Saturday, October 31, 2009

Hillary Clinton's Pakistan Visit: Courageous and Positive



I didn’t come only for happy talk: Hillary By Anwar Iqbal
Dawn, 31 Oct, 2009

WASHINGTON: US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on Friday defended her decision to publicly air America’s grievances against Pakistan, saying that she had not come to the country for ‘happy talk’ alone.

Her three-day trip, which ended on Friday, was aimed at getting frank, open discussions going about the fight against terrorism — and that includes presenting US concerns, Mrs Clinton told CNN.

She stunned Pakistanis on Thursday when she told a gathering in Lahore that she did not trust Pakistan’s version of its engagement with Al Qaeda.

‘Al Qaeda has had safe haven in Pakistan since 2002. I find it hard to believe that nobody in your government knows where they are and couldn’t get them if they really wanted to,’ she said.

Commenting on her outburst, the New York Times noted: ‘It is extremely rare for an official of Mrs Clinton’s rank to say publicly what American politicians and intelligence officials have said in more guarded ways for years.’

The newspaper also noted that Mrs Clinton’s remarks upset her hosts, ‘who have seen hundreds of their soldiers and civilians killed’ in the war against the terrorists.

‘But the remarks gave voice to the long-time frustration of American officials with what they see as the Pakistani government’s lack of resolve in rooting out not only Al Qaeda, but also the Taliban leadership based in Quetta.’

In her interview with CNN, Mrs Clinton said it is time to ‘clear the air’ with a key US ally. She added: ‘I don’t think the way you deal with negative feelings is to pretend they’re not there.’

‘I think it’s important, if we are going to have the kind of cooperative partnership, that I think is in the best interest of both of our countries, for me to express some of the questions that are on the minds of the American people,’ she said.

In a separate interview with the BBC, the Secretary of State clarified her comments and the US view of the Pakistan government’s commitment to combating militancy.

‘Of course we are very encouraged to see what the government is doing. At the same time, it is just a fact that Al Qaeda had sought refuge in Pakistan after the US and our allies went after them because of the attack on 9/11,’ she said.

‘And we want to encourage everyone, not just the Pakistan government or the military but Pakistani citizens to realise the connection between Al Qaeda and these Taliban extremists who are threatening Pakistan. They are part of a syndicate of terror.’

Secretary Clinton told CNN she was not suggesting that someone inside the Pakistani government might be complicit with Al Qaeda or might be failing to follow through in fighting the terrorist group.

‘No, no,’ she said. ‘What I was responding to is what I have been really doing on this trip, which is there exists a trust deficit, certainly on the part of Pakistanis towards the United States, towards our intentions and our actions. And yet we have so much in common, we face a common threat.

‘We certainly have a common enemy in extremism and terrorism, and so part of what I have been doing is answering every single charge, every question.’

Trust ‘is a two-way street,’ she added. ‘I just want to keep putting on the table that we have some concerns as well. And I think ... that’s the kind of relationship I’m looking to build here.’

Asked whether she had underestimated the level of anti-American sentiment in Pakistan, Mrs Clinton said: ‘No, because I’ve been following the research and the polling that’s gone on for a couple of years. I knew that we were inheriting a pretty negative situation that we were going to have to address.’

That’s why she wanted three days in the country, ‘a long trip for a secretary of state,’ she said.

‘I wanted to demonstrate that, look, we are not coming here claiming that everything we’ve done is perfect.’

‘I’ve admitted to mistakes by our country going back in time, but I’ve also reminded people that we’ve been partners and allies from the beginning of Pakistan’s inception as a country.’

‘Pakistan has helped us on several important occasions, and we are very grateful for that. So let’s begin to clear the air here.’

Related:
Clinton: Pakistan 'Making Progress' Against Extremists - PBS
EDITORIAL: Is Al Qaeda in Pakistan? - DT
Sceptical university students in Lahore confront Hillary - Dawn
Clinton in Pakistan encounters widespread distrust of U.S. - Los Angeles Times
Hillary Clinton wraps up tough mission in Pakistan - Guardian

Thursday, October 29, 2009

The Pakistan report card

The Pakistan report card
The News, October 29, 2009
Fasi Zaka

In times of unimaginable tragedy, it is hard to judge outpourings of grief. The mind is freckled by floods of angry emotion. After having said this, I still feel disappointed that right after the International Islamic University (IIU) bombings one of the pictures I saw in the press was of a demonstration by the boys of the university upholding banners that were against the Kerry-Lugar bill. It seemed to me the significance of what had happened to these hapless students hadn't yet dawned on them.

The International Islamic University has absolutely nothing to do with the bill, and in any case the Taliban didn't bomb the university because they were convinced that the IIU had drafted it for John Kerry. Even at that time, in the aftermath of a senseless act it was difficult to acknowledge for people that the Taliban were utterly nihilistic in their aims.

It was a lost opportunity to honour the lives of the people lost, to say that Islam just doesn't allow any semblance of what the Taliban are doing. One of the students who died was Sidra, a young topper of the Rawalpindi board in the arts group. Her best friend who saw her die chillingly spoke of being unable to sleep, to remember the cold touch of her cheek when she was about to be buried. How did the Kerry-Lugar bill fit into this? Valid criticisms of the bill aside, this was not the moment to do it because it was peripheral to the whole issue, because the Kerry-Lugar bill is also on the lower end of the Taliban agenda, revenge being their first. And the thirst for blood is so great, that the revenge is also taken from the absolutely innocent.

For complete article, click here

Related:
Somersaults on air - Dawn

A regional approach to Afghanistan

EDITORIAL: A regional approach to Afghanistan
Daily Times, October 29, 2009

Foreign ministers of China, Russia and India, holding their 9th meeting in Bangalore in India, have jointly urged the international community not to let the focus slip from their mission in Afghanistan. They also jointly condemned “terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and reiterated that there could be no justification for any act of terrorism anywhere”.

The three countries spoke of “the commitment of restoring peace and stability and building a democratic, pluralistic and prosperous Afghanistan”. In the joint statement, China joined the other two countries in condemning the “recent terror attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul”. The context of the meeting was also found in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) which was “steadily becoming an important factor of emerging architecture of security, economy, culture, people-to-people contacts and cooperation in Asia”.

The meeting was “sanitised” for Pakistan by the presence of China, and one can assume that Pakistan will not be in hostile company if it compared notes with other member and observer states of the SCO on what the neighbours of Afghanistan can do to ease the next stage of development in Afghanistan. The last time Afghanistan plunged into a Hobbesian “state of nature” its neighbours worked at cross-purposes and each suffered in varying degrees.

For complete editorial, click here

Wednesday, October 28, 2009

A Broad Dialogue With Muslims Worldwide

A Broad Dialogue With Muslims Worldwide
Interviewee: Farah A. Pandith, U.S. special representative to the Muslim communities, U.S. State Department
Interviewer: Toni Johnson, Staff Writer, CFR.org
October 28, 2009

The Obama administration has created the post of special representative to the Muslim communities with the goal of building trust with the world's Muslims. The first person to serve that role, Farah Pandith, a Kashmir-born Muslim, says the U.S. role in Muslim engagement includes working with the local communities, to try to provide an opportunity across the board in every region, and opportunities to build on initiatives for the common good. The new initiative will employ social media and a host of other tools to help meet the needs of diverse Muslim communities. "The United States is not engaging with a particular kind of religious leader or endorsing a particular type of Islam," she says." Our effort is to engage with a wide scope of civil society, included in that will be people who have influence whether they're religious leaders, scholars, academics, teachers, businesspeople."

Your position as Special Representative to Muslim Communities was created following President Obama's address to the "Muslim world" in June in Cairo. You've been working in the State Department for quite some time on Muslim issues. How is this position different from your last one, and what do you hope to accomplish now?

I was senior adviser to the assistant secretary for Europe, so my reach was only in the Europe bureau. The new office of the special representative is a global portfolio. This is an opportunity to go beyond the traditional government-to-government approach and to really think about how we can build cooperation, partnerships, dialogue, to share ideas with civil society and with Muslim themselves who are making a difference in communities and who are interested in finding ways to move forward with their ideas.

My job is to be the hub here at the State Department to coordinate such efforts and I will spend a lot of my time on the ground working in two ways. One is a strong focus on the next generation of Muslims - the youth demographic is extremely important when it comes to Muslim communities around the world. We need to do more to get to know this young generation, and I'm working very hard on that through our embassies. Two, we have a focus on building networks of likeminded thinkers around the world. All of these programs and all of our approaches will be based through our embassies, which will work with me here in Washington. But it's our officers on the ground who will be working to collaborate with my support and involvement. This office isn't on an island in of itself - we're working with several important parts of the State Department, [including] the public diplomacy team, the women's empowerment ambassador-at-large, [and] the new media teams.

