Monday, June 30, 2008

Peshawar Operation Moves Ahead Swiftly

Pakistan Shells Islamic Militants Near Peshawar
By JANE PERLEZ and PIR ZUBAIR SHAH, New York, June 29, 2008

PESHAWAR, Pakistan — With Islamic militants tightening their grip around Peshawar, kidnapping residents and threatening the city itself, the new coalition government of Pakistan delivered its first military response to the Islamists on Saturday.

The action was limited, with security forces shelling territory outside Peshawar held by an extremist leader. Army forces were not used, and the intent apparently was merely to push the militants back from the city’s perimeter.

But the shelling was the first time the new civilian government, which has been committed to negotiating peace accords with Pakistani Taliban and other Islamic militants, resorted to military action.

In response, the leader of the Pakistani Taliban, Baitullah Mehsud, announced that he had suspended his participation in peace talks.

The Pakistani channel Samma TV reported that Mr. Mehsud had threatened to take the fight against the government to the heart of Pakistan, the provinces of Sindh and Punjab, if military action continued.

In Peshawar, senior military officials said that a regional security force had fired mortar shells against two bases of an Islamic militant known as Mangal Bagh, whose well-armed fighters have taken control over much of Khyber agency adjacent to the city.

“The ultimate objective is to establish the writ of the government where it is challenged,” Mohammed Alam Khattak, inspector general of the Frontier Corps, said at a news conference here.

General Khattak said the operation had been undertaken in response to “growing public demand” for a show of force against militants who have kidnapped city residents on an almost daily basis over the past several weeks and intimidated surrounding towns by shutting down the courts.

The show of force on Saturday, which included a blockade around the area of Bara in the Khyber agency where Mr. Mangal Bagh keeps most of his fighters, was limited to the Frontier Corps, a paramilitary force that is considered poorly equipped and generally demoralized.

The Pakistani Army maintains a large presence in Peshawar at an old British fort that houses the 11th Corps, but for the moment the army was being held in reserve, a spokesman for the military, Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas, said.

The main goal of the operation, according to a senior military officer, was to destroy the bases of Mr. Mangal Bagh in Bara. General Khattak said he expected the operation to be limited and to be completed in five days.

Residents in Sipah, where Mr. Mangal Bagh lives, and in Shalober, the site of one of his bases, said by telephone that his forces had left both places by Friday. Mr. Mangal Bagh returned to his house in Sipah late Friday night and then left at 4 a.m. Saturday, said Rauf Khan Afridi, a resident of the town who was reached by telephone.

Mr. Afridi said that Mr. Mangal Bagh had returned to Bara on Saturday night and announced that he would convene a meeting of his leadership to discuss the situation.

Visitors to Sipah on Friday said there were no armed men in their usual haunts in the marketplace or around the village, a sign that they were expecting the attack from government forces and had fled.

The peace talks between the Pakistani government, which was formed after February elections, and Mr. Mehsud, the Taliban leader, have been criticized by the United States and NATO, on the ground that an accord would grant the Pakistani Taliban time to strengthen their ability to strike at coalition forces across the border in Afghanistan.

The White House was monitoring the situation, but had scant comment. “Extremists pose a threat to Pakistan, Afghanistan and the United States, and we will all continue to go after them when and where necessary” said Gordon D. Johndroe, a spokesman for President Bush’s National Security Council.

One of the most important elements being negotiated by Pakistan’s new government is its call for an end to crossings by Mr. Mehsud’s forces into Afghanistan to fight NATO and American forces. That has not been finally agreed to.

But many elements have already been put into effect. The army has pulled back from positions in Mr. Mehsud’s territory, and both sides have exchanged prisoners. The impact of Mr. Mehsud’s announcement that he was withdrawing from the talks is not clear yet.

The forces of Mr. Mangal Bagh, which were the primary target of Saturday’s attack, are made up of several thousand fighters. Most of them are volunteers, but some have been conscripted.

His group is called Lashkar-i-Islam, the Army of Islam, and has imposed strict moral codes through much of Khyber agency. It has conducted public executions of men labeled as criminals, and in one case a man and a woman were stoned to death after being accused of an illicit relationship.

Mr. Mangal Bagh’s fighting force, built up over the last three years, has been reinforced by another militant leader, Hajji Namdar, who has a more potent force consisting of Uzbek and Arab fighters who specialize in attacking NATO soldiers in Afghanistan. Mr. Namdar’s fighters have been responsible for many of the attacks on NATO supplies that travel past Peshawar and through the Khyber agency.

The boldest strike by Mr. Mangal Bagh in Peshawar came last weekend, when his fighters abducted 16 Christians from a house in a middle-class neighborhood. They were released after extensive negotiations with the police.

Some doubts were expressed on Saturday about the seriousness and intent of the attack by the Frontier Corps.

Afrasiab Khattak, a leader of the Awami National Party, which now governs the North-West Frontier Province, of which Peshawar is the capital, has said he believed that Mr. Mangal Bagh and his men were a creation of Pakistan’s powerful Inter-Services Intelligence agency.

“In the past, these operations have been inconclusive,” Mr. Khattak said. “We will have to wait and see if this one is conclusive.”

Despite the shelling, weekend activity in Peshawar appeared normal. In the upscale neighborhood of Hayatabad, which borders Khyber agency, people strolled in the streets, and an ice cream vendor cycled down a main boulevard selling his wares.

For the sake of the federation By Farahnaz Ispahani

For the sake of the federation
By Farahnaz Ispahani
The News, 6/27/2008

As I sat in the National Assembly through the long and onerous budget session for the first time, I felt that the hours were strenuous and what was expected of us demanding. A huge finance bill needed to be read and understood and the arcane though undoubtedly important systems involved in and surrounding the passing of the bill, had to be learnt.

In the process, however, I also learnt what it means to be a public servant and what it means to be part of the great Federation of Pakistan. Each MNA who spoke in the National Assembly during the budget debate addressed concerns, fears and attitudes that reflected the situation in their home provinces and districts.

The unavailability of electricity, a basic need, has been totally ignored since the last government of Shaheed Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto is tormenting the people of this nation. Scarcity of water – clean, potable and otherwise – is also an issue that affects the lives of everyone, rich or poor. The doubling of world wheat prices, the rising cost of oil, and the fudged budget figures handed down by the previous government left the elected leadership with far less money in the bank then we knew.

The biggest threat to our security and survival – Pakistan's fight against extremists – is also constantly on our minds. "I can't travel back to my home. They'll kill me," my Assembly colleague from FATA confided as we talked in the National Assembly's corridors. Many of my elected colleagues from the ANP, the PPP and from FATA told me that the Taliban are now in a position to threaten Peshawar. Taliban injunctions, attempting to override the writ of the Pakistani state, threaten our constitutional freedoms as much as the legal disputes currently occupying centre-stage. But how much of all this is receiving the priority it deserves on the streets of Islamabad, Lahore or Karachi?

Sadly, very little. At least some of the leading political parties have opted to act as pressure groups on a "single point political agenda," instead of recognising the multiple dimensions of the mandate of a pluralist parliament. The progressively emerging civil society also appears to be losing track of the distinction between its role as definer of issues while allowing Parliament to act as the decider, based on its status as the people's representative. Elements within the newly liberated media appear to have decided to play the role of "campaign manager" on one issue, leaving much of our poor nation's miseries in a haze.

There are too many power centres operating simultaneously in Pakistan today. Their relative weight must be determined through the constitution and democratic traditions, not on the basis of their ability to create a logjam. Should national policy be determined inside Parliament, through the votes of those who collectively received millions of votes, or on the basis of the noise generated by some in the streets and the media? The PPP received around 12 million popular votes while the PML-N got 6.6 million. Other parties received varying degrees of support and representation while some, by virtue of their boycott off elections, got no votes at all. Shouldn't all political actors abide by the dictum of democratic politics, "Let the minority have its say; Let the majority have its way?" Surely the refusal of some to patiently allow political processes to work is not helpful for Pakistan's stability.

The number of interest groups and pressure groups in Pakistan that are vying for increased public and political space in the country is legitimate. In a democratic country it is the legitimate right of differing groups to lobby, act and even protest to make their presence felt. But the dilemma in Pakistan is that the sanctity of institutions is being eroded further. A deliberate process seems to have been initiated to ensure that no institution of the state remains above controversy. Barely five months since the people voted in a general election every institution, from the Parliament to the courts, is being guillotined in public discourse. This is not without design.

In all civilised democracies, the courts and the parliament are considered the final arbiters of all matters judicial and political. The unravelling of Pakistan's institutions started several decades ago but the worst period proved to be the last few years when all civilian institutions were mutilated to such an extent that they stopped functioning. Parliament became a pliant tool and the judiciary a willing partner in the systemic deconstruction of the political structure.

Looking back at the "eight-year long ordeal" of Pakistan, the year 2007 would indeed be remembered for the ultimate in tinkering with institutions and one man's wish to be the messiah of the nation. After Election 2008 it was hoped that political stability would return to Pakistan and resolution of the key issues would be left to the parliament. But the forces unleashed on the streets of Pakistan due to mishandling of critical issues by the establishment, are now refusing to let Parliament exercise its authority and are continuing to push for acceptance of their demands.

