Sunday, December 20, 2015

Fall & Rise of Taliban: A Lecture in Islamabad


Sponsored by American Institute of Pakistan Studies: http://pakistanstudies-aips.org

A lecture was organized under the SPIR Lecture Series on November 26, 2015 at School of Politics and International Relations. Dr. Hassan Habbas from National Defense University, Washington D.C. gave a lecture on “Are Taliban History: How and why they survived for over two decades in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” Director SPIR, Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal formally started the session by the welcome address.

Dr. Hassan Abbas is a Pakistani-American academic in the field of South Asian and Middle Eastern studies. His research focuses on security issues pertaining to governance, law enforcement and counterterrorism in these regions. Dr. Abbas was a civil servant in Pakistan.

Dr. Abbas raised a major concern about the reasons of terrorism and the inability of Pakistan and Afghanistan to curb its prevailing influence. He highlighted five major concerns for Pakistan and Afghanistan as well. According to him the prevailing influence of Taliban in Afghanistan is due to its inability of national building through the soft power projection and functioning of state through flawed criminal justice system. The ethnic tensions in the political hierarchy of country cause economic and political imbalance and in history Afghanistan remains a rentier state which remains the main cause of major powers’ intrusion inside Afghanistan.

Tahreek-Taliban-Pakistan is a quite influential non-state actor in Pakistan and its influence is prevailing due to the internal political and constitutional vacuum between federal regime and FATA. The tribal disconnect inside FATA between the tribes creates space for non-state actors. He highlighted the essential crime and terror nexus in Pakistan. Most of the sprinter groups associated with non-state actors involved in the terror activities are not to be merged with terrorist, instead of criminals.

Dr. Abbas concluded his presentation by emphasizing his note about mainstreaming FATA, through constitutional reforms and institutional buildup. After the lecture, a healthy question answer session was held.

ISIS & The Future of Iraq: A Talk at the Habib University, Karachi


The Future of Iraq: YCSD holds Public Lecture with Dr. Hassan Abbas
Habib University website, November 24, 2015
Sponsored by American Institute of Pakistan Studies: http://pakistanstudies-aips.org

KARACHI, November 24, 2015: Habib University’s Yohsin Center for Social Development (YCSD) and Office for Global Engagement (OGE) hosted a Public Lecture with Dr. Hassan Abbas – Professor and Chair of the Department of Regional and Analytical Studies at National Defense University in Washington, DC. on November 24th. Bringing with him great insight into the examination of geopolitical roots of the expanding chaos in the Middle East as well as Saddam Hussein’s legacy, he led a riveting discussion at the Tariq Rafi Hall, this being the third and final lecture of the current semester at Habib University.

Led by the moderator of the Public Lecture, Dr. Hafeez Jamali, the event started off with an introduction of Dr. Hasan Abbas. Listing out his career trajectory, the moderator spoke of his professional and academic achievements, also informing the audience of how Dr. Abbas has remained a former member of the Board of Trustees at Habib University.

Dr. Abbas took the stage with great enthusiasm, commenting on his delight at being back at Habib University, at “seeing the dream turn into reality”. To delve into the state of Iraq and ISIS currently, he listed out three questions:
Who is behind ISIS, what inspires these young radical Muslims to be sympathetic to the ideology of ISIS?
How do we understand the rise of ISIS, is it a symptom or a cause?
What inspires these nearly 200,000 young people, with their foreign schooling and further education from regions such as France, UK, US, Middle East and so on, to drop everything and fight for the “cause”?

In order to answer these questions, Dr. Abbas set up a historical context for his audience, where he mapped out the ethnic identities of the current population of Iraq. He said that each of these identities have their own sense of rights, of what they’re entitled to and where they belong. He spoke of how, since the middle of 2014, one third of Iraq is under the control of ISIS, while one fifth of the entire population live in the area controlled by them. Furthermore, 10,000 people were butchered just in the last year by ISIS, while 200,000 remain internally displaced. Nearly 2 million refugees make up this area, thus why would the population that does turn to ISIS, do so?

For complete article, click here

Thursday, December 10, 2015

Iraq vs ISIS: How can the U.S. Help?

Iraqis hate our policy of containing ISIS
Tom Ricks Blog, Foreign Policy, November 18, 2015

By Hassan Abbas
Best Defense guest columnist

In June 2014 I witnessed thousands of Iraqis throng the offices of top Shia clerics in Najaf, including Grand Ayatollah Ali-al Sistani, asking for a religious injunction to proceed towards Mosul and fight the Islamic State. It was not a choreographed exercise. People were genuinely moved to make a difference.

A Jihad fatwa was indeed issued as a result encouraging Iraqis to join military for the purpose but the fervor — even though it mobilized thousands — was not a substitute for a coherent Iraqi policy to defeat the Islamic State.

