Army’s march in politics by Asghar Khan

Dawn,Books and Authors, June 5, 2005
Army’s march in politics
By M. Asghar Khan

M. Asghar Khan writes about hurdles in the road to democracy in Pakistan

This book elaborates on the early entry of the army into Pakistani politics. Giving examples from history, the author has written about past rulers including Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, Z.A. Bhutto and Ziaul Haq

I am sure democracy is in our blood. Indeed, it is in the marrow of our bones. Only centuries of adverse circumstances have made the circulation of this blood cold. It has become frozen, and our arteries have not been functioning. But thank God, the blood is circulating again. It will be a people’s government.

I should like to give a warning to the landlords and capitalists who have flourished at the people’s expense by a system which is so vicious, which is so wicked, and which makes them so selfish that it is difficult to reason with them. The exploitation of the masses has gone into their blood. They have forgotten the lessons of Islam.
— Mohammad Ali Jinnah

It is generally the practice of the news media and the powerful propaganda machine controlled by governments to justify the imposition of military rule as having been necessitated by the failure of politicians. A closer examination of events in most of these countries will, however, show that this is seldom the case. In Pakistan, it was only with the assurance of the support of the army that governor-general Ghulam Mohammad dismissed prime minister Khawaja Nazimuddin, in 1953, when he enjoyed the support of the constituent assembly. It was again with the support of the army that the governor-general, in 1954, was able to dissolve the constituent assembly. In the circumstances, it was not surprising that General Ayub Khan, in addition to his duties of commander-in-chief of the army, assumed the responsibilities of the minister of defence in the new government.

When elections were due in March 1959 under the 1956 constitution, a coup was staged in October 1958, and the army took over the affairs of the country. Pakistan was thus denied the opportunity of electing its representatives in an election which the country had not had since its birth 11 years earlier. Again, when the Round Table Conference, called in March 1969, had resulted in complete agreement on the restoration of democracy, and Ayub Khan had agreed to step down, he was ousted by another general, the constitution was abrogated and martial law imposed. The politicians and political parties were prevented from functioning. After the elections had been held under a Legal Framework Order drawn up by General Yahya Khan, the National Assembly was not allowed to meet, and military action was taken in East Pakistan without the sanction of the National Assembly and in complete disregard of the political nature of the problem.

Despite the fact that military action had resulted in the loss of half the country, barely five and a half years later the army took another initiative and interfered once again in what was essentially a political problem. On the excuse that the parleys between the government and the PNA negotiating teams had broken down, Ziaul Haq staged a coup in July 1977 and took over the affairs of the country. The elections promised within 90 days were not held, and the representatives of the people were once again denied the opportunity of performing their legitimate responsibilities. Two years later, when elections were due to be held in November 1979, they were once again postponed.

Democratic traditions had been so weakened by the end of Ziaul Haq’s era in the 1980s, and the calibre of political leadership so corrupted, that it became normal for a party in opposition to establish contact with the army and intrigue to bring the elected government down. This process continued for two decades until Mian Nawaz Sharif, intoxicated with power and misjudging the measure of his popularity, chose to remove the chief of army staff in a bizarre manner, when he was returning from a visit to Sri Lanka. The army commanders on the ground refused to accept the prime minister’s decision and instead removed the prime minister. This was generally liked, at the time, by the public, and General Pervez Musharraf was hailed much as Ayub Khan had been 40 years earlier when he had imposed martial law. Musharraf appeared to have done his homework, and his seven-point programme, with its emphasis on accountability, was welcomed by the public. Corruption during the two stints of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif had been widespread, and both prime ministers were known to have been involved in major financial scandals.

Despite the failings of Pakistan’s political leadership, the first 30 years of Pakistan had been marked by major steps by politicians towards national unity. The 1956 constitution, with all its failings, was one such step and so was the 1973 constitution, a major landmark in the constitutional history of the country.

When General Ziaul Haq was killed in an air crash in 1988, the chief of the army staff asked Ghulam Ishaq Khan to take over as president of Pakistan. Power, however, remained with the army which continued to be associated with all the government’s major decisions that were of a political nature. During the next 10 years, four elections were held. These were “monitored” by the army. The selection of the interim cabinets that were installed to “conduct” the elections and to run the affairs of the country for a period of three months was approved by the chief of the army staff. Funds were disbursed to politicians under the directions of the president by a team headed by a general in the president’s secretariat.



Whatever the moral strength of Pakistan’s position on the Kashmir issue, it is not realistic to expect India to walk out of occupied Kashmir. The facade of a secular India would thus be exposed, which India fears will lead to a strengthening of the centrifugal forces in different parts of the country


In one election, I was waiting for the results and noticed that results from most of the remote areas of the country had been announced on TV by midnight but the result of a Rawalpindi constituency had not been announced. I telephoned the election commission and spoke with the secretary of the election commission to enquire as to why, when results from remote areas had been announced, the result of the Rawalpindi constituency, which was right under their nose, had not been declared. He replied that these results had not reached the election commission from GHQ as yet. The results of this Rawalpindi constituency were announced late the next morning. I met the chief of the army staff and enquired whether it was true that the election results were being sent to the election commission through GHQ. He replied that this was correct but they were performing only a monitoring role. In another case, the army officer who was in charge of monitoring the election in a district had given strict instructions that no result was to be sent to GHQ without first informing him. While watching the election on TV, he heard the announcement by the election commission that a particular politician of that district was declared successful with a large majority. He telephoned his subordinate and enquired why his instructions had not been obeyed and results sent to GHQ without informing him first. He was told that no result had been sent to GHQ as yet. There are many examples of such manipulations, of the use of money and of other devious methods adopted in all the four elections that show what a farce these elections have been.