For complete article, click here

Monday, October 26, 2009

Comparison: South Waziristan and South Punjab



Zahoor's Cartoon
Daily Times, October 27, 2009

A panic-proof resolve Rajmohan Gandhi

A panic-proof resolve Rajmohan Gandhi
Dawn, 26 Oct, 2009

Let me start this piece with a declaration of faith. As an Indian who knows the neighbouring country, I affirm that Pakistan has enough courage, commonsense and diligence in its people to survive the tough challenge it faces.
I follow this avowal with a groan. What, I ask, will be the consequences of the cruelty heaped the other day in Faisalabad on a humble young woman and a humble young man for their crime of seeking the shade of a campus tree for a short conversation away from their hard lives of poorly compensated toil?

The uniformed security guard who reportedly shaved those innocent heads, and thereby proved his manliness to himself, was an unknowing accomplice of the Taliban, and campus officials who refuse to punish the security guard are, whether or not they know it, the Taliban’s allies.

May this hurtful reminder of our subcontinent’s cruel streak spur us towards a total, public and unrelenting repudiation of extremist thinking wherever it comes from, and whoever acts on it, whether a Hindu, Sikh or Muslim, a Sunni or a Shia, a separatist or a nationalist.

And let us not forget even for a split second that suicide bombing, whatever its psychological roots, has nothing to do with someone belonging to this or that religion, nation, sect or ethnicity. Profiling cannot be wrong in the West but right in our part of the world. Extremists of every ilk are our adversaries. Pakhtuns, Afghans, Tamils or Nagas are not.

At this watershed moment — to turn to the larger canvas — Pakistan and India need not so much a grand deal (e.g. movement over Kashmir by New Delhi matching a Pakistani resolve against anti-Indian militancy) as a purposeful partnership.

Deals are struck by parties nursing suspicions about each other. In a deal, each party stands poised to renege before the other can break its word. A partnership, by contrast, is forged by parties that see a common danger and know they have to fight it jointly.

All our eyes see a common danger before us. Let us believe our eyes.
Indians live in denial or daydream when they imagine that extremist triumphs in Pakistan will leave them unscathed. Pakistanis inhabit a fantasy world if they think that terror strikes aimed at India will leave them unhurt. Suicide bombs snuffing out young lives in an Islamabad university are not unconnected to murderous attacks on innocent villagers in Indian-administered Kashmir or on tourists in Mumbai. There is no escape from this law of consequences.

But we must also believe what we know to be true, which is that the vast majority of Pakistanis and Indians are disgusted by the culture of the gun and the suicide bomb. They would like an uncompromising partnership to banish that culture. We should remain panic-proof in our firm knowledge that this is where the people of Pakistan and India stand.

Indians must acknowledge that Kashmir is a dispute that remains to be settled and one that should be settled through creative dialogues involving India, Pakistan and all major shades of Kashmiri opinion. And Pakistanis should accept the error in thinking that support for extremist violence in Kashmir was risk-free.

Any Pak-India partnership must before long find a reflection even in the Afghan policies of each country. Both India and Pakistan have a stake in the triumph of the ballot over the bullet in Afghanistan. Successes for the Taliban there will hurt Pakistan before they can threaten India.

Indians on their part should be totally clear in their minds that New Delhi’s engagement in Afghanistan is meant for the benefit of the Afghan people and in the interest of Pakistan as well as India, not for pressurising or embarrassing Pakistan. Not only that. The people and government of Pakistan should be kept informed of Indian projects in Afghanistan. In fact efforts should be made for joint India-Pakistan projects in a country that has been battered for decades.

To allay Pakistani concerns, India should announce categorically that it will not send soldiers to Afghanistan and also that it will not send trainers for Afghanistan’s army or police. Even if it be true that many an Afghan harbours warmer feelings for India than for Pakistan, Indians should recognise that ties of geography, ethnicity and family bring to the Pak-Afghan relationship a depth that can never enter the India-Afghan relationship.

Whatever the Obama administration decides about American troop levels in Afghanistan for the immediate future, the phasing out of America’s military involvement there is inevitable. The US simply does not have the stomach for a long-term nation-building exercise in Afghanistan. Recognising this reality, Pakistanis and Indians should focus less on what America should or should not do, and more on how they (we) can assist Afghanistan — separately and jointly — once the US leaves and even before the US leaves.

It is only too true that the governments (and armies) of India and Pakistan are not yet ready to enter into a purposeful partnership. Stubborn suspicions and prejudices will not disappear in days or weeks.

But patent self-interest may conquer suspicion and override prejudice. India will not be able to fold its arms and remain a detached witness of the struggle within Pakistan between the vast majority who cherish life, safety, friendships and liberty, and a small minority that wants to squeeze all life into the narrow barrel of a gun.
Any successes for that minority will injure India. Most Indians therefore would want the Pakistani majority to win out. At this important moment, Pakistanis must reject the temptation to fear India, and Indians must reject any urge to curse Pakistan. A country’s battle against extremism can never be won by outsiders.

The necessary moral, ideological and military effort has to come from within. Neither America nor India nor Pakistan can save Afghanistan if Afghans themselves are unable to resist extremism.

Nor can America win Pakistan’s hard battle against extremism. But Pakistanis have too much to lose in not fighting the battle, or in playing the blame game, and they have the capability to win the battle. Indians should be rooting for them.

The writer is a research professor at the University of Illinois, US.

Understanding the ‘Jihad Print Media’ in Pakistan: PIPS Seminar

Understanding the ‘Jihad Print Media’ in Pakistan and its Impact
Pak Institute of Peace Studies, October 26, 2009

Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) conducted a national seminar on Understanding the ‘Jihad Print Media’ in Pakistan and its impact on 20 October in Islamabad. The seminar brought together a large number of media representatives, scholars and academics to discuss and comment on PIPS’ recently produced report on the subject.

Dr. Tariq Rehman, Director National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-e-Azam University Islamabad chaired the seminar while Mr. Zafarullah Khan, Executive Director Centre for Civic Education, Islamabad was the key speaker and discussant. Other speakers included Mr. Taufeeq Asif Advocate, President Rawalpindi Bar Association, Mr. Afzal Khan, South Asia Free Media Association (SAFMA), Mr. Amir Zia, Director News at Samaa TV, Islamabad, and Mr. Javed Siddique, Resident Editor Daily Nawa-i-Waqt, Islamabad.

Director PIPS Mr. Muhammad Amir Rana said in his welcome address that the seminar was part of the PIPS series of discussion meant for creating awareness and building up consensus on the analysis of radicalization in Pakistani society and media. The purpose of this seminar, he noted, was to discuss jihad print media, its characteristics and impact on Pakistan society and mainstream media.

For complete article, click here

Thursday, October 22, 2009

Pakistan Under Stress - Asia Society Event, Oct 22

PAKISTAN UNDER STRESS
October 22, 2009 Asia Society Event

For complete video of the event, click here

In recent years, Pakistan has endured tremendous challenges—including militant attacks, high-profile political assassination, suicide bombings, prolonged political instability, and deteriorating law and order—but is the situation as dire as some claim it to be? Join experts for a discussion on these and other pertinent issues.

Featuring:

Hassan Abbas, Bernard Schwartz Fellow, Asia Society and Senior Advisor, Belfer Center at the Harvard Kennedy School

Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy, journalist/documentary filmmaker, Channel 4 (U.K.); and Asia Society Asia 21 Young Leader

Mary Anne Weaver, foreign correspondent and author of Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan

Oct 22, 2009 | 6:30pm to 8:00pm

New York: 725 Park Avenue, New York, NY

For directions and details, click here

Related:
Discuss: What explains the resilience of the Taliban in Afghanistan? - Asia Society

Pakistan fights back

Pakistan fights back
At last, it takes the Taliban seriously
By David Ignatius
Washington Post, October 22, 2009

RAWALPINDI, PAKISTAN Until a few months ago, Pakistani officials often used the term "miscreants" when they described the Taliban fighters operating from the western tribal areas. This moniker conveyed the sense that the Taliban was a nuisance -- a ragtag band of fanatics and gangsters who could be placated with peace deals -- rather than a mortal threat to the nation.

That state of denial appears to be over. This week's offensive against Taliban sanctuaries in South Waziristan is the latest sign that Pakistan has awakened to the seriousness of its domestic terrorism problem. Here's how one of Pakistan's top military commanders put it to me, expressing sentiments that are widely shared among his colleagues:

"We must win, if we want our children to be living a life of their choice and belief, and not of these beasts. I wish I could tell you how much I hate them. We want to get our beautiful and peaceful country back from their vicious clutches. We cannot allow them to destroy our future."

Popular anger against the Taliban has been building this year. Back in April, the country seemed dazed and politically paralyzed. But as the Islamic extremists broke out of the Swat Valley that month and moved closer to the capital, something changed. The army launched an aggressive campaign in Swat, the Taliban fighters were pushed back and the public cheered.

The Taliban countered with a recent wave of terrorist attacks, and a visitor sees more checkpoints and roadblocks now than a few weeks ago. People are edgy, but the suicide bombers haven't broken public support for the army's assault in Waziristan. Quite the opposite, judging from editorials in the country's sometimes strident newspapers.