As a result, Iraq now is bleeding to death at the hands of this vicious and fanatical group that is empowered by conflict in Syria, poor governance, and sectarian bigotry. It is difficult to deny that the US occupation inadvertently set it in motion. Since that day in Iraq, over ten thousand people have been brutally killed, over two and a half million displaced, and around two hundred thousand are now refugees in neighboring states. Islamic State thugs now control nearly one third of Iraq — areas where about one fifth of the Iraqi population resides. The Iraq-Syria border no longer exists. Iraqis feel abandoned.

American public skepticism about another ground war and concerns about Baghdad’s capacity to be inclusive are weighing heavily on President Obama’s mind apparently as he has largely ignored Iraqi prime minister Haider al-Abadi’s pleas for stronger U.S. support to tackle the Islamic State. It leaves Iraqis puzzling over the United States’ real intentions — adding to the long list of challenges for the future of US diplomacy in the region.

I have traveled to Iraq thrice since then and have spent much time talking to a broad segment of Iraqi society and leaders, from college and seminary students, to several prominent religious and political leaders in Baghdad, Najaf and Karbala. At a September 2015 conference in Baghdad, I interacted with politicians and government officials whose views were consistent with what I have been hearing throughout my travels: they harbor deep skepticism about U.S. intentions in Iraq. They seriously doubt that President Obama’s directive to “degrade and destroy” the terror outfit is for real. A leading Iraqi politician asked me whether Americans only seek to “contain” the Islamic State, or if we are also contemplating the “elimination” of this menace. Time and again, I heard confusion about actual U.S. policy. This lack of clarity about U.S. intentions and policy has even lead to conspiracy theories that the United States supports the Islamic State.

Why do Iraqis feel this way is not that hard to grasp. For both Sunni and Shia in Iraq, their stark reality is that the Islamic State continues to expand its operations and strengthen its support base in Iraq and Syria. If a U.S.-led international coalition, one supported by regional players, is not showing real results on the ground—the conclusion is that the response itself is weak and half-hearted.

The United States has its own list of complaints ranging from Iraq’s increasing “reliance” on Iran and linked support to Syria’s brutal dictator Bashar al-Assad. For any change in Iraq’s regional policy inclinations, U.S. officials need to regain the trust of Iraqi partners. The Obama administration cannot ignore that the splitting up of Iraq along ethnic and sectarian lines — a phenomenon already in motion — is a recipe for perpetual war and further empowerment of radicals across different Muslim groups living in the region. To remain aloof at this hour is self-defeating.

The emerging terrorism hub in and around Iraq has become far more threatening to global security than the Taliban revival in Afghanistan, where Obama is wisely adjusting his policy.

A unified and democratic Iraq is still possible. U.S. assistance to the Abadi government should be linked to constitutional reforms — to decentralize power and move towards establishing a federation — and improvement in rule of law, but the important point is that critical U.S. military assistance is sorely needed and should not be delayed. Iraq is asking for more intrusive and extensive air strikes targeting the Islamic State. Its military is not a professional force by any stretch of imagination but it is far better to engage them than militias and tribal groups. Iraq needs modern military hardware and training so that Iraqi security forces can dismantle Islamic State infrastructure in Iraq setting the stage for governance reforms. Abadi is far more amenable to these ideas than Maliki. At the end of the day, a sustainable victory against the Islamic State will depend on every Iraqi citizen getting treated equally and justly.

It is worth noting that despite many failures and weaknesses, there are bright points in Iraqi security forces’ record. They have shown some signs of improvement and potential in recent military offensives against the Islamic State. It has at least been able to successfully secure the South of Iraq. And when around 15 million pilgrims travelled to Karbala last December for the annual religious commemoration known as ‘Arbaeen,’ the security forces effectively safeguarded the Najaf-Karbala area — an area that ISIS has repeatedly threatened for sectarian reasons. Additionally, Iraqi society is showing resilience and unity in the face of deteriorating governance. Both Shia and Sunni are participating in the street protests against corruption and lawlessness indicating that Iraqi society can overcome the wounds it suffered over decades of oppression, occupation and violence.

Helping Iraq upgrade its security forces — including its civilian law enforcement & paramilitary capability — will also lessen its reliance on Iranian backed militias that are a death knell for institutional capacity building. The US can — and must — help Iraq tackle the Islamic State challenge in a decisive fashion and convince those fighting the Islamic State that it is indeed on their side.

Hassan Abbas is Professor of International Security Studies at the National Defense University’s College of International Security Affairs in Washington DC & a senior advisor at the Asia Society. He is author of The Taliban Revival: Violence and Extremism on the Pakistan Afghanistan Frontier. The essay reflects author’s personal opinions, and it does not necessarily reflect the views of the NDU, the Defense Department or the U.S. government.

The Fight Against the Pakistani Taliban: Consequences


The Fight Against the Pakistani Taliban: What Are the Costs?

