Wednesday, May 20, 2020

Updates: What are Taliban up to?

Afghan Taliban leader says committed to deal with the US
In Eid message Haibatullah Akhunzada asks US 'not to waste' the opportunity offered by the deal to end 19-year-old war.
May 20, 2020, Aljazeera


The leader of the Taliban said on Wednesday that his group was committed to a landmark deal with the US, despite being accused of carrying out hundreds of attacks in Afghanistan since it was signed in February.

Haibatullah Akhunzada urged Washington "not to waste" the opportunity offered by the deal to end the US's longest war in a message released ahead of next week's Eid al-Fitr holiday, which marks the end of the Islamic holy month of Ramadan.

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Operation Freedom Sentinel
DOD Lead Inspector General quarterly report
January 1, 2020, through March 31, 2020
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
U.S.-Taliban Agreement Signed Amid Fluctuating Violence 

On February 29, U.S. and Taliban representatives signed an agreement in which the Taliban agreed to prevent terrorists from using Afghanistan to threaten the United States or its allies.1 The same day, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper and Afghan President Ashraf Ghani announced a U.S.-Afghanistan joint declaration echoing the agreement between the United States and the Taliban.2 According to the agreement and the joint declaration, the United States agreed to first reduce its forces from roughly 13,000 to 8,600 within 135 days, and then fully withdraw all remaining forces within the following 9 and a half months, conditioned on the Taliban adhering to the agreement.3 Violence in Afghanistan at the beginning of the quarter was high, in part because U.S. forces exerted “military pressure” on the Taliban “to create the conditions for a political settlement,” according to U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A).4 According to media reports, the Taliban similarly increased its activity to strengthen its negotiating position.5 The United States and Taliban agreed to a 1-week reduction in violence as a precondition of the signing of the agreement.6 According to senior U.S. officials, the Taliban significantly decreased its attacks during the negotiated week of reduced violence that preceded the signing of the agreement.7 However, both during the reduction in violence and after the signing of the agreement, the Taliban continued attacks against Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF).8 In the final 2 weeks of the quarter alone, the Taliban launched more than 300 attacks, with major assaults in several provinces, with the insurgents seizing territory and inflicting heavy ANDSF casualties, according to media sources.9 USFOR-A told the DoD OIG that U.S. military operations remained focused on defending the ANDSF throughout the quarter.10 Insider attacks by ANDSF personnel—or Taliban infiltrators—targeting the ANDSF continued this quarter, following the growing trend since 2008.11 USFOR-A reported that there were 17 insider attacks that targeted the ANDSF, killing 48 ANDSF members and wounding 6.12 USFOR-A reported that there was one insider attack this quarter that resulted in the death of U.S. service members. On February 8, a gunman wearing an ANDSF uniform opened fire, killing two U.S. personnel and one Afghan in Nangarhar province.1

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Taliban Sources Repository
University of Oslo, May 2020

This repository has transformed a large private collection of Taliban documents into an enduring and usable intellectual resource for scholars of Afghanistan, Taliban, and Asian history.

For details, click here

Politics and Security in Iraq: 5 Dominating Themes


Politics and Security in Iraq Today
May 18, 2020


Thursday, May 14, 2020

Iraq Update: Can the new Prime Minister deliver ?


Pro-Iranian militiamen US embassy baghdad


IRAQ’S NEW LEADERSHIP: HOPES AND EXPECTATIONS

Hassan Abbas, 
May 12, 2020

After a prolonged political deadlock, Iraq finally has a new prime minister: former Iraqi intelligence chief Mustafa al-Kadhimi, an independent candidate. The task before him is gigantic, with challenges ranging from economic crisis due to coronavirus and collapsing oil revenues, to deteriorating relations with the U.S. and a worsening domestic security situation. ISIS attacks in areas bordering Syria have witnessed an uptick in recent weeks.

