Daily Times, April 17, 2006
EDITORIAL: Pak-Saudi “special” relationship
The visit of the Saudi crown prince, Sultan bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, to Pakistan comes in the wake of Iran’s self-declaration as a member of the “nuclear club” that has compelled many states to think in strategic terms. Under the circumstances, Prince Sultan and President Pervez Musharraf have jointly impressed upon the United States that the problems arising out of the Iranian case at the IAEA should be addressed through negotiations only. But, equally significantly, the two leaders have also talked about cooperation in “defence production and training” between the “armed forces of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia”. Saudi Arabia has always been Pakistan’s special friend; and observers abroad have often opined that Pakistan cannot refuse a Saudi “request”. Talking about regional issues, the two leaders must have taken a close look at the developing scenario of a possible showdown between the US and Iran and its fallout on the Gulf and West Asian region.
While Arab states in the region have understandably not been too outspoken about their growing fear of Iran, Arab writers have pointed to the Shiite populations in Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia which Iran could potentially use to pressure certain countries in its neighbourhood. That is why Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak risked being indiscreet when he said recently that the Shiites living in the Arab states were inclined to express greater empathy for and allegiance to Iran than to their own countries. Of course, this fear is not unfamiliar to Pakistan. In the 1980s it was asked by the Gulf states to help set up a military response force to Iran — a request Islamabad politely declined. Even this gesture of neutrality on Pakistan’s part did not persuade Imam Khomeini that Pakistan was innocent of a pro-Arab bias.
Strategically speaking, a nuclear Pakistan cannot relate well to a nuclear Iran because of “the Arab factor”, especially after the Saudis and other Arabs have started buying heavily into Pakistan’s economy. Having bought up the communications giant PTCL and a steel mill, they plan to build a $2 billion refinery and a $2 billion steel mill. They are also preparing to buy the gas companies when they come up for privatisation — all deals being in the “strategic” domain. Read together with the past Saudi largesse to Pakistan, it seems that the Saudis could be seeking a new and enhanced relationship with “nuclear Pakistan” to create an “equilibrium” which is no longer possible in their eyes within the relationship with an “oceanic” United States that is faced with negative domestic fallout from its adventure in Iraq.
Pakistan is said to have received more Saudi financial aid — starting in the 1960s — than any other country outside the Arab world. In return, the Saudis have received military and diplomatic help from Pakistan. In the 1960s, Pakistani instructors went to Saudi Arabia to train Saudis on the use of newly acquired British aircraft. An agreement reached in the 1970s made it possible to send 15,000 Pakistani military personnel to the kingdom. The money paid for their services helped Pakistan in its defence preparations. The dictum in Islamabad was: “The Saudis will not let Pakistan sink”.
There’s more. When Pakistan did not have money to create a zakat fund the “seed money” came from Riyadh. In the 1980s, when Pakistan’s military balance with India went awry, Saudi Arabia paid (approximately $1 billion) for a batch of 40 F-16 fighter aircraft. In 1998, then prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, facing bankruptcy in the aftermath of the nuclear tests, received a Saudi offer for providing up to 50,000 barrels of oil a day to Pakistan for an indefinite period on “deferred payment” terms. (The first Muslim leader to visit Pakistan’s nuclear installations was Prince Sultan, then Saudi Arabia’s defence minister.) The rumours that Pakistan might be helping Saudis develop their own nuclear weapons capability have been around although Saudi Arabia is a signatory to the NPT. So far there has been no proof of such collaboration. But Saudi Arabia might well be counting on Pakistan’s nuclear capability to shore up the Gulf region’s security in the face of an Iran that has become increasingly unpredictable under President Ahmadinejad.
In his diplomacy in the region, King Abdullah has ignored neither the United States nor India. He joined the Americans in efforts to effect a permanent normalisation of relations between Pakistan and India. But then he rather unexpectedly proposed during his visit to the region last year that India be invited to be a member of the OIC. The present move to buy into the security and economic future of an internally disturbed Pakistan could also be a part of the same strategy. (For the Gulf Arabs, being friendly to Pakistan doesn’t mean being hostile to India.) The two-day fifth special session of the Standing Committee of Foreign Secretaries of SAARC, held at Dhaka on April 11-12, has agreed to grant “observer” status to both the US and South Korea. (Japan and China already have it.) With India already considerably weaned away through its nuclear deal with the US, the region seems to be moving towards isolating Iran. This is also being leveraged by Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia also represents the smaller Arab states in the Gulf. It may not say it, but its fear of a rather cantankerous Iran is real. It doesn’t, however, agree with the remedies being discussed in the inner sanctum of the neo-cons in Washington. Pakistan, too, doesn’t agree with possible American military options on Iran. Another American military action in the region will play havoc with whatever is left of the world’s oil economy and doom the Arabs’ current success at economic diversification which requires peace at all cost. As Iran’s neighbour, Pakistan, too, has similar fears as it looks to become a “trading hub” in the region. Iran may not see it like this, but then Iran has chosen an isolationist path and should blame no one in its neighbourhood for thinking of their own security. *
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