A new book on Taliban and Afghanistan: Recommended Reading

Dawn, July 16, 2006
Book Review: Afghanistan: The Taliban Years By S. Iftikhar Murshed

First impressions
This book is a first-hand account of the Taliban rule in Afghanistan from 1996-2001. It is based on the author’s experiences as he tried bringing the Taliban and the Northern Alliance to the negotiating table

S. Iftikhar Murshed writes about his experiences with various politicians in their quest for a permanent settlement between the Afghan parties during the Taliban regime

THE DAY I took over my new Afghanistan assignment, I had my first, somewhat comical, encounter with the Taliban.

President Farouk Leghari had just dismissed the second Benazir Bhutto government amid scandals. Her brother Murtaza had been gunned down in Karachi the previous month and her husband, Asif Ali Zardari, was arrested amid reports about his complicity in the murder. Yaqub-Khan was reappointed foreign minister in the caretaker administration of Prime Minister Meraj Khalid. So often had he held this post since the time of General Ziaul Haq that the world record for being appointed foreign minister under various governments was probably his, as he would jokingly tell me.

Elections were to be held within 90 days and the speculation was that Yaqub-Khan would again become the next government’s foreign minister. It was Yaqub-Khan who insisted that I should again head the foreign ministry’s sensitive Afghanistan department because he preferred known faces or, as he put it in rather unflattering Shakespearean terms, it is “better to bear the ills we have than fly to others that we know not of.”

I was talking with Yaqub-Khan in his office in the evening when foreign secretary Najmuddin Shaikh stormed into the room to say that Mulla Ghaus, the acting Taliban foreign minister, was waiting outside and wanted to meet us.

“Let him come in,” said Yaqub-Khan.

“Okay, but I warn you he’s going to kiss you,” replied Najmuddin.

“Do I have to kiss him back?” asked an obviously worried Yaqub-Khan.

At this point, Ghaus walked in unannounced, hugged the startled Yaqub-Khan and kissed him on both cheeks. I was next in line. He was a short fair-skinned man with an untidy black beard which did little to hide his protruding teeth and receding gums. Thick small-lensed dark glasses concealed his eyes, one of which had been injured some years earlier during the fighting against Soviet occupation forces. I was later to discover that he had a subtle sense of humour.

The brief conversation with Ghaus was about a sequential settlement of the conflict in Afghanistan starting with a ceasefire and ending with the formation of a political commission that would work out the modalities for a permanent broad-based government. This proposal had been evolved by the United Nations Special Mission for Afghanistan (UNSMA) and considerable work had already been done on it. Mulla Ghaus brushed aside the idea of an immediate ceasefire on the grounds that the opposition would use the lull in the fighting to regroup and attack Kabul. This was the first glimpse that I had of the difficulties that would be confronting me in the coming months.

* * * * *

In early June 1997, the chief secretary of Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province, Rustam Shah, conveyed an urgent message to me from Ahmed Shah Masood. The latter said that he wished Pakistan well and could not possibly be hostile to it. After all, his father was buried in Peshawar. He wanted to meet a senior Pakistan official on neutral soil, preferably Dubai. The meeting should be kept secret.

It was accordingly decided by the government that Rustam Shah and I would proceed to Dubai. No one else was to know of the meeting and foreign office colleagues were told that I had gone to Lahore for three or four days to attend a family marriage. Mulla Omar and the top Taliban leadership in Kandahar were, however, informed as I would ultimately be required to convey Ahmed Shah Masood’s message to them.

We reached Dubai on the afternoon of June 18 and met the delegation sent by Ahmed Shah Masood the same evening at the Forte Grand Hotel where they were staying. The Northern Alliance team was led by Younis Qanooni of the Jamiat-i-Islami. He was a finance minister when the Burhanuddin Rabbani regime controlled Kabul and subsequently became a minister in December 2001 in the interim administration of Hamid Karzai. He resigned to contest the presidential election on October 9, 2004 but was defeated by Karzai. The other members of his delegation included Ustad Fazl, the head of the Hizb-i-Wahdat’s political division, and a person who was introduced to us as Hamid from the Jumbish-i-Milli.