The 53-year-old Mustafa al-Kadhimi has an interesting background. He began his career as a journalist known for his scathing criticism of President Saddam Hussein, forcing him to move to exile in Iran, Germany, and then the UK. He returned to Iraq after Saddam’s brutal regime collapsed. He is the author of many books, including Humanitarian Concerns, which in 2000 was selected by the EU as the best book written by a political refugee. He continued his advocacy work after returning to Iraq, but remained politically non-aligned and above sectarian politics. He was a surprise pick as head of the National Intelligence Council of Iraq in 2016 and made a name for himself for his efforts against ISIS and was recently in the spotlight for his role in the elimination of Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS.

In the prevailing Iraqi political scenario, his strength lies in being seen as an acceptable figure for all sides, including regional players and the U.S. Given his good working relationship with the Western-led anti-ISIS campaign, he is deemed trustworthy in Western capitals. Iran is uncomfortable with this choice but he has open lines of communication with them as well. Insightfully, Iranian-supported Kataib Hezbollah, a militant outfit, issued a stern statement criticizing its allies in the Iraqi Parliament for their failure to stop the rise of Mustafa al-Kadhimi as the new Iraqi Prime Minister.

Al-Kadhimi is expected to instill discipline in the country’s security forces and he would not allow the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), the militias that had emerged after Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Sistani’s anti-ISIS Fatwa, to follow a path independent of Iraq’s government policy. Even after officially being merged into Iraq’s defense forces, many elements of PMF are still pursuing their own agendas. Within a couple of days of assuming his office, the new prime minister promoted Lt. General Abdulwahhab al-Saidi and appointed him as Commander of Counterterrorism Forces. The previous government had moved him out of counterterrorism operations despite his achievements against ISIS probably wary of with his rising popularity and good rapport with the US security services operating in the region.

For complete essay, click here

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Thursday, May 07, 2020

India's Tackling of Pandemic And a Worsening Image Problem


Covid-19, India and crisis communication | ORF

Modi’s Coronavirus Test
The Pandemic Offers a Struggling India the Chance to Reset
By Anubhav Gupta and Puneet Talwar
Foreign Affairs, May 04, 2020

The novel coronavirus is an enormous test for Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Not only must his government contain the spread of the virus in one of the densest, most populous countries in the world but it must prevent social-distancing measures from pushing India’s flagging economy over the cliff into free fall. Even before the pandemic, the country was struggling with slow growth, high unemployment, and widening social divisions. Now, the coronavirus is exacerbating all three problems—risking a perfect storm of health, economic, and social crises.

But the pandemic also gives Modi a chance to hit the reset button. So far, he deserves credit for acting with urgency. India evacuated its citizens from China, Iran, and other epicenters of the virus in February and March. It shut its borders to almost all foreigners and initiated a contact-tracing and testing operation for Indians coming into the country. And when it became clear by late March that the virus was already spreading within India, the government announced a national lockdown that so far has slowed the infection rate. If Modi seizes this opportunity to address India’s underlying problems as he battles COVID-19 and the economic wreckage it has caused, he has a chance to emerge from this crisis in a stronger position both at home and abroad.

INDIA IN CRISIS

After winning a landslide reelection victory in 2019, the Modi government seemed poised to focus on economic development. Instead, it used its mandate to enact divisive social policies. The revocation of Kashmir’s special autonomy in August and the passage in December of a citizenship bill seen as discriminating against Muslims drew widespread international scrutiny and domestic criticism. In the early months of this year, Indians packed the streets in the largest display of public opposition that the Bharatiya Janata Party–led government has seen in its six years in power.

By then the country was already in the midst of a sharp economic downturn. This month, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported that India grew at a rate of only 4.2 percent in 2019, much slower than previously predicted and down from eight percent as recently as 2016. Modi’s government has struggled to create jobs for India’s disproportionately young population, presiding over the highest unemployment rate in 45 years.

The pandemic has made the jobs crisis worse. In late March, Modi took the decisive step of issuing a national stay-at-home order that closed most shops and businesses. As a result, India’s unemployment rate nearly tripled from 8.7 percent to 23.4 percent in the span of a month, according to an estimate by the Center for Monitoring Indian Economy. Implemented with less than four hours of warning, the lockdown also hurt the millions of poor Indians who work in the informal sector (which accounts for over 80 percent of all jobs in the country) and left hundreds of thousands of migrant workers stranded. National and international media fixated on scenes of thousands of migrants thronging bus stations in major cities as they sought to return to their villages, forcing Modi to apologize for the suddenness of the lockdown.

