Tuesday, June 29, 2010

Across rural Punjab, Sikhs and Hindus are helping restore mosques destroyed during Partition

Shades Of The Old Punjab
Across rural Punjab, Sikhs and Hindus are helping restore mosques destroyed during Partition
Chander Suta Dogra, Outlook India, July 5, 2010

Brothers In Arms

•Around 200 mosques across Punjab have been repaired, rebuilt or built from scratch with the help of Sikhs and Hindus in the last 10 years
•Many destroyed during Partition riots are now being restored by village communities
•In some cases, the Jamaat-e-Islami is involved, but most are unorganised village-level efforts
•It’s a reassertion, after decades, of Punjab’s unique religious and cultural synthesis

***
The Ghuman family of Sarwarpur, near Ludhiana, cannot understand what the fuss is about. Ever since Sajjan Singh Ghuman, an NRI Sikh living in England, rebuilt a mosque in his native village that was damaged during Partition, the shrine, as well as his family back home, have attracted the curiosity of outsiders. “We never imagined we would be on a Punjabi TV channel just because my elder brother rebuilt this small mosque for the poor Muslim families of our village. For him, it was just a gesture towards restoring the collective heritage of our village,” says Sajjan’s brother, Joga Singh, who manages the family’s lands in Sarwarpur. Sure. But what Joga and his family, or even the TV channel, do not know is that the sentiment that inspired his brother’s act is being manifested in scores of villages across Punjab, with Sikhs and Hindus joining hands to either rebuild old and damaged mosques or build new ones. Odd? Perhaps. But Punjab, as admirers of its unique religious synthesis say, has always defied stereotypes to do its own thing.

For complete story, click here

Building Bridges: Community Policing in South Asia


The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) is organising an online conference from July 5-10 entitled “Building Bridges: The Police and the Public – Experiments with Community Policing in South Asia”. The Conference will feature experts from the region and outside providing their thoughts on this critically important aspect of genuine police reform.

The coming conflagration By Kamran Shafi

The coming conflagration By Kamran Shafi
Dawn, Tuesday, 29 Jun, 2010
 
But first to Gen Stanley McChrystal who was always quite a favourite with me if only because he understood that if innocent lives were lost in the struggle against terrorism some form of apology, if not outright recompense, were immediately in order.

So, there he was, this rough and ready general, standing on the doorstep of those who had been affected, saying sorry. He was there too, his lean and businesslike look for all to see, leading his men from the front.

But, to say what he said must have taken some brass, some idiocy! “Biden who?” about the vice president; likening Holbrooke to a wounded animal and the president’s national security advisor Gen James Jones to a joker or some such; and describing certain events in barrack language which does not bear repeating in this family newspaper.

As someone has already said, McChrystal’s shooting off at the mouth could be a direct result of his being exposed rather a lot to Pakistani generals who say what they want when they want with complete and utter abandon. And, as we say in the vernacular ‘take their eyes out’ (aankhein nikaltay hain) at any ‘bloody civilian’ who dares question their pronouncements.
We must note here and now the shameful way in which, barring DawnNews, not one TV channel spoke about the message that President Obama’s firm and correct handling of McChrystal’s shooting off at the mouth should have immediately sent to the Pakistani civilian leadership and to Pakistani army generals: that this was the only correct and appropriate way of dealing with insubordination. Instead, all we saw were a few senior pundits tiptoeing around the issue as if they were ballerinas dancing on broken glass.

What makes this so much more important is the fact that the completely unmilitary and ill-disciplined way in which our prima donna brass hats, a most appropriate term used by President Truman for Gen Douglas MacArthur when MacArthur attempted to become emperor of all he surveyed and was sacked for his pains, behaved at the time of the announcement of the Kerry-Lugar Bill far surpassed anything McChrystal said or did.

For complete article, click here

Pakistan in the Danger Zone: New Report from Atlantic Council

Pakistan in the Danger Zone: A Tenuous U.S. - Pakistan Relationship
by Shuja Nawaz, Atlantic Council, June 25, 2010

The Afghanistan war may be lost on the battlefields of Pakistan, where a vicious conflict is now being fought by Pakistan against a homegrown insurgency spawned by the war across its Western frontier. A year after we at the Atlantic Council raised a warning flag about the effects of failure in Afghanistan and the need to meet Pakistan’s urgent needs in its existential war against militancy and terrorism, the situation in Pakistan remains on edge. Domestic politics remain in a constant state of flux, with some progress toward a democratic polity overshadowed by periodic upheavals and conflicts between the ruling coalition and the emerging judiciary. The military’s actions against the Taliban insurgency appear to have succeeded in dislocating the homegrown terrorists but the necessary civilian effort to complement military action is still not evident. The government does not appear to have the will or the ability to muster support for longer-term reform or sustainable policies. The economy appears to have stabilized somewhat; but security, governance, and energy shortages are major challenges that require strong, consistent, incorruptible leadership rather than political brinkmanship, cronyism, and corruption that remains endemic nationwide. Recent constitutional developments offer a glimmer of hope that may allow the civilian government to restore confidence in its ability to deliver both on the domestic and external front. But the government needs to stop relying on external actors to bail it out and take matters into its own hands.

Unless some game-changing steps are taken by both sides, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship may also be heading into another serious downturn, marked by continuing mistrust and a disconnect between the public posturing and private dialogues. The United States and Pakistan appear to have different objectives while speaking about common goals: while both are fighting terrorism and militancy, the U.S. is looking for a safe military exit out of a stabilized Afghanistan while ensuring that Al Qaeda does not re-emerge. Pakistan seeks to secure its own territory against an active homegrown insurgency, while keeping a wary eye on India to its east. Increasingly, domestic political imperatives seem to be coloring the rhetoric and pushing policy between these two allies. The 2010 mid-term elections and a sputtering economy at home feed the U.S. desire to end the Afghan war. An unfinished transition from autocratic presidential rule to a parliamentary system in Pakistan that pitted the civilian president against the military and other political parties in Pakistan has hamstrung Pakistani politics. The European allies in Afghanistan have been missing in action in Pakistan. They have not been able to establish their own relationship with Pakistan in a manner that would engender mutual trust and confidence. They have a minimal presence on the economic development scene in this key country bordering Afghanistan.

For complete report, click here

Bad News, Good News from South Asia

Bad News, Good News from AfPak and South Asia
Asia Society, Jun 28, 2010
“U.S. policy options in Afghanistan have become more complicated by the day. Following the Gen. McChrystal fiasco, a silver lining is the appointment of Gen. Petraeus as new commander -- the best bet for the U.S. in this scenario. However, it appears the Afghan leadership is busy charting its own path, which doesn’t necessarily coincide with U.S. interests. CIA Director Leon Panetta’s disclosure that according to his organization's estimate, Osama bin Laden is in Pakistan's tribal region -- FATA -- adds a new twist to the whole story. The million dollar question: If that is indeed the case, then why is the U.S. spending billions of dollars in the security sector in Afghanistan? Reports that Afghan President Hamid Karzai secretly met the notorious Haqqani recently (most likely through the good offices of Pakistani intelligence) also explains the diminishing space for a U.S. role in defining the future of Afghanistan. Perhaps another high level policy review in White House is due!” says Asia Society Bernard Schwartz Fellow Hassan Abbas.
“The good news from the region relates to a series of meetings between Indian and Pakistani interior ministers (who manage internal security) in Pakistan last week. Both countries decided their premier law enforcement agencies will cooperate and that both countries, along with other South Asian states, will stand against terrorism together. The Indian army reportedly also expressed its appreciation for some successes in the Pakistani military action in FATA -- a rare development. Hopefully these interactions will continue and gather momentum, brightening the prospects of peace in South Asia.”

Sunday, June 27, 2010

New Insights about 1965 Indo-Pak War


HISTORY OF 1965 WAR-LIEUTENANT GENERAL MAHMUD -2006

Book Review by Agha H Amin, June 26, 2010, http://pakistan-observer.blogspot.com/

The Army has bought all copies of a book written by a former intelligence chief fearing it may explode the myth victory in the 1965 war with India, a source has said” , thus reported Amir Mir for Gulf News on 01 October 2006.

Although not wholly correct this was a brave job of reporting the prevalent intellectual dishonesty par excellence in Pakistan.

