim” their faith.

This view is generally seen as an effort by Western powers to externalise the problem and not own up to the responsibility of the unintended consequences of their own policies. Hijacked or not, religion cannot explain the actions of suicide bombers anymore than Christianity could explain the gas chamber, Catholicism the bombing at Omagh or the faith of Japanese kamikaze pilots or Tamil LTTE guerillas. Muslims argue that it is important to distinguish between Islam and its exploitation by violent groups to mobilise support. To look for the roots of their actions in religion is not only flawed but dangerous.

Of course these polar views obscure the many areas of agreement between the two as, for example, on the contribution of political and economic frustrations to creating “breeding grounds”. Take for example former US secretary of state Colin Powell’s assertion that the war on terrorism cannot be won unless we confront the social and political roots of poverty.

But it is what issue is accorded priority and whether a practical course of action follows the rhetoric about “underlying causes” that determines whether this perceptional gap will widen or close. Most would agree that as the roots of terrorism are manifold, so must be the means to address them. There is also consensus that as it is both local and global in its manifestation, its internal and external dimensions need appropriate national policies and international strategies.

There is no silver bullet that can address global terrorism in all its complexity. And certainly in the short run, law enforcement and good intelligence remains the key to both punitive and preventive actions.

However, I would propose a broad-gauge counterterrorism strategy based on nine “Cs”:

• Comprehensiveness: A comprehensive, multifaceted strategy is needed that encompasses law enforcement, political, social, cultural, financial and diplomatic measures.

• Consensus at the global level is required on a strategy incorporating both short- and longterm measures that work in tandem.

• Causes and conditions that breed, encourage and contribute to terrorism must be objectively identified and addressed.

• Confusion between explanation and justification must be removed. Trying to understand a phenomenon does not mean “giving in” to terrorism.

• Capabilities must be improved and national capacities strengthened across the spectrum to pursue terrorists and prevent terrorist activities.

• Cooperative rather than coercive national and international strategies should be pursued so that the reaction to counterterrorism measures does not compound the problem.

• Civil liberties and principles of good governance must be upheld in the fight against terror, because real security can only be achieved through respect for human rights.

• Civilisational and cultural: dialogue and understanding including engaging in the battle for the hearts and minds, must become an integral part of global consensus-building to evolve a joint strategy. Such a dialogue must be premised on the understanding that the root cause of friction between civilisations are not primarily religious differences, but mainly issues of power, competing political and economic interests, policies and misunderstandings.

• Conference at the summit level must be called to craft and coordinate an approach based on these elements.

Profound challenges evoke profound responses. As we all share the same world, our destinies are naturally entwined. Peace and security has never been, nor can ever be, a zero-sum game. The only way to respond effectively to the challenges posed by terrorism is to work with unity. What is required is cooperation and coordination, not confrontation. It is crucial that we promote harmony and understanding, which in turn are dependent on political, social and economic justice.

If the measures I just suggested appear too intimidating, we need only to remind ourselves that so far the actions that we have seen to combat terrorism may have doused the flames, but they have yet to put out the fire.