NOVEMBER 17, 2015 by SARA OBEIDA; PBS

In December of 2014, the Pakistani Taliban waged a brutal assault against an army-run school in Peshawar, leaving 145 people dead — 132 of them uniformed school children.

It was the deadliest single attack in the history of the Pakistani Taliban — known also as the TTP — prompting the government to bolster military efforts to beat the group back.

These military campaigns, however, have brought unintended consequences, as some militants have been driven from strongholds in North Waziristan, South Waziristan and the Swat valley, and taken refuge in the slums of Karachi, a city of more than 20 million people.

This migration has shifted a growing share of the burden of fighting the Taliban from the army, to local police units, often in conjunction with a paramilitary force known inside Pakistan as the Rangers. Police and the Rangers have helped drive down violence against citizens in Karachi, but critics have complained about their tactics, which are alleged to include torture, extrajudicial killings, and the disproportionate targeting of certain ethnic groups.

For more on the fight against the Taliban in Pakistan, FRONTLINE spoke with Hassan Abbas,who served in the administrations of former presidents Benazir Bhutto and Pervez Musharraf and is author of The Taliban Revival. Abbas is now a professor of international security affairs at National Defense University and is a Senior Advisor and Bernard Schwartz Fellow at the Asia Society.

This is an edited transcript of a conversation held on Nov. 13th, 2015.


The Pakistani Taliban emerged in 2007 as a unified group in Pakistan. How big of a threat are they today, eight years later?
The Pakistani Taliban emerged as an umbrella group in 2007. They were called the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP. It was a new command and control system for about 30 to 40 tribal, criminal, and extremists gangs.

In 2004 and 2005, the number of suicide bomb attacks in Pakistan was maybe one or two. But from 2006 onwards there was a sharp rise. And then from 2007 to early 2014, they had not only expanded the operations, they had actually created havoc in Pakistan, in alliance with Al Qaeda.

The violence impacts Pakistan’s economy. Foreign investment will not come if they see the suicide attacks happening in Lahore, in Islamabad, in Peshawar. In some cases, the Taliban went after judges, they went after lawyers who were prosecuting TTP cases, and journalists as well. Through very targeted fear creation, they were able to create an environment in which people could not speak against TTP.

I think their real success moment came during the 2013 elections, in which they created an atmosphere in which political parties considered relatively liberal or progressive could not go out and campaign. By creating fear in a political sphere, they were able to influence the election results, and that, from a Taliban point of view, was a huge success. Not that it was a pro-Taliban religious extremist group that won the election, but they were able to influence the result.
What differentiates the Pakistani Taliban from the group in Afghanistan?

The Afghan Taliban are mostly the Pashtuns who were living in Afghanistan. Many of them were trained in Pakistani madrasas, but they associate their group with the Taliban government of 1996 to 2001.

The Pakistani Taliban is a separate group living on the Pakistan side of the border, and they emerged much later, in 2007, as a coherent group.

There is one group that connects them, which is the Haqqani Network. They had moved back from Afghanistan after the Afghan jihad, and they were thriving in the Pakistani tribal belt. This is the same area where the Pakistan Taliban operated. But the Pakistan Taliban, by and large, are only targeting the Pakistani army, Pakistani police, Pakistani citizens. The Afghan Taliban were focused on Kabul. The Haqqani group, though they were living among the Pakistan Taliban, they were not looking towards Islamabad; they were always looking towards Kabul. So this categorization is important — they may all look alike, speak the same language, have the same narrative, but on the ground, these are different groups.

In the 90s, the Pakistani defense establishment deemed the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan to be pro-Indian. They wanted to use the Afghan Taliban to counter Indian influence. There was a perception that the Afghan Taliban were friends. It turned out after 9/11 that the Afghan Taliban were giving sanctuary to Al Qaeda. But Pakistan continued to deem them “good,” or pliable Taliban. The problem for the military establishment was the later cross-pollination with the Pakistani Taliban, who became the bad Taliban. Unfortunately for the Pakistani security establishment, acquiescence of the good Taliban made the bad Taliban stronger.

Pakistan has stepped up its counter-insurgency campaign, especially in the wake of last year’s Taliban attack on the Peshawar school. How successful has that campaign been?

The operation, to my understanding, has been the first major well-coordinated, planned, thought-out operation against the TTP. The campaign is not only restricted to the tribal areas, but also in Peshawar and Karachi — because the TTP had expanded networks and alliances all across Pakistan.

I was in Pakistan a few months ago and I interviewed security officials, even those who are critical of the military operations, and there was a kind of consensus that [the campaign] has been quite successful, at least in the tribal areas. The TTP’s hubs, which were in two or three important areas, have been cleared. The leadership is on the run. About 70 percent of the infrastructure in the tribal areas has been dismantled.

TTP is not dead — their alliances with other militant groups are still alive and kicking. But it is on the run, and there are no special sanctuaries for them to operate freely. As a result, the number of suicide bombings in Pakistan has significantly declined.

For complete Interview, click here