"The politicians may be divided over other matters but are united over the need for a military operation against the terrorists," wrote the Daily Times. "If peace is to be restored in Pakistan, militancy has to be crushed," argued the Post. Dawn editorialized that "at the moment, the political will and public support is on the security forces' side."

An official of the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate, the country's spy agency, says, "The majority feel this should have been done yesterday." The recent wave of terrorism, he contends, is the Taliban's attempt "to reassert themselves" and "create ill will against the army" to check the Waziristan offensive. "That will not deter us from this operation -- and taking it to its logical end," he insists.

Security is tight at the army's headquarters in Rawalpindi. On Oct. 10, Taliban terrorists stormed past the green lawns and the stately cricket pitch at the entrance and penetrated deep into the compound, killing eight soldiers. That assault on the army's inner sanctum worried the country -- the Karachi stock market went into a brief free fall -- but it hardened the military's resolve.

In his office 100 yards from where the attack began, Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas, the military's spokesman, says the offensive against the Taliban haven marks an end to past thinking that "somehow we'll be able to manage them, co-opt them, bring them on board." About 28,000 Pakistani troops are advancing down the three main roads of South Waziristan, pursuing an estimated 5,000 to 10,000 fighters into their mountain strongholds. The army plans to stay until it has control of this rugged area, arguably for the first time in Pakistan's history.

Abbas says that to win, the army must be seen as operating independently of the United States: "We told the Americans, stay away. Let us do it." To demonstrate that independence, the Pakistanis asked the United States to halt its highly effective Predator drone attacks over South Waziristan. "Public support is more important," explains one military official.

Pakistan has pledged action against the Taliban in the past, only to make peace agreements when the fighting got tough. It's too early to say whether the early resolve this time will carry through the harsh winter, as the army confronts the notoriously tough Mehsud tribesmen. In the tribal areas, "people are always on the winning side. They wait and see the outcome," says Abbas.

If the Waziristan campaign does succeed, it would create an important new dynamic in the region. Rather than a weak Pakistan that doesn't control its Afghan border, we might see a strong Pakistan that -- by securing its tribal areas -- can be a more effective partner in neighboring Afghanistan. That would be a big boost for the United States, but to work, it must be labeled "Made in Pakistan."

davidignatius@washpost.com

Related:
FACTBOX: The battle in Pakistan's South Waziristan - Reuters
Pakistani Taliban: whole country is now a war zone - Telepgraph
Pakistan's Second Front - Ayesha Siddiqa, Newsweek
Daily Brief AfPak - Senior Pakistani military officer assassinated in Islamabad
Are the Haqqanis next on Pakistan's hit list? - Foreign Policy

Wednesday, October 21, 2009

Pakistan civilian-military ties hit new low

Pakistan civilian-military ties hit new low
Ahmed Rashid, BBC, October 16, 2009

As a wave of militant attacks hits Pakistan, tensions between the army and the civilian government have hit a new high, despite promises by the military establishment that it would no longer intervene in politics. Guest columnist Ahmed Rashid has this assessment.

The renewed tension comes as feverish speculation has gripped the country about the army's intentions, after it forced the government to backtrack on a US bill which provides Pakistan with millions of dollars as long as it pledges to eradicate Taliban and al-Qaeda militancy.

At least nine Taliban suicide attacks have hit Pakistan's security forces in the days from 5 October - including a devastating and embarrassing siege inside the army's General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi that claimed 22 lives, and three attacks on a single day in Lahore.

Over 150 people have been killed and several hundreds injured.

However, these attacks did not stop army chief Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani from challenging the government and the US administration as Washington's crucial aid bill - which has taken more than a year to pass through the US Congress - was finally ready for signing on President Obama's desk.

Caught by surprise

It was while on a visit to Kabul in late September that Gen Kayani first conveyed to Gen Stanley McCrystal, the US commander in Afghanistan, that he found the bill insulting and demeaning to the army.

For complete article, click here

Is a Fair Election in Afghanistan Possible? - Yes, Why Not?

Is a Fair Election in Afghanistan Possible?
By The Editors, NEw York Times, October 21, 2009

President Hamid Karzai’s acceptance of a runoff election in Afghanistan may be a first step to creating a credible Afghan government, but much uncertainty remains. Abdullah Abdullah, the chief rival to Mr. Karzai, said Wednesday he was preparing for a second ballot, set for Nov. 7, but he left open the possibility to joining a coalition with Mr. Karzai that would make a new vote unnecessary.

Is there a way to reduce fraud when nearly a quarter of the ballots in the August vote was thrown out by international auditors? What measures should be taken in the brief time before the second election? Can its outcome be trusted?

Gary Hart, former United States senator Jean MacKenzie, Institute for War and Peace Reporting
Karin von Hippel and Mehlaqa Samdani, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Bruce Riedel, former C.I.A. officer

Excerpts:
Cameras and Invisible Ink
By Karin von Hippel and Mehlaqa Samdani

How the runoff election is carried out (if it occurs) can either restore confidence in the electoral process and government, for which millions of Afghans risked their lives in the vote in August, or threaten the future of democracy in Afghanistan.

While a little more than two weeks is not enough time to revise the flawed electoral register or introduce biometric safeguards in Afghanistan, four extra steps could be taken by the international community and Afghan monitors to lend credibility to the electoral process.

First, the installation of an unspecified number of closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras could prove critical. These could be randomly placed outside some polling stations where no observers will be present because of a heavy Taliban presence. At the end of the day, footage could verify that, for example, only 80 people entered the polling station, and not 800 as the logs suggests, and of that 80, at least 10 could have been repeat visitors.

A similar mechanism was employed by the United Nations during the 2000 presidential election in Serbia, when Slobodan Milosevic wanted Serbs living in Kosovo to vote. In Kosovo, instead of CCTV cameras, human “witnesses” did the watching and counting.

Second, it is important to further “Afghanize” the Electoral Complaints Commission and make its ruling more acceptable to the Afghan people. Following the August 20 election, the E.C.C., which consists of three international and two national commissioners, was seen as the face of foreign interference.

This time around, time permitting, the composition of the commission could be expanded by amending the Electoral Law to include three national commissioners and a loya jirga convened to select the third Afghan commissioner.

Third, invisible ink should be widely available as an option in those places where voters fear Taliban violence if they participate in the electoral process. While the Taliban may not have cut off many fingers marked by indelible ink (used to prevent repeat voting) as they threatened to in late August, the fear of this occurring may have prevented large numbers of voters from going to the polls.

Finally, the international community must restore its credibility among the Afghan people and speak with a single voice. Rather than appear divided or confused in a rush to endorse or reject the election, as happened previously, the international community must wait until all votes have been counted and complaints considered. It must coordinate its response before delivering its “verdict’”on the Afghan election.

For all comments, click here

Related:
Afghanistan elections Q&A - Guardian
Obama's civilian task in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq - Christian Science Monitor
Is Escalation Obama's Only Choice in Afghanistan? - TIME

Update: Pakistan's Battle Against Militants in South Waziristan

Troops face stiff resistance in South Waziristan By Sailab Mehsud
Dawn, 21 Oct, 2009

LADDAH: Troops and militants were locked in fierce clashes in several Mehsud areas of South Waziristan on Tuesday and the army said that 12 Taliban fighters had been killed since Monday night. Four security personnel lost their lives.

Troops trying to dislodge militants from their positions and take control of hilltops and strategic locations were facing stiff resistance.

According to an official of the political administration, the four security personnel, an army major among them, were killed in clashes in Toor Ghundai. Four soldiers were injured in Sherwangi.

Heavy clashes were reported from Nawazkot and Makin areas. The official said the Taliban had suffered heavy casualties in Toor Ghundai, but he was not sure about the number of casualties.

Sources said that militants had repulsed an attack in Kotkai area.

The Inter-Services Public Relations said that troops had seized a large quantity of weapons and ammunition and were consolidating their positions in Sherwangi after securing important heights.

In the Jandola-Sararogha axis, troops are consolidating their positions and extending the perimeter of security around Kaskai and Shisanwam. Terrorists attacked security forces from surrounding heights with rockets and small arms.

According to the ISPR, 21 mortar bombs, 22 grenades, five RPGs, two heavy machineguns with 600 rounds, one 75mm RR, 14 107mm SBRL rockets, 27 82mm mortar bombs, 100 rifle rounds, seven rockets, 900 machinegun rounds and 11 IEDs were seized in Sagarzai, Spinkai, Nazarkhel, Tarakai Ridge, Spin Ghara, Kund and Kalkalle areas.

Three vehicles allegedly used by terrorists were destroyed. The village of Khasura is being cleared of IEDs and mines.

Relief work: About 134,477 displaced families have been registered at six camps in Dera Ismail Khan and Tank districts. Five IDP camps have been set up in Nairela, Runhpur, Sheikh Yousaf, Mufti Mehmood and Muryali areas of D.I. Khan and one in Tank.