A former director-general of the ISI is on record as having said that he was responsible for the creation of the lslami Jamhoori Ittehad in the 1988 elections. A former corps commander of Karachi had claimed that he had created the “MQM Haqiqi”. It is, therefore, no surprise that all the governments installed in this manner were beholden to the GHQ and took guidance from it when taking any major decision. It was also a feature of this decade of a “sham democracy” that the “opposition”, the military’s “alternative”, spent all its energies in winning the favours of the GHQ in its effort to oust the government by other than democratic means. All the governments during this period were dismissed for either corruption or incompetence by the president using his special powers. Whilst in office, the civilian governments wielded very little power and were, in fact, working under the guidance, if not control, of the GHQ. It was disclosed by a former minister in the PPP government at a PTV panel discussion recently that no prime minister has ever been allowed to inspect the Kahuta nuclear installation or has been privy to its functions.

Considering the subservience of the civilian government to the GHQ, the action taken in order to dismiss General Pervez Musharraf, in October 1999, showed a lack of understanding of the place of the prime minister in the power triangle in Pakistan. Despite having installed a president of his choice, and having selected the chief of the army staff himself, the prime minister still did not have the power to overrule the GHQ and the chief of army staff of his choice. The election of October 2002 should, therefore, be seen in the light of our past experiences and the ground realities in Pakistan.

It would, however, be wrong to assume that the people of Pakistan do not want democracy or that they think that the army’s rule is a better alternative. But the country has not experienced real democracy so far. Our experience of the last half century, the break-up of Pakistan, the absence of the Bengali factor in our politics and the Indian threat as perceived in Pakistan are major factors that will always hinder the evolution of democracy in the country. As long as East Bengal was a part of Pakistan, there was a powerful political factor which could not be ignored. This was resented by some top generals in the army and the feudal class of West Pakistan. It was this thinking that led Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Yahya Khan to refuse to hand over power to an elected majority, thus causing a civil war and the break-up of the country.

After 1972, Pakistan has increasingly felt threatened by India. Although the political consciousness has grown, and the urge for democracy amongst the people is real, they see the Pakistan armed forces as the only force that can save them from India’s aggressive designs. India’s handling of the Kashmir problem and of the fate of the Muslims in India leaves no doubt in the people’s minds that the Pakistani armed forces alone can save them from this powerful threat. No matter what political forces emerge in Pakistan, no matter what their performance and no matter how well they conduct themselves, so long as the people of Pakistan perceive India as a threat to their existence, the armed forces of Pakistan will be seen as the saviour, and no matter what the people’s political preferences, they will always look towards the armed forces for their security and survival.

Should the Indian leadership, through a just settlement of the Kashmir problem and a change in its policy of persecuting Muslims, be able to show the vision and wisdom that it has so far lacked, and should the people of Pakistan have no fear of an expansionist India, democracy will surely take root in Pakistan. If such a situation is created, the people’s representatives, freely chosen, will assume their rightful role in national affairs. Till such a time as the people of Pakistan perceive the Indian threat to be real, the armed forces in Pakistan will continue to enjoy the position of authority and trust, and it would be unreasonable to expect any political leadership to assume that position. Paradoxical as it may sound, the key to real democracy in Pakistan lies with India. However, so long as the present situation vis-a-vis India lasts, a realistic balance between democratic institutions and military power in Pakistan, institutionalized and recognized by the Constitution, would help to confer stability in an otherwise uncertain situation.

Whatever the moral strength of Pakistan’s position on the Kashmir issue, it is not realistic to expect India to walk out of occupied Kashmir. The facade of a secular India would thus be exposed, which India fears will lead to a strengthening of the centrifugal forces in different parts of the country. A settlement on Pakistan’s terms, therefore, is unlikely to be acceptable to India, and if both countries maintain their stands on this issue, the Kashmir problem is likely to remain unresolved for another 50 to 100 years. The chances are that before the end of this period, the two nuclear powers with a common border will destroy themselves in a senseless nuclear holocaust, the likes of which the world has not yet seen. Even if this did not happen, the population explosion alone would impose a burden on the economy of both the countries which they cannot bear when they are spending their meagre resources on non-productive expenditure. Both are purchasing expensive weapons of war such as ships, aircraft and missiles from the USA and other western countries, helping to strengthen the economies of these countries and impoverishing their own. Pakistan’s population of 150 million will be 250 million in another 20 years, and 500 million by 2050. India’s population, which is also expanding at the same rate, will have overtaken that of China and doubled in another 20 years. There will be millions dying of starvation in both countries while politicians continue to mislead their people. Even water will be scarce. It is a frightening prospect that we should address ourselves to.

The solution of the Kashmir problem in a manner that would meet the needs of both India and Pakistan will create new opportunities of peace and prosperity for the people of the two countries. Will the leadership of these two countries rise above their personal vanities and narrow political considerations? If they show the vision and the courage to do so, they will save their people from disaster and help the establishment of democracy in Pakistan.

Excerpted with permission from
We’ve Learnt Nothing from History — Pakistan: Politics and Military Power
By M. Asghar Khan
Oxford University Press,

M. Asghar Khan, joined politics in 1968 soon after leaving the PAF. In 1972 he formed the Tehrik-i-Istaqlal and was elected MNA in 1977. He is the author of a number of books including Pakistan at the Crossroads, Generals in Politics and Islam, Politics and the State — The Pakistan Experience