Book Review: Dawn August 13, 2006
REVIEWS: Ideological or secular? by Dr M. Reza Kazimi
Secular Jinnah
By Saleena Karim
Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity
By Ian Bryant Wells
Religious majorities prefer an ideological state, religious minorities prefer a secular state. Both aspirations are reflected in the life and work of Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Two recent publications on the Quaid-i-Azam explore different phases of his mission — Secular Jinnah: Munir’s Big Hoax Exposed by Saleena Karim and Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity: Jinnah’s Early Politics by Ian Bryant Wells. The first book relates to the final phase of Jinnah’s career, the second to its first phase. Since Saleena Karim’s book is polemical, it needs to be reviewed first. The focus is on a statement ascribed to Jinnah by Mohammad Munir, which the author says, Munir concocted:
“The new state would be a modern democratic state with sovereignty resting in the people, and the members of the new nation having equal rights of citizenship regardless of religion, caste or creed”
Why she finds this statement objectionable is that: “The words ‘modern democratic state’ used in conjunction with ‘sovereignty resting in the people” — clearly describe a secular democracy”. What Jinnah actually said, according to the author was:
“But the Government of Pakistan can only be a popular, representative and democratic form of government. It’s parliament and cabinet responsible to parliament will both be finally responsible to the electorate and the people in general without any distinction of caste, creed or sect, which will be the final factor with regard to the policy and programme of the government that may be adopted from time to time.”
Saleena Karim comments: “The second version is entirely different from the first.” In actual there is only a partial difference that is, reference to ‘sovereignty resting in the people’ is omitted. In the Objectives Resolution, God’s sovereignty was to be exercised by the people.
Elaborating on Jinnah’s refusal to countenance theocracy she writes: “Jinnah knew that Islam and theocracy are entirely incompatible.” This conclusion she bases on the Quran.
“They take their priests and anchorites to be their Lords in derogation of Allah … yet they were commanded to worship but one Allah”
Objectively worship and obedience have different meanings. She further elaborates: “The notion of secular Islam had been explored by a number of scholars in recent years, but in reality the two terms cannot sit side by side since they are too dissimilar. Islam indeed effectively excludes religion from the affairs of the state just as secularism, but that is where their similarity ends.”
This is just where their similarity needs to end. She writes some 50 pages later that “The Islamic State is designed primarily to deal with practicality, since the “spiritual side of Islam is solely the concern of the believer.” From this last observation we are left wondering about the difference between Munir and her.
Saleena Karim in the next chapter gives a long list of myths which she purports to explode under the head of reality. Myth No.4 is:
“On the rare occasion that a Muslim Leaguer tried to pass a resolution to call Pakistan an Islamic State, the rest of the Muslim League vetoed it.”
Reality: “The individuals who called for an Islamic State had vested interests. Jinnah warned many times that some people purporting to be the supporters of the Pakistan Movement were actually creating mischief.”
Here she is pitting interpretation against fact. Unless it is made clear who had what vested interests, we cannot identify the mischief. The Raja of Mahmudabad in Some Memories recounted that his advocacy of an Islamic State had brought him into conflict with Jinnah. The Raja admitted that on looking back, he realised how wrong he had been.
“A democratic form of government must be seen for what it is. It certainly does not imply ‘modern democracy’.”
How could anyone know what was not there? Liaquat Ali Khan, for one, sent a detailed critique of the Plan on May 21, 1946, sufficient to show that even if the Muslim League desired to create Pakistan from the Cabinet Mission Plan, it did not have the means
What is the difference between democracy and modern democracy? She says that change of policy is according to the Quranic principle of mutual consultation. As stated by her, the principle would stand God forbid, for oligarchy, not democracy, but this is not all: Jinnah “rightly took consultation with all the citizens of the state, regardless of caste, creed or sect, since they are irrelevant in practical matters.” The difference between Munir and Karim is further narrowed down.
Lastly she comes to the Cabinet Mission Plan as an index of what Jinnah really desired. The Muslim League’s clear concession of sovereignty in its proposal of May 12, 1946 is explained away by saying: “The Mission’s Plan was, from the League’s point of view, a temporary solution” and “The bottom line is that the Mission Plan was a prelude to actual Partition — and everyone knew it.”