Despite its abrupt implementation, the national lockdown was the right move. Thanks to Modi’s swift action, the country of more than one billion had only around 33,000 confirmed cases of COVID-19 as of May 1. The latest numbers suggest that the rate of new infections is slowing, with cases now doubling every ten days compared with every four at the start of April.

It is too soon, of course, to celebrate. The lack of widespread testing means there are likely many unreported cases. Out of an abundance of caution, India has extended by a further two weeks the lockdown that was scheduled to end after May 3. Modi will face immense pressure in the coming days and weeks as he balances public health exigencies with the lockdown’s damage to the economy. As a result of COVID-19, the IMF expects the Indian economy to grow at only two percent in 2020, while other analysts believe the economy could even shrink by one percent this fiscal year. India may suffer its lowest growth rate in 40 years as a result of the pandemic.

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Why Gulf States Are Backtracking on India
Islamophobia is undoing years of New Delhi’s diplomatic gains in the Middle East.
BY Sumit Ganguly, Nicholas Blarel, Foreign Policy May 5, 2020 

Over the last several years, especially under the tenure of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India had made significant strides in its relations with the countries of the Persian Gulf. And it achieved those gains while also maintaining cordial ties with two of the principal antagonists in the region: Iran and Saudi Arabia. For an unabashedly Hindu nationalist government, this was no minor accomplishment, especially since Gulf states such as the United Arab Emirates were historical partners of India’s archrival, Pakistan. But the relationships that New Delhi so carefully crafted over the past five years—drawing on the efforts of the previous government—are now at substantial risk. Domestic developments targeting its 200 million Muslims are beginning to unravel India’s diplomatic feat.

Official reports suggest that the coronavirus outbreak has only had a limited impact on India’s population—at least so far. But despite the relatively low reported numbers of infections and deaths, India’s Muslim community has faced online and physical assaults during the coronavirus crisis—incidents in which members of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) are also implicated. The attacks came in the wake of news that an Islamic sect, the Tablighi Jamaat, held a large annual meeting in New Delhi’s Nizamuddin district in early March, right as countries were beginning to restrict public gatherings to prevent the virus’s spread. With nearly 3,000 pilgrims from over a dozen countries packed in cramped quarters, the coronavirus spread rapidly; the assembly has now been identified as a major source of infections in India. There is little question that holding this meeting—despite widespread knowledge of the virus—was reckless. But the blatant abuse of India’s Muslim communities now places at risk New Delhi’s carefully tailored diplomatic approach to the Middle East, and especially toward the Gulf states.

In a rare public move, Princess Hend al-Qassimi of the UAE has been expressing her dissatisfaction with a rising Islamophobia among Indians. “I miss the peaceful India,” she tweeted on May 4. And that came after she directly highlighted a tweet from an Indian living in the UAE as “openly racist and discriminatory,” reminding her followers that the punishment for hate speech could be a fine and even expulsion. These statements have followed other expressions of concern over the BJP’s treatment of Indian Muslims from across the Islamic world, including from the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, which urged India to take urgent steps to protect the rights of its Muslim minority. This last criticism is particularly damning, as India had actively worked to repair its historically problematic ties with the group and had managed to be invited as guest of honor at the annual Organisation of Islamic Cooperation meeting in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, in March 2019.

For complete article, click here

Also see:
In India, Coronavirus Fans Religious Hatred - New York Times
Coronavirus Spread in India Sparks Intolerance Toward Minority Muslims - VOA
What the world can learn from Kerala about how to fight covid-19 - MIT Technology Review
Covid-19, India and crisis communication - Observer Research Foundation (Source for photo above)

Tuesday, May 05, 2020

Afghanistan: Next Round - By Hamid Hussain


Blasts in Afghanistan as presidential rivals hold oath ceremonies ...