22,000 copies of a book earlier cleared for publication and distribution by the Army Book Club were thus wasted and assigned to dusty store rooms.All so that the truth remains enchained and suppressed , even when written by a three star general without whom Musharraf would have been behind the bars on 12 October 1999.
The book was however not titled The Myth of 1965 Victory, as claimed by Amir Mir but History of Indo Pak War 1965. Another Pakistani analyst Hassan Abbas claimed that Mahmud had requested Musharraf for a job and this may have forced him to drop the title Myth of 1965 Victory.Military history being distorted here to get a job in a fertiliser corporation called FFC.Mahmud must have relented but even then his half truth was not seen as fit for publication by Musharraf after earlier agreeing to have it published ! Indecisive we are at the cost of Pakistani taxpayer.

The book was not published by Oxford University press as Amir Mir claims but published by Services Book Club of Pakistan Army and only produced by Oxford University Press.

Amir Mir states that the manuscript was submitted by General Mahmud as per the rules in vogue . Are there any ? This is news ? Mahmud submitted the script to the GHQ because the book was sponsored by GHQ as the fact that it was published by Services Book Club !

The sources said that General Mahmood Ahmed had submitted the manuscript of his book to the GHQ as per the rules in vogue.

The fact that the book was published with the Services Book Clubs consent and then not distributed in the three services proves that someone at the highest level had a second thought that Mahmud was committing blasphemy ! Criticising Pakistans most infallible organisation and Mahmuds criticism however correct needed to be buried in the best Pakistani tradition of burying the truth !

Amir Mir claims in his 2006 article that General Mahmud tried to get a few hundred copies for his own library but could not get permission from the GHQ.This is not correct.Mahmud did manage to get at least a 100 copies .

Mahmuds book heavily supported by the army in terms of cartographic efforts all maps made by the 477 Army Survey Group may in brief be described as heavy in tactical detail,sparse in operational analyis and barren in strategic analysis.

Mahmuds book is not a solo effort .He thus states that it all started when the Pakistan Army decided to analyse 1965 war in 1976 (preface).

Its major plus point is that it debunks many myths about 1965 war.

Mahmud assesses Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik as an exceptional commander of his times (p.69).

He assesses the Operation Gibraltar , infiltration in Kashmir a success in the sense that it successfully created a strategic opportunity for success of Operational Grand Slam the Pakistani attack against Akhnur.

He faults Pakistani high command with not launching a concentrated attack in Khem Karan and instead dividing its strength by dual attacks like Grand Slam and Khem Karan.

Mahmud thinks that change of command in Grand Slam was a major faux pas and finds faults with Major General Yahya Khans conduct as a divisional commander (p.98). Whereas he ignores the fact that major failure of Grand Slam lay in the first two days when armour was divided into penny packets and artillery divided overextended as confessed by Pakistan Armys official military historian Major General Shaukat Riza in his book 1965 War.

One reason why Mahmuds book may not have been distributed after being printed a typical Musharraf style change of decisions when high or not high may have been his daming verdict on Pakistan Armys main attack in Khem Karan.Mahmud thus summed up Pakistan Armys main attack in Khem Karan as “ In 1965 the situation in the Ravi Beas Corridor presented an opportunity of classic envelopment which would have been realised by any great captain of war .The Pakistan Army ,alas,had none in authority” (Page 303).

On page 139 he states that Pakistani High Command regarded the international border with India as “inviolable”.This clears the myth that that it was ZAB alone who duped the naieve Pakistani generals into launching an offensive in Kashmir.

On page 530 Mahmud debunks the much circulated theory of Pakistan being at a disdvantage in 1965 , thus he states “ The critical question is whether the Pakistan Army had the resources in 1965 to undertake the gigantic double envelopment pre-emptive offensive ? The answer is yes” ........but then Mahmuds goes on to elaborate Pakistans military strategic failure at the highest level when he states “ Had the military objective been perceived correctly and had the necessary planning been done thoroughly for such an offensive operation”.

On page 532 he places the blame squarely on the higher level commanders when he states “ Pakistan Army’s conduct of operations in 1965 war was gravely marred by incorrect assessment of Indian strength,intentions and capabilities”.

He credits the ISI with more clearly assessing Indian intentions but states that ISI’s assessment was not considered credible by the military higher command.

On page 532 again he analyses this being the gist of his book titled “Epilogue” The price of our army’s ignorance of the operational art was exacted by the stalemate of 1965 and the ignonimous defeat in 1971”.This Mahmud ascribed to the fact that the Command and Staff College did not prepare commanders for command beyond brigade and divsional level.

On page 363 and 364 Mahmud confirms the greatest intelligence failure of the war when the capture of Indian despatch riders mail confirming presence of Indian 1st Armoured Division was not taken seriously by both 15 Division Headquarters and GHQ.

Major General Naseerullah Babar who I had interviewed in March 2001 had stated in the interview that the then DG Military Intelligence Brigadier Irshad had dismissed this as an Indian deception plan.

It appears that Mahmud did not bother to interview Major General NUK Babar while he interviewed many officers who were of same seniority as NUK Babar !

Mahmuds book is an expanded version of Shaukat Rizas book 1965.Both are heavy on facts and poor in analysis although Mahmud tried to be more blunt , although if we believe Hassan Abbas his yearning for a post retirement job in Fauji Fertiliser Corporation may have heavily compromised the cause of military history in Pakistan.

Many of the maps are not wholly accurate although prepared by a heavy brigade of serving officers from corps of engineers.

Most important however is the treatment meted out to Mahmuds book despite his mild criticism wrapped in harmless sentences ! We are not prepared to accept criticism even when done in a book supported and sponsored by the military.

How thin skinned we are to criticism even when based on facts made available to an insider ! If we in 2006 are not ready to analyse what happened in 1965 then God Help us in analysing more serious blunders committed after 1965 !

Related:
New Book Exposes the Failure of Operation Gibraltar - South Asia Tribune or click here
Inside Story of Musharraf-Mahmood Tussle - Daily Times

Friday, June 25, 2010

Veiled Truths: The Rise of Political Islam in the West

Veiled Truths
The Rise of Political Islam in the West
Marc Lynch, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2010

In The Flight of the Intellectuals, Paul Berman argues that it is not violent Islamists who pose the greatest danger to liberal societies in the West but rather their so-called moderate cousins, such as Tariq Ramadan. Such a reading of contemporary Islamism, however, misses the many nuances of the movement and the real battles between reformers and Salafists.

This spring, Tariq Ramadan arrived in the United States nearly six years after being denied a visa by the Bush administration. The U.S. government had previously refused Ramadan entry on the grounds that he had donated to a French charity with ties to Hamas. Then, last January, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that Ramadan was welcome. His appearance in the United States seemed to manifest the White House's changing rhetoric about the Muslim world. In June 2009, President Barack Obama spoke in Cairo of reaching out to Muslims with "mutual interest and mutual respect." Figures such as Ramadan -- symbols of a nonviolent Islamism long shunned as enablers of extremism -- may now represent a bridge across previously intractable divides.

Paul Berman will have none of this. His book The Flight of the Intellectuals, based on a 28,000-word essay published three years ago in The New Republic, mounts a furious counterattack from the bygone days of the Bush administration. Too many in the United States and Europe, Berman argues, are confronting the wrong enemy. Violent Islamists do not pose the greatest danger; instead, it is their so-called moderate cousins, who are able to draw well-meaning liberals into a poisonous embrace. Their rejection of violence is both partial -- not extending to Israel or to U.S. troops in Iraq -- and misleading. In Berman's telling, the Islamist project of societal transformation from below does profound violence to the individual Muslims who are forced to live in an increasingly constricted milieu. The only defensible response is to repel the stealth Islamism of putative moderates with a morally pure vision of liberalism.

For complete essay, click here

Thursday, June 24, 2010

'Engaging the Muslim World: A Conversation with Hassan Abbas': Fletcher Forum

Engaging the Muslim World: A Conversation with Hassan Abbas
Fletcher Forum, Vol.34:2 Summer 2010

FLETCHER FORUM: Let’s start with President Obama’s speech to the Muslim world in Cairo in June 2009, almost a year ago. Has that speech altered U.S.–Muslim relations? Was it a step in the right direction or simply words that remain unsubstantiated?

