Sino-US rivalry & South Asia

Dawn, April 16, 2005
Sino-US rivalry & South Asia
By Afzaal Mahmood


Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's four-nation South Asian visit - Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and India - was significant for two reasons. It was the first visit by a top Chinese leader after the generational change of guard in Beijing. Secondly, it showed the importance South Asia had come to acquire in the escalating Sino-US strategic competition.

Though both the United States and China have played down their differences, some recent developments have a tale to tell. Under heavy US pressure, the European Union has postponed the lifting of embargo on arms exports to China until next year at least.

A few weeks ago, China's National People's Congress passed a law authorizing the use of "non-peaceful means" to prevent moves towards Taiwanese independence. The anti-secession law has raised the risk of confrontation between China and the US because neither is accustomed to blinking when its authority is challenged.

Another alarming development is that China-Japan relations have hit rock bottom. In December, Japan for the first time listed China as a potential threat in revised defence guidelines.

It recently described the issue of Taiwan as a major regional security problem., infuriating China which sees it as a domestic issue. Each side has demanded the other to halt oil and gas exploration projects in disputed areas of east China.

Yukio Okamoto, special assistant to the Japanese prime minister, in a speech in New Delhi, recently spoke of Indo-Japanese cooperation to restrain a powerful China that wishes to alter the status quo to right perceived historical wrongs.

Veteran Singapore leader, Lee Kuan Yew, sees a 40 per cent probability of war between China and Taiwan at some point over the next 10 years. President George W. Bush has made it clear that the US will be willing to go to war with China, if need be, to protect the independence of Taiwan.

Washington views China as a clear and emerging threat to the dominant power status of the US and that it must be contained by diplomacy, by trade or even by armed conflict.

Pakistan was the first country to be visited by Premier Wen Jiabao. This was the first official visit by a top Chinese leader since May 2001 when Premier Zhu Rongji came to Pakistan and committed Chinese financial and technical support to large projects including the construction of Gwadar port.

Premier Wen Jiabao's visit was marked by the signing of 22 agreements for specific cooperation in various sectors ranging from agriculture, information technology to energy and education, and involving an investment of $350 million.

However, the most important event during Premier Wen Jiabao's visit was the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good Neighbourly relations between Pakistan and China which seeks to take care of Pakistan's perennial sense of insecurity. But for some inexplicable reason, beyond the comprehension of ordinary mortals, the people of Pakistan have been kept in the dark about the text of the treaty. The Chinese side has, however, published extracts from the treaty in the People's Daily.

According to Premier Wen Jiabao, the treaty marks "a new stage" in Pakistan-China friendship. China has always supported the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Pakistan. The treaty seeks to institutionalize the Chinese backing.

A clause in the Treaty stipulates that neither party will join "any alliance or bloc which infringes upon the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the other side."

It will be a mistake of immense magnitude if our policymakers continue to believe that, compared to Pakistan, China attaches less importance, weight or value to its friendship with India. If there were any doubts in this regard they should have disappeared after the productive and successful four-day visit of India by Premier Wen Jiabao who said the visit produced "rich results".

The pronouncements of the Chinese premier on important policy issues as well as on the outcome of his talks with Indian leaders clearly show that India is a very important element in China's calculation.

"We are going to put in place," said the Chinese premier in New Delhi, "a bridge of friendship linking our two countries." Even far more significant were his observations to a group of senior Indian journalists: "The 21st century could belong to Asia if India and China developed relations and worked together."

After detailed discussions between the Chinese premier and his Indian counterpart, the two sides reached agreement on a number of issues. On the vexed boundary question, India and China agreed on a set of guiding principles to help them resolve the issue in a "pro-active" manner through "equal and friendly consultations and proceeding from the overall interest of bilateral relations." They also agreed that differences on the boundary question should not be allowed to affect the overall development of bilateral relations.

The Chinese premier made it clear that Sikkim was no longer a problem in Sino-Indian bilateral relations. Consequently, the new map of China did not show Sikkim as part of China. Beijing recognized the Sikkim state as part of the republic of India. But what must have pleased New Delhi most was the statement from China that it would be happy to see India as a permanent member of the Security Council. Justifying the decision, Premier Wen Jiabao said that his country "understands" India to be a "major developing country that plays a positive role in regional and international affairs..... and (is) ready to see a greater role of India in the international arena, the UN included".

From the Chinese point of view, the most significant achievement of the visit was the acceptance by India of China's offer for strategic partnership. Consequently, New Delhi and Beijing have agreed to establish "an India-China strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity." The two sides also agreed to declare 2006 as the "year of India-China friendship."

India now enjoys the unique distinction of being the "strategic partner" of both the US and China. If economics drives politics, the growing economic ties between India and China at least partially explain the breakthrough in their political relations.

From $2.9 billion in 2000, the level of bilateral trade has jumped to more than $13 billion, bringing the target of $25 billion by 2010 within reach. If the present trend continues, it may put China ahead of the United States as India's largest trading partner.

No doubt, China and India have made determined efforts to remove irritants from their relations. Real politik and pragmatism have played an important role in bringing about a marked improvement in their bilateral ties. Their decision to join hands as strategic partners is a development of great significance with far reaching implications, particularly for the South Asian region.

Whether the two Asian giants can maintain the current tempo of strategic and cooperative partnership will largely depend on how far they succeed in harmonizing their geo-strategic interests.

After joining hands with India as strategic partner, the US now wants to build up New Delhi as a major world power in the 21st century. The objective is to encircle China and prevent the emergence of a hostile rival whose military rise, economic clout and self-confidence in Asian affairs make the world's biggest communist country a real threat in the eyes of the Bush administration.

There are unmistakable indications that South Asia is unwittingly getting involved in the escalating US-China strategic competition. Pakistan is a non-Nato ally of the US and its front-line collaborator in the war against terror. Recently, it signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with China with whom it has had a time-tested and comprehensive relationship.

Has Islamabad given sufficient thought to the implications of a divided South Asia and getting involved in the emerging US- China rivalry? Will it be able to maintain neutrality and equi-distance from Washington and Beijing? Have policymakers taken into consideration the very damaging consequences which will inevitably follow if South Asia gets sucked in US-China strategic competition? These are questions that need careful deliberation.

The writer is a former ambassador.