Related:
All schools, colleges closed nationwide - DT
EDITORIAL: Army’s message to the Mehsud - DT
Pakistan urges Nato to seal Afghan border - Dawn
Army cuts deal with Taliban factions - DT
US encouraged by Pakistani offensive against Taliban: Gates - AFP

UPDATES:
Dumbest Drone Strike Ever - Newshoggers
Missile strike could complicate Pakistan battle - AFP

Tuesday, October 20, 2009

Karzai-Abdullah Run-off for Afghan Presidency on November 7

Karzai Agrees to Nov. 7 Runoff in Afghanistan
By SABRINA TAVERNISE and SHARON OTTERMAN
New York Times, October 20, 2009

KABUL, Afghanistan — President Hamid Karzai’s concession of the need for a runoff election in Afghanistan appears to have prevented his country from slipping into paralysis, but has created a new landscape of risks and uncertainty.

Mr. Karzai’s concession was a critical first step toward creating a credible Afghan government, coming after heavy pressure from European and American officials, including veiled threats that his actions could affect pending decisions about troops levels, according to one American official who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the delicacy of the matter.

But diplomats immediately questioned whether a new vote could be arranged before the announced date of Nov. 7, and whether a second round of balloting would have more security or less fraud than the first, in which nearly a quarter of ballots were thrown out by international auditors. “There are huge constraints to delivering in the second round,” said one Western official. “Can you deliver a result that is any different from the one we’ve already got?”

The host of uncertainties left open the prospect of what administration officials and their Western allies expect will be three weeks of ferocious horse-trading as Mr. Karzai and his principal challenger, Abdullah Abdullah, decide whether they can strike a deal to actually avert a runoff, which would carry enormous political risks for both of them, as well as strategic one for the United States and its allies.

Diplomats said the efforts to get the two men to join forces would now intensify. Mr. Abdullah has hinted he would be open to negotiate, but Mr. Karzai, at a news conference here on Tuesday, seemed to rule it out.

For complete article, click here

Related:
Future Karzai cabinet to balance 'warlords' and West - Reuters
Afpak Progress - Wall Street Journal
Kudos for Karzai and smiles all around - Foreign Policy
Held by the Taliban - ‘You Have Atomic Bombs, but We Have Suicide Bombers’- Part III by David Rhode, NYT
Held by the Taliban - A Drone Strike and Dwindling Hope Part IV - NYT

The future of the relationship between Pakistan and the UK

A conversation with Simon Shercliff and Hassan Abbas: the future of the relationship between Pakistan and the UK (October 16, 2009)
UK in the USA, October 16, 2009

On October 14, 2009, Simon Shercliff, First Secretary at the British Embassy in Washington with responsibility for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Hassan Abbas, a Senior Adviser to Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and a former Pakistani government official, met to discuss the complexities of Pakistan's relationship with its neighbors, and to explore the UK Government's commitment to Pakistan and the region at large.

Shercliff, noting the "strategic nexis" between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, began the conversation affirming the British Government's interest in seeing a "long term strategic discussion" between India and Pakistan, ultimately leading to a "warming of the relationship."

Referencing a recent trip to Pakistan, Dr Abbas noted that the Pakistani people have shown "a lot of appreciation" for British support, particularly in assistance setting up government entities to combat terrorism. "The support for a national counter-terrorism authority will be a really great step," said Abbas. "Ultimately, this whole fight against militants and its fate will be decided on whether Pakistan's law enforcement and police are capable."

Simon noted that a "long term, comprehensive, whole of government look at capturing extremists" would require Pakistan to engage in a spectrum of initiatives - education reform, building roads and hospitals in addition to law enforcement and good governance, and wondered how other countries might lend support in these areas.

Abbas agreed, saying that "developing capacity for good governance is central and it is crucial." Dr Abbas felt that the UK could promote scholarships and training opportunities - for instance, in advanced law enforcement fields like forensic science, where Pakistan has a demonstrated need. Pakistani citizens at all levels need to see the benefit of accepting aid from countries like the United States and Great Britain, not simply the country's leadership or political elite. Building a hospital or a library, Abbas noted - institutions that help ordinary people - is a symbol of friendship that is much stronger than military support.

"People in Pakistan cherish their relationship with Britain," Abbas concluded. "The old, strong relationship there should be benefited from."

To listen to the interview, click here

An insurgency swells, but Pakistan focuses on India

An insurgency swells, but Pakistan focuses on India
By H.D.S. Greenway, Boston Globe, October 20, 2009

PAKISTAN REELS from almost daily bombings, and its cities, Lahore, Rawalpindi, Peshawar, and Islamabad are cited in news reports as once were Ramadi, Najaf, Samarra, and Baghdad when Iraq was on the boil.

The Pakistani army is now engaged in the frontier tribal areas as never before, and its intelligence officers are admitting to an increasingly coordinated threat from the Taliban and Punjabi militants, both with links to Al Qaeda. Most worrying is the rise of Islamic militancy in the Punjabi heartland, showing that the growing insurgency cannot be limited to the Afghan frontier.

Americans have been telling the Pakistanis that the real threat came from this insurgency nexus, not from Pakistan’s traditional enemy, India, and that Pakistan should wake up to the danger. Yet the bulk of Pakistan’s armed forces are still focused on the Indian border.

After three Indo-Pakistani wars since the British partitioned the sub-continent in 1947, two of them over Kashmir, old fears of India run deep in the Pakistani psyche. So is distrust of America, which uses Pakistan and then discards it “like a used condom,’’ as bitter Pakistanis are wont to say. Pakistanis particularly remember how the United States simply walked away when the Russians were defeated in Afghanistan, leaving Pakistan with the chaos on its border.

Too many Pakistanis view the fight against Islamic militants and the battle for Afghanistan as America’s struggle - not really theirs. Elements in the Pakistani military and intelligence service have long tolerated the Taliban as an ace up the sleeve, and as a counter to Indian influence in Afghanistan.

But haven’t the provocations, the Mumbai hotel bombings, the attack on the Indian parliament, and the bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul, come from the Pakistani side, and hasn’t India shown restraint? Yet, from Pakistan’s vantage point, every Indian consulate opened in Afghanistan is an encirclement, and every move has a hidden anti-Pakistani agenda.

Communal violence between Muslim and Hindu was the midwife to the birth of Pakistan, and there is a feeling that India has never really recognized the legitimacy of the homeland for Muslims that Pakistan was intended to be.

In 1971, when the Bengalis of East Pakistan sought to establish an independent country, it was an Indian invasion that accomplished the birth of Bangladesh. But, as Henry Kissinger discovered when he tried to prevent that war, it was the dismemberment of Pakistan that India really wanted.

No doubt the Pakistani military’s brutal behavior in east Bengal, and an intolerable flow of refugees into India were part of the drama. Millions were hemorrhaging out of East Pakistan. You could track their columns by the flocks of vultures overhead. But independence for Bangladesh was becoming inevitable. It did not need an Indian invasion.

India’s prime minister, Indira Gandhi, according to Kissinger’s memoirs, held the belief that “Pakistan was a jerry-built structure held together by its hatred for India. . .’’ Neither Baluchistan nor the Northwest Frontier properly belonged to Pakistan, she told Kissinger and President Nixon. They too wanted and deserved greater autonomy; they should never have been part of the original (partition) settlement and were among the “ congenital defects ’’of Pakistan. She implied that confining her demands to the secession of East Pakistan amounted to Indian restraint; that “the continued existence of West Pakistan reflected Indian forbearance, ’’ Kissinger wrote.

Times change, and serious Indians have little desire today to dismember Pakistan. Indeed, India’s greatest fear is shared by the United States: that Pakistan will disintegrate into chaos. But old fears die hard, and it isn’t likely that Pakistan is going to let down its guard to concentrate all its resources on the home-grown insurgents that are threatening the state.

Like so many of the world’s hot spots that have bedeviled the United States - Vietnam, Iraq, Israel-Palestine - the India-Pakistan conflict was spawned in the break-up of European colonial empires after World War II.

Pakistan is far more important than Afghanistan will ever be, and if the United States wants to see it remain a viable ally, nothing could help more than a concerted diplomatic effort to lessen the continuing tensions between Pakistan and India that so hinder efforts to contain Islamic militants.

H.D.S. Greenway’s column appears regularly in the Globe.

Monday, October 19, 2009

The Art of Afghan Alliance Building: Foreign Affairs

The Art of Afghan Alliance Building
Winning Hearts and Minds, Eight Years On
Kathy Gannon, Foreign Affairs, October 13, 2009

Eight years ago, Washington's special envoy to Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, told former mujahideen leaders -- the likes of Marshal Muhammad Qasim Fahim and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf -- that they had a choice: either be part of the solution or the problem.