HASSAN ABBAS: I think we should start even earlier than the Cairo speech. President Obama, during his presidential campaign, provided many indicators regarding his insights about the politics of the Muslim world, and particularly about his knowledge of the Muslim minority within the United States. His nuanced policy statements about Islam and Muslims created many expectations among Muslims early on. Newspapers and magazines published in various parts of the Muslim world sounded very pro-Obama during the presidential election season in the United States. His statements during the campaign—where he made a case for creatively engaging the Muslim world—were indeed very insightful. At one point, he very clearly said that he would address the Muslim world from a Muslim country, and so I think people were very much looking forward to his speech.

I remember the day he was elected. I was sitting in one of the media centers in Washington, DC, as an analyst for Geo TV, which had organized live coverage of the election results for Pakistani and South Asian audiences. Most Pakistanis interviewed for the channel were jubilant when it became clear that Obama was surely winning. Just glance through the editorials of many newspapers in Turkey, Indonesia, and Egypt the day after Obama’s victory and this feeling is clearly reflected.

Coming now to your question on the Cairo speech, there was debate among Muslims whether Cairo was the best place for the speech. For instance, many argued that he should have chosen a Muslim democracy such as Turkey or Indonesia. But he opted for Egypt, which says a few things. One, he did that knowing that this is an Arab country ruled by a dictator. However, he chose Al-Azhar University, one of the most important centers of Islamic learning, as the forum for his address, which in turn won the hearts of many. Irrespective of these issues, in terms of relations between the United States and the Muslim world, his message was addressed to a global audience of Muslims as well as non-Muslims.

He emphasized the need for a relationship based on respect. I think President Obama had it exactly right. This is the real issue vis-Ć -vis the “Islam and the West” debate. The political issues are all critical—the conflict zones and America’s role in those conflicts are also critical—but the nature of suspicion in the Muslim world about the West in general and the United States in particular needed to be tackled. President Obama very intelligently, and I believe very sincerely, reframed the issue when he said that he was in Cairo to seek a new beginning “based upon the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive and need not be in competition.” I think the significance of this assertion is still not recognized to the extent that it should have been, both in the Muslim majority states and in the United States.

FORUM: To follow up on that, do you think the Obama administration has succeeded in matching the promise of “mutual interest and mutual respect” with concrete steps toward engagement?
 
ABBAS: In his speech, President Obama mentioned the potency of positive engagement in the Muslim world as a way of sidelining extremists. This parallels a view within the Muslim world, which argues that you must not only fight the extremists or the militants, but also work to empower the progressive and liberal forces in the Muslim world.

I believe that more interaction and “a relationship of respect and mutual interest” will naturally lead to empowering progressive Muslim intellectuals. I must add that the West has always been interacting with an elitist and largely non-representative group of the Muslim world, whether it is in Egypt, Pakistan, or Jordan. It is tragic that this Westernized elite of theMuslim world, in most cases, is disconnected from their own people. Often this elite is involved in oppression and autocracy. So most people in the Muslim countries, who have negative feelings about their own governing elite, by default develop a very anti-U.S. or anti-Western view because they see the West or America through the lens of their own leaders, who are perceived as great friends of the United States. This issue is particularly relevant to the politics of the Arab states today.

I think the Obama administration understands that it must bridge the gap between America and the non-elite Muslims of the world. Another aspect of President Obama’s policy which I think is working toward building this relationship is the decision not to use the words “war on terror,” because this phrase is not only very unpopular in the Muslim world, it is also contradictory in many ways. Many Muslims interpreted it as a “war on Islam” and viewed the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the atrocities of Abu Gharib, in this light.
 
For complete interview (pdf), click here

A 'do over' in Afghanistan after McChrystal's fatal error

THE RUNAWAY GENERAL
Stanley McChrystal, Obama's top commander in Afghanistan, has seized control of the war by never taking his eye off the real enemy: The wimps in the White House

By Michael Hastings, Rolling Stone, Jun 22, 2010

'How'd I get screwed into going to this dinner?" demands Gen. Stanley McChrystal. It's a Thursday night in mid-April, and the commander of all U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan is sitting in a four-star suite at the HĆ“tel Westminster in Paris. He's in France to sell his new war strategy to our NATO allies – to keep up the fiction, in essence, that we actually have allies. Since McChrystal took over a year ago, the Afghan war has become the exclusive property of the United States. Opposition to the war has already toppled the Dutch government, forced the resignation of Germany's president and sparked both Canada and the Netherlands to announce the withdrawal of their 4,500 troops. McChrystal is in Paris to keep the French, who have lost more than 40 soldiers in Afghanistan, from going all wobbly on him.

"The dinner comes with the position, sir," says his chief of staff, Col. Charlie Flynn.

McChrystal turns sharply in his chair.

"Hey, Charlie," he asks, "does this come with the position?"

McChrystal gives him the middle finger.

The general stands and looks around the suite that his traveling staff of 10 has converted into a full-scale operations center. The tables are crowded with silver Panasonic Toughbooks, and blue cables crisscross the hotel's thick carpet, hooked up to satellite dishes to provide encrypted phone and e-mail communications. Dressed in off-the-rack civilian casual – blue tie, button-down shirt, dress slacks – McChrystal is way out of his comfort zone. Paris, as one of his advisers says, is the "most anti-McChrystal city you can imagine." The general hates fancy restaurants, rejecting any place with candles on the tables as too "Gucci." He prefers Bud Light Lime (his favorite beer) to Bordeaux, Talladega Nights (his favorite movie) to Jean-Luc Godard. Besides, the public eye has never been a place where McChrystal felt comfortable: Before President Obama put him in charge of the war in Afghanistan, he spent five years running the Pentagon's most secretive black ops.

For complete article, click here
For various perspectives on the issue, see
A 'do over' in Afghanistan? - Stephen Walt - Foreign Policy
The general in his labyrinth - Thomas Ruttig - Foreign Policy
McChrystal's fatal error - By Robert Grenier, Al Jazeera
Like a rolling stone - Mosharraf Zaidi, The News
Killing the Horse Midstream - D.B. Grady, The Atlantic Monthly
Of Gen. Stanley McChrystal and Blackwater - Jeremy Scahill, The Nation

Wednesday, June 23, 2010

A Terrorism Expert Turns Her Gaze Inward

A Terrorism Expert Turns Her Gaze Inward
By Karin Fischer, The Chronicle Review, June 20, 2010

Cambridge, Mass.
When the jihadis plied her with a bowl of fruit, Jessica Stern briefly considered: Were they being hospitable, or were they trying to do her harm?

It was 1999, and Stern, a Harvard-trained expert on terrorism, was at the compound of Lashkar e Taiba, or Army of the Pure, a Pakistani militant group believed to be associated with Al Qaeda and, later, behind the attacks in Mumbai that left nearly 175 people dead. She was alone, a woman, an American, and a Jew.

But Stern pushed her fear of poisoning away, allowing herself, she said later, to feel only curiosity and empathy: Who were these men, this henna-bearded emir and three elders, and what impelled them to acts of violence?
Stern's interview with the chiefs of Lashkar e Taiba, and her conversations with aspiring mujahedin at Pakistani madrassas, with Jewish radicals in West Bank settlements, and even with a former Christian cult leader, living in a Texas trailer park, formed the basis of her 2003 book, Terror in the Name of God (HarperCollins), a pathbreaking work that delved into the motivations of terrorists. She went beyond a calculus of geopolitics and policy to dissect the personal origins of violent extremism, to delve into the ways in which belief, humiliation, and disenfranchisement can be turned to terrorism.

Now, Stern has taken on an equally challenging project, examining how her interest in terrorism is rooted in her own terror—her rape, at gunpoint, at the age of 15. Her latest book, Denial (HarperCollins), details an unflinching investigation that led to the identification of Stern's attacker, a serial rapist, as well as her attempt to reconcile the reactions that police, her family, and she herself had to the assault.

For complete article, click here
Also See:
Why does terrorism fascinate me? Because of the terror in my past - Jessica Stern, Washington Post

Tuesday, June 22, 2010

AfPak Behind the Lines: Punjab's growing militant problem

AfPak Behind the Lines: Punjab's growing militant problem
AfPak Channel, Foreign Policy, June 22, 2010

The AfPak Channel is pleased to continue a new weekly feature, AfPak Behind the Lines, where we interview an expert on a hot topic in Afghanistan and Pakistan circles. Today, we speak with Hassan Abbas about the growing threat from militancy in Punjab.

1. Your article in the CTC Sentinel last spring defined the conglomeration of militant groups known collectively as the ‘Punjabi Taliban.' We hear most often, however, about the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan militant groups based in the tribal regions. What are some similarities and differences between the two? How has the ‘Punjabi Taliban' developed since your CTC article?