The two hot-button issues, it seems, are the speedy (whether legal or not) removal of the incumbent president and the restoration of the first round of PCO judges, which includes Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry. Both might be crucial to Pakistan's long-term interests if pursued constitutionally and through Parliament. Both will harm the fragile fabric of Pakistan even further if done rashly.

Unfortunately, these are not the only issues that confront our nation today. The situation along the Pakistani-Afghan border that has resulted in the loss of precious lives of innocent civilians and fine Army professionals has many serious consequences for our nation. The State's sovereignty and security hangs in the balance. The civil war in Baluchistan is yet to be resolved and the delicate peace in urban Sindh still remains a cause for concern. Sadly, the single issue campaigners remain unwilling to think deeply or to analyse beyond immediate gains in popularity.

A recent opinion poll indicated changing popularity of our political leaders. But few people noticed that while a single issue has raised support for some in one of Pakistan's four provinces, the people in the other three provinces clearly think differently. The preponderance of Punjab in the Pakistani Federation translates into a national jump in support whenever someone gains backing in the province. But unless that support can also be replicated in Sindh, the NWFP/Pukhtoonkhwa and Balochistan, it does not augur well for national unity.

My apprehension is that some of the well meaning individuals and lawyers who are sweating on the streets to pursue the worthy cause of an independent judiciary have somewhere lost their direction and are failing to understand that Pakistan's democracy and federation can be saved by reconciliation, not confrontation. If the name of the game remains "destabilisation" to get more popular and to play to the galleries in the urban centres of the country's largest province, we could end up witnessing the trivialisation of larger challenges facing Pakistan. That would certainly endanger our very national survival.

The writer is a PPP member of the National Assembly.

Sunday, June 29, 2008

How Pakistan and India lost it

How Pakistan and India lost it
By Rahul Singh, Dawn, June 30, 2008


WHICH system is better for economic progress: democracy or dictatorship? In India, except for a brief period of Indira Gandhi’s ‘Emergency’ rule, there has been democracy throughout, a flawed democracy, to be sure, but democracy nevertheless.

Many Indians feel that this democracy has often come in the way of economic growth and that if we had more of the kind of discipline — and the use of the ‘danda’ — that comes with dictatorship, we would have done better.

I don’t agree. Look at countries that, after years of dictatorship and the danda, have turned to democracy: almost all the nations of South America, along with Spain and Portugal, not to forget the Soviet Union. They have all done far better economically under democracy.

More relevant to our region, however, are the ‘Asian Tigers’ — South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Thailand, even Malaysia. Except for brief periods of authoritarian rule, they prospered under democracy, though in Singapore’s case, one man, Lee Kuan Yew, brooked no opposition (yet his people were happy to let him run the city-state as he wanted, and he did a fantastic job, giving them a standard of living that matches the West).

But Pakistan and India interest me more. What provoked this piece is a book the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington, USA — one of the world’s premier think-tanks — has just released.

Edited by Michael Kugelman and Robert Hathaway, and rather clumsily titled Hard Sell: Attaining Pakistani Competitiveness in Global Trade, it contains illuminating papers by some of Pakistan’s leading economists and policy-makers, such as Mirza Qamar Beg, Shahid Javed Burki, Parvez Hasan, Manzoor Ahmad, Shaghil Ahmed and Shahrukh Rafi Khan, as well as senior US officials who interacted with Pakistan, like Douglas Hartwick, Esperanza Gomez Jelalian and Edward Gresser.

Since its independence, Pakistan has had both democratic and military rule, though more of the latter. Yet, both types of regimes made the same blunders, with the Pakistan economy barely moving forward, while its population exploded. Over a quarter of the population remained below the poverty line.

The Bhuttos, father and daughter, as well as Nawaz Sharif, were just as big economic disasters as were dictators like Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan. None of them had a clue on how to make their country progress faster. They were mainly busy holding on to power and fighting rivals, or confronting India; the standard of living of their people be damned.

Indira Gandhi was much the same, obsessed by power and innocent of economics. Both countries followed a policy of nationalising virtually every form of major economic activity except, mercifully, the agricultural sector, while foolishly trying to be ‘self-reliant’ by imposing heavy import duties on every consumer item to protect domestic industry, which as a result became inefficient, producing shoddy goods. The public sector, instead of looking after the public good, became inefficient and corrupt.

International trade, the main vehicle for the remarkable success of the ‘Asian Tigers’, was ignored by India and Pakistan, being considered by them for merely their balance of payments position. A regional trading association like Asean became a powerhouse while Saarc was a non-starter.

The book contains an illuminating table showing that the combined world market share of China and Hong Kong’s manufactured exports in 2005 was over 13 per cent, while that of South Korea was also an impressive 3.5 per cent. And Pakistan’s market share? Only 0.18 per cent! Even India’s was an abysmal 0.95 per cent.

Almost a third of Pakistan’s exports still go to the US and 80 per cent of these exports consist of textiles of one kind or another. Manufactured goods hardly figure at all. This is crazy, lopsided economics.

Shahid Javed Burki shows how in the late 1940s, both India and Pakistan were linked by close economic ties, with half of Pakistan’s exports being bought by India and two-thirds of Pakistan’s imports coming from India. Pakistan supplied food grains to India, since the British had made what is now Pakistan the granary of the subcontinent, by digging canals and bringing virgin lands in Punjab and Sindh under cultivation. Cotton was also successfully grown in this region, feeding the textile mills of Gujarat (India) and Bombay.

It was a symbiotic two-way trade that benefited both nations. Then, in 1949, a colossal mistake was made: trade relations between the two countries were virtually terminated. Both countries were equally to blame, and both suffered, but Pakistan more so.

The Cold War, and the politics that came with it, took over. Economics occupied the back seat. Pakistan veered towards the USA, India moved in the direction of the Soviet Union. A hostile confrontation began, culminating in two wars, 1965 and 1971. Pakistan became obsessed by Kashmir and India, later, by “cross-border terrorism”.

India woke up in 1991, when faced by a foreign exchange crisis and was forced to liberalise its economy. It was fortunate to have a technocrat like Dr Manmohan Singh (now the prime minister) at its economic helm. Since then, India’s GDP has grown by a healthy eight to nine per cent annually. Pakistan’s wake-up call came ten years later and its economy, it was claimed by the government, was growing by around seven per cent a year.

Both nations can do better, provided they give priority to economics over politics. In all fairness it must be admitted that they are finally beginning to do this. Kashmir is no longer such an obsession in Pakistan and there is a realisation in India that the terrorist challenge it faces — Pakistan faces it, too — does not entirely originate from Islamabad. The enemy is also within.

But above all, mutually beneficial trade between the two countries must be opened up and enlarged. As the ‘Asian Tigers’ showed so convincingly, that is the key to economic success.

There is a lesson that India offers. Take just one area: India’s success in information technology (IT) and outsourcing. There is no reason why Pakistan cannot replicate this, as it has, like India, the huge asset of an English-speaking core of educated youngsters.

India’s success was based on the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) and the Indian Institutes of Management (IIMs) that it set up all over the country. When the IT boom took place graduates from these institutes were up and ready to exploit it. India could help Pakistan set up similar institutes.

For too long have Indian and Pakistani leaders looked upon each other with suspicion and hostility, concerned only with maintaining their power. It is time they started looking at the welfare of their people.

The writer is a former editor of The Reader’s Digest and Indian Express.
singh.84@hotmail.com

Military Action in Kyber Agency (FATA)

Editorial: Action in Khyber, reaction in FATA
Editorial, June 30, 2008

Paramilitary forces, whose personnel were freely held for ransom by warlord Mangal Bagh, have gone into the Khyber Agency in the neighbourhood of Peshawar and destroyed the warlord’s house and made his “hundred-thousand strong” army flee from its stronghold. What started three years ago and swelled into a near autonomous state is finally being challenged by the state of Pakistan. It will be adjudged to be a late operation by historians and blame will be apportioned to President Pervez Musharraf during whose watch the problem arose and the civilian rulers of the day who woke up late.

Warlord Mangal Bagh has fled to Tirah, the high altitude valley that Pakistan once proudly called a tribal no-man’s land. He became the ruler of Khyber after killing those who resisted him. He got his income by imposing heavy fines on the local inhabitants for petty neglect of religious pieties and began recruiting his army. The syndrome that surfaced in Khyber is the same as that which appeared in South Waziristan and Swat: intimidation followed by “empowerment” of those abandoned by the state of Pakistan as soldiers and suicide-bombers of “Islam”.

When his “government” became too big for Khyber’s capacity to generate revenues to pay for it, Mangal Bagh descended on Peshawar, cherry-picking rich parties in borderline Hayatabad for extortion, then threatening the rich of Peshawar into paying him big cash. The snowballing of his business of death gave him the charisma he needed. As he killed innocent people in the Agency, people owing allegiance to his “Islamic order” increased by the day in the NWFP and in other parts of the country. He began courting the TV channels when he saw that the rest of Pakistan too was ready for the plucking.

The whole thing was tiresomely old hat. A hundred years ago a water-carrier by the name of Batcha Saqao appeared in Afghanistan, holding aloft the banner of “Islam”, and actually toppled the throne in Kabul to establish his rule there. The only difference today is that in Pakistan, 20 years of jihad, allowed by the state itself, has softened it for adventurists. The sacrifice made by Pakistan for jihad was not spiritual but political: an unwise abdication from its internal sovereignty. The Jihad brought Al Qaeda to Pakistan as the generals foolishly sought “strategic depth” in Afghanistan.