Afghanistan – Next Round Afghan Style

Hamid Hussain, May 1, 2020

“However tall the mountain is, there is a road to the top of it”.   Afghan Proverb  


United States and Taliban signed an agreement in February 2020.  The agreement was to pave the way for withdrawal of US troops and integration of Taliban in Afghan political system. The next step was exchange of 5000 Taliban and 1000 Afghan government prisoners.  This also proved to be the first hurdle.  Afghan President Ashraf Ghani insisted on linking prisoner release with cease fire.  Taliban rejected it and under US pressure, Ghani released few hundred Taliban prisoners.  

In the deal with US, Taliban agreed not to threaten “security of US and its allies’.  Taliban defined only Europeans as ‘US allies.  Off course they don’t consider Afghan government as US ally therefore they continued to attack government forces. On the start of the Muslim holy months of Ramazan, Ghani asked again for a ceasefire.  Taliban representative in his response called this call ‘illogical’.  Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) also called for a ceasefire during negotiations between Taliban and Afghan government.  Taliban are not likely to agree to this.  They see attacks on Afghan security forces as a lever to extract more concessions. Taliban also want to calibrate its military operations to keep momentum of its cadres.  If they agree to a prolonged ceasefire and few months later need military operations, they may face difficulties in re-activating its own cadres. 

Current violence in uneven geographically.  Violence has decreased in Taliban controlled areas in south and east and large cities.  In Taliban controlled areas, night raids by Afghan forces and air strikes by US forces and attacks by Taliban on government posts and convoys, Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks and target killings was the main engine of violence.  Afghan forces have stopped operations in Taliban controlled areas resulting in marked reduction of violence.  In government controlled large cities, Taliban were attacking government and civilian targets.  They have markedly reduced these attacks that resulted in reduction of violence in large cities. In some parts of eastern Afghanistan, Daesh was responsible for most attacks.  An unlikely alliance of US, Afghan forces, Taliban and local militias confronted Daeshfrom all sides eliminating most pockets of Daesh that contributed to marked reduction of violence. In all these areas, with reduction of violence, general public feels somewhat secure with economic activity picking up in towns and rural areas. 

Most violence is now concentrated in contested areas where Taliban and Afghan forces are trying to assert control.  Taliban want to expand the territory under their control to further strengthen their bargaining position. Some parts of Ghor, Ghazni, Badghis and Badakhshan have seen increased violence.

In Washington, a pause button is hit on all military and diplomatic ventures.  Diplomats and military leaders are grounded during Corona virus crisis.  The only exception is Afghanistan.  Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, President’s special envoy Zalmay Khalilzad and even commander of US troops in Afghanistan General Austin Miller are shuttling between Kabul and Doha to keep Afghan project on track.  Khalilzad and Austin made a trip to Islamabad and met army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa to get Pakistan’s help in influencing Taliban to keep violence low. Corona crisis and economic meltdown has weakened President Trump’s position for the upcoming election.  He wants to use withdrawal from Afghanistan as his big achievement.  This is the main reason that only Afghan file is open on diplomatic front.  

Afghans are hard bargainers. Every negotiation round is painfully slow and contentious.  If prisoner release is facing so many hurdles then wait until negotiations start about political bargains.  This will be a multi layered process involving Taliban, different factions that are currently part of Afghan government, local tribal leaders and all those who are currently out of power.  Violence will be used at different stages by each group to advance its own interest and extract maximum concessions. In this battle, each Afghan party will also seek assistance from foreign backers.  

“Community is not made by force”.   Afghan Proverb 

Hamid Hussain
April 2020


Post-Script

Afghan Government Tussle:  Bargaining reminiscent of an old bazaar of Central Asia is going on between Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah.  Tentative agreement is that Abdullah will get forty percent of ministries and head the peace negotiations with Taliban.  Khalilzad is cajoling and Pompeo is carrying the stick.  Many details need to be hammered out but if this agreement goes through it will have its own set of repercussions.  Ghani and Abdullah will run their share of ministries as fiefdoms to reward their partisans.  If Abdullah becomes the head of the negotiation team that will make any meaningful negotiation very difficult.  Abdullah’s support is overwhelmingly non-Pushtun and he will not be able to give too much ground to Taliban as it will risk his own support base.  