First, I would prefer to tweak the title of the group to ‘Punjabi militants,' for there are many differences between the band of militants operating in Punjab and those based in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pukhtunkhwa province (previously NWFP). Though this classification may sound purely academic, it has policy implications also. These Punjabi militants, who had drifted away from their parent organizations (such as Jaish-e-Mohammad and Sipah-e-Sahaba), had moved towards FATA after 2005 because they considered the area safer to live, train, and operate from. These were called ‘Punjabi' not because they were all ethnically from Punjab province -- in fact, a few Sindhi and Urdu speaking militants were also present in this group. Hence, all non-Pashtuns (with the exception of non-Pakistanis like Uzbeks) came to be called "Punjabi Taliban."

Relations between Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan -- TTP) and these Punjabi militants were complicated. They never merged and the nature of this collaboration remained restricted to distribution of tasks for a limited number of terrorist attacks in Punjab. Of course, they learned from each other, provided useful information and training to each other but their larger goals remained distinct. The Pakistani Taliban are partly a reaction to U.S. and Pakistani policy in Afghanistan and FATA, whereas Punjabi militants are frustrated from Pakistan's policies vis-Ć -vis Kashmir. Unacknowledged by India as well as the U.S., Pakistan achieved some success in stopping militants from going towards the Kashmir conflict zone in recent years. There are some exceptions here of course, but by and large, Punjabi militants started challenging the state after getting frustrated that they were abandoned.

As I projected in my CTC paper, these Punjabi militants are more lethal because they are ideologically and militarily trained for Fidai missions whereas the Pakistani Taliban in FATA (who predominantly are Pashtuns) mostly use ‘suicide bombing' as a strategy. There is a difference between these two techniques: modern day Fidai operations can be defined as an attempt to infiltrate the target area, create mayhem and terror, and keep an option to escape from the crime scene alive (e.g., the attack on Sri Lanka's cricket team and the Mumbai attacks), whereas a suicide bomber's only mission often is to blow himself up at a given target. In comparative terms, the first technique requires much more training, information, coordination, and networking.

Finally, Punjabi militants are returning to Punjab after military campaigns in FATA and in adjacent areas became more effective. Unfortunately, police organizations and intelligence agencies failed to track this reverse movement in recent months -- hence more terrorist activity in Punjab. However, according to my interviews with police officials in Punjab, they have gone through a learning curve and now have a good idea about the modus operandi of these militants. Punjab's police, I must add, have some of the finest police officers in the country who if provided support and independence to act, can turn the tables on Punjabi militants.

2. The Pakistani military has carried out a series of offensives against militants across the FATA in recent years, and the U.S. has a well-known program of drone strikes there. Is there any talk of similar operations in Punjab? What would the reaction be in Pakistan to either?

Any drone attacks in south Punjab will be devastating for the U.S.-Pakistan relations. Secondly, unlike in FATA, there are no areas in Punjab that are controlled by militant groups per se. As mentioned above, these Punjabi militants are not interested (at this moment at least) in taking over the reins of government or something like that. Hence, there is no space or location that can be classified as a ‘Punjabi militant controlled zone.' This means there are no specific targets for anyone to focus on. Lastly, in case of any outside intervention, these militant groups will get more traction and political government will face a revolt-like situation.

The more worrisome development is that the returning Punjabi militants are reaching out to their comrades who had remained in Punjab and were lying low previously. Banning militant groups was not enough -- they had to be decommissioned fully and the government had to focus on the deradicalization processes also. Simultaneously, more funds and training for Punjab Police could have helped significantly. It took the U.S. many years to understand that police in Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa province needs help, and thankfully that started happening around 2008 gradually. Hopefully, more international and U.S. funds will start going to Punjab's police soon. If anyone believes that the Pakistani Army will go in these areas to operate, they will be disappointed. Such movements can only be defeated through law enforcement action as explained in my forthcoming paper on police reforms for USIP.

For complete article, click here
Related:
Govt undecided on tackling ‘Punjabi’ Taliban: report  - Dawn
Could the Taliban Take Over Pakistan's Punjab Province? - AEI
Pakistani militancy spreads to country's heartland - AP
Again, what Punjabi Taliban? - The News
Into the heartland - Economist

Iran's Nuclear Ambitions: Myth or Reality?

The Birth of a Bomb

A History of Iran's Nuclear Ambitions
By Erich Follath and Holger Stark, Spiegel Online, June 17, 2010

In the dispute over Tehran's nuclear program, the UN Security Council has imposed new sanctions. Is Iran truly building a nuclear bomb as Western countries claim? Or are countries playing up the dangers to bring Iran to its knees? SPIEGEL traces the history of Tehran's nuclear program -- with stops in Washington, Vienna and Isfahan.

It is yet another of those secret meetings at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The deputy director general of the agency, who works on behalf of the United Nations to prevent nuclear bombs from getting into the wrong hands, has invited 35 diplomats to a meeting on the fifth floor of the UN building in Vienna. Some take pictures with their mobile phones of the ice floes on the Danube River drifting by below. Everyone is prepared for a routine meeting. But everything will be different this time. With the help of high-tech espionage, history is written on this February day in 2008. And perhaps it will later be said that it was the day Iran finally lost its innocence, and the day the Israelis were provided with arguments for a war.

Olli Heinonen confronts the diplomats with new information about Tehran's nuclear program. The Finnish nuclear scientist, the IAEA's deputy director general and head of the Department of Safeguards, has been to Natanz and Isfahan several times himself, and his inspectors, or "watchdogs," report back to him regularly. In addition, cameras monitor nuclear activities in many of the Iranian facilities. As useful as all of this is, it doesn't replace supplementary, secret information.
 
For complete article, click here

Monday, June 21, 2010

Harnessing Local Capacity: U.S. Assistance and NGO in Pakistan By Nadia Naviwala

Harnessing Local Capacity: U.S. Assistance and NGO in Pakistan
Harvard Kennedy School Policy Analysis Exercise, Spring 2010
By Nadia Naviwala

The motivating question for this Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) Policy Analysis Exercise (PAE) is: How can USAID spend the new $7.5 billion development assistance package for Pakistan more effectively by engaging local NGOs and leaders?

The challenge for USAID is to work with Locally Funded NGOs without converting them into foreignfunded NGOs. This PAE suggests that USAID can achieve this by following principles of “non-distortionary” and “demand-driven” assistance...

For complete report, click here

Friday, June 18, 2010

The challenge of Islam

The challenge of Islam
By Gerard Russell, Foreign Policy, June 3, 2010

"America," said Alexis de Tocqueville, "is a country of freedom where, in order not to wound anyone, the foreigner must not speak freely." By these standards Akbar Ahmed, a professor at American University and formerly an administrator on Pakistan's north-west frontier, has published a particularly audacious book.

His book Journey into America: The Challenge of Islam, which comes out on June 15, speaks freely about the Muslim perspective on American society. It knowingly comes in the aftermath of acts of terrorism carried out by American Muslims. Its focus is rightly much broader, but this sharpens its relevance.

In the spirit of de Tocqueville, whom he frequently quotes, Ahmed led a mixed team of Muslims and Christians, Americans and foreigners, to examine American Muslim society with the eye of an anthropologist and an expert on Islam. Over the course of a year the author and his team traveled to more than 75 U.S. cities across the country, visiting more than 100 mosques, residences, and educational institutions. The book offers plenty of colorful observations based on 2,000 interviews -- both those one might expect (Noam Chomsky, U.S. Muslim leaders) and those one might not (the Ku Klux Klan and a Las Vegas stripper). In 520 pages, Ahmed gives a series of insightful vignettes on interfaith relations, politics, conversion, and race. And then the book makes a disturbing prediction: that violence involving U.S. Muslims will continue to increase.

Ahmed blames for this both the American intelligence and security community ("the cheerleaders of the hate and fear-mongering directed against Muslims") and Muslim leaders in the United States. These, he says, "need to face the crisis in their community rather than recoil in the customary defensive manner." In any event he feels many are out of touch, and have failed to build relationships with other faith communities -- specifically, the Mormon and Jewish communities (if you're wondering why Muslims should build relations with these two other faith-groups in particular, then the book explains this at some length).