He jokingly said that Abdul Rashid Dostum, a notoriously vicious Uzbek warlord -- once aligned with the communists, later with the anticommunist mujahideen, then with the terrorist Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and finally with the United States -- now called himself a "man of peace." That was just months after Dostum had crammed hundreds of young Pashtun men who had fought for the Taliban, many of them wounded, into unventilated train cars in searing heat. Dozens of them died before arriving at their final destination: a grossly overcrowded prison in his stronghold in the northern province of Sheberghan. By then, Dostum had become Washington's new best friend.

Over five years ago, I argued in a Foreign Affairs essay ("Afghanistan Unbound," May/June 2004) that the windows of opportunity were closing for Afghanistan and that making allies of Afghans -- not military action -- would win what was then a losing war. I wrote then that the alliances the United States and its coalition partners had made with Afghan warlords, whose internecine fighting had killed 50,000 of their own people when they were last in power, were returning Afghanistan to its lawless and insecure pre-Taliban days. Choosing to ignore the warlords' past crimes, I argued, would embolden them, instead of making them the good partners the West so naively believed they could be. Washington would not meet its goal of greater homeland security, and for Afghans, peace and prosperity would remain elusive.

Indeed, as the United States and its NATO allies slog on in Afghanistan, it is Washington's mismanagement of local alliances that has proved to be the undoing of its strategy in the country. And, most damaging, these mistakes have cost the United States the allegiance of ordinary Afghans -- an allegiance that is critical to winning the war, collecting intelligence to find al Qaeda, and ensuring that Afghans themselves prevent whoever is in power, including the likes of Sayyaf, from using their country as a safe haven.

For complete article, click here

Related:
The Real Problem in Afghanistan - Tufts Journal

Pakistan's security in the face of threats by insurgents - C-Span



C-Span Washington Journal
October 18, 2009

Hassan Abbas, Harvard Univ. Belfer Center for Science & Int’l Affairs, discusses concerns about Pakistan's security in the face of threats by insurgents and the Taliban, and how this affects Pakistan’s foreign policy, especially with its neighbor, Afghanistan.

To watch click here or here

Sunday, October 18, 2009

Inside Afghanistan - Two important perspectives

The Case for Humility in Afghanistan
A Taliban victory would have devastating consequences for U.S. interests. But to avoid disaster, America must beware the Soviet Union’s mistakes -- and learn from its own three decades of failure in South Asia.
Steve Coll, Foreign Policy, October 16, 2009

The United States has two compelling interests at issue in the Afghan conflict. One is the ongoing, increasingly successful but incomplete effort to reduce the threat posed by al Qaeda and related jihadi groups, and to finally eliminate the al Qaeda leadership that carried out the Sept. 11 attacks. The second is the pursuit of a South and Central Asian region that is at least stable enough to ensure that Pakistan does not fail completely as a state or fall into the hands of Islamic extremists.

More than that may well be achievable. In my view, most current American commentary underestimates the potential for transformational changes in South Asia over the next decade or two, spurred by economic progress and integration. But there is no question that the immediate policy choices facing the United States in Afghanistan are very difficult. All of the courses of action now under consideration by the Obama administration and members of Congress carry with them risk and uncertainty.

To protect the security of the American people and the interests of the United States and its allies, we should persist with the difficult effort to stabilize Afghanistan and reverse the Taliban's momentum. This will probably require additional troops for a period of several years, until Afghan forces can play the leading role.

However, that depends on the answer to Gen. Colin Powell's reported question, "What will more troops do?" As Gen. Stanley McChrystal wrote in his recent assessment, "Focusing on force or resource requirements misses the point entirely." Instead -- after years of neglect of U.S. policy and resources in Afghanistan and after a succession of failed strategies both in Afghanistan and Pakistan -- the United States, as McChrystal put it, has an "urgent need for a significant change to our strategy and the way that we think and operate." While I cannot endorse or oppose McChyrstal's specific prescriptions for the next phase of U.S. engagement in Afghanistan because I do not know what they are, I do endorse the starting point of his analysis, as well as his general emphases on partnering with Afghan forces and focusing on the needs of the Afghan population. I believe those emphases are necessary but insufficient.

Whether President Obama's policy involves no new troops, a relatively small number of additional forces focused on training, or a much larger deployment, we can be certain of one thing: American soldiers will continue to put their lives on the line in Afghanistan and the U.S. Treasury will continue to be drained in pursuit of U.S. goals there. We know this because President Obama has publicly ruled out withdrawal from Afghanistan as an option. Instead, within the administration and prospectively in Congress, the question seems to be whether to pursue U.S. goals with the resources already invested, or to invest more in tandem with the adoption of a new strategy. It is important, then, to think through what U.S. interests in Afghanistan actually are and what means may be required to achieve them.

For complete article, click here

Related:
Held by the Taliban Part I - By David Rhode, New York Times
Inside by the Islamic Emirate Part II - David Rhode, New York Times

Friday, October 16, 2009

Democracy in Pakistan under threat?

Democracy under threat? By Cyril Almeida
Dawn, 16 Oct, 2009

Is Project Democracy in trouble? Is the latest kerfuffle in civil-military relations, this time over the Kerry-Lugar bill, just another manifestation of the broken, chaotic decision-making process at the institutional level from which the system will soon move on?

Or is it another marker in deteriorating relations between the presidency and the army high command that are slowly edging towards the point of no return? When — if — the obituary of the Zardari presidency or government is written, it’s safe to say that the Kerry-Lugar fiasco will surely merit more than a footnote.

So which is it? Are we headed for bust and the derailment of the present phase in the transition to democracy, or even the transition itself, or is this what democracy in Pakistan is set to look like for the foreseeable future, a process characterised by brinkmanship without quite slipping too close to the edge of the cliff?

First things first: while the army high command is currently unlikely to bring a halt to the democratic process or unseat the present political dispensation, it would be foolish to think that it cannot or will not under any circumstances. Zardari and co clearly have some space to govern, but that space isn’t unlimited and its boundaries may be closer than imagined by the pro-democracy camp.

What’s particularly troubling about the Kerry-Lugar fiasco is how the army high command essentially came out and fired a warning shot across the government’s bow and then promptly retreated behind a wall of silence, leaving it to the government to clean up the mess with the Americans, the opposition and the public.

Since it’s difficult to imagine that the army was not aware of what was unfolding in the US Congress, the army’s tactics amount to a classic political ambush at home. The main cause for worry is not that the army would attempt a hatchet job at all — that our politics is often bare-knuckled is well known to our politicians — but that it would do so on an issue in which the government has invested so much and has little to no room to wriggle away or save face.

The bill was already passed by Congress by the time the army chose to pipe up and the government had already tried to drum up the aid package as its greatest foreign-policy success to date. Political opposition to the bill was always expected, but that’s the nature of our politics — automatically reject in opposition what you would likely do in government.

The army intervention, though, amounted to a kneecapping for the government; and without a doubt it will lead the most hawkish and paranoid in the government to wonder if a decapitation is next. The more reckless may even push for a strike-before-the-army-strikes counter-strategy.

Which brings me to the second point: Zardari must chart a new course from here. And that course must eschew confrontation with the army while at the same time reaching out to the political opposition more urgently.

When a grenade of the kind lobbed by the army lands in the court of someone as constitutionally powerful as Zardari, there is a mighty temptation to return the favour. Turning the other cheek does not come easily to anyone with the hubris to imagine they can run a country like Pakistan. Nor is turning the other cheek really advisable when your tormentor may in fact want to slap you into submission or worse.

But Zardari is not just another president in the country’s tawdry political history; he is the custodian of the transition to democracy and on his shoulders therefore rests a very heavy burden.

Like him or hate him — and it is apparent that there are many, many in the latter camp — focusing on Zardari the politician, president or person misses the larger point, that he is uniquely placed to give the country what it so desperately needs: democratic continuity.

Zardari’s democracy will necessarily be ugly, scandal-plagued, tawdry even. Part of the blame for that must lie with him, but there is also the fact that he is a creature of his environment, and the politicians in the Class of 2008 aren’t the most savoury of characters.

Yet, whatever the sins of this government, present and future, nothing will come close to the damage caused to the prospects for democracy if Zardari fails to ensure democratic continuity in the short term and a democratic transfer of power in the medium term.

The country will never, ever come close to addressing its fundamental problems if it does not settle on one framework of governance, one set of rules for how the state is to be organised and run.

To believe the army has the solutions is to believe in a fairytale. And to believe the army at least has the ability to ensure the security of the state and its people and therefore must influence the state’s policies or at least set its parameters is to ignore the fact that some of the greatest threats to national security in our history have been created and exacerbated by the army itself.

So what Zardari must do is stop the fresh incursions into political terrain by the army. Whether it is the army’s intention or not, the fact is that a year and change into the transition to democracy, army intervention in controversies such as the Kerry-Lugar bill and the restoration of the deposed judges is chipping away at the fragile wall that is keeping the army out at the moment. That wall needs to be strengthened, but in a shrewd way. Directly confronting the army while Zardari’s flanks are exposed by his personal unpopularity risks bringing the wall down altogether.

