The News, June 6, 2006
Doing our homework on the nuclear issue
Nasim Zehra
In an unequivocally "united" move Pakistan's key political parties, cutting across deep divides, passed a resolution on A Q Khan and the country's nuclear programme. The resolution categorically stated that "Pakistan's nuclear programme is vital to our defence and is not directed against anyone. Pakistan is a responsible nuclear state and is fully cognisant of its responsibilities in international politics," and that Pakistani scientists "enjoy the respect and appreciation of all Pakistanis, and our nation is indebted to them for the remarkable progress that our country has made in the field of nuclear technology, weapons development and energy security." The resolution also ruled out the handing over of Mr Khan to the United States.
While the points raised in the resolution have been regularly reiterated by different members of the Pakistani government, ranging from the president to the foreign minister and the bureaucrats, this resolution holds special significance. One, because of its timing. It has come as a direct response to the May 25 hearing of the US Congressional Sub-committee on Terrorism and Nuclear Non-Proliferation on the A Q Khan case. The committee basically concluded that Pakistan was the most dangerous country for its proliferation activities.
Two, the Senate resolution is a bipartisan, direct and comprehensive response to the attempted pressure by Washington on the Pakistani government regarding the A Q Khan case, proliferation and the nuclear command and control system for Pakistan's nuclear programme. Three, this is perhaps the clearest and most unambiguous articulation of Pakistan's response to the repeated demand made by different sections of the United States' policy-making community and by the IAEA that Pakistan's lead scientist be handed over to the IAEA, or that the IAEA and US officials be given direct access to A Q Khan. Four, the assertion comes at the time of intense US pressure on Iran. Unlike the diplomatic exchanges, it is a clear assertion and communication of Pakistan's sovereign right to responsibly develop and manage its nuclear programme.
While the hearing was based on evidence that was both dated and insufficient, it will be a tool that various lobbies opposed to Pakistan's nuclear programme will use. For example, in addition to the testimony a few think-tanks in Washington have also organised simulation exercises premised on the possibility of Pakistan's nuclear programme falling into the hands of "extremists." On May 17 the article, "Choosing among bad options: The Pakistani 'loose nukes' conundrum," by Thomas Donnelly, was posted on the American Enterprise Institute's web publication, National Security Outlook.
Significantly the Pakistan embassy in Washington also met with senior State Department officials and raised the issue of the May 25 testimony. The State department has opted to duck the matter with not a single official showing up at the hearing. The chairman of the sub-committee complained at least three times during the hearing that the State Department had been invited to make its own case on Pakistan and the A Q network. If there was a method to this madness, it remains unclear. However, since the State Department made a clear choice to not present any facts presenting Pakistan's case to the committee, many have wondered if the hearing was "orchestrated" to put pressure on Pakistan.
Clearly, Pakistan is in this alone. The Bush administration, currently seeking Congressional support for the Indo-US nuclear deal, is keen to strengthen its non-proliferation credentials to counter the non-proliferation critics of the deal. Hence, at this point, especially, there will be no support forthcoming for Pakistan. Otherwise too, Pakistan's nuclear programme and the A Q Khan affair remain an issue of ongoing divergence between Washington and Islamabad. Pakistan's own political instability and more importantly the A Q Khan affair obviously put Pakistan in the dock. So has the broad strategic conclusion in Washington that nuclear weapons in the hands of a Muslim state are unacceptable.
The question is really about Pakistan's own ability to project Islamabad's policies and actions on the A. Q Khan case and its nuclear programme. The Senate resolution was a necessary political statement spelling out Pakistan's bottom line on these issues. However, Pakistan has not opted for the transparency required to project the substance of the major steps it has taken to safeguard its own nuclear programme and nuclear arsenal and also to promote international nuclear non-proliferation. These include:
(i) An on-going dialogue on safety and security of nuclear/strategic facilities and assets; (ii) creation of a tight command-and-control structure over Pakistan's nuclear assets; (iii) cooperation with the IAEA and the US on the Iranian nuclear issue; (iv) cooperation, through specific steps, in dismantling the proliferation network involving A Q Khan; (v) adoption of export control legislation and regulations reflecting the highest standards (such as NSG, MTCR, Australia Group) -- even without reciprocal benefits.
These steps have been taken without compromising state-controlled tight security and the secrecy of Pakistan's own nuclear programme. Many have been taken with technical support from the US. Despite Pakistan's sensitivity regarding external infringement in the nuclear-strategic area, the US has been able to secure several important advances in Pakistan's cooperation on these issues, but ones that both sides remain quite about.
Pakistan needs to publicly articulate these steps. It needs to reiterate its commitment to a comprehensively and fairly worked-out fissile fuel cut-off treaty. Similarly Pakistan needs to reiterate its commitment to signing the CTBT as part of a broad South Asian nuclear restraint regime that Islamabad first proposed in 1998. Islamabad also needs to publicly reiterate its earlier proposal that Pakistan and India discuss ways to strengthen non-proliferation and promote strategic stability.
The onus is also on Islamabad to be seen as an active player on the world scene promoting non-proliferation, while safeguarding its own security-driven nuclear programme. In addition to making a categorical statement, as has been made by the government and now by the politicians, projecting Pakistan's operational policy on non-proliferation would be an effective response. This approach would also help to create a context within which real Pakistan's cooperation with the US and other members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group can take place.
Pakistan needs to be proactive, imaginative and bold. Maybe parliament, and especially the Senate's Foreign Affairs Committee, should work out a strategy to proactively promote and project Pakistan as a responsible nuclear state. Part of the pressure that Pakistan faces can be treated by removing the disconnect between Pakistan's policy content and the articulation plus projection of policy. Also, the Senate's multi-party committee may be the appropriate platform from where the initiative should be taken to drain out populism from public discourse on national security. Often state institutions and the political parties have been responsible for reducing debate on national security issues like the nuclear programme to mere point-scoring battles. A matter-of-fact and well-informed debate means that the people of Pakistan are not reduced to thinking that taking steps to better manage our own nuclear programme and to become a responsible nuclear state within the international community amounts to "selling" or compromising Pakistan's nuclear programme; a fear that has been responsible for the government's decision to not be more open about the steps taken to safeguard our nuclear programme and to promote non-proliferation.
The writer is an Islamabad-based security analyst and adjunct professor at SAIS Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC. Email: nasimzehra@hotmail.com
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