We were warmly welcomed by Qanooni at the lobby of the hotel and conducted to a small conference room. He invited me to begin the talks. I told him that I was in Dubai to listen to any new ideas that he might have about bringing the Afghan conflict to an end. For its part, Pakistan stood for the restoration of durable peace and stability in Afghanistan. It was against outside interference and fully supported Afghanistan’s unity and territorial integrity. There could be no military solution and it was important for all the Afghan groups to work towards a negotiated political settlement. All parties should adopt a positive approach as the future could not be built on the wounds of the past.

Qanooni replied that there had been a complete change in the Afghan situation and this was what had prompted his leadership to request for the meeting. He expressed the hope that it would lead to a greater understanding between Pakistan and Afghanistan which, in turn, would benefit the entire region. Like most Afghan leaders I have met, whether from the Taliban or the Northern Alliance, he was lavish in his praise for the help that Pakistan had rendered to the Afghan people in their jihad against the Soviet occupation forces. His prayer was that God may give the Afghans the opportunity to repay this debt that they all owed to Pakistan. Qanooni continued that Pakistan and Afghanistan were indistinguishable. They had everything in common and should work in unison in international forums such as the UN. The two countries should supplement each others’ efforts. If things were in place, Pakistan could play an effective role in Central Asia. Pakistan and Afghanistan would be able to re-establish broad and deep economic collaboration. Unfortunately, the convergence that had brought Pakistan and Afghanistan together during the struggle against the Soviets had disappeared. His colleagues had hoped that this convergence would continue to inspire the relationship between the two countries after the jihad. However, these hopes had been shattered and what existed was an unsavoury stalemate.

Wrong policies had been pursued “somewhere”, as a consequence of which, the two countries now had to start from scratch. At all events, the Afghan people would never forget the help that Pakistan had given them in their hour of greatest need.

Qanooni said that despite the strains in the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the countries must not look back. They should build upon their commonalities. The two peoples had similar perceptions. Afghanistan had always welcomed dialogue with Pakistan. Numerous delegations had been exchanged but, unfortunately, to no avail. The time had come to be frank and forthright with each other.

Future changes in Afghanistan should not be brought about by military means but through dialogue and negotiations. Welcoming my emphasis on non-interference by external powers in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, Qanooni said that the continuation of the conflict was detrimental to Afghanistan’s neighbours. Pakistan had suffered immeasurably. The violence in Afghanistan had resulted in millions of deaths and had devastated the country’s infrastructure, its culture, and its entire national system. His leadership would not wish to prolong the conflict even by one hour. It must be brought to an immediate end. However, if pushed against the wall, the Northern Alliance would be left with no option but to meet force with force.

The conditions prevailing inside Afghanistan were deteriorating rapidly and it was important to move fast towards peace. Pakistan and Iran should evolve a new strategy to bring this about. The two countries had to move in unison. They should identify their enemies and friends both at the regional as well as the international levels. There must be a rapprochement between them so that they could work together for peace. The Afghans had come to Dubai with an open and positive mind. The presence of the Pakistan delegation symbolised the determination of the Nawaz Sharif government to move towards a settlement.

Qanooni’s emphasis that Pakistan and Iran needed to move in tandem to resolve the Afghanistan conflict left me in no doubt that this so-called “secret” meeting was with the approval of Tehran. Qanooni’s brief had obviously been cleared by the Iranian government.

I told Qanooni that Pakistan was impartial towards all the Afghan groups. This was demonstrated by its non-recognition of the Taliban for nine months though they controlled Kabul and two-thirds of the country. Our neutrality was again illustrated by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s meeting with Professor Rabbani the previous month during the ECO summit in Ashgabat.

There should be no doubt that Pakistan had a vital interest in the restoration of durable peace in Afghanistan as no other country had suffered more from the continuation of the conflict. However, a permanent settlement could only emerge from the Afghans themselves for which a meaningful dialogue among the Afghan groups was essential. Qanooni had been present when we visited Shibberghan on December 7, 1996. He could not have forgotten that Dostum, in the presence of the other leaders and representatives of the Northern Alliance, had agreed to a sequential settlement beginning with a ceasefire, the exchange of prisoners, the creation of a political commission that would deliberate upon the modalities leading to the establishment of a broad-based government.

Finally, the methodology for the demilitarisation of Kabul was to be determined. Subsequently, at the conference on Afghanistan convened by Iran at the end of January 1997, Sibghatullah Mujaddadi had announced that he had met Mulla Omar in Kandahar a few days earlier and that the latter had accepted these proposals. The main elements for a permanent settlement were, therefore, in place. The Afghan parties were now within negotiating range and a serious attempt for a dialogue had to be made.

