Tuesday, August 08, 2006

Nuclear Free South Asia: A laudable ideal

The News, August 9, 2006
Towards a nuclear-free South Asia
PLAIN WORDS by M B Naqvi

The writer is a veteran journalist and freelance columnist.

Exactly sixty-one years ago the US inaugurated the nuclear age by dropping a nuclear bomb on Nagasaki. The evil nature of the bomb is obvious. It is a weapon against which there is no defence and it does not distinguish between combatants and civilians; and kills all indiscriminately; men, women and children.

Atomic weapons did not remain a US monopoly for long. The Soviets, British and French quickly acquired them. By 1960s the Israelis had made their own atomic weapons, helped by France, Britain, the US and South Africa. China entered this exclusive club in 1964. Ten years later India blasted its way into it. Pakistan felt compelled to go nuclear in 1972 after India had defeated and dismembered it. The rumours of Islamabad trying to go nuclear may have moved the Indians to explode a bomb in 1974; maybe to forestall Pakistan. Pakistan acquired the know-how in 1984 and a device by 1986. Many nations may be trying to acquire nuclear capability. And the US is accusing Iran. North Korea is the latest member of the club.

One's compelling concern is about the nuclearisation of South Asia. Islamabad freely acknowledges its nuclear weapons are to deter India that is perceived as a permanent existential threat. As for India, it has grand ideas of a great power status with a military capability to match it. In 1998, India reminded the world of its nuclear status. Pakistan felt constrained to go one better by blasting six nuclear devices against India's five. There has been no moment of tranquillity since. Instead an armed truce in which the arms race in nuclear, missiles and conventional weapons spheres has escalated. South Asia's emotional volatility may make this area see nuclear weapons being used again.

Pakistan's propaganda and existence of its conventional and nuclear deterrent ensures that India does not achieve the status uncontested. Its true stature is reduced by Pakistan's truculence and constant negative propaganda. Nevertheless, Indians have managed their foreign policy well enough and the world recognises it, or at least pretends to, as being a great emerging power comparable to China. Its status, thanks to the western media, has recently risen sharply.

Pakistan's ruling establishment realises that Pakistan's stature has diminished. The reasons for this are varied: Pakistan is the epic-centre of the Islamic Revolution; it has many militant Islamic groups; whenever a terrorist is arrested anywhere, some connection with Pakistan is mentioned. Pakistan is also perceived as a volatile, unstable and unreliable state with nuclear weapons. Major world powers are volubly worried about the future of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. Would they fall into the hands of Islamic extremists, given the growing influence of Taliban in many areas of Pakistan? The US has become wary in its ties with Pakistan because of the threat of it being ruled by Taliban-like militants eventually.

Pakistan president claims standing for a moderate and modern Islam. But his regime's actions negate modernism and tolerance. The whole county is racked by sectarian terrorism. Jihadi organisations want to liberate Kashmir and the regime is still facing near revolt in FATA areas and Balochistan. The rhetoric of the ruling party is vaguely about Islam. This distance between reality and claims alarms foreigners. Nuclear weapons have aggravated great powers' concerns. Qazi Hussain Ahmed has claimed that the Americans have already taken control of these weapons. True or false, the suspicion of American intentions vis-a-vis Pakistan's nuclear weapons is widespread. The question is what should Pakistan do about, or with, these weapons?

There was the threat of an Indian invasion in 2002 during which Pakistan threatened the use of nukes a dozen times to make India desist. India had 600,000 troops on the border with armour. The world took this threat of war seriously. The fact is that Pakistan's atomic weapons had not deterred India. Why didn't they deter? It is simple. India too has many more nuclear weapons and vehicles to deliver. If Pakistan's nuclear deterrent deters India, there is no reason why many more Indian nuclear weapons would not deter Pakistan.

Actually, India dared Pakistan to use its nukes first and wait for a massive riposte. Pakistanis, instead of worsening the situation, found discretion to be better than valour and decided to concede the main Indian demand: Pakistan should rein in jihadis. The Indians were not fools to then go to war. They got what they wanted: that Pakistan should not let its territory be used against India. The assurance was credible. One's conclusion is that the nuclear weapons of Pakistan did not deter India from invading it. What happened was that Pakistan gave India what it demanded. The nukes proved useless in deterring India from demanding and getting the desired promise.

This central fact should guide Pakistan's policy makers. No more wars with India should be the aim. Islamabad has to follow a policy of peace, whether or not India responds likewise. Pakistan has to persevere. This is now a given. If this is so, a whole new policy orientation towards India is needed. This new India policy would be hindered by the presence of nukes, being a cold war baggage.

The best course will be to ask Muhammad al Baradei, the IAEA chief, to come and take charge of these weapons. Let his scientists dismantle them in a scientific manner into elements that can be used or disposed off safely. Doubtless, the world faces a problem: fissile material cannot safely be disposed off. But that is a different subject for scientists to tackle. Islamabad had better sign the NPT, CTBT and all the rest of the protocols. It should become a wholly non-nuclear power. That would lift the nightmare of India using its nuclear arsenals to decimate the urban-industrial centres of Pakistan. The threat of a possible conventional war would remain. But that will be faced best with policies of peace, more democracy, more trade and more popular contacts.

The matter does not end here. The nuclearisation of South Asia has meant huge distortions in the economies of both India and Pakistan. Far too many resources are being devoted to useless militarisation. Insofar as India is doing it, well that has to be deprecated. But Pakistanis should desist from doing what the Indians are doing so as not to remain entrapped in an arms race. Pakistan must eschew militarism.

Indians pose no existential threat to Pakistan. One holds that India is now far too Hinduised to think of annexing even a village of Pakistan. It simply has no use for Pakistani Muslims. India would say fine things for diplomatic purposes and be a good enough foreign power, if Pakistanis would allow it. But it would remain a foreign power. It would not now do what Nehru implied with his policy of more popular contacts. Nehru is dead and India has got rid of much of his legacy. India is now a different kettle of fish.

Pakistan has to adjust and evolve new policies regarding its nuclear weapons. Nukes are bad for the world and are even worse for South Asia. Pakistanis should revert to their earlier stance of wanting to make South Asia a nuclear weapons-free zone. Islamabad would acquire a high moral stature, a la South Africa, and its words would resonate. Pakistanis should be leading the world nuclear disarmament movement. Arguments have long been clear against a nuclear apartheid in which some possess nuclear weapons and boss over others on that basis. Pakistanis should be an important part of world peace and anti-nuclear movements. Some Indians are also campaigning against nuclearisation of South Asia. Pakistanis should join hands with them and strengthen the common movement.
Email: mbnaqvi@cyber.net.pk

1 comment:

Ashutosh said...

A sober and rational article. Very well thought and if followed will do lot of good not only for pakistan but for the whole world. You must publish such thoughts in print media as well