For complete article, click here
Related:
Journey into America website
In Search of Muslim Identity: Akbar Ahmed's Journey into America - Huffington Post

Monday, June 14, 2010

The Most Dangerous Place: Pakistan’s Lawless Frontier - Asia Society Book Event on June 15 in New York

Discussion
The Most Dangerous Place: Pakistan’s Lawless Frontier
Asia Society, New York, Tuesday, June 15 at 6:30 pm
To register for the event, click here

Featuring:
Imtiaz Gul, Author, The Most Dangerous Place: Pakistan's Lawless Frontier

In Conversation with
Hassan Abbas, Bernard Schwartz Fellow, Asia Society

Jeff Laurenti (Moderator) - Senior Fellow and Director of Foreign Policy Programs Program, Century Foundation

Pakistan's tribal areas bordering Afghanistan have always been only loosely under government control. Since the US toppled the Taliban in 2001, Al Qaeda has set up shop in Pakistan and turned this area into a Taliban mini-state. In The Most Dangerous Place, Imtiaz Gul, veteran Pakistani journalist, broadcaster and author, chronicles Pakistan's descent into chaos following 2001, and explains the dilemma facing the Obama Administration as it tries to shape a new policy to turn the tide in Afghanistan. The book brings into question some of our fundamental assumptions about Pakistan: Is the militancy in Pakistan’s tribal areas now the number one threat to US security? Is Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal at risk of falling into the hands of the most-feared terrorist organizations in the world?

To watch the video of the event click here

The ISI-Afghan Taliban Link and the "Discovery" of Minerals in Afghanistan

Commentary
Adding Fuel to Conspiracy Theories Along the Af-Pak Border
Asia Society, Jun 14, 2010

"Although the news item in today’s New York Times about the discovery of major mineral resources in Afghanistan may come as a surprise for Americans, it adds weight to a conspiracy theory long-held by many Afghans and Pakistanis: Many in the region believe that U.S. forces are there because of some hidden resources in Afghanistan! Hence, this news is likely to be interpreted in Pakistan and Pashtun-dominated areas of Afghanistan in a way that will increase anti-U.S. feelings,” says Asia Society Bernard Schwartz Fellow Hassan Abbas.

Separately, “the 'Af-Pak' scenario becomes more critical with a newly released report from the London School of Economics speculating about links between Pakistan's infamous intelligence organization ISI and the Afghan Taliban. The information is not new but the fact that a leading academic institution has published a paper on it adds credibility. However, most of the sources are not named, which lessens its credentials as well. If the report is to be believed then one can't help but deduce that ISI is more successful than all the major players in Afghanistan -- both regional and global. Pakistanis are unlikely to agree to this because for them it raises a major question -- if ISI is so 'smart' in pursuing its agenda in Afghanistan then why is it consistently failing in tackling the Pakistani Taliban who are playing havoc in Pakistan.”

Related:
Say what? Afghanistan has $1 trillion in untapped mineral resources? - Foreign Policy

Sunday, June 13, 2010

The ISI-Afghan Taliban Link?

The cloud in the sky
By Huma Imtiaz, Foreign Policy, June 13, 2010
 
The LSE Development Studies Institute report by Matt Waldman titled "The Sun in the Sky," released on Sunday, details the relationship between Pakistan's notorious spy agency the Inter-Services Intelligence and the Afghan Taliban. The report details the ISI's close relationship with the Taliban and its involvement with the Quetta Shura, along with claims from Taliban commanders that the ISI is heavily involved in the planning and execution of attacks on schools and other government targets in Afghanistan. In short, the ISI, an important part of the Pakistani Army, is hoodwinking the United States by still heavily supporting the Taliban movement, in order to ensure they have a permanent voice in deciding the future of Afghanistan.

While the report details how ISI trains militants, manipulates the Quetta Shura and more, one of the most astounding accusations is this:

"According to a Talib who has regular contact with members of the Quetta Shura, in late March or early April this year President Zadari [sic] and a senior ISI official visited some 50 high-ranking Talibs who were held in a prison in a secret location in Pakistan. Some 30-35 had been arrested in recent months, and 10-15 were longer-term prisoners. Reportedly, he told them they were arrested because he was under a lot of pressure from the Americans and that, ‘you are our people, we are friends, and after your release we will of course support you to do your operations.' "

Even though hating President Zardari might be a national pastime in Pakistan for many, this statement seems far-fetched, even to the most committed of his foes.First, it is hard to believe that the uber-secretive ISI would share such information with members of the civilian government. Secondly, even if ISI officials did take Pakistan's civilian government into confidence, why would they take a civilian president to assure the Taliban of the ISI's support? If they had to reassure the high-ranking Talibs, a more reassuring face would have been that of the ISI chief's, or even the Chief of Army Staff's.

For complete article, click here
To read original paper, click here
Pakistani president never met Taliban, officials say - Guardian

Wednesday, June 09, 2010

Sweetened poison: How Obama lost Muslim hearts and minds - Fawaz Gerges

Sweetened poison: How Obama lost Muslim hearts and minds
Fawaz A. Gerges, The Middle East Channel, Foreign Policy, June 4, 2010

A year after President Obama's historic speech last June 4 in Cairo, the reality of his Middle East policy is in sharp contrast to the promising rhetoric and high expectations he raised. Obama's address, coupled with a concerted outreach strategy, made a deep impression among Arabs and Muslims. Many hoped that the young African-American president would seriously confront the challenges facing the region and establish a new relationship with the world of Islam.
Although it is not too late for Obama to close the gap between rhetoric and action, sadly for now, he has not taken bold steps to achieve a breakthrough in America's relations with the Muslim arena. His foreign policy is more status quo and damage control than transformational. Like their American counterparts, Muslims desperately long for real change that they believe in.

Unless President Obama takes risks in the Middle East, he might end up leaving a legacy of broken promises and shattered expectations in the region. Unless addressed effectively, Obama runs the risk of rupturing America's relationship with the Muslim Middle East further.

The Arab and Muslim response to the Cairo speech last year revealed a sense of optimism, of real change, tempered with instinctual scepticism. There also was a widespread feeling among many Arabs and Muslims that a man with the name, Barack Hussein Obama ("Blessed Hussein is with us"), would understand their universe better than his predecessors and treat them as partners, instead of subordinates, and rectify previous mistakes and misuses of American power.

For complete article, click here

Once Upon a Time in Afghanistan...

Once Upon a Time in Afghanistan...
Record stores, Mad Men furniture, and pencil skirts -- when Kabul had rock 'n' roll, not rockets.

BY MOHAMMAD QAYOUMI, Foreign Policy, MAY 27, 2010

On a recent trip to Afghanistan, British Defense Secretary Liam Fox drew fire for calling it "a broken 13th-century country." The most common objection was not that he was wrong, but that he was overly blunt. He's hardly the first Westerner to label Afghanistan as medieval. Former Blackwater CEO Erik Prince recently described the country as inhabited by "barbarians" with "a 1200 A.D. mentality." Many assume that's all Afghanistan has ever been -- an ungovernable land where chaos is carved into the hills. Given the images people see on TV and the headlines written about Afghanistan over the past three decades of war, many conclude the country never made it out of the Middle Ages.

But that is not the Afghanistan I remember. I grew up in Kabul in the 1950s and '60s. When I was in middle school, I remember that on one visit to a city market, I bought a photobook about the country published by Afghanistan's planning ministry. Most of the images dated from the 1950s. I had largely forgotten about that book until recently; I left Afghanistan in 1968 on a U.S.-funded scholarship to study at the American University of Beirut, and subsequently worked in the Middle East and now the United States. But recently, I decided to seek out another copy. Stirred by the fact that news portrayals of the country's history didn't mesh with my own memories, I wanted to discover the truth. Through a colleague, I received a copy of the book and recognized it as a time capsule of the Afghanistan I had once known -- perhaps a little airbrushed by government officials, but a far more realistic picture of my homeland than one often sees today.


A half-century ago, Afghan women pursued careers in medicine; men and women mingled casually at movie theaters and university campuses in Kabul; factories in the suburbs churned out textiles and other goods. There was a tradition of law and order, and a government capable of undertaking large national infrastructure projects, like building hydropower stations and roads, albeit with outside help. Ordinary people had a sense of hope, a belief that education could open opportunities for all, a conviction that a bright future lay ahead. All that has been destroyed by three decades of war, but it was real.

For complete article, click here
Related:
Is Afghanistan 'Medieval'? - Thomas Barfield

Monday, June 07, 2010

What is happening in North Waziristan?

