Out of the tribal areas and into the cities of Pakistan
By Kalsoom Lakhani, Foreign Policy, March 15, 2010
The last week has been tough for Pakistan. A series of attacks occurred throughout the country, including a siege of the World Vision International office in Mansehra last Wednesday that killed six aid workers, and a suicide bombing in Swat over the weekend that killed around a dozen people and wounded at least 37. However, the wave of bombings targeting the city of Lahore garnered the most attention. Last Monday, a car bombing targeted the Special Investigations group of the Federal Investigative Agency, the Pakistani equivalent of the FBI, killing at least 14 people and wounding 89 others. News correspondents said the amount of explosives "was so large it brought down the two-story building."
And this past Friday, two suicide bombers struck within15 and 20 seconds of each other in R.A. Bazaar in Lahore, killing at least 45 people and injuring scores more. The attacks, dubbed by news agencies as "the bloodiest strike in Pakistan this year," were later followed by six "low-intensity blasts" in the middle class residential neighborhoods Iqbal Town and Samanabad in Lahore. Although the bombs were reportedly locally made and used "a very small quantity of explosives," the six blasts appeared to be a well-coordinated attempt to ignite panic and chaos in Lahore. Residents rushed out of their homes. Punjab's police were filmed rushing from one site to another as the deafening sounds of another blast were heard. As Pakistanis remained riveted to their television screens, Lahore was paralyzed with terror.
In the aftermath of the bombings, it is not so much a question of "Why Lahore?" but rather, "Why not Lahore?" The series of attacks does not necessarily mean the center of violence has shifted from one major city to another. It means there was no epicenter at all. Whether or not the escalation of violence was in revenge for the death of Qari Zafar, a leader of the Punjabi militant group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi who was killed in a U.S. drone strike, militants are sending the message that they have the ability to strike anywhere at any time. Despite the Pakistani military's successes in northwest Pakistan over the past year, this war is far from over.
While it is convenient to attach the broader "Taliban" label to the problem, the network of players is far more complex and nebulous. Although the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan swiftly claimed responsibility for Monday and Friday's suicide attacks in Lahore, this organization has only been able to conduct large-scale attacks in Pakistan's major cities with the coordination and help of militants in the southern Punjab nexus, groups that make up the oft-labeled "Punjabi Taliban."
In the April 2009 issue of the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) Sentinel, Hassan Abbas defined the Punjabi Taliban as "a loose conglomeration of members of banned militant groups of Punjabi origin -- sectarian as well as those focused on the conflict in Kashmir -- that have developed strong connections with Tehrik-i-Taliban, Afghan Taliban and other militant groups based in FATA and NWFP." These organizations, including Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, and Jaish-e-Muhammad, provide weapons, recruits, finances and other resources to the TTP and are responsible for planning many of the attacks attributed to the Pakistani Taliban
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