So what can Zardari do? Win back the PML-N. A unified political front would work to Zardari and his government’s advantage in two ways. One, it would reduce the intra-political pressure his government is under. Two, a stronger political front would mean the army would need to be more careful about its political forays.

Ah, but how can he trust the PML-N? Isn’t it not-so-secretly hoping for mid-term elections? Wasn’t Shahbaz Sharif caught powwowing with Kayani recently? All true, and Zardari probably can’t trust the Sharifs.

But Zardari also needs to quietly assess who poses the bigger threat to his party and its future. Between the PML-N and the army, the PML-N is from a structural point of view weaker while the army is only temporarily weakened by its tarnished political credentials. And in the democracy stakes, the PML-N cannot shut out the PPP, only the army can.

Again, it’s not clear if the army is interested in forcing change at the moment. But it is clear that the fragile wall against possible army intervention is being eroded. And in a place like Pakistan, a civilian leader ignores such a development at his peril.

cyril.a@gmail.com

Thursday, October 15, 2009

Wave of Deadly Attacks in Pakistan

Wave of Deadly Attacks in Pakistan
By ZAHID HUSSAIN, Wall Street Journal, October 15, 2009

ISLAMABAD -- Pakistan erupted in a wave of insurgent violence Thursday when gunmen attacked three security-agency buildings in the eastern city of Lahore, killing at least 20, including six attackers, and a suicide bomber killed at least six people at a police station in the country's northwest, according to officials.

Police suspected that as many as 50 militants were involved in the attack on the Elite Force police center in Lahore. Major General Shafqat Ahmed, the general officer in charge of Lahore, said the center had been cleared of militants and five attackers were killed. He said a search operation was being carried out for the other assailants. The center provides training to the antiterrorist police force.

At least three people were killed when about half a dozen gunmen attacked a building occupied by the Federal Investigation Agency, Pakistan's equivalent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which is involved in counter-terrorism investigations. Two of the dead were FIA officials.

At least five FIA officials are being held hostage. Pervez Rathore, the city's police chief said the attackers are wearing suicide-bomb vests. The FIA was targeted last year, too, when militants blew up a nine-story building where militants were being detained.

Mr. Rathore, Lahore's police chief, said four gunmen stormed the Manawa police academy. He said three of the attackers blew themselves up and the fourth was killed by police. Four policemen were also killed.

At the Elite Force building on Bedian Road, the militants engaged in an intense gunbattle with the security forces. Mr. Rathore said some 10 heavily armed militants had entered the building. The attackers included three women, the first time women were believed to be involved in a Pakistan terror attack. Army troops were called in, and helicopters were hovering over the building.

The total number of dead so far in the three Lahore attacks is 20, including six attackers.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan has claimed the responsibility of Lahore attacks, according to a private TV news channel, GEO News.

In the suicide car bombing, police say the attacker rammed his explosives-laden vehicle into a police station in the Kohat district in northwest Pakistan, killing six people. Some 20 people were wounded, according to the Associated Press.

Rehman Malik, the Federal interior minister, said Thursday's events represented a concerted attack by the militants. "They are targeting the security forces," he told reporters. He said the FIA building has now been cleared; the fate of the hostages wasn't immediately clear. Police said two militants had been killed.

Thursday's violence, severe and coordinated even by the deadly standards of recent insurgent attacks in Pakistan, comes as the military is preparing a ground offensive in South Waziristan, a tribal area believed by U.S. and Pakistani officials to be the stronghold of Pakistan's Taliban and al Qaeda. The Taliban has vowed to step up attacks in Pakistan unless the offensive is called off.

The attacks come just days after an audacious attack on the Pakistani military's headquarters in Rawalpindi outside Islamabad that left 20 people dead after a prolonged standoff between the militants and commandos.

More than 120 people have died in attacks in the past week in Pakistan. On Monday, a suicide car bombing aimed at Pakistani soldiers in the country's northwest killed at least 41 people, officials said, even as the country was still reeling from the Rawalpindi attack and attacks on a U.N. office in Islamabad, a crowded urban market and most recently a rural military patrol. The strikes follow a relatively quiet summer and underscore the threat still posed by Islamist militants, despite military efforts against them.

Lahore has become a popular target for Pakistan's insurgents as militant groups from the northwestern tribal regions increasingly coordinate attacks with groups based in Punjab province, which includes Lahore. In March, gunmen attacked the Sri Lankan cricket team during its visit to Lahore, killing six police officers. That attack, officials say, was masterminded by Mohammed Aqeel, also known as Dr. Usman, a member of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a banned Punjabi militant outfit with strong links to the main Pakistan Taliban's faction and al Qaeda. Mr. Aqeel also led the attack on the military headquarters in Rawalpindi, officials say, and was captured in the attack.

Also in March, gunmen armed with assault rifles and hand grenades stormed the same police academy in Lahore, sparking a daylong battle with security forces that left at least 11 people dead before the assailants were overwhelmed by paramilitary troopers and police.

Related:
Hostage drama ends at Bedian; 20 dead in Lahore attacks - Dawn
Militants groups in Pakistan's Punjab province - Reuters
Fear and anxiety growing in Pakistan - BBC
Lahore terrorist attacks foiled; all attackers killed - The News

Not So 'Smart Power': WSJ

Not So 'Smart Power'
Congress sticks a gratuitous thumb in Pakistan's eye.
Wall Street Journal, October 15, 2009

This is said to be the age of "smart power," when the U.S. uses diplomacy and foreign aid, not force of arms, to advance its interests. This must not take into account the room-temperature diplomatic IQs on Capitol Hill.

At the request of President Obama, Congress voted last month to triple American aid to Pakistan to $7.5 billion over five years. The Kerry-Lugar bill signals America's commitment to Pakistan, which we want to help us defeat the Taliban and al Qaeda along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. This should have been an easy diplomatic win—until some of the 435 Secretaries of State in the House decided to make their own Pakistan policy.

The House approved the aid with conditions, and Foreign Affairs Chairman Howard Berman demanded that they stay in the final bill. The California Democrat was backed by Gary Ackerman, Jane Harman and the 152-strong India caucus in the House, who wanted to send Pakistan their own message. None of the contentious language was in the Senate version, and the Administration and these columns warned Congress to keep it out.

For good reason, as subsequent events show. Pakistan's military, media and opposition parties have seized on the House language to attack America's supposed designs on the country. The government of President Asif Zardari, which backed the aid and wants closer ties with the U.S., finds itself on the back foot. Recent gains toward strengthening civilian rule and fighting the Taliban are in jeopardy.

Congress insisted that the Secretary of State certify that Pakistan's government exercises "effective civilian control over the military." The bill also demands "a sustained commitment" against Islamic terrorism, particularly against the Taliban hotbed of Quetta and the anti-Indian Lashkar-i-Taiba terror group's seat in Muridke. These conditions aren't binding. They're merely a gratuitous thumb in the eye of Pakistani national pride.

At a meeting presided over by military head General Ashfaq Kayani, the Pakistan army's corps commanders last week issued a dƩmarche to the civilian government that the bill violates Pakistani sovereignty. The opposition led by Nawaz Sharif, a former premier with Islamist leanings, joined in the strike in parliament. As hard as the Nobel chorus may find it to believe, President Obama's ascension hasn't magically rid the world of anti-Americanism. Pakistan's politics is especially combustible and U.S. influence is brittle.

Pakistanis also remember the Pressler Amendment of the 1990s, which barred military-to-military contacts in response to Pakistan's development of the nuclear bomb. This only reduced U.S. sway in Islamabad and meant that a generation of Pakistani officers had little contact with the U.S. in their formative years, coloring their views today. General Kayani, by contrast, still speaks fondly of the year he spent at Fort Leavenworth.

In his defense, Mr. Berman says, "This is a created crisis, by people who either haven't read the bill or don't want to describe it accurately, and whose goal is either to destabilize [Pakistan's] government, or challenge some of the Pakistani military's priorities." He has a point, but Pakistanis hold no monopoly on political immaturity. Mr. Ackerman issued a release "denouncing" the response in Pakistan, saying, "If Pakistan doesn't want us as a partner, that's up to them." In other words, if we lose Pakistan, so be it.

Smart power can't work if it's wielded by a confederacy of dunces.

US note dilutes some conditions in Kerry-Lugar bill By Anwar Iqbal

US note dilutes some conditions in Kerry-Lugar bill By Anwar Iqbal
Dawn, 14 Oct, 2009

WASHINGTON: The requirement for an effective civilian control over promotions and strategic planning in the Pakistani military is not mentioned in a new joint explanatory statement of the US Congress issued on Wednesday.

‘There is no intent to, and nothing in this act in any way suggests that there should be, any US role in micromanaging internal Pakistani affairs, including the promotion of Pakistani military officers or the internal operations of the Pakistani military,’ said an explanatory note attached to the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009.