Accord in NWA
By Mushtaq Yusufzai, The News, June 08, 2010
20 militants freed, Army convoy let go

PESHAWAR: Situation in the troubled North Waziristan tribal region has witnessed a gradual improvement following an agreement on Monday that led to the release of 20 Taliban by the government and in return the militants allowed an Army convoy, stranded in Miramshah for the last 45 days, to proceed.

Relations between the government and Hafiz Gul Bahadur-led Taliban had turned sour 45 days ago after an attack on a security forces convoy by suspected militants near the Hamzoni village, 25 kilometres west of Miramshah.
Eight soldiers were killed and several others injured in the attack on the convoy. The government later imposed a curfew on the Miramshah-Dattakhel Road and launched a crackdown against the Hamzoni tribe under the collective responsibility clause of Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR). It arrested 50 people, including Taliban militants and some tribesmen.

The incident generated rumours that the government was planning to launch a major military operation against the Taliban in North Waziristan. However, a Jirga comprising tribal elders and clerics made sustained efforts to bring the two sides to the negotiating table. It finally succeeded in persuading them to show flexibility in their hard stances.

The government, as a sign of goodwill gesture, first released 20 detainees out of the total 54, and agreed to remove some of the checkpoints to which the Taliban and tribesmen had objected.
The Taliban returned some vehicles and arms and ammunition that they had seized after the attack on the military convoy in Hamzoni village. Sources privy to the Jirga said North Waziristan Taliban leader Hafiz Gul Bahadur had promised that his men would not resort to confrontation with the government and would be responsible for protection of security forces if he was informed prior to movement of convoys in his area.

For complete article, click here

Related:
Dynamics of a N Waziristan operation - Express Tribune
Engaging with tribal chiefs in Fata - Dawn
Haqqani group flees N Waziristan - Central Asia Online
Army declares victory in Orakzai - Dawn
Pakistan, US agree on Waziristan operation - Dawn

India Takes a Softer line on Pakistan ?

A softer line
Editorial Dawn, 07 Jun, 2010

Indian External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna reiterated his country’s desire for dialogue with Pakistan to resolve outstanding issues during his recent visit to Washington. This is in keeping with India’s changed, softer line towards this country. But the fact that Mr Krishna chose to make these remarks in the US capital suggests that Washington is gently nudging New Delhi to keep lines of communication open with Islamabad. The minister made the remarks at a reception attended by President Obama. In keeping with standard practice the American president chose not to publicly comment on Pakistan and India’s bilateral relations. But a senior State Department official has confirmed Pakistan featured in the US-India strategic dialogue. India has long rejected ‘outside’ mediation concerning its relations with Pakistan, yet all signals indicate the Indians are listening to what the Americans have to say.


The call for dialogue was coupled with the familiar mantra for Pakistan to do more to tackle terror. Particular Indian concerns — supported by the US — include progress in the trial of the 2008 Mumbai attacks’ suspects and action against Pakistan-based militant outfits that might target India. Without naming Pakistan, Mr Krishna claimed that the “epicentre” of terror lies in “India’s neighbourhood.” While efforts by anyone to help forge peace between Pakistan and India are welcome, both nations must realise that ultimately, they need to sort out their problems themselves. There is no doubt that Pakistan needs to take action against terror outfits active on its territory. But considering the amorphous and unpredictable nature of the enemy, the peace process must continue even if efforts are made to sabotage it.

India should realise that peace with Pakistan is in its interest. With a home-grown, increasingly brutal Maoist insurgency raging within, India needs to maintain good relations with all its neighbours in order to deal with its internal security issues. July 15, when the Indian external affairs minister is due in Islamabad for talks with his Pakistani counterpart, is some weeks away. The regional geo-political situation may well take strange twists and turns in the intervening period. It is hoped that the desire for peace and dialogue is just as strong when Mr Krishna lands in Islamabad.

Related:
Indo-Pak hyphen irrelevant, says Krishna; US supports - Hindustan Times
U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue Joint Statement - US State Department
Promoting Strategic Dialogue - Times of India

Steps Towards Peace: Putting Kashmiris First - New ICG Report

Steps Towards Peace: Putting Kashmiris First
Asia Briefing N°106, International Crisis Group, 3 Jun 2010

OVERVIEW

India and Pakistan have consistently subjected Kashmiri interests to their own national security agendas and silenced calls for greater autonomy. With the start of their composite dialogue – comprehensive negotiations to resolve all contentious bilateral issues, including Kashmir, launched in February 2004 – both appeared willing to allow more interaction across the Line of Control (LOC) but failed to engage Kashmiris in the process. As a result, they did not take full advantage of opportunities to enhance cross-LOC cooperation by identifying the most appropriate Kashmir-specific confidence-building measures (CBMs), and bureaucratic resistance in both capitals resulted in uneven implementation of even those that had been agreed. India has suspended the composite dialogue since the November 2008 Mumbai attacks by Pakistan-based militants, but neither New Delhi nor Islamabad has backtracked on these CBMs. Nevertheless, the CBM process will only achieve major results if the two sides devolve authority to Kashmir’s elected representatives and take other vital steps to win over its alienated public.

Despite the recent rise in militancy, clashes between separatists and security personnel and other violence, Kashmir (known formally as Jammu and Kashmir, J&K) is not the battlefield it was in the 1990s. The Indian government has pledged to reduce its military presence there and has made some overtures to moderate factions of the separatist All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC). It has also refrained from the blatant election rigging that characterised J&K polls in the past. The roots of Kashmiri alienation, however, still run deep, and outbreaks of violence occur regularly. J&K remains heavily militarised, and draconian laws that encourage human rights abuses by security forces remain, fuelling public resentment that the militants could once again exploit.

In Pakistan, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP)-led government has taken some action against operatives of the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT), renamed Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JD), responsible for the Mumbai attacks. The alleged masterminds of this action are being tried, the first time in the country’s history that criminal charges were levied against the perpetrators of terrorism on foreign soil. Pakistan-based militants, however, still regularly infiltrate the LOC, and the military, which retains control of Kashmir policy, continues to support Kashmir-oriented jihadi groups, including the LeT/JD and the Jaish-e-Mohammad. A second Mumbai-like attack in India by these or other Pakistan-based jihadis would bring relations to another low, indeed possibly to the brink of war.

Post-Mumbai, mounting tensions between the two neigh­bours have eclipsed Kashmiri hopes for political liberalisation and economic opportunity. Given the Kashmiri political elites’ subservience to New Delhi or Islamabad, this atmosphere of mutual hostility is widening the gulf between J&K and Pakistan-administered Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), undermining the progress that had been made in softening the borders that divide the Kashmiri people. Moreover, the corrupt and dysfunctional state governments in both Srinagar and Muzafarabad are failing to provide basic services and are reluctant to solicit voices from across the political spectrum, thus contributing to the fractures in Kashmiri society. In India-admin­istered Kashmir, for instance, Ladakh and Jammu are increasingly resentful of the Valley’s monopoly over J&K’s relations with New Delhi.

The Indian government cannot afford to postpone crucial decisions to improve centre-state relations. It should revive the “special status” guaranteed by the constitution and repeal all draconian laws. Replacing military-led counter-insurgency with accountable policing and reviving an economy devastated by violence and conflict would instil greater confidence among Kashmiris. It is in New Delhi’s interest to be regarded as a sincere partner committed to improving Kashmiri lives, not as an occupying force.

While Pakistan’s elected civilian leadership has expressed a desire for improved bilateral relations and to resume the composite dialogue, it must ensure that jihadis can no longer disrupt the regional peace. Islamabad must also make certain that civilian institutions, particularly AJK’s elected bodies, drive the normalisation process. Likewise, policymakers in both the national capital and Muzafarabad should prioritise reforms that open political debate to all shades of Kashmiri opinion, stimulate the local economy and end AJK’s over-dependence on the centre.

This briefing resumes Crisis Group reporting on the Kashmir conflict after a four-year gap, assesses existing cross-LOC CBMs and identifies the key political, social and economic needs of Kashmiris that need to be addressed on both sides of the divided state.

Islamabad/Brussels, 3 June 2010

For complete report, click here

With U.S. Aid, Warlord Builds Afghan Empire

With U.S. Aid, Warlord Builds Afghan Empire
By DEXTER FILKINS, New York Times, June 6, 2010

TIRIN KOT, Afghanistan — The most powerful man in this arid stretch of southern Afghanistan is not the provincial governor, nor the police chief, nor even the commander of the Afghan Army.

