Militarism in Algeria and Pakistan —Ahmad Faruqui

Daily Times - March 23, 2005
VIEW: Militarism in Algeria and Pakistan —Ahmad Faruqui

Algeria’s tragic impasse persists. Behind the façade of elections, a military clique continues to wield power. President Bouteflika has to operate within “red lines” defined by the military. While each nation is unhappy with militarism in its own way, Algeria’s political parallels with Pakistan are astounding. They are also equally discouraging

Leo Tolstoy opens Anna Karenina with the line, “All happy families are alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” Perhaps the literati will forgive me for restating this as a political postulate, “All democratic nations are alike; every undemocratic nation is undemocratic in its own way.”

In the case of Pakistan, unhappiness has come in the form of militarism. As UCLA historian Stanley Wolpert once put it, the army has been “Pakistan’s protective wolfhound, always on duty, powerful enough to keep any enemy at bay, or to destroy its ‘master’ if he forgot the proper password or feeding hour.”

The 1940 ‘Pakistan resolution’ called for a state for the Muslims of British India so that they could be protected from the tyranny of a non-Muslim civilian majority. While that objective was achieved with the creation of Pakistan in August 1947, the hypothetical tyranny of a civilian majority was traded for the actual tyranny of a Muslim military minority.

The military was to use the conflict with India over Kashmir to declare itself the guardian of the national interest and rule the country whenever it felt that was threatened. So far, that has been 32 of 57 years. Not only does this extended military interlude contradict Pakistan’s call for self-rule in Kashmir, it is also at odds with the global trend toward democracy. Military regimes that prevailed for decades in Eastern Europe and Latin America have yielded to democratic governments.

Algeria, which is hosting this week’s Arab League summit, also has a long history of militarism. However, before drawing any parallels between Algeria and Pakistan, it is important to recognise some key differences between the two countries. Algeria, with a population of some 35 million, is much smaller than Pakistan but its per capita income is about four times higher. It ranks as the world’s 16th largest oil producer and 6th largest gas producer. Rents from oil and gas production have created a rentier economy akin to that of most Gulf states, allowing the Algerian state to spread its largesse across the citizenry in a way that is not possible for Pakistan.

Located at the relatively peaceful northwestern tip of Africa, Algeria does not have an external security problem like Pakistan’s conflict with India. Even then, it has a relatively large military of about 125,000 troops and spends more than 3 percent of its GDP on defence.

The presence of a large military has made it difficult for Algeria to make a successful transition to democracy. The war of independence from French rule was waged by Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN), a coalition led by a Francophone elite that surprisingly relied on religious forces to mobilise the population. Independence came in 1962 and Ben Bella, a war hero, was elected as the first president. He was deposed in a coup in 1965 by Colonel Houari Boumediene, another war hero.

As in Pakistan, Islam is closely interwoven into Algerian politics. Algerian Islamists emphasise the religious nature of native resistance to the French, beginning with the call by the religious brotherhoods in 1830 for a jihad to liberate Algiers. This continued through the War of Independence. Capitalising on this link, Boumediene pursued a strategy of co-opting the Islamists. Boumediene’s successor, Colonel Chadli Bendjedid continued this approach.

Algeria’s army regards itself as the guardian of the national interest. Oil revenues feed into a vast patronage networks, giving the state the upper hand in deciding the classic issue of politics, i.e. “who gets what, when, and how.” In Pakistan’s case, the military has accomplished this by creating its own corporations, by appointing retired senior military officers to civilian posts and by granting them land at throwaway prices.

The year 1988, when Zia’s plane crash transformed Pakistani politics, also proved to be a watershed in Algerian history for entirely different reasons. Declining oil prices forced the regime to eliminate subsidies, disproportionately affecting the urban working classes and leading to riots in all major urban areas. The army brutally suppressed the rioters. This damaged its claim of being a force of national liberation.

Belatedly, it called for multi-party elections, hoping that the arrival of democracy would herald an end to the state’s sagging fortunes. For the first time in its history, Algeria witnessed a relatively free political atmosphere with a flourishing press, competitive political parties and intense debate on the direction of the state. But events would prove that the state was not prepared to respect the electoral results.

In the municipal elections of 1990, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) garnered 33 percent of the popular vote. In an even greater upset, it captured 44 percent of the parliamentary seats in the first round of legislative elections in December 1991. When it became clear that the FIS would win an absolute majority in parliament, the military stepped in and nullified the election. President Chadli resigned and a state council took power. This ushered in a civil war that would consume 150,000 lives. On a smaller scale, this was a replay of Pakistan’s 1971 tragedy.

Since 1992, the Algerian military has retained power through controlled and contrived elections. Colonel Liamine Zeroual won the presidency in 1995 in elections boycotted by the Islamists. In 1999, the military put forward Abdelaziz Bouteflika as its candidate. He had been called ‘The American’ during his prior tenure as foreign minister. Bouteflika was elected unopposed. He declared an amnesty which led to many rebels laying down their arms. Violence abated but a state of emergency remained in place.

Bouteflika was re-elected to the presidency last year. But by polling 83 percent of the vote, he caused many to question the results. The independent paper, El Watan, called it a result worthy of Kim Il Sung, the former North Korean leader. Algeria’s tragic impasse persists. Behind the façade of elections, a military clique continues to wield power. President Bouteflika has to operate within “red lines” defined by the military.

While each nation is unhappy with militarism in its own way, Algeria’s political parallels with Pakistan are astounding. They are also equally discouraging. To use elections as a front for military rule, Pakistan’s army invented the doctrine of Basic Democracy in 1959. It enshrined it in the 1962 constitution. Had Ayub patented the concept, it would have made up for Pakistan’s lack of oil revenue.

Dr Ahmad Faruqui is an economist and author of Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan. He can be reached at faruqui@pacbell.net