“Courage among civilized peoples consists in a readiness to sacrifice oneself for the political community.”        G.W. Hegel


Taliban:  After conclusion of agreement with United States, there was some ripple within Taliban ranks on two planes.  One related to jockeying for power that resulted in removal of some members of Taliban’s Doha office.  Second related to some rank and file who were charged up to fight the ‘infidel’ and now told to hold attacks on the ‘infidel’ but continue to kill fellow Afghans. To placate these fellows one senior Taliban commander gave some hardline narrative suggesting that Taliban will not negotiate with Afghan government but looking to replace it ushering in new era of Taliban 2.0 that will be a bit moderate and tolerate few things not allowed in 1990s. It will be very difficult for Taliban leadership to accept a power sharing agreement in present set up.  If US pulls out then next step will be marked reduction of US financial assistance.  In this environment, government will become more dysfunctional from fights for dwindling resources and corruption.  Taliban will wait for that moment to expand territorial control.  They will need more coercion of the population as they have the guns but not the gold that does the magic of defections from the other camp. 

“I will say this much for the nobility: that tyrannical, murderous, rapacious, and morally rotten as they were, they were deeply and enthusiastically religious”.     Mark Twain


Neighbors:  Pakistan’s main interest is to have some semblance of stability in Afghanistan while working to decrease Indian influence.  This is due to apprehension that a strong Indian presence in Afghanistan will keep its western border destabilized.   It wants that Taliban become part of the new set up that will help reduce Indian influence.  Islamabad does not want another round of civil war or outright Taliban take over as it will worsen Pakistan predicament. It will face refugee crisis and financial burden and worsen country’s regional and international position.  India’s main concern is that return of Taliban in any capacity risks use of Afghan territory against Indian interests.  Delhi has the bad memory of 1990s when Afghanistan was used to fuel Kashmir insurgency.  Current BJP government is not in a mood for engagement.  It wants to keep Pakistan off balance hoping that faced with myriad of problems Pakistan will not be in any position to re-activate insurgency card in Kashmir.  If Afghanistan descends into chaos after American withdrawal or Taliban capture large chunk of territory, it will be very difficult for India to maintain large influence.  Keeping in mind this worst case scenario, India has been trying for over a decade to establish a military base in Tajikistan.  This effort is not successful in view of Chinese and Russian interests.  A Chinese paramilitary contingent is secretly operating in southeastern Tajikistan in the panhandle bordering Wakhan corridor to prevent return of Uighur militants in Xinjiang.  The largest Russian troop presence outside Russia is in Tajikistan.  Russia considers Central Asia as its backyard and not willing to allow combat presence of other countries.  India is currently using Ayni and Farkhor airbases in Tajikistan for transporting non-military supplies to Afghanistan.  It has no combat assets stationed in Tajikistan.  If things deteriorate then India can strengthen its position in northern Afghanistan.  In this Iran is a partner as interests of both countries converge in Afghanistan. If Russia joins this ensemble then India may be able to convince Russia to allow use of Tajikistan bases for military purposes.  The only sane approach is a dĆ©tente between India and Pakistan as chaos in Afghanistan is against the interests of both countries.  If both parties understand this fundamental reality then they can control their gut reactions and avoid adding fuel to the fire.  

“Any intelligent fool can make things bigger, more complex and more violent; but it takes a touch of genius and lots of courage to move something in the opposite direction."                Albert Einstein


United States: A speedy drawdown before elections is President Trump’s main objective.  If he is re-elected, then political compulsion will be removed, and he may decide to keep some American assets in Afghanistan as surely it is not likely that Afghan government and Taliban can reach a deal in the next 1-2 years. If Democratic nominee Joe Biden wins the election, then we may see revisit of current policy.  The key factor will be economic aftermath of Corona pandemic.  If US economy is in deep recession then it will be very hard for Biden to sell to American public increased American military and economic commitment to Afghanistan.  Biden has been involved in Afghanistan as Vice President and he held the view that Pakistan was much more important than Afghanistan and he expressed this to then Afghan President Hamid Karzai.  He may give more role to Pakistan for policing the badlands.  Unless things completely meltdown, it is likely that Washington will keep air and intelligence assets in Afghanistan.  The security of these assets can be contracted to private security companies.  In this scenario, Kurdish model can be adopted.  The line will be drawn along Hindu Kush range. Taliban will be allowed to play in the south and east while non-Pushtuns organized, armed and provided intelligence and air cover to keep their area free of Taliban encroachment. 