It is Matiullah Khan, the head of a private army that earns millions of dollars guarding NATO supply convoys and fights Taliban insurgents alongside American Special Forces.

In little more than two years, Mr. Matiullah, an illiterate former highway patrol commander, has grown stronger than the government of Oruzgan Province, not only supplanting its role in providing security but usurping its other functions, his rivals say, like appointing public employees and doling out government largess. His fighters run missions with American Special Forces officers, and when Afghan officials have confronted him, he has either rebuffed them or had them removed.

“Oruzgan used to be the worst place in Afghanistan, and now it’s the safest,” Mr. Matiullah said in an interview in his compound here, where supplicants gather each day to pay homage and seek money and help. “What should we do? The officials are cowards and thieves.”

Mr. Matiullah is one of several semiofficial warlords who have emerged across Afghanistan in recent months, as American and NATO officers try to bolster — and sometimes even supplant — ineffective regular Afghan forces in their battle against the Taliban insurgency.

For complete article, click here
Related:
Afghan jirga's resolutions 'nice on paper' - AFP
Reformed Taliban acceptable: Holbrooke - DT

Saturday, June 05, 2010

Essence and Perception: Changing the Perception of Islam in the West - Dr. Robert Crane

Essence and Perception: Changing the Perception of Islam in the West - Dr. Robert D. Crane, The American Muslim, May 30, 2010

Introduction: The biased perception of Islam, common especially in America, results not only because extremist Muslims resort to reactionary violence and claim that this is Islamic, but because other Muslims fail to explain the essence of Islam in ways that Americans can understand.

Biased perceptions about Islam and Muslims result also, especially in Europe, from bias against all religion, because in European history religion has usually been a cause rather than a cure for conflict.

Changing the perception of Islam in the West requires education about the essence of all religions, as well as credible demonstration of this essence in practice. Muslims, Christians, Jews, Buddhists, and others must join in solidarity to rehabilitate the role of religion in the world, in both essence and practice, by providing a new paradigm of faith-based, compassionate justice for public policy guidance.

The following four questions must be asked and answered.

I. Do Faith and Religion Have a Future?

In a secular world, many people ask whether there is a future for faith and religion. One should distinguish between the two. Faith is belief in the unseen, in transcendent reality, in the ghaiba. This is part of human nature and has provided purpose to human life since the first appearance of sentient life on earth. Faith is universal and eternal and therefore has a future. Faith is the essence of religion.

Religion is the response to faith in both individual and community life. Religion is the pursuit of knowledge about higher truth and the translation of knowledge into moral practice.

There are many religious paths in the search for absolute truth, and there are many forms of practice, but all are designed for the same purpose, which is to worship the Absolute in thought, word and deed, whether we call it God or Gott or Dios or Allah

For complete article, click here

Friday, June 04, 2010

Who will be Pakistan Army's Next chief?

Global Insider: Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff
Kari Lipschutz, World Politics Review, 04 Jun 2010

Late last month, Pakistan's Defense Minister Chaudhry Ahmed Mukhtar denied rumors that the government was planning to extend Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani's term as chief of army staff. In an e-mail interview, Hassan Abbas, Bernard Schwartz Fellow at the Asia Society and Quaid-i-Azam Professor at Columbia University, discusses the possible candidates for one of Pakistan's most powerful positions.

WPR: As Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani's honorable retirement in November 2010 draws nearer, what are the prospects of his term as Pakistan's chief of army staff being extended?

Hassan Abbas: There have been credible rumors about a possible extension in service for Gen. Kayani, and indications are that the Obama administration is supportive of this possibility. The primary reasons for this support are to maintain the working relationship between the Pentagon and the Pakistani army's General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi, which has improved in the last couple of years, and to maintain continuity of command in the midst of a major military campaign against terrorists and insurgents in the Pakistan-Afghan border region.

The political consequences of Kayani's extension cannot be ignored however. Kayani was director-general of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) during the Musharraf era, and he played a constructive role during Pakistan's transition to democracy in early 2008. He also played a conciliatory role during the judicial crisis in 2009. As a result, he is very powerful, and the Pakistani political leadership would probably like to deal with a new and less-influential army chief. More so, there is no precedent for such an extension during civilian rule.

Recently, there were media reports in Pakistan suggesting that senior army commanders want an extension for Kayani. If so, then political leaders of Pakistan are unlikely to oppose such a "consensus" between "the army and America" -- widely perceived to be the two most important players in Pakistan.

WPR: If Kayani does retire as planned, who are the possible successors?

Abbas: According to the country's constitution, the choice of the new army chief will be made by Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani. President Asif Zardari as the commander-in-chief and co-chairperson of the ruling Pakistan People' Party (PPP) will also significantly influence this decision. Under ordinary circumstances, one of the following generals is likely to be designated as the new army chief:

1. Lt. Gen. Khalid Shamim Wayen, until recently corps commander in Quetta and now holding the very important position of chief of general staff at GHQ, is considered to be the favorite within military circles.

2. Lt. Gen. Muhammad Yusuf, currently corps commander in Bahawalpur XXXI Corps, may get the position if Wayen is appointed chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), which is largely a ceremonial position in Pakistan and for which the incumbent will also be retiring in October 2010. Some analysts believe that Kayani may be appointed as CJCSC, with the role of this office enhanced and expanded. This is possible, but unlikely.

3. Among junior contenders, Lt. Gens. Nadeem Taj and Jamil Haider are noteworthy.

WPR: What impact will the transition have on the U.S.-Pakistani security and political relationship?

Abbas: Pakistan's army is undisputedly the most powerful institution in the country, though its capabilities and cohesion are being challenged like never before. None of the top-most contenders for the position of army chief are known for harboring any extremist views, and U.S.-Pakistan army relations are institutional in nature. The U.S. should avoid influencing the choice of a new army chief as well as voicing its opinion about Kayani's possible extension, as that will complicate the situation both for Pakistan's political leadership and for U.S. interests in South Asia.

Thursday, June 03, 2010

The Polite Islamophobia of the Intellectual!

The Polite Islamophobia of the Intellectual
A Book Review By Bruce B. Lawrence, Religion Dispatches - June 1, 2010

The Flight of the Intellectuals
by Paul Berman (Melville House, May 2010)

Islamophobia/Islamophilia: Beyond the Politics of Enemy and Friend
Andrew Shryock, ed. (Indiana University Press, June 2010)

Lauded by Foreign Affairs as “one of America’s leading public intellectuals,” Paul Berman was recently identified in a flattering New York Times review as “a man who identifies ‘with the liberal left.’” If Berman inhabits and projects the liberal left, then the conservative right has lost its claim to being at the forefront of Islamophobia.

The huge mistake of the Times (and almost every outlet of mainstream media reporting) is to assume that Berman is a public intellectual who can speak about Islam, that his is an authoritative voice to be heeded, his insights accepted and thus, perhaps most importantly, his warnings followed. In fact, the message in Flight of the Intellectuals, Berman’s latest polemic which hit the bookstores last month, is so insidious, his knowledge of Islam so shallow, that it must be addressed through the one major category of public discourse into which it fits: Islamophobia/Islamophilia.

For complete review , click here

U.S.-Relations with the Muslim World: One Year After Cairo - Excellent CSID Conference

U.S.-Relations with the Muslim World: One Year After Cairo
Wednesday, April 28, 2010, Ronald Reagan Building Amphitheater
Washington, DC 20004 - organized by CSID

On Wednesday, April 28th, 2010, the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy (CSID) organized its 11th Annual Conference at the Ronald Reagan Building in Washington D.C. The conference was perfectly situated amidst the great policy-shaping institutions, many of whose representatives were present and active at the conference. With the increasingly critical and timely theme of "U.S. Relations with the Muslim World: One Year After Cairo," CSID hosted a diverse range of speakers and participants from around the world to discuss the aftermath of President Barack Obama's famous Cairo speech in June, 2009, and the road forward in transforming his inspiring and well-intentioned rhetoric into tangible policies and actions. CSID President, Dr. Radwan Masmoudi, and Conference Program Committee Chair and Co-Director of the Center for Global Studies at George Mason University, Dr. Peter Mandaville, joined together in warmly welcoming all conference participants and inviting them to actively listen to, and engage with, the long list of distinguished speakers on the day's program. Dr. Masmoudi charged all attendees with the responsibility of being proactive in their comments and questions throughout the day, to build and sustain an atmosphere of cooperation, critical engagement, and forward-thinking as CSID moves into its second decade as a leader in restructuring and improving the relationship between the United States and Muslim-majority countries around the world.