The explanatory note also dilutes the requirement that needed Pakistan to interrogate any Pakistani national involved in nuclear proliferation and to allow US officials access to such a person.

A new clause included in the explanatory note now ‘reflects our understanding that cooperative effort currently being undertaken by the governments of Pakistan and the United States to combat proliferation will continue.’

Section 302 of the act Congress passed late last month required the Secretary of State to submit annual reports to appropriate congressional committees to justify the continuation of security and military assistance to Pakistan. A failure to issue such a report could cause the aid to be discontinued.

There’s no such requirement for economic assistance. The secretary’s report shall include an assessment of the extent to which the Pakistan government exercises effective civilian control of the military.

This report should also include ‘a description of the extent to which civilian executive leaders and parliament exercise oversight and approval of military budgets, the chain of command, the process of promotion for senior military leaders, civilian involvement in strategic guidance and planning, and military involvement in civil administration,’ said the original document.

Pakistani diplomats, however, explained to the media on Wednesday that while the above clause could not be deleted from the bill, the explanatory statement would make it ineffective. The administration will no longer be asked to issue such a report.

For complete article, click here

Related:
Explanatory statement added to Kerry-Lugar bill - DT
The Kerry-Lugar Bill: details and conditions - The News
“The Kerry-Looter Bill” - ABC

Monday, October 12, 2009

NPR's Michele Norris speaks with Hassan Abbas on Pakistan's Security Crisis



Pakistan Attacks Raise Questions Of Security
Michele Norris speaks with Hassan Abbas, NPR, October 12, 2009

It's been a particularly violent week in Pakistan. A string of bombings has rocked several communities, killing dozens and injuring many more. The recent spate of attacks raises questions about the ability of the Pakistani government to control militants in the country's largely lawless northern region. Michele Norris speaks with Hassan Abbas, senior adviser to the Belfer Center at Harvard's Kennedy School and a fellow at the Asia Society.

For listening to the interview click here

Related:
‘Senior officers were main target of GHQ attack’ - The News
Terror wave continues, army targeted again - DT
GHQ attackers’ leader one of army defectors - DT
How an ex-Army commando became a terrorist - The News
In Pakistan, a Deadly Resurgence - Washington Post
Pakistani Police Had Warned Army About a Raid - New York Times

Sunday, October 11, 2009

Deciphering the attack on Pakistan’s Army headquarters



Deciphering the attack on Pakistan’s Army headquarters
By Hassan Abbas
AfPak channel, Foreign Policy, October 11, 2009

Before Pakistan could start recovering from a suicide bombing at a U.N. office in Islamabad and a massive bomb blast in a Peshawar market last week, the brazen October 10 attack targeting Pakistan's most secure military complex -- Army Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi, just a few miles from the capital of Islamabad -- jolted it further. This latest attack dragged on for 18 hours as around 40 officials were held hostage by terrorists in a building that belongs to a very important military department. During initial gun battle, the Army lost a brigadier and a lieutenant colonel. This episode concluded with the arrest of the commander of the operation Aqeel, alias Dr. Usman, and the killing of his some seven associates who wore army fatigues and had coordinated their attack on GHQ from at least two directions.

This was neither the first attack on an army structure in the country nor the most deadly -- but it is unprecedented given the extent of the breach of the GHQ security, the confusion that it created in its initial stage (raising concerns about the safety of army chief Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani), and its timing vis-Ć -vis the planned launch of a ground military operation in South Waziristan. It could be a transformational event for the army -- cementing its resolve against local militants, bridging internal divisions and forcing a review of its intelligence estimates. However, jumping to conclusions without a thorough investigation and reacting rashly based on preconceived notions would be highly counterproductive. Additionally, though Pakistan's nuclear installations are not in the immediate vicinity of GHQ, the nature of the attack raises questions about how security agencies would react if a future attack targets any of the nuclear weapons facilities.

Before attempting to analyze the attack further, let's look at the facts that have come to light so far. The Crime Investigation Department of Punjab -- a civilian law enforcement body -- recently shared its assessment with relevant government departments maintaining that "terrorists belonging to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), in collaboration with Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), were planning to attack GHQ in Rawalpindi." It even warned that terrorists clad in military uniforms were planning to attack GHQ while riding in military vehicles. Pakistan's leading newspaper group -- the Jang group of publishers -- both in its English and Urdu publications disclosed this on October 5. This information was partly based on interrogations of suspects involved in the attack on Sri Lankan cricket team in March this year. Poor coordination between civilian law enforcement and the military is obvious.

Secondly, a profile of Aqeel, the only terrorist arrested at the scene at GHQ, is quite instructive. Hailing from Kahuta in Punjab province, Aqeel was an employee of Army Medical Stores before he joined local militant groups (first Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and then Jaish-e-Mohammad). Later he became a member of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and remained a close associate of Ilyas Kashmiri, al Qaeda's chief of paramilitary operations in Pakistan who was recently killed in a drone strike in South Waziristan. Punjabi police were looking for him in connection with a number of recent terrorist attacks in Punjab, and he is suspected of involvement with the Sri Lankan cricket team attack.

Thirdly, the TTP's Amjad Farooqi group claimed responsibility for the attack shortly after it became public. An old Harkatul Mujahideen fighter, Amjad Farooqi's links with al Qaeda are well established. And lastly, some Pakistani media analysts known for their hawkish views openly speculated on Pakistani television about Indian intelligence agencies' possible role in the attack -- especially in the context of a growing India-Pakistan rivalry inside Afghanistan, but there is no proof of Indian involvement in this attack. In fact, these terrorists' links to indigenous militant groups in Waziristan have already been acknowledged by the army and police.

To understand how the Pakistani Army will view this developing situation, three other factors are also very relevant. Effective military operations in Swat have taught the army that 'a stitch in time saves nine' and that without public support no military campaign can succeed. Additionally, Indian allegations about the Pakistani Army's direct involvement in every attack on its personnel and interests in Afghanistan help those extremist elements in Pakistan who see India and Pakistan clashing on every path. And finally, the divergence in the civil-military perspectives about the intent and content of the Kerry-Lugar bill has generated a major debate in Pakistan about the nature of the U.S.-Pakistan relations. A trust deficit is unfortunately growing on both sides despite regular interaction between leaders of the two countries and public cooperation in counterterrorism field.

The complexity of the challenge at hand for both Pakistan and the U.S. is vividly apparent in this context. Despite this setback, Pakistan cannot afford to delay the ground operation in South Waziristan, as that will only provide TTP with more time to resolve its leadership crisis, reorganize, and acquire more armor and weaponry. For the TTP and its associates, the GHQ attack will be deemed a successful operation, useful for attracting more recruits. But on the flip side, Pakistani public support for more effective counterterrorism measures will also increase. As most polls and surveys indicate, Pakistani support for effective action against TTP and other militant groups increased after the rise of violence in the Swat Valley area. So, the time is ripe to cleanse the FATA as well as parts of South Punjab where extremism is brewing. For this to happen, intelligence sharing between Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the civilian law enforcement agencies, especially the competently led Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) and newly constituted National Counterterrorism Authority (NACTA), will be critically valuable.

Indian political leadership, despite its reservations about the 2008 Mumbai attack investigation in Pakistan, can also help by fully reviving the peace process with Pakistan and by restraining itself from accusing Pakistan of blame for everything that negatively affects India. The Obama administration can lend a hand by convincing the U.S. Congress to reframe the few provisions of the recently passed aid bill that have become controversial in Pakistan. Pakistan's politicians on their part can help the army's counterterrorism resolve by standing together and developing consensus on major policy issues confronting the state.

The Pakistani Army's track record is not enviable. Its disastrous interferences in political affairs and pursuance of illegitimate foreign policy goals through non-state actors cannot be justified on any grounds. Still, Pakistan needs a disciplined, cohesive and efficient army today more than ever before. Anything less than a full-on counterterrorism effort from the Pakistani military will attract more serious challenges tomorrow than those it confronted yesterday.

Hassan Abbas is a Bernard Schwartz fellow at the Asia Society and senior advisor at the Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School. He is also the author of Pakistan's Drift into Extremism.

Related:
Militant leader who led attack on Pakistan Army base is one of many defectors - times onLine
A Game-Changing Attack in Pakistan - Huffington Post

Saturday, October 10, 2009

Pakistan's Army Headquarter Under Attack - Terrorists Eliminated after an 18 hour long Crisis

Pakistan army: Commando raid frees 22 hostages
By MOHAMMAD YUSUF (AP) – October 10, 2009

RAWALPINDI, Pakistan — Pakistani commandos raided a building inside army headquarters early Sunday and freed 22 people held hostage for more than 18 hours by Islamist militants, a military spokesman said. Three captives and four militants were killed in the operation.

Explosions and gunshots rang out as commandos moved into a building in the complex just before dawn, while a helicopter hovered in the sky. Three ambulances were seen driving out of the heavily fortified base close to the capital, Islamabad.