The warlords of the Tribal Areas gain sustenance from the umbrella control of Al Qaeda which can supplement the income of anyone who has exhausted his capacity to live off the retreating authority of the state and the helplessness of the citizens abandoned by the state. According to one Islamabad observer, the who’s who of Al Qaeda surrogates of the state can be listed like this: “South Waziristan now belongs to Baitullah Mehsud; Maulvi Faqir Muhammad controls Bajaur; Mangal Bagh and Haji Namdar rule Khyber; Commander Umar Khalid is the boss of Mohmand”.

How much has the state of Pakistan retreated since 2001 and what is the extent of the terrain the Pakistan army now has to win back? In all, 20,000 square kilometres. We have to leave out Balochistan for now or we will stray from the topic in hand. There are other more lethal “losses” to consider, however. What all these Al Qaeda warlords — who call themselves the Taliban — know may not be a part of our consciousness. But they know that they have conquered the minds of many Pakistanis through their methods of intimidation.

If there is action in Khyber, there is bound to be predictable reaction from Al Qaeda too. This has come from Baitullah Mehsud. He has suspended all peace talks with the army and declared that he will attack Sindh and Punjab. The opposition politicians will cringe. They will have to decide whether to support the government in this action or hang on to the reprieve they won earlier this year by dismissing the war in the Tribal Areas as “not our war” and by focusing on the lawyers’ movement where they even swore to lay down their lives for the sake of “democracy” in Pakistan.

Under the circumstances, the response of different groups of people will be important. Will the politicians and the TV channels disapprove of the military operation and expect that when Baitullah Mehsud strikes in Punjab he will let them off the hook because of their “neutrality”? Will the basis of this disapproval be their interpretation of the operation that the Americans have imposed another war on Pakistan and the PPP government has succumbed to it and is now guilty of killing innocent people? If so, that would be a tragedy of the highest order.

The army knows the pattern from its memory of the Lal Masjid Operation last year. First there is a public demand for “doing something” against a public flouting of state authority, then there is the moral reneging on it, then the operation is made grounds for removing the government in power. The army this time has clearly got a public fiat from the government to launch the operation. If we don’t want Pakistan to go down, we should fully support the operation all the way. *

Saturday, June 28, 2008

Banned militant outfits regroup in Karachi

Banned militant outfits regroup in Karachi
* Groups distributing pamphlets, CDs and leaving graffiti messages across city
By Faraz Khan, Daily Times, June 29, 2008

KARACHI: Banned militant outfits are resurfacing in Karachi and reopening their offices, Daily Times learnt on Saturday.

Some of them have taken on new names. Rival sectarian outfits, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Sipah-e-Mohammad Pakistan (SMP), have reopened their sealed offices and have temporarily changed their names to Ahl-e-Sunnat-Wal Jamat and Shia Ulma Council, respectively. The Tehreek-e-Jafferia Pakistan (TJP) has also changed its name to the Jafferia Student Organisation.

According to reliable sources, the government has, informally, lifted the ban on the organisations and assured them there will be no interference in their activities. Over the past two months, the SSP and its sister organisation, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ), are the only ones to have held major gatherings, in Nagan Chowrangi, Orangi Town, Shah Faisal Colony, Sohrab Goth, Landhi and Qayyumabad. The TJP and SMP have also reopened their offices in Soldier Bazaar, Jaffer Tayyar, Drigh Road and Orangi Town.

The groups are distributing handbills and chalkings on walls across the city. Graffiti has appeared for groups such as Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, Jaish-e-Mohammad and Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami.

The groups have reportedly restarted their activities from mosques in areas where they dominate. They are distributing CDs as well. According to sources, the CD being distributed amongst the Shia community shows the capture and public execution of a Shia Pakistan Army officer by teenage boys in the tribal areas. Rival Shia and Sunni groups have also started distributing CDs of their clashes in Parachinar, revealing the killings, while jihadi and militant groups are circulating videos of the destruction caused by the operation in tribal areas by coalition and Pakistani forces.

Next stop Islamabad?

VIEW: Next stop Islamabad — Zahid Hussain
Daily Times, June 29, 2008

The massacre of 22 rival tribesmen by Baitullah Mehsud’s Taliban fighters in Jandola, close to the Frontier Corps headquarters, and attacks on girls schools in the Swat Valley indicate the impunity with which the militants are operating

Peshawar, capital of the North West Frontier Province, lies besieged by the advancing Taliban who have been steadily wresting legal and territorial controls from a state unable to battle them with resolve. Islamic militants now control the region’s main arteries and can cut off communications at will.

Organised under the banner of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, the militants are now challenging the writ of the state not only in the lawless tribal belt but have also established their parallel rule in large swaths of NWFP’s settled areas.

They are now active in many cities, including Dera Ismail Khan, Nowshera, Mardan, Kohat and the Swat Valley and pose a direct challenge to provincial authorities. In fact, political management of the province, already difficult, will become impossible if large pockets of militancy continue to grow.

The advance has been helped by paralysis in the government and the absence of a comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy. Fragmentation of power has caused a complete breakdown in the decision-making process, resulting in huge confusion.

Early this week Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani approved a plan for a fresh military operation in the tribal and settled areas and authorised the army chief to take a final decision on how and when to take action.

“The chief of army staff will be the principal for application of the military effort,” said an official statement issued after a meeting of top civil and military leaders. In simple words it is left to the military leadership to decide the line of action.

This is an admission of its own ineptitude by the civilian government. It refuses to take ownership of the anti-terrorism policy. It is around three months since the PPP-led coalition government came to power, but it has failed to give a clear policy direction on the issue which presents the most serious threat to Pakistan’s national security — indeed, threatens its very survival. Instead the government is now completely depending on the military to salvage the situation.

What the newly elected civilian leadership has failed to understand is that counter-insurgency is too important an issue to be left entirely to the military. No one can deny the need for complete harmony between the civilian government and the military for countering terrorism effectively. But the leadership has to come from the elected representatives of the people.

Terrorism cannot be defeated by military means alone. The battle has to be fought on political and ideological fronts as well. A major reason for the rise of militancy has been the weakening of the state. There is no cohesion on what terrorism is and how it must be fought even among the four coalition partners. The PPP and the PMLN hold completely divergent views on how to deal with the problem. No one is in charge here.

The administration has been paralysed while the militants are knocking on the doors of Peshawar, just two hours drive from Islamabad. The so-called peace negotiations with the militants in South Waziristan and the accord in Swat have failed to deliver peace.

The massacre of 22 rival tribesmen by Baitullah Mehsud’s Taliban fighters in Jandola, close to the Frontier Corps headquarters, and attacks on girls schools in the Swat Valley indicate the impunity with which the militants are operating. Not that the Taliban are very strong; more accurately it is the collapse of law enforcement that has allowed them the space. Weakened and demoralised law enforcement agencies have emboldened the militants.

The lack of will among the police is obvious. Police stations in the outskirts of Peshawar have long given up night patrolling after the killing of several officers in militant attacks. Some reports suggest senior police officers refused to raid a terrorist hideout in Peshawar’s Hayatabad district a part of which is located in the Khyber tribal agency.

The government’s attempts to cut deals have also played to the Taliban’s advantage. The authorities have been trying to negotiate a controversial agreement with Baitullah Mehsud which is aimed at containing the militants within the region. Last month the provincial government, led by the Awami National Party, signed a peace deal with militants in the Swat Valley — a key battleground for the past 18 months.

Thousands of militants had taken control of the Valley last year, prompting a military operation that eventually drove out the insurgents. They are now back, despite the accord. Under the agreement, the government released dozens of militants captured during the military operation, many of them criminals.

The government claimed that the accord would bring peace to the area, but it appears only to have strengthened the militants. There is little sign the militants will lay down arms, as the deal requires. Many officials are sceptical about the credibility and efficacy of such agreements. They worry that the deals could provide breathing room for the militants to regroup.

Peace deals cannot work until the writ of the government is established. That is not happening. As the militants encircle Peshawar, there is fear that their next stop would be Islamabad.

Zahid Hussain is the Pakistan correspondent for the Times of London, the Wall Street Journal, and Newsweek. He is also the political correspondent for the Karachi-based monthly Newsline and the author of Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam.

Taliban in Peshawar

Taliban bring vigilante law to Peshawar
Daily Times, June 28, 2008

PESHAWAR: The Taliban are no longer at the gates of Peshawar, they’re inside, making their presence felt in the largest city in the NWFP.

Their brazen movement is a chilling demonstration of the political and military failure to resist a militant Islamist tide rolling in from the Pashtun tribal belt on the Afghan border.

“This speaks of a complete lack of control by the government over the situation,” said Mehmood Shah, a former tribal region security chief.

President Pervez Musharraf warned more than two years ago that Talibanisation, the spread of the militants’ puritanical culture, was the greatest threat that Pakistan faced.