For complete article, click here
For remarks by Farah Pandith, US State Department's Special Representative for Mulsim Communities, click here
For Response to Farah Pandith’s “Perspectives on Muslim Engagement” by Dr. Emile Nakhleh, click here
For Steven Kull's "Muslims and America: Internalizing the Clash of Civilizations", click here
For "A Nigerian Perspective on Cairo Speech" by Chloe Berwind-Dart, click here
For "The Changing Landscape of Political Islam and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Obama Era" by Dr Halim Rane, click here

Lahore attacker reveals key information about suicide Bombing Newtworks in Pakistan

Lahore attacker reveals key information
By Umar Cheema, The News, June 04, 2010

ISLAMABAD: A surviving attacker of the Lahore carnage, Abdullah alias Muhammad, has disclosed that he was misled into believing that Ahmedis were involved in drawing blasphemous caricatures of the Holy Prophet (SAW) so their bloodshed was a great service to Islam. An official of Lahore police privy to the interrogation told The News that Abdullah was fed the idea by his masterminds that Ahmedis, being a driving force behind the caricature controversy, deserved exemplary punishment and he together with his comrades were sent on this mission. The attacker belongs to a militant group affiliated with al-Qaeda. A member of the Ahmedi community, when contacted and told about Abdullah’s statement, repudiated the claim as a total farce, saying they believed in the Prophethood of Hazrat Muhammad (SAW).

Abdullah was trained in Miramshah in North Waziristan and is a resident of that area and his seminary-mate in Karachi took him to the training camp. One of his brothers is already stationed there. Muaz, another surviving attacker of Qadianis’ Model Town worship place, was also trained in Miramshah. However, his background details are not available so far as he is still under medical treatment after being badly wounded during the attack. He is a resident of Muzaffargarh. Abdullah’s socio-economic profile is revealing as it brings under spotlight the background of majority of the suicide bombers who become convenient target of the jihadi entrepreneurs. With some exceptions like Ibrar, a chemical engineer who first masterminded Marriott Hotel attack and then actively participated in GHQ attack and got killed, the bombers mostly hail from humble backgrounds.

For complete article, click here

Saving Israel From Itself

Saving Israel From Itself
By NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF, New York, June 2, 2010

When reports first circulated on Twitter of a deadly attack by Israeli commandos on the Gaza flotilla, I didn’t forward them because they seemed implausible. I thought: Israel wouldn’t be so obtuse as to use lethal force on self-described peace activists in international waters with scores of reporters watching.

Ah, but it turned out that Israel could be so obtuse after all. It shot itself in the foot, blasting American toes as well, and undermined all of its longer-term strategic objectives.

Abba Eban, the former Israeli statesman, is famously reported to have said in 1973: “The Arabs never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.” The quotation resonated because it was largely true.

Palestinians were locked for years into a self-defeating dynamic of violence and self-pity that led to terrorism and intransigence. Feeling misunderstood, they shrugged at global opinion and lashed back wherever they could, undermining their own cause.

Yet now, as a rabbi noted on my Facebook page, it is Israel that never misses an opportunity to miss an opportunity.

Israel under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seems locked in a self- defeating dynamic in which it feels misunderstood and gives up on international opinion. It lashes out with force in ways that undermine its own interests. It is on a path that could eventually be catastrophic.

For complete article, click here
Related:
The Wages of Hubris and Vengeance - Counterpunch
Israel and the Future of Zionism - Pew Research Centre (2006)
The Hypocrisy of Netanyahu - Juan Cole  (Informed Comment)
Defending the indefensible: a how-to guide - Stephen Walt, Foreign Policy

Slashing of Education sector budget in Pakistan?

Gut reaction
Friendly budget
Lubna Jerar Naqvi, The News, June 03, 2010

With the budget hovering, there are reports that the education-sector allocation will be slashed down. According to reports, the amount allocated to the education sector in the 2010-11 budget will be slashed by one billion 70 million rupees, leaving five billion 20 million rupees. Higher education will face a cut of two billion 70 million rupees. And as if that wasn't enough, there are reports that school fees may see a spike by 15 per cent during the next academic year.

This is strange since only last September, while addressing a seminar on International Literacy Day, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani said that his government aimed to achieve 85 per cent literacy in Pakistan by 2015. He declared 2010 as the year of literacy. He had also said then that the government had allocated over Rs31 billion in the budget for the education sector. He claimed that the education allocations would be raised to four per cent of the GDP from the current level of 2.4 per cent.

But in April this year the price of paper products was increased by 15-20 per cent because of the imposition of taxes and expensive imports of paper and cardboard. According to the All Pakistan Paper Merchants Association, the prices of books and copies increased by 25 per cent.

This means less budget allocation plus high prices of school stationery plus high school fees resulting in a rise in the illiteracy rate as well as school dropouts in addition to a slump in the female literacy rate.

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Tuesday, June 01, 2010

Indian Intel's assessment about Pakistan army's border deployments

Pakistan removes third of army's border deployment
Suman Sharma / DNA, June 2, 2010

A recent assessment by the military intelligence (MI) of the Indian Army of the Pakistan Army’s deployment in a counter insurgency (CI) role in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) has concluded that 35% of Pakistan Army troops are engaged in that role, thereby creating ‘gaps’ or ‘holes’ on the Indo-Pak border.

In the assessment, presented at the Ambala-based 2 Strike Corps, it was acknowledged that the Indian Army is more than prepared to face any 26/11-type situation during the

Commonwealth Games in October, because the holding reserve forces of the Pakistan Army are not in full strength at the border. The assessment says the order of battle (Orbat) and deployment of Pakistani troops and their commitment to internal security duties have made the border porous.

Out of nine Pakistan Army brigades responsible for holding the border at the Shakargarh bulge, four are engaged in CI operations under ‘Op Al-Mizan’.

Former Indian Army chief Gen (retd) VP Malik says: “Pakistan doesn’t just use regular formations, but also uses militancy as a strategic weapon, going by the everyday incidents at the Line of Control. So the gaps at the border shouldn’t be a cause of concern.”

Going by the MI assessment, Pakistan’s total commitment in Al-Mizan has 5 infantry division headquarters, 14 infantry brigade headquarters, 39 infantry battalions, one artillery brigade headquarters, and 44 other units.
To maintain a balance between offensive and defensive formations, elements from the strike formations are also deployed in Al-Mizan. Pakistan has the Mangla-based 1 Corps as its strike corps (to launch offensives) in army reserve north (ARN), with its back-up in the Peshawar-based 11 Corps; the other strike corps is the Multan-based 2 Corps in army reserve south (ARS), with its back-up in the Quetta-based 12 Corps

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US and the' War on Terror': Chess or chequers?

Chess or chequers?
Dr Maleeha Lodhi, The News, June 01, 2010

The writer is a former envoy to the US and the UK, and a former editor of The News.

Fighting terrorism should be like a game of chess but the US approach has been more akin to playing chequers, says Bruce Hoffman, an American scholar who has spent years studying the phenomenon.

A chess-game approach means understanding the threat and enemy and being able to anticipate and thoughtfully respond to how it changes and adapts. This means a strategy that uses reason and guile, not just brute force. Chequers (known as draughts in Pakistan) becomes a one-dimensional numbers game which measures gains more by how many leaders or militants are eliminated than how the flow of recruits is retarded.

One of the great advantages of spending time at Washington's leading think tank, the Woodrow Wilson Centre, is to be able to meet and listen to authorities on important issues. There is no shortage of terrorism experts, but what Bruce Hoffman has to say is significantly different from the run-of-the-mill 'sound byte' analysis that often poses as specialist 'wisdom'.

Hoffman is currently a fellow at the Wilson Centre and a professor in Security Studies at Georgetown University. He has authored several books, including Inside Terrorism and his latest article provocatively titled 'American Jihad' appears in the current issue of The National Interest. One does not have to agree with all arguments to gain insights from his scholarly perspective.

I spoke to him in the immediate aftermath of the failed car bomb attempt in Times Square, which reignited the debate in America about whether the US is employing the right policy toolkit to address a complex challenge.

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