Army spokesman Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas said "mopping up" operations were still under way, but it appeared the crisis was nearing its end.

Up to five heavily armed militants took the hostages after they and other assailants attacked the main gate of the army headquarters on Saturday, killing six soldiers in a brazen attack on one of the most powerful institutions in this nuclear-armed country.

No group claimed responsibility, but authorities said they were sure that the Pakistani Taliban or an allied Islamist militant group were behind it.

The strike appeared to be a warning to the military that its planned offensive on the insurgents' stronghold of South Waziristan along the Afghan border would be met with attacks against targets across Pakistan. Authorities said the siege had stiffened their resolve to go ahead with that operation.

"Most of the hostages are out of the building now," Abbas said.

Abbas said 20 of the hostages had been kept in a single room guarded by a militant wearing a suicide vest. He said troops shot him before he managed to detonate his explosives.

Abbas said the 22 who were freed included soldiers and civilians. Three captives were killed, along with four militants, he said.

Pakistan has been hit by scores of attacks by militants over the last three years, with security forces a favorite target.

Related:
Pakistan Army Moves to Free Hostages at Its Headquarters - New York Times
The News predicted attack - The News
Hostage crisis at Pakistani base - The National
Pakistan Says 22 Hostages Freed, 3 Killed in Rescue Operation - Bloomberg
Operation in Waziristan inevitable after GHQ attack, says Malik - Online

Friday, October 09, 2009

Pakistan's 'other-people's-money' problem

Pakistan's 'other-people's-money' problem
The News, October 10, 2009
Mosharraf Zaidi

The Kerry-Lugar Bill is about giving Pakistan money. For the Americans, the legislation may have evolved into becoming an instrument of democratisation, an instrument of imperialism, or an instrument of development--and it may even be possible that it is all three, or none of the three. But for Pakistan, the bill has always been about one thing: money. The debate and discourse it is stimulating today is peripheral to that central issue, and it conceals the realities of the incentives that drive the Pakistani elite's behaviour. Military, feudal or capitalist, the elite have always had a serious thing for other people's money.

The Pakistani military loves other people's money. It has sustained a reputation as an important investment for American power by perpetuating its role as a frontline force that acts as a guardian against evil things, for example, Communism throughout the Cold War, peaking in the 80s and then the lull in business from 1989 onwards, followed by the swinging 90s. And then in 2001 came the violent extremism of Al Qaeda.

The Pakistani capitalist loves other people's money. The country's capitalist elite has always sided with the almighty dollar. Not the almighty rupee, but the almighty dollar. And capitalist Pakistan is as knee-deep in elite patronage politics as the PPP is. While recent indicators may suggest that the PML-N has turned a corner -- with its unequivocal support for the lawyers movement -- its history is no secret. Moreover, Nawaz Sharif's genesis as a political entity during the Zia years is not a solitary tale of the military's patronage of big business-cum-big politics. Dozens of heavy-weight politicians that inhabit all versions of the PMLs today (particularly those of the PM- Q) owe their monetary and political fortunes to favourable notifications emerging from the corridors of power during the military regimes of Ayub, Zia and Musharraf.

The Pakistani feudal loves other people's money. It has cemented a reputation as an important investment for American power by perpetuating its role as a victim of the Pakistani military. But strangely, feudal Pakistan has always been a willing and able partner of the military in all its campaigns against democracy, and the predictable and stable civilian institutions that should underpin it. The feudal centrifuge of Pakistani politics, the PPP, has shed blood in service of democracy, but its record is far from pristine. It has been enabled by and has been an enabler of the military's power plays throughout history. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto rose to prominence as a trusted stud of Field Marshall Ayub Khan. So while his heroism for standing up to Zia's deception and having the courage to live and die by the sword can never be questioned, his political genesis has an unquestionable khaki shade. More recently, while Shaheed Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto perpetuated the Bhutto family's legacy of making the ultimate sacrifices for their politics, her return to Pakistan was negotiated with Pakistan's military. May God rest her soul in peace, but she too left a khaki tint on the proud red, black and white flag of the PPP's now largely feudal colours.

Within this political culture -- a culture in which other people's money is a fundamental and existential element of strategy, tactics and operations -- the Pakistani elite have been operating in synchronicity with their attendant political conditions.

The military elite, personified by the Corps Commanders meeting at the General Head Quarters (GHQ) on Wednesday, struck first and struck hard, playing to public sentiment and "standing up" for Pakistan. This was a perfect pill for the military. It has been desperately seeking to re-establish its credibility, its legitimacy as a major centre of political power in Pakistan, and by extension its political bona fides. It is understandable that it would seek these things, having had its image dragged through the mud by the fag-end of the Musharraf years, as he alienated and antagonised millions with his bullying of the Chief Justice, and his contempt for civilian institutions.

The capitalist elite, guided by crony capitalism, is a two-faced monster. It is personified by the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) on one hand, and by the opposition parties on the other. The KSE element helped sway the market downward, signaling to investors everywhere that Pakistan is such a sorry stack of cards that it will collapse into a Taliban hell, if the US taxpayers don't send that $1.5 billion -- public outcry be damned. The political opposition element helped to ratchet up the temperature, in lock-step with the military elite, mind you. Tellingly, none have had the gall to reject the money -- only the conditions.

The feudal elite, personified by the obduracy of the president and the audacity of the foreign minister, has chosen to cheerlead for the Kerry-Lugar Bill. Much anger and hysteria is focused on Husain Haqqani but the ambassador, despite his considerable supernatural powers, is not the cause of the PPP's addiction to other people's money. Other people's money is part of the very DNA of feudal politics in this country. How else will the PPP pay for the public sector's expenditures? Expenditure that the PPP itself has caused to grow through opaque vote-getting schemes (like the Income Support Programme being run by that vaunted economist, Farzana Raja). Expenditure, for which concurrent domestic revenues will never be raised -- because doing so would entail taxing the only group left in the country that doesn't get taxed through the nose -- the feudal elite. And what kind of feudals would tax themselves?

Feudal, military or capitalist, the Pakistani elite love other people's money. The country's perennial indebtedness and unquenchable appetite for other people's money however, is not inevitable. Contrary to the conventional wisdom peddled by Citibank salesman pretending to be economists, and World Bank economists, pretending to be human -- Pakistan can survive without bailouts. Reduced public sector expenditure, increased revenue mobilisation and a government held accountable at the local, provincial and federal level are not just mantras -- they matter. Their absence, systemic to an elite patronage system of governance, is the reason Pakistan seems to be aid dependent. But it is not.

On October 28, 2008 (almost exactly a year ago), I argued that Pakistan must default in order to break out of a cycle that sustains the elite's largesse to itself. Sadly, instead of forcing the Pakistani state to confront administrative, structural and strategic demons, the international community's response to the Pakistani elite's poker-faced bluff has been to raise the stakes.

Pakistan's elite have already won this round, once again. The Kerry-Lugar Bill discourse in Pakistan is characterised by patriotism and greed or both, but it is not guided by reason. No one, neither the military nor the capitalist elite have questioned Pakistan's seemingly limitless appetite for financial assistance, which is the basis for the formulation of the Kerry-Lugar Bill. Instead, there is elite consensus around the need for other people's money. The only disagreement is about how to cash in.

The writer advises governments, donors and NGOs on public policy. He can be reached through his website www.mosharrafzaidi.com

Related:
US Senate committee separates myth from facts in Kerry-Lugar bill - DT
Say no to Kerry-Lugar Bill - The Nation
US govt to be asked to remove strings - Dawn

Ali Eteraz (Children of Dust) with Hassan Abbas | Asia Society


Ali Eteraz (Children of Dust) with Hassan Abbas | Asia Society

October 15, 2009
Asia Society: 725 Park Avenue, New York, NY
5:30 PM

Children of Dust is a probing and vital memoir of growing up male, Pakistani, and Muslim as Ali Eteraz shares his experiences at rural Pakistani madrassas, his conflicts as a Muslim activist in the U.S., and his engagement with the modern Middle East as an adult in a post-9/11 world.

As a lawyer, columnist, and writer, Eteraz has worked for the advancement of legislative and legal reform in the Muslim World. He is currently a contributor to The Guardian, True/Slant, and Dawn, Pakistan’s largest and oldest English language daily. His articles have appeared in Dissent, Foreign Policy, Open Democracy, and Alternet, among others, and have been linked by hundreds of blogs, including NYTimes.

Join Eteraz and Hassan Abbas, Bernard Schwartz Fellow at Asia Society New York, for an insightful discussion about the Pakistani diaspora and what defines Muslim identity in America and the West in the post-9/11 world.

Followed by a book signing with the author.

Cosponsored by SAJA (South Asian Journalists' Association)

Please note: this event will also be a free live video webcast from 6:30 to 8:00 pm EST. Online viewers are encouraged to send questions to moderator@asiasoc.org.

Children of Dust by Ali Eteraz and Pakistan's Drift into Extremism by Hassan Abbas are available from AsiaStore.


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