I reminded Qanooni that the events in Mazar-i-Sharif in May had clearly shown that the Afghan factions were perfectly capable of establishing cooperation with each other irrespective of their ethnic diversity or political differences. General Malik and Mulla Ghaus had signed a written agreement on May 19, on May 24 Ahmed Shah Masood had indicated that he wanted to negotiate an honourable surrender, and on the same day Karim Khalili of the Hizb-i-Wahdat had sent a delegation to Kabul for talks.

The building blocks for the creation of sustainable peace were in place and it was for this reason that Pakistan had been working towards convening an intra-Afghan dialogue in Islamabad. We envisaged that countries bordering Afghanistan would be invited as observers or even guarantors should an agreement among the Afghan parties emerge. Our initial soundings with Iran, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan indicated that they were favourably disposed to the idea.

While we spoke, the new foreign minister of Pakistan, Gohar Ayub Khan, was visiting Tajikistan and the other Central Asian republics to develop this concept further. Perhaps even the United States and Russia could be invited to the meeting which should be held under UN auspices. This was a concept I had developed during a visit to Moscow in the first week of April. I did not, however, tell Qanooni that I had already discussed this with the Russians and they were enthusiastic about taking part in the process. The idea subsequently emerged as the “Six Plus Two Group”.

Qanooni welcomed the concept of an intra-Afghan dialogue though he had reservations about Islamabad as the venue. Furthermore, there appeared to be a contradiction. On the one hand, Pakistan claimed to be for conciliation among the Afghan groups and, on the other, it had been trying to unseat the Rabbani government at the United Nations. He was already aware of the sequential settlement proposal which he felt had been overtaken by events. Similarly, the agreement between the Taliban and Malik was no longer valid. The central issue was the establishment of a broad-based government and he wanted to know whether the Taliban were willing to move towards such a dispensation.

We decided to adjourn the meeting to the following day when we would first discuss the broad principles of policy and then the procedure for the adoption of that policy.

The second meeting with Qanooni was held at 10:30am at the Avari Hotel, where I was staying. I told Qanooni that the gist of our discussion the previous evening had been conveyed to Islamabad. Because of the positive nature of the discussions, Pakistan had decided that it would reopen its consulate general in Mazar-i-Sharif. We expected the Northern Alliance to give full protection to our consul-general and his staff. Qanooni said that he too had briefed his leaders about our earlier talks. They were happy with the outcome and had asked him to convey their complements to the Pakistan delegation. He had been instructed to carry the negotiations through to its ultimate success.

Qanooni expressed delight at our decision to reopen the Mazar-i-Sharif consulate general and assured me the personnel and premises would be given full protection. He then added: “Please ensure that there are more people from the ministry of foreign affairs and less from Inter Services Intelligence” and then quickly explained that this remark had only been made in jest and that I should not take it seriously.

Qanooni asked me advice on the principles of policy and the procedures that should be followed to bring about a settlement of the Afghanistan problem. I replied that this was an internal Afghan issue and I, as an outsider, had no right to tell them how they should conduct their own affairs. Qanooni said that I should not be diplomatic with him. He was convinced of the sincerity of the Pakistan delegation and he only wished to hear my views. I replied that the principles of policy should be the restoration of durable peace and stability through an intra-Afghan peace process; the cessation of outside interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan; and commitment to the unity and territorial integrity of Afghanistan. The procedure for the initiation and implementation of these principles should be through an intra-Afghan dialogue in Pakistan to which countries that have common borders with Afghanistan would be invited as observers and even possible guarantors should an agreement emerge. The US and Russia could also be invited. The conference should be held under UN auspices. The intra-Afghan dialogue would deliberate upon various proposals leading to the establishment of a broad-based government.

* * * * *

On our return to Islamabad, Rustam Shah and I briefed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif about our meeting with Younis Qanooni in Dubai. Nawaz Sharif, who obviously did not understand the complexity of the issues involved, turned to me and said that I should solve the Afghanistan problem within one week! For this purpose I was free to travel to Kandahar, Mazar-i-Sharif or any other place in Afghanistan without obtaining the approval of the government as was required under our procedures. Two planes — the Pakistan Air Force Fokker which we had used for going to Shibberghan and Kandahar in December 1996, and a four-seater Falcon jet, also belonging to the air force were at my disposal.