How could anyone know what was not there? Liaquat Ali Khan, for one, sent a detailed critique of the Plan on May 21, 1946, sufficient to show that even if the Muslim League desired to create Pakistan from the Cabinet Mission Plan, it did not have the means. It was because of voicing sentiments echoed by the author that the Cabinet Delegation on June 25, 1946 felt justified in accepting a qualified acceptance from Congress.
Saleena Karim says: “The British may have formally rejected Pakistan as an independent state, but the proposal came close enough regardless — too close for the Congress as it would turn out.” The Cabinet Mission Plan may have come close to Partition, but it lacked what she holds central to an Islamic State-sovereignty.
Now to turn to Ian Bryant Well’s depiction of the formative phase of Jinnah’s political career. His contention is that: “By focusing on Jinnah’s later career, and examining it in isolation from his early politics, scholars have often judged Jinnah harshly.” It is to redress the balance he says, that he examines Jinnah’s early career.
Ian Bryant Wells is the first author to recount Jinnah’s agitation against Lord Willingdon to show that Jinnah was not averse to mass politics. Further, he cites Jinnah’s speech in the Elementary Education Bill to prove that Jinnah was not elitist in his outlook: “Are you going to keep millions and millions of people under your feet for the fear that they may demand more rights?” Wells recounts that Jinnah attacked the representative character of the Simla Deputation. Wells next tells us that Jinnah began to associate with the Muslim League in 1910, but does not tell us why. As regards Jinnah’s decline in Congress, Wells maintains that it was not caused by the rise of Gandhi, but by the death of Dadabhai Nauroji, Sir Feroz Shah Mehta, Gopal Krishna Gokhale and Balgangadhar Tilak. Nor does Wells fail to highlight the brief interlude in 1919, when Gandhi and Jinnah were united in their support of the Montford Reforms. Wells shows that their rift in the following year did not end Jinnah’s attempts either at Non-Cooperation, nor communal harmony. In Nagpur in 1920, we are informed, more than 70 per cent of delegates were Muslims raising questions about the Nagpur Congress’ representative character.
Wells fully demonstrate how the different attitudes to Jinnah of Motilal and Jawaharlal Nehru shaped the political destiny of India. Even after a rift with Jinnah, Motilal remarked: “We can afford to fight like Kilkenny cats and still be friends” (p138). And here is Jinnah on the subject of Motilal: “Will you bring Motilal Nehru to bow before the throne at Viceregal Lodge? What has Pandit Motilal Nehru been doing in the Assembly? Has he not been cooperating with you? Have you no eyes, have you no ears, have you no brains?”
Jinnah was chiding the British for being unable to discern policy from posture. His exasperation fell on deaf ears. In the years ahead, it would fall in the deaf ears of both the British and Motilal’s son. Once when Jawaharlal angered the Muslim League, Motilal Nehru rushed to conciliate Jinnah. Once Pandit Motilal was dead Jawharlal Nehru referred to “my dear friend Mohammad Ali Jinnah”. To describe one’s father’s friend as one’s own went against the grain of Indian culture and did not bode well for the future.
Lord Willington found Jinnah more Congress than the Congress after he had come back to lead the Muslim League. Even before, he had made himself vulnerable to Muslim accusations. In the central assembly — Jinnah was led to oppose the Central Muslim Party of Sir Abdul Qaiyum. This is the central strand of Jinnah’s struggle to be brought out in this book. The main challenge before Wells was to explain the transition in Jinnah’s politics. Since he kept the last decade of Jinnah outside the scope of his book, his account of Jinnah’s gradual change during the Khilafat Movement serves as a microcosm. His running exchange with M. Naeem Qureshi makes interesting reading. Naeem Qureshi was in fact exaggerating when he dubbed Jinnah “a consistent and staunch Pan-Islamist”. Jinnah and Mahmudabad had to walk out from the Delhi 1818 All-India Muslim League session over the Khilafat issue which shows he was not consistent. Jinnah pleaded with Gandhi not to raise the religious sentiments of the masses, which shows he was not staunch. Yet on the whole Wells argues on the basis of Jinnah’s inclination, while Qureshi argues on the basis of Jinnah’s action. The best arbiter would be Jinnah’s article on the Khilafat in the Indian Review of October 1919; the only primary source Wells does not cite.
Wells explains that M.A. Jinnah had to represent the concern of his electorate. This happened with regard to his non-communal perception of the Khilafat, and it happened with regard to Separate Electorates. This does not take into account all of the external factors, but Wells should be lauded for completing a portrait worth the contemplation of both India and Pakistan.
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