"The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westerners never do."  Samuel P. Huntington
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Saturday, May 02, 2020

Pakistan and the Future of the Taliban


Pakistan and the Future of the Taliban: 10 Things to Consider

 by  Hassan Abbas 
March 30, 2020, Center for Global Policy, Washington DC. 

Developing an intra-Afghan understanding is a necessary step for peacebuilding in Afghanistan, but it cannot happen with Afghanistan’s neighbors pulling the various groups in different directions. U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, Zalmay Khalilzad, had a clear mandate to cut a deal with the Taliban and, to give him his due, he pursued it with vigor. The much awaited next step entails a difficult negotiation process between the jihadist group and the Afghan state. However, a regional settlement, while complicated, is absolutely required if Afghanistan is to ever fully taste security and stability. An intra-Afghan settlement will be contingent on this regional component. Pakistan will have to play a crucial role in the shaping of such a multilateral agreement.

Iran, Russia, China, and India will also have to be a part of such a settlement. This may sound overly ambitious at this point, but peace in Afghanistan will be key for not only pushing back extremist tendencies in Southwest Asia but also for regional trade and economic connectivity. The regional players are likely to pursue this path not only to stabilize Afghanistan but also to eliminate the threats the Islamic State and other transnational militant entities allied with the Taliban pose in Afghanistan and beyond.

Pakistan’s Role

Pakistan is seen as a loyal patron of the Afghan Taliban, and in Pakistan’s security circles this reputation is cherished. In a conversation about Pakistan’s support for the Taliban, a former senior Pakistani official told this author, “Our Taliban policy has saved Pakistan.” This comment reflects Pakistan’s worldview.

Islamabad will have to be fully on board to achieve regional conciliation. By the same token, Pakistan lacks influence over the anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan and will need Tehran and New Delhi, among others, to reciprocate wholeheartedly for any regional peace initiative to take off.

How all of this can play out in the coming months depends on the political and security dynamics in South Asia. Here are 10 relevant aspects of the challenge to show what is at stake and what the possibilities are:

1. Pakistan enjoys influence over the Afghan Taliban, but the relationship is more complex than we may assume. The Taliban’s old guard respects Pakistan, and their contacts with Pakistan’s military-intelligence complex are deep-rooted. However, the old guard (that includes Mullah Baradar, the Haqqanis and Mullah Haibatullah) is struggling constantly to maintain its control over young field commanders, aligned drug smuggling networks, and a new generation of insurgents inspired by a variety of local interests – some of which are not always in line with those of Taliban. To believe that Pakistan can control all these elements of Taliban is an exaggerated assessment.

2. The Trump Administration appreciates Pakistan’s help in reaching the present arrangement with the Taliban, but it also believes that Pakistan can deliver even more. Washington is right. Islamabad is playing it safe by not committing to serve as a guarantor for anyone while strongly encouraging the elements it has control over (like Haqqanis) to live up to the commitments made to Washington. Hedging your bets is a standard operating procedure in statecraft. 

3. In supporting the Taliban, Pakistan is earnestly expecting that its core security interests will be taken care of. To this end, it will push the Taliban to guarantee that Indian influence in Afghanistan ends. The Taliban can only do that if they either control Kabul or have significant influence in Afghan foreign policymaking. The Taliban so far have proved to be a deadly insurgent group with a capacity to manage a sustained terrorism campaign. Running or participating in a government, the next logical expectation, if they are able to effectively negotiate with Kabul, is a different ball game altogether. More so, anti-Taliban personnel currently dominate the civil bureaucracy and military in Afghanistan, and they will resist a Taliban takeover. The Taliban have not shown much success in holding an urban center for long, either. Hence an open confrontation will only facilitate a civil war, bringing more destruction. The Taliban will follow their own instincts and calculus in making these choices. Pakistan is expected to support them in whatever they do rather than attempt to dictate its own terms.

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Related, also see:

Podcast: The State of Negotiations for Peace in Afghanistan