These days Taliban fighters do not sneak in to Peshawar. They arrive in broad daylight on the back of pick-up trucks, brandishing automatic weapons, and threatening owners of music stores to close down. “They had long hair and flowing beards, and were carrying Kalashnikovs. They told me to close down the shop or face the consequences,” said Abdul Latif, a clean-shaven 20-year-old, whose video store received a visit from the vigilantes last week. “I asked police for help but they said they are helpless,” he said.

Even Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam chief Fazlur Rehman, a member of the ruling coalition known for his past support for the Taliban and opposition to Pakistan’s alliance with the US, has rung alarm bells.

“It’s just a matter of months before news comes that the entire NWFP has slipped out of control,” Fazl warned parliament. Officials said they (law enforcement agencies) were getting ready to go on the offensive within weeks to free Peshawar from the creeping insurgency, and an anti-terrorist force of 7,000 men had been raised.

“If we don’t take timely action, we will be facing a much bigger problem,” said Malik Naveed Khan, provincial police chief, whose cousin was killed by a suicide bomber two years ago. reuters

Also See:
‘Taliban killing 30 Shias a day’ - DT

Friday, June 27, 2008

The U.S. - India Nuclear Deal

Can India Say Yes?
New Delhi comes to a crossroads over nuclear cooperation with the United States.
Washington Post, June 25, 2008; A12

INDIA IS clearly destined for a greater role on the world stage, and there are sound reasons to hope that it will increasingly find itself in sync with the United States as its influence grows. India, a culturally diverse and economically booming democracy of more than 1 billion people, and America share political values and strategic priorities -- such as blunting Chinese military power and resisting Islamist terrorism. These considerations led the Bush administration to pursue a "strategic partnership," the heart of which is a far-reaching nuclear cooperation agreement. It would permit a resumption of U.S. sales of nuclear fuel and technology to India for nonmilitary uses, despite India's development of nuclear weapons outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Why, then, is India balking at the deal, the final contours of which were settled almost a year ago? If anything, the accord is stacked in India's favor. It allows India not only to buy uranium and nuclear reactors from the United States but also to reprocess spent atomic fuel at a new facility, under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) supervision to prevent its diversion into weapons programs. The United States committed itself to helping India accumulate a nuclear fuel stockpile, thus insulating New Delhi against a U.S. law that provides for a supply cutoff in the event that India conducts a nuclear test. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, understanding both the boost in international prestige the arrangement would give India and the reduction in carbon emissions that his country could achieve from using more nuclear energy, has all but staked his government on implementation.

The problem is that India's old-style domestic politics lags behind its new international opportunities. Mr. Singh's own Congress Party is not firmly united behind the nuclear deal, and his junior coalition partner, the Communists, are dead-set against it -- because they see it as a sellout of the country's traditionally independent foreign policy. India must first seek approval from the IAEA's board of governors and then from the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group -- and then the U.S. Congress would have to sign off, probably not without some criticism of India's energy cooperation with Iran. If the Communists quit, Mr. Singh's government will fall, and his Congress Party would have to face voters with inflation at a 13-year high.

Mr. Singh's party and the Communists are scheduled to meet today for one last round of negotiation. Prospects for agreement are bleak. And there might not be time to get the accord through this U.S. Congress, even if the Communists unexpectedly back down -- or if Mr. Singh decides that sticking to the deal is worth the risks of a new election, as some recent reports from New Delhi suggest he will. The good news here is that India is indeed a vibrant democracy, where the people's elected representatives across the spectrum have a right to be heard and to influence policy. But if New Delhi's politicians cannot find a way to say yes to such a clearly advantageous agreement with a natural ally, the next U.S. administration no doubt will think twice before trying anything like it.

There Are Two Pakistans

There Are Two Pakistans
Haider Ali Hussein Mullick
June 25, 2008, The Washington Post (PostGlobal)

Uniting Pakistan the military state and Pakistan the nascent democracy is our generation's calling.

There are two Pakistans. The first is stuck in an illusion of undisturbed national stability and unity through military management; the second stands on the weak shoulders of a nascent democracy, perpetually insecure and sporadically functional.

For more than sixty years, Pakistan has struggled with its split personality, brought about by its military or political parties. Historically the United States has preferred the first Pakistan – managed by the military and governed by the free market. The challenge for today's generals and politicians is to find a way to merge, secure, and present the country in a way that attracts the better of the two Pakistans, and preserves U.S. support in the war on terror.

Today, more than any other time in the nation's history, Pakistan needs ideological and political harmony. But socialist demagoguery or Islamist idealism will no longer suffice. Pakistan's Pandora's Box has exploded, letting loose new and old forces questioning the very heart of the country's raison d'ĆŖtre. The elusive quest for constitutional justice lead by idealistic lawyers and savvy politicians has locked horns with the military. Equally important is the surge in energy and food prices, and domestic and regional terrorism. Still, there is more. Millions of ordinary Pakistanis, empowered by a recalcitrant media and rapid globalization, refuse to buy the stories of the generals and the politicians. From picket lines to flour lines, Pakistanis are asking for a new Pakistan – one country under law, dignity, and prosperity.

But before a new and united Pakistan can emerge, the dichotomy of the two existing Pakistans must be resolved.

Regional and international economic and security concerns have greatly influenced Pakistani domestic politics. Defining and redefining the idea of Pakistan, and its future course, however, has always been the prerogative of domestic forces, notably the generals and the politicians. They have managed and governed the two Pakistans.

The generals come to power during times of economic doom and national (real or perceived) insecurity – for example, in 1999 former general and present President Musharraf ousted former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, in the wake of national bankruptcy and U.S. sanctions against Pakistan's nuclear tests. They take over and promise to 'clean house,' psychologically teleporting Pakistanis to the Day of Independence to watch the generals rewrite the idea of Pakistan.

All four military rulers have sold the idea of Pakistan as a country backed by the United States, militarily strong, economically viable, ideologically coherent, and diplomatically dependable. That's usually Plan A. Plan B – in times of U.S.-Pakistan friction – is Chinese and Saudi support. These plans are usually sold to ordinary Pakistanis as a clear alternative to incompetent, weak, corrupt, and bickering politicians. Regional national security imperatives, such as favorably shaping Afghan politics and keeping India bogged down in Kashmir, require sugar coating. That's where all-purpose political Islam comes into play. Generals believe that supporting an Islamist ideology defined by a puritanical, anti-Western xenophobia yields benefits that outweigh the costs. A multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, and multi-sectarian country needs a simple unifier, and while religion doesn't mix well with politics, the generals have always believed that they can control it.

In the short run, most ordinary Pakistanis fall for the promise of total transformation: a land of hope with no sign of past corruption, all the glory and promise of a strong nation state, and the will to fight poverty at home and promote its national interest abroad. But that presents one major problem: Big promises yield short term economic growth but not long term political or judicial stability. Within a decade, wealth disparity, political agitation, and military fatigue pushes the generals out.

Civilians usually come to power in times of national crisis, when millions are crying foul over broken promises. There is tremendous hope but little patience. Depending on the severity of socioeconomic strife, the politicians may have a few months to deliver relief to the masses. If they fail – and most of them do – the voters get angry and the democratic opposition begins to discredit the government. At first the opposition exerts political pressure through national and provincial parliaments. Then there is talk of the 'no confidence vote' – two-thirds of the national parliamentarians can vote out the prime minister. If all else fails, the opposition lobbies for the presidential and military support to oust the government. Depending on their agenda, the intelligence services usually play the role of a catalyst; they abet the rise or fall of a political party.

The military sits back or watches – and sometimes facilitates – the politicians' failure. When the economy completely tanks, the military scolds the prime minister. That usually doesn't work. Then the military advises the president to dissolve the parliament, and if the president refuses or is incapable, the military unilaterally removes the prime minister. A few years later, the generals fail to keep the lid on political dissent, and millions of Pakistanis are back to square one.

The new civilian government and the military leadership can choose a similar path – or, for the first time, they can genuinely support constitutional democracy. Only then can the country overcome its plethora of socioeconomic and security problems. Acting alone, the two Pakistans are self-destructive. Bringing them together, pragmatically and constitutionally, is the calling of our generation.

Haider Ali Hussein Mullick is an independent policy analyst, and an Adjunct Fellow at Spearhead Research, Lahore, Pakistan. He can be reached at haider.mullick@gmail.com

Pakistan Through the Lens of Iraq

Pakistan Through the Lens of Iraq
June 20, 2008
Marvin G. Weinbaum and Edward P. Joseph

This Commentary first appeared in The Daily Star in collaboration with Search for Common Ground on June 03, 2008

"There is no military solution in Iraq, only a political one." General David Petraeus's aphorism is about the only thing on which war proponents and opponents agree. The question is why so few American policy makers hold the same view about Pakistan.

As Pakistan's recently elected government negotiates a ceasefire with militants, Washington worries – with good reason – that the deal will simply give Pakistan's Taliban and their allies a free hand to launch attacks in neighbouring Afghanistan or plan the next 9/11-type attack on the United States. As General Petraeus takes over Central Command, which has military responsibility for 27 countries in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia, America's options in Pakistan become much clearer when examined through the lens of the US experience in Iraq.


Like Iraq, Pakistan is undergoing tumultuous political change. In both countries' elections, Pakistani and Iraqi voters had to brave the threat of suicide bombings. But unlike Iraqis, Pakistanis did not go to the polls to advance sectarian or ethnic advantage, but to express a collective demand for democratic rule.


Across sectors, classes and ethnicities, Pakistanis swept President Pervez Musharraf's party out of power along with religious parties in the North West Frontier Province. In a stroke, Muslim voters in Pakistan rejected both extremism and the military means employed to fight it. Even as Pakistanis themselves, like Benazir Bhutto, fell victim to terrorists, opposition to the military campaign was universal.


The widespread perception was that US President George W. Bush's "war against terror" in Pakistan was ineffective, produced too many civilian casualties, and served to enrich and empower the military establishment. In the end, many Pakistanis concluded that it was America's fight, not theirs.


No one more than Petraeus appreciates the importance of a stable government able to win popular support for a counter-insurgency. But unlike in Iraq, the challenge facing the new government in Islamabad is not only to gain the confidence of the population in regions where terrorists operate, but to convince an entire country that counter-insurgency initiatives are necessary.


That task could now become more difficult with the fraying of Pakistan's Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani's coalition government as they work to reinstate the Supreme Court Justices. Political jockeying, unresolved constitutional issues – including the question of Musharraf's future – and a looming economic crisis already compete with the extremist threat for urgent attention.


The United States may soon lose patience with a democratic government less pliable than its predecessor and look again for a strong military hand to satisfy their concerns about al Qaeda and insurgency in Afghanistan. This would be a serious mistake. As in Iraq, the United States must shift its thinking to fully embrace democratic government as the foundation of any strategy for thwarting extremism and terrorism.


A clear lesson from Iraq is to separate motivation and capability. In Iraq, the tide began to turn not with the surge, but with "the Awakening" of Sunni tribesmen willing to cooperate with the United States in the fight against al Qaeda. In Pakistan, the motivational challenge is far more complex.


A secular Pashtun party is leading the effort to cultivate tribal leaders to adopt a pro-government stance in exchange for development and political reforms. Unlike in Iraq's al Anbar province, tribal leaders in Pakistan's border areas are not acting out of their own volition to fight an enemy, but simply being asked to stand down after bruising the country's military.


Given both tribal sympathies towards the Taliban – and fear of their ruthless tactics – it is doubtful whether development and political reforms will be incentives enough.


Like its Iraqi counterpart, the Pakistani army is severely limited in its capacity to wage counter-insurgency. But there is a major difference: it is far less clear in Pakistan who the military sees as its "enemy".

While its army's main intelligence apparatus, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), often cooperates with US intelligence, the ISI retains its ties with the Afghan Taliban and other anti-Kabul armed groups. These groups find sanctuary in Pakistan's border areas where they are viewed as strategic assets, despite their collaboration with al-Qaeda and Pakistan's tribal militants.


Sensing international fatigue at the flagging endeavour in Afghanistan, Islamabad eyes these militant groups, together with Pakistan's own patronised extremist organisations, as a "reserve force", providing Pakistan with a sphere of influence over its neighbour. In short, the Pakistani army wants little more than a military disengagement from tribal militias. With a part of the Pakistani security apparatus deeply intertwined with the Taliban and other militants linked to the wider network of terrorists, greater civilian rule that brings transparency and control over the intelligence services should be welcomed, not feared.


Accommodating Pakistan's tumultuous changes is among the greatest foreign policy challenges of the day. General Petraeus's new appointment is the occasion to look at Pakistan through the lens of Iraq. Instead of recoiling in anxiety, the way forward is to embrace Pakistan's democratic development and use it to advance American's urgent security goals.

Marvin G. Weinbaum is scholar-in-residence at the Middle East Institute and a former State Department analyst for Pakistan. Edward P. Joseph is a visiting fellow at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

Leadership Void Seen in Pakistan

Leadership Void Seen in Pakistan
By CARLOTTA GALL, New York Times, June 24, 2008

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — Pakistan is in a leaderless drift four months after elections, according to Western diplomats and military officials, Pakistani politicians and Afghan officials who are increasingly worried that no one is really in charge.

The sense of drift is the subject of almost every columnist in the English-language press in Pakistan, and anxiety over the lack of leadership and the weakness of the civilian government now infuses conversations with analysts, diplomats and Pakistani government officials.

The problem is most acute, they say, when it comes to dealing with militants in the tribal areas that have become home to the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

Although the political parties and the military all seek a breather from the suicide bombings and nascent insurgency that have roiled Pakistan in recent years, there are fundamental disagreements over the problem of militancy that they have not begun to address, Pakistani politicians and Western diplomats say.

The confusion is allowing the militants to consolidate their sanctuaries while spreading their tentacles all along the border area, military officials and diplomats warn. It has also complicated policy for the Bush administration, which leaned heavily on one man, President Pervez Musharraf , to streamline its antiterrorism efforts in Pakistan.

If anyone is in charge of security policy in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, Pakistani politicians and Western diplomats say, that remains the military and the country's premier intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence , or ISI, which operate with little real oversight.

While the newly elected civilian government has been criticized for dealing with the militants, it is the military that is brokering cease-fires and prisoner exchanges with minimum consultation with the government, politicians from the government coalition, diplomats and analysts said.

Politicians in both the provincial and central governments complain they are excluded from the negotiations and did not even know of a secret deal struck in February, before the elections.

"You see a lack of a coordinated strategy between the federal level and provincial level, and that includes the ISI and the military, who are clear players," said one Western diplomat with knowledge of the tribal regions, who spoke only on the condition of anonymity. "You see it even on principles of negotiation and combined strategy."

One newspaper, the weekly Friday Times, satirized the situation with a front-page cartoon showing the country's main political players riding in a plane, all issuing different instructions.

Since coming to power in February, the fragile coalition government, run by Benazir Bhutto 's widower, Asif Ali Zardari , leader of the Pakistan Peoples Party, has been engrossed in internal wrangling over removing President Musharraf.

The coalition is barely functioning after half its ministers left the cabinet in May in a dispute over whether to reinstate 60 high court judges dismissed by Mr. Musharraf last year.

For now it is just accepting the military's decisions regarding the militants, said Talat Masood, a retired Pakistani general who is now a political analyst. He characterized the country as suffering from "institutional paralysis and a dysfunctional government, signs of which are showing already."

The American commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan, Gen. Dan K. McNeill, also described the government as "dysfunctional" just before leaving his post earlier this month.

"I have a feeling that no one is in charge and that is why the militants are taking advantage," Mr. Masood said. "It is a very dangerous situation because what is happening is the Afghan government is getting desperate."

The frustration is such that President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan threatened this month to send troops into Pakistan to pursue Pakistani militant leaders.

That Pakistan's government appears broken is not surprising, analysts say. Pakistan's civilian institutions were atrophied by eight years of military rule, and the country's major political parties were left rudderless by the absence of their leaders, who lived in exile much of that time. The assassination of Ms. Bhutto in December left her party in even deeper disarray.

The military remains the country's strongest institution, having ruled Pakistan for about half of the country's 61 years of independence. But it is proving to be an increasingly fickle and prickly partner for Washington. United States and NATO officials are still struggling to decipher the intentions of the army's new chief of staff, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani.

Last fall, at the time of his appointment, American officials spoke approvingly of General Kayani, who seemed well aware of the threat the militants posed to Pakistan, and of the dangers of peace deals that have allowed the militants to tighten their grip in the tribal areas.

But despite at least $12 billion in aid to Pakistan from Washington for the fight against the militants since 2001, General Kayani has recently shown a reluctance to use the military for counterinsurgency operations, suggesting that the task be left to the much weaker tribal force, the Frontier Corps. He has encouraged the civilian government to take the lead.

Part of the confusion stems from the shift in power from military rule, after President Musharraf stepped down as head of the army in December, to the new civilian government, one Western military official said. "Kayani is being careful not to get too far out in front and is trying to determine who is in charge," he said. "We all are."

The uneasy balance between civilian and military authority was demonstrated this month when the finance minister, Naveed Qamar, revealed details of the defense budget to Parliament for the first time in 40 years. While Mr. Qamar called it a "historic moment," the document was a mere two pages.

Parliament, tied up with budget negotiations until next month, has not discussed security or militancy. "We do understand this is the biggest issue, and after the budget session it will have to be addressed," said Farah Ispahani, a Pakistan Peoples Party legislator.

Meanwhile, the military under General Kayani has quietly pursued its own policies, politicians from the government coalition, diplomats and analysts say. The military and ISI negotiated a little-known truce with the tribes and militants of North Waziristan just days before the Feb. 18 elections, a senior government official in Peshawar confirmed.

The deal was so secretive that few in the government know its contents even today. "The civilian government is in the back seat, or not even in the back seat," said the Western diplomat, who did not want to be identified because of the critical nature of the remarks. The military also began negotiations with the most powerful of the Taliban commanders, Baitullah Mehsud , in January, just weeks after the government accused him of masterminding Ms. Bhutto's assassination.

An official agreement with the Mehsud tribe has not been completed, but the military has already pulled back from some positions, put in place a cease-fire and exchanged prisoners with the militants.

Western officials are suspicious of the deal. Mr. Mehsud is accused of dispatching scores of suicide bombers in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but the agreement initially included no prohibition on cross-border attacks.

Only after strong pressure from the United States and other allies did the military insert such a clause this month, according to a senior official close to the negotiations. In the meantime, cross-border attacks increased by 50 percent in May, NATO officials in Afghanistan say.

The provincial government in the North-West Frontier Province has also expressed its reservations about the deal. Officials from the Awami National Party, a Pashtun nationalist party that leads the government in the province and which is also part of the national coalition, complained that they have not been included in the military's decisions.

"Our main demand is that we should be included in negotiations," said Wajid Ali Khan, a party official. "We don't know with whom they are talking."

Moreover, the central government's point man for counterterrorism, the acting interior minister, Rehman Malik, has appeared to have an uneven grasp of developments.

This month he announced in Parliament that the peace deal with militants in the Swat Valley, just outside the tribal areas, had been scrapped. But he retracted the statement the next day, after the provincial government insisted the deal was still on.

Officials of the Awami National Party have complained that his comments undermined their negotiating position. Afrasiab Khattak, a senior official of the party, and other party officials are confident they can make the peace deals in their province work. But few believe that the deals brokered by the military in the tribal regions will last more than a few months, including military officials themselves, senior government officials in Peshawar say.

More fighting and violence is almost certainly on the horizon. What the plan will be then, no one seems to know.

FATA, Taliban and the Future of Pakistan?

Are the woods approaching?
By Palvasha von Hassell, Dawn, June 27, 2008

IN Shakespeare’s play, a desperate Macbeth is reassured by the three witches that the likelihood of his losing power is as high as that of a forest some distance away moving to the castle gates. Reassured by this, Macbeth feels secure until the day of his downfall, when his incredulous eyes witness the said forest making steady and unrelenting progress towards him. It is enemy soldiers, camouflaged by the branches of trees.

Similarly, until some months ago no one in Pakistan would have seriously believed that certain areas of the country could possibly be in danger from Pakistan’s Taliban elements. True, the Jamia Hafsa stand-off in Islamabad and bombings in Lahore and Rawalpindi were alarming examples of disruptions the militants were capable of in areas hitherto regarded as beyond their reach. But what is currently happening in the NWFP raises nothing less than the chilly prospect of fanatics from tribal areas taking control of Peshawar.

Let’s be clear about one thing: whereas Macbeth is a moral play about a power-hungry murderer and disrupter of law and order who is defeated by the forces of good and all else that is orderly in society, people who threaten to overrun Pakistan are forces of ignorance and regression. As I write, they have set fire to eight girls’ school in Swat. They must be resisted at all costs.

Although the Taliban movement would, in all likelihood, have caused Pakistan tremendous problems at some stage or another, the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 served as a major catalyst. Who knows, Osama may indeed have been handed over to an Arab country, with Washington in negotiations about him. And had the blunder of Iraq been avoided, Al Qaeda would have lost support anyway.

Would the Taliban have survived perpetual international isolation? My guess is, not. But of course, many interests of important people would not have been served that way. The way to hell, it just occurred to me, is paved not with good intentions but with evil ones, as it should be. So all this did happen, as we do not need to be told, and Pakistan is bearing the brunt of it. For where were the Taliban to go when bombed, if not to the tribal areas?

Don’t forget, Washington had it all figured out: their ally Gen Musharraf would put paid to them on the other side of the border, as this was Pakistani territory after all. After having threatened to “bomb Pakistan back to the Stone Age”, they were allegedly paying him large sums of money to do the job so they could get on with business in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

What was left entirely out of the equation was that the tribal areas had always for a number of reasons been largely beyond the writ of the Pakistani state; to expect them to suddenly be brought under unprecedented military control under the newly created situation in Afghanistan was seriously delusional. To compound the mistake, and while all of us were still recovering from the shock of the illegal and mendacious attack on Afghanistan, Iraq was invaded.

As a result, Taliban and Al Qaeda had a field day. Greatly strengthened, they decided to respond to Musharraf’s ineffectual pounding by declaring a war on the Pakistani state, which has since had to negotiate from a position of weakness with ruthless elements that have decimated traditional tribal leadership.

The situation today is that we have a democratically elected government that is dealing with a number of problems such as the judges issue and a food crisis. There is chaos to some degree, which the militants are taking advantage of. They sign agreements one day, and burn schools the next. Pakistan is vulnerable at this stage, and it is time for all political and societal forces to show a resolute front to those trying to blackmail the country.

While it is inadvisable to take military action in the tribal areas and Swat at Washington’s behest, as that would be counter-productive, Pakistan must meet the militant threat by mobilising political forces. There is no alternative to Fata becoming a part of the Frontier province and thus being brought into the political mainstream. Socio-economic uplift is all very well, but it is a long process. Pakistan needs an urgent solution.

The question is, considering the demographic changes that have taken place in the years since 2001, how strong is the support in the tribal areas for fusion with Pakistan? An even more vexed question that will have to be settled is: is Afghanistan willing to recognise the border with Pakistan? What about tribes with members on both sides of the border? These are the questions Pakistan has put of for a long time. Now it has to find answers in a hurry. It is a daunting task, but must be undertaken.

Chances of success are fair in the short run if, firstly, priority is given to the threat from extremists. Second, if foreign interference is kept to a minimum. Third, political parties are allowed to operate in Fata — not to forget, an ANP-supported candidate won in Bajaur last year. This would, to some extent, dilute the necessity of Washington dealing with the Pakistani president because he appoints the provincial governors, who appoint the PA in charge of the tribal areas. Then, the writ of the state is extended to Fata and Swat, which means no Sharia law and lastly, terrorist activities are severely dealt with. A recent poll has shown that support is seriously declining worldwide for such activities.

Sounds unlikely? That’s what people said about the Berlin wall coming down, but it happened because there was a will to make it happen. Those who witnessed and suffered the horrors of Partition didn’t do it for the sake of a Pakistan ruled by fanatics. No, the woods that are approaching won’t provide shade. They will darken the skies until no light can be seen.

The writer is a Cambridge-educated analyst based in Hamburg: p_v_hassell@t-online.de

Justice for Our Justice

Justice For Our Justice
The whole of Pakistan, a nation known for its violent differences, came together to push for a single lesson.
Aitzaz Ahsan, NEWSWEEK, Jun 21, 2008

In mid-June, a young Pakistani student was called on to accept an achievement award by Anne Patterson, the U.S. ambassador in Islamabad. When Samad Khurram strode onto the stage, however, he announced to Pakistan's gathered elite that he could not, in good conscience, accept an award from a government that's remained silent in the face of President Pervez Musharraf's suppression of Pakistan's judiciary. Bowing his head slightly, Khurram then walked off the dais and sat down.

The young man is no radical. Khurram is a polite Harvard undergraduate who looks up to Martin Luther King Jr., not Mullah Omar. He professes a deep fondness for America: not the imperial power that backs Third World dictators, but the nation of laws that he's discovered during his stay in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Khurram's fault, if any, is that he desires the same for Pakistan—a dangerous position to take in his troubled homeland.

Yet his stand is becoming increasingly common. Days before his recent show of bravery, I joined him and a few hundred thousand believers in Pakistan's Constitution outside Parliament in Islamabad. We had gathered for an act of collective and nonviolent defiance perhaps unrivaled in Pakistan's checkered history.

The crowd, which had been invited to assemble by Pakistan's Lawyers' Movement (which I lead), included young girls in jeans and T-shirts, elderly women in veils, students, housewives with their husbands and elderly pensioners with their grandchildren. All had converged on the country's capital to push a seemingly esoteric issue but a critical cause: the restoration of Pakistan's Supreme Court judges.

Those jurists had been ousted by Musharraf on November 3, 2007, after the president, fearing that they'd rule against him on a challenge to his right to run for re-election while in uniform, had declared de facto martial law and thrown the judges out of office.

Pakistan's lawyers quickly took to the streets in protest, but were bludgeoned and bloodied; thousands were detained. I myself was kept first in solitary confinement and then under house arrest for nearly four months. My wife was forced to go into hiding. The chief justice, Iftikhar Chaudhry, and the other independent judges were detained, along with their children.

Thinking he'd strengthened his hand, Musharraf then held general elections—which his party lost. A new coalition government was formed, which promised to swiftly reinstate the judges.

Then the backsliding started. Prodded by America to retain Musharraf, the government complied and did nothing to restore the judiciary. Promises were made, but one deadline after another slipped by.

After two months, we lawyers returned to the streets, calling for a long march toward Parliament. Starting on June 9, marchers from all parts of the country, including Khurram and I, began to converge in Islamabad. Gazing over the sea of humanity in the early-morning hours of Saturday, June 14, I felt that virtually the whole of Pakistan—a nation distinguished more by its violent differences than its commonalities—had come together on a single issue: justice for the chief justice.

This was not a stereotypical mob baying for any brutish form of recourse. It was, instead, a gathering simply demanding fairness under the law. Though few of the non-lawyers in the crowd could have recited the concepts by name, the assembled citizens were taking a stand for basic principles like habeas corpus, the ideas of the Magna Carta (which proclaims the supremacy of law) and the spirit of the U.S. Bill of Rights—all of which have been squashed by Musharraf. Above all, however, they were there to support the kind of judges, like Chaudhry, who treat these concepts not as mere words but as a solemn compact between the state and its citizens.

As the first rays of the Saturday sun streaked over Parliament, I delivered the concluding speech, and this remarkable crowd, the biggest in Pakistan's recent history, dispersed peacefully for the trip home. Not a shot was fired or a pane of glass broken. Yet more than 200,000 Pakistanis had managed to make their point: they wanted their judges back.

Yet as I walked off stage I found myself wondering if the governing coalition, the general or his backers in America had been listening. Unfortunately, the signs aren't promising. A few days later at the award ceremony for Khurram, the U.S. ambassador blithely ignored his brave call for justice. Khurram himself is now in the protective custody of his terrified parents. They fear that Pakistan's notorious intelligence agencies, known for their propensity for making inconvenient people disappear, could move against him.

This very tendency was one more thing that had landed Pakistan's chief justice in trouble—he had repeatedly demanded due process and habeas corpus for all prisoners, even those picked up by the military.

For Khurram's sake, and that of every other Pakistani, we need our chief justice back now.

US plans to triple non-security aid to Pakistan

US plans to triple non-security aid to Pakistan in new strategy
AFP, June 26, 2008

WASHINGTON (AFP) — The United States is considering a new aid strategy for Pakistan that will triple unconditional non-security aid to 1.5 billion dollars annually but tie security funding to counterrorism performance, lawmakers said.

In coming weeks, bipartisan legislation will be introduced in the US Senate laying the foundation for the new approach, senior Democratic Senator Joseph Biden said Wednesday.

Biden, who chaired a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the new strategy, proposed that the central elements of the new plan include tripling non-security aid to 1.5 billion dollars annually over a 10-year period.

"A significant increase in non-security aid, guaranteed for a long period, would help persuade the Pakistani populace that America is not a fair-weather friend but an all-weather friend; it would also help persuade Pakistan's leaders that America is a reliable ally," he said.

But Biden, in a controversial move, also wanted US security aid -- around one billion dollars annually at present -- to be tied to results.

This, he said, would "push the Pakistani military to finally crush" the Al-Qaeda and Taliban militant groups believed based along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

"It's not clear we're getting our money's worth. We should be willing to spend more if we get better returns -- and less if we don't," he said.

Biden said that the US-Pakistan relationship was in "desperate need of a serious overhaul" and that the status quo is "unsustainable."

The United States provided Pakistan more than 10.5 billion dollars for military, economic, and development activities in the 2002-2007 period.

Ranking Republican Senator Richard Lugar said Biden's proposal for dramatic adjustments to US foreign assistance to Pakistan had given the committee "an important model for discussion.

"We should carefully reconsider both the amounts that we are providing and the goals we are hoping to achieve in Pakistan," Lugar said.

President George W. Bush's administration has given general support to the plan.

"While we do not agree on every point in the current version of the proposed legislation, we welcome this initiative and feel strongly that a new, bipartisan commitment to partnership with Pakistan is crucial," said Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher.

"We look forward to working closely with this committee to see this initiative through," he said.

The elements of Biden's plan "are vital but they may be reconfigured in the final legislation," one congressional aide said.

The Pentagon cautioned that any strategy change in military aid should not come at the expense of Pakistan's legitimate defense needs, opposing any "conditional language" on security assistance.

"Doing so undermines the trust relationship with Pakistan at a time when it is most critical," cautioned Mitchell Shivers, the principal deputy assistant secretary of defense.

But Biden said the performance of the Pakistan military has been mixed.

"We've caught more terrorists in Pakistan than in any other country but Pakistan remains the central base of Al-Qaeda operations."

The Government Accountability Office (GAO), an independent US government watchdog, had called for a coherent plan to stem any terrorist threat coming from Pakistan.

It particularly referred to the vast, impoverished, mountainous and unpoliced Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), seen as a key sanctuary for top terrorists who masterminded the Sept 11, 2001 attacks.

Wendy Chamberlin, president of the Washington-based Middle East Institute, said any legislation tying security aid to performance would not be easy.

"Historically, Pakistan viewed conditioned aid as a colonial practice that belittles the recipient," she said.

Thursday, June 26, 2008

Army Will Lead the Counter-terrorism Efforts in Pakistan

COAS to call the shots in military action
The News, June 26, 2008
PM chairs high-level meeting; decides to stop hostile movement across border
By Asim Yasin

ISLAMABAD: In a major development on Wednesday, Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani gave his approval to a multi-pronged strategy to fight the menace of terrorism and extremism with the main thrust to counter this challenge by engaging the people through their elected representatives, tribal elders and local influential people.

However, the meeting decided that the Army chief will have the authority to determine the quantum, composition and positioning of the military effort. While the chief of the Army staff would supervise the application of the military, the Frontier Corps and the law enforcement agencies, the instruments of the governor and the chief minister in their respective jurisdictions for law and order, will fall under the command of the COAS for operations.

It also decided that focus will be to initiate swift operations based on actionable intelligence to eliminate terrorists and to stop hostile movement across the border for operations against the coalition forces in Afghanistan.

The PM nominated the governor NWFP as the chief coordinator for liaison with the federal government, the provincial government, important political leaders and the local military commanders.

The prime minister chaired a high-level meeting here at the PM House in which top military and civilian officials briefed him on the progress on the war on terror and the law and order situation in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (Fata).

The meeting was attended by the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the DG ISI, NWFP Governor Owais Ahmed Ghani, NWFP Chief Minister Amir Haider Khan Hoti, Foreign Minister Makhdoom Shah Mehmood Qureshi, Minister for Environment Hameedullah Jan Afridi, Minister for States and Frontier Regions Najmuddin Khan, Adviser to PM on National Security Mehmood Ali Durrani and Adviser to PM on Interior Rehman Malik.

The meeting focused on improving the law and order situation and establishing the writ of the government. The strategy of the Army operation, talks and other options for tackling across the border actions were also deliberated upon.

The meeting decided that Pakistan would not allow its territory to be used against other countries, especially Afghanistan, and under no circumstances would foreign troops be allowed to operate inside Pakistan.

The meeting decided that the governor, in consultation with the federal and provincial governments, would be responsible for planning, execution and coordination of a well-thought-out and comprehensive development plan for Fata.

All agreements with the tribes in Fata will be backed by a robust enforcement mechanism. It was decided that in case of non-compliance and violation of the agreement, the government would reserve the right to use force.

The meeting decided that the NWFP governor will also undertake all reconciliatory efforts, making sure that political agreements made with the tribes were based on mutual respect and trust drawing strength from the Riwaj (customs), expulsion of foreign fighters will be the responsibility of tribes and they will be held accountable for the presence as well as actions of all foreign fighters.

The tribes will also be responsible for stopping cross-border movement for militancy from their areas. However, this will require intimate coordination between the political and the military/security prongs of the effort.

It was decided that the tribes would not fight or target the Army, the Frontier Crops and other law enforcement agencies in their areas. They will be made to understand that the use of force by the military will be justified if the tribes acted contrary to their obligations.

The chief of the Army staff will supervise the application of the military effort. Although, the Frontier Corps and the law enforcement agencies will be the instruments of the governor and the chief minister in their respective jurisdictions for law and order, yet they will fall under the command of the COAS for military operations.

It was agreed that the Army chief will have the authority to determine the quantum, composition and positioning of the military effort. It was agreed that the principle of use of minimum force and avoidance of collateral damage would be kept in focus. The focus will be to initiate swift operations based on actionable intelligence to eliminate terrorists and to stop hostile movement across the border for operations against the coalition forces in Afghanistan, decide on the level of liaison, contact and cooperation with ISAF in Afghanistan and keep the government appropriately informed and keep the prime minister, the NWFP governor, defence minister and adviser interior informed about the operations.

It was also agreed that in addition to the political instrument, large-scale development, economic empowerment and selective use of military force would be the other prongs of the strategy.

It was decided that the broad objective of this strategy would be to bring about peace, reconciliation and normalcy in the country and to marginalise the hardcore terrorists, militants and criminal elements so that Pakistan’s national interest reigned supreme.

The meeting decided to ensure that the local tribal customs, traditions and Rivaj were respected by all representatives of the government, including the military and the law enforcement agencies, and to ensure that all foreign fighters were expelled from Pakistan’s territory.

Monday, June 23, 2008

Crisis in Pakistan-US relations

Crisis in Pakistan-US relations
The News, June 23, 2008
Khalid Aziz

A few days ago I had the opportunity to present a paper, “FATA: internal security and Pakistan’s international obligations,” to a conference in Islamabad. It included five proposals for tension reduction between the US, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The conference came at an opportune time. NATO and the ISAF are dismayed at the peace negotiations Pakistan has decided to initiate with the militants, and charge that Pakistan’s peace deals transferred militancy to Afghanistan and raised the death and injury rates among allied troops.

President Karzai added a strident warning of military intervention by Afghan forces into Pakistan if the militants were not stopped from entering Afghanistan. The immediate cause of his wrath against Pakistan was the Kandahar jailbreak executed by the Talibans. It led to the escape of about 1,400 prisoners, including 400 Taliban. Karzai said that his forces would launch raids into Pakistan to hit the militants. It was “better for the Afghan troops to be killed during offensive operations in Pakistan than in militant attacks in Afghanistan,” he said.

A few days earlier, allied air force and unmanned Predators used precision-guided weapons to attack nine reinforced bunkers of the Pakistani Frontier Corps positioned along the international border with Afghanistan. The Frontier Corps, also called the Scouts, were reorganised after the Third Afghan war in 1919. They are lightly armed well trained soldiers who act as the political agent’s police force. It is a force known for its bravery and hard work. It operates in those parts of the tribal areas where government writ extends; about 1/8th of FATA. They are officered by regular officers of the Pakistani military.

All the tribal administrative agencies have either one or two units of this force. They are manned by the tribes, who normally serve in mixed configurations to prevent breakdown of disciple. Their officers are normally from the army. They have served with bravery and distinction so far. Today, they are tasked to assist the 90,000 strong army stationed in FATA.

The Scouts have a legendary history. A fact not generally known is that it was a unit of the Frontier Corps, the Gilgit Scouts, who under 24-year-old Major Brown and Captain Mathieson, both formerly of the Tochi Scouts, jointly fought in October 1947 to get rid of the Dogra governor of Gilgit, Brigadier Ghansara Singh. This action brought the Northern Areas into Pakistan. It is also true that if they hadn’t acted there would have been a bloodbath of Hindu and Sikhs in the Gilgit.

Today the Scouts have an impossible job of guarding more than 800 kilometres of Pakistan’s western border with Afghanistan. They are occupying more than 18,000 positions on this dangerous border, most of them as bunkers. During the Taliban administration in Kabul Pakistan established a post at Gora Tai in Mohmand Agency at a location known as Spina Soka (white peak). The Afghans have been contesting the Pakistani claim to this area, and according to records, this portion on Pakistan’s western border and stretching along the Kunar-Bajaur watershed, is not demarcated.

On June 10 an Afghan army group with the support of the ISAF came to the region and started constructing a post on the same ridgeline as the Pakistani Scouts’ position. This was contested by the Scouts personnel but the Afghans continued to work. In the afternoon the Mohmand Rifles sent a senior officer, Major Akbar, to speak to the Afghans and to suggest to settle the matter at higher level. However, the parleys did not succeed since the rear Afghan headquarters did not agree. Before dusk, the Afghan forces withdrew. After about 45 minutes the sound of small-arms fire was heard by the Spina Suka post which later turned out to be a Taliban ambush. The Pakistani post was ordered to retain position and not to allow anyone near their security perimeters. At about 20.30, nine of the 11 bunkers of the Scouts suddenly and without warning came under direct attack by precision bombs and missiles. It was this unprovoked air attack which led to the death of Major Akbar and 12 others.

What has angered the Pakistani military is the fact that Pakistan had provided the exact GPS locations of each of the 11 bunkers as well as 22,000 other locations in FATA to the US forces to prevent casualties from friendly fire. It is not understood why the positions were attacked. This needs to be cleared up in the proposed joint inquiry by US and Pakistan.

I am afraid that the bad blood caused by this action will continue to sour relations between the two nations for some time to come; the alliance between the US, Pakistan and Afghanistan has become brittle and, as they say, the compact requires mending; there is too much at stake.

One of the reasons for this tension is the new rules of the game which have emerged in Pakistan after the Feb 18 election. Instead of Gen Musharraf and the military making all the decisions as in the past, now a disparate group of people are involved. There are many more power centres and policy consultations have to be wider and time consuming; just as in the US. Secondly, both the NWFP and the federal government have opted for peace deals which are distrusted by the US and Afghanistan since they do not prevent militant action in Afghanistan.

The new army chief wants to act according to the Constitution and desires that directions must be given to the army regarding policy by the political executive. The US is not used to this method of working in Pakistan. It felt more comfortable with Gen Musharraf’s personalised approach. That is not possible any more. However, the allies have a serious cause of worry. Out of the many serious problems facing Pakistan, the most worrying is the deteriorating security situation within FATA and the NWFP. However, we neither have a central focal point for its redress nor a counter-insurgency strategy. This is Pakistan’s major weakness.

Since major policy revisions are underway, it would be worthwhile to keep the following five obligations in mind while we negotiate a new compact with the US and Afghanistan:

Pakistan must initiate a comprehensive consultation process with stakeholders for the formulation of a national counter-insurgency strategy. Such a strategy must be owned by the National Assembly. In the meantime, Pakistan should formulate a draft interim strategy based on international good practices for battling the militancy. Strengthening the state must be a goal of such a policy. It must contain indicators to monitor progress.

Second, Pakistan must undertake reform of Fata to mainstream it by extending the Political Parties Act, extension of empowered local government, reform of the FCR and finally the merger of FATA into the NWFP in phases. Third, Pakistan must prevent to the maximum extent possible the freedom of movement of militants crossing over to Afghanistan. Four, Afghanistan should not heighten tension on the international boundary and issues if any must be resolved at the diplomatic level. The allies should understand the sensitivities when they operate with Afghan forces on the international border. Fifth, the US Congress should pass a bill to place the US-Pakistani relationship on a strategic level committing itself to Pakistan’s economic and social transformation.

If the above recommendations are implemented the situation relating to militancy could improve considerably.

The writer is a former chief secretary of NWFP and heads the Regional Institute of Policy Research. Email: azizkhalid @gmail.com

Nuclear Security Imperatives

Nuclear Security Imperatives
By MIRZA ASLAM BEG, June 23, 2008

The story of Pakistan's Nuclear weapon programme is unique, as regards 'intent and the sacrifices' made to acquire the capability. In 1974 when India carried-out the first explosion, our Prime Minister Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, declared that Pakistan would acquire nuclear weapon capability, to maintain the balance of power in South Asia, no matter what price it had to pay. Thus Pakistan became the first country in the world to pronounce its 'intent' to acquire nuclear weapon technology overtly, though it could be possible only through great deal of covert activity. And the price Pakistan had to pay was very little, in terms of money, but very high in terms of personal sacrifices of our national leaders, who made it possible to achieve the objectives of the programme within a period of 22 years – 1975-1998.

There were mainly five persons, to whom our nuclear programme is indebted to – Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who gave the 'policy definition and set the goals'; General Ziaul Haq provided unflinching support to the programme from 1977 to 1988; Benazir Bhutto added 'logic and restraint'; Dr. A.Q. Khan, the work-horse, with his technological genius achieved break-through in a short period of ten years and Mian Nawaz Sharif added 'credibility and confirmation' to our nuclear weapon capability, by giving a befitting response to Indian atomic tests of 12 May 1998, carried out under the leadership of Dr. Samar Mubarakmand who conducted five tests on 28th May at Chaghi and the sixth on 30th May at Kharan. All the five personalities have paid a very high price for their contributions.

Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was eliminated through the judicial process; General Zia was assassinated through sabotage; Benazir Bhutto was assassinated through terror in cold-blood; Dr. A.Q. Khan was humiliated by the military government and confined to languish in a sub-jail, since 2004. Mr. Nawaz Sharif lost his government, suffered humiliation and eight years long exile. This is what makes Pakistan's Nuclear programme so unique and dear to the Pakistani nation.

The Story: In 1975, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, formed the task force under Dr. A. Q. Khan, defined the goals to be achieved, gave him full autonomy and freedom, and directed him, "go and get it." Dr. A. Q. Khan could not get the technology, from those who possessed – Washington, Moscow, London, Paris or Beijing yet he got it from the American and European agents operating with the 'nuclear under-world', who had everything to offer, if one is prepared to pay the price. Thus Dr. Khan entered the nuclear underworld, made his contacts and did his shopping. He rubbed shoulders with others, shopping in this 'grand mall'. North Korea, Libya, Iran and others could also consult with each other, to find the lead to the best bargain. Thus they all remained under constant watch by the American watching eyes who recorded and photographed such contacts, and produced these as evidence against Dr. Khan in 2004. Our military leadership found him guilty and put him under 'protective custody' without a trial. Tomorrow, when Dr. Khan is free, he will tell the real story.

General Ziaul Haq supported the programme for ten long years, thus Pakistan was able to enrich weapon grade uranium, and through system engineering, was able to design and develop the complete technology of the atomic weapon, and "crossed the red-line" in 1986. As the programme expanded, Gen Zia, inducted Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) under the gifted scientist, Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, who took care of research and development of the weapon system. In 1986, the Vice-Chief of Army Staff, General K.M. Arif was also made a member of the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA).

In march 1987, I was appointed Vice-Chief of Army Staff and made privy to the nuclear programme. I visited the KRL laboratory and saw the atomic devices and thousands of centrifuge machines, spinning and enriching uranium. I also visited the computer laboratory, where device testings were carried-out. What I saw, was a marvel of scientific work. In 1987, Dr. A.Q Khan was also tasked to complete the weapon delivery system, using the F-16s and the mirages. Within six months, our scientists tested the system, which worked perfectly well. It was at this time that Mr. Richard Barlow, who was covertly monitoring our programme, reported to Washington that "Pakistan has crossed the red-line." Washington told him to 'shut-up'.

He was transferred and the President of United States continued to testify before the congress, for three successive years, 1987, 88 and 89, that Pakistan was several years behind in making weapon grade uranium and the atomic warhead, because, USA needed Pakistan's support in their war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, the Americans turned their back on Pakistan threatening to cut-off military and economic aid, which they did in 1990.

On 17th August 1988, General Zia, several senior army officers and the American Ambassador died