How the ‘second track’ began

Dawn, June 15, 2006
How the ‘second track’ began
By Thomas P. Thornton


A WIDE range of “second track” contacts are now routine between Indians and Pakistanis, a welcome and helpful part of the political landscape of South Asia. While basic “people-to-people” meetings contribute to mutual understanding, private unofficial contacts on security matters help specifically to reduce the danger of renewed crises.

This year marks the 25th anniversary of the first of these meetings. As it happened, the beginnings of the process were in fact in Washington — appropriately enough in an era when all manner of things were ascribed to the “foreign hand.”

As Jimmy Carter’s administration was drawing to a close in 1981, we in the White House’s National Security Council staff had little to cheer about. American hostages remained in Iran and the collapse of US-Soviet relations after Moscow’s invasion of Afghanistan had forced Carter to reorient his policies. The original emphasis on issues such as non-proliferation, human rights and economic development had given way to a renewed Cold War, and things looked no better on the South Asian front.

Not only did Afghanistan hang as a heavy cloud over the subcontinent, Carter and Zia were unable to do more than paper over the bitterness that had separated them before the Soviet invasion, and the heady hopes of better Indo-US relations that had characterised the early Carter-Desai era had fallen on notably bad days with the return of Indira Gandhi and the reorientation of American policy to deal with the perceived renewed threat from the Soviet Union.

On the ground in South Asia, relations between Pakistan and India were again growing tense. While neither was yet armed with nuclear weapons, that risk was growing, and even conventional wars between the two had brought unconscionable costs. There was a dangerous absence of communication between New Delhi and Islamabad, and that which did exist ranged from sullen to shrill. Each side had to divine the strategic posture and intentions of the other from propaganda pronouncements, espionage of questionable quality, occasional firing across the border, and loud demarches by foreign ministries that were committed to their own version of a relentless Cold War.

Washington had learned at least one useful thing from its Cold War experience with the Soviet Union: that an ongoing dialogue between Soviet and American strategic thinkers — both civilians in the think tanks and individuals inside the respective military establishments — had made a significant contribution to the detente process. The dialogue had become institutionalised and, over the years, valuable personal contacts grew and each side had come to understand better the mindset of the other. The esoterica of command and control issues and deterrence theory, shared at these meetings, had helped reduce the danger of nuclear war.

Since this level of communication was totally lacking in South Asia, the NSC staff decided to explore the possibility of getting a process of dialogue started as a last, modest contribution of the waning Carter presidency. One thing was clear from the beginning: the record of the United States as a mediator (some would say meddler) in South Asian affairs was not stellar and if contacts between Pakistan and India were to be stimulated, the obvious step of inviting Indians and Pakistanis to discuss their bilateral problems at Camp David or some other secluded spot in the United States would be the kiss of death. Any get-together should be in a broader context, under non-American auspices, and outside the United States.

The solution proved simple enough. We believed that South Asian delegates might feel most comfortable (and be least conspicuous) in London, so after contacts with the British government, we approached the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London with the suggestion that it sponsor and provide the venue for a meeting on security issues in South Asia. In this way, the Indo-Pakistani encounter could be embedded within a larger gathering that included other South Asians, and Europeans and Americans as well. The IISS responded with alacrity, but required help with funding.

While there are pots of money in various obscure places in the US government where the trivial sums involved could easily be found, it was decided not to use these lest the fact of American government involvement become conspicuous and blight the project. The non-governmental Ford and Rockefeller Foundations were more than willing to help out and in short time the invitations were issued. The meeting, on the intentionally broad topic of “Security in South Asia”, was held on July 21-23, 1981, just five months after the Carter administration and its NSC staff had passed into history.

The choice of the delegates from the two sides was left to the IISS. Most important was the inclusion of Pakistanis and Indians who were influential in setting the terms of the domestic intellectual debate on strategic matters, and who had at least some presence in their respective corridors of power. While there were no designated leaders, K. Subrahmanyam (then director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi) and Noor Hussain (director of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad) enjoyed pride of place in their respective delegations. Peter Lyon from the University of London’s Institute of Commonwealth Studies provided the theme paper and various invitees prepared papers in advance, responding to some of Lyon’s ideas.

No one expected a major breakthrough and there was none. Both sides generally stated familiar positions, but they had at least begun talking to each other directly. A considerable amount of back-and-forth did take place at the meetings, the inevitable posturing was kept within reasonable bounds, and informal conversations after meals (and generous nightcaps) established contacts that could develop in the future.

The dialogue of strategic thinkers from the subcontinent did in fact become institutionalised in the following decades. Further contributions were made from the American side by, among others, the series of meetings organised by Robert Scalapino and Leo Rose of the University of California at Berkeley and, later, the Neemrana meetings in which the late Paul Kreisberg paid a key facilitating role. With the growing normalisation of Indo-Pakistani relations in recent years, further impetus from outside has hardly been needed.

It would be overstating the case to ascribe decisive influence to the second-track process. The role of a specific gathering is probably even harder to assess, but the ice-breaking session in London is well worth remembering as a first step in a process that has provided at least some steadying influence in an erratic and often dangerous bilateral relationship.

As it happened, the other — rather more widely reported — event that was going on in London in the summer of 1981 was the wedding of Charles and Diana. By comparison, the Indo-Pakistani strategic dialogue that was quietly launched a quarter century ago looks to have been a smashing success.

The writer teaches South Asian affairs at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, US. He was a senior member of the National Security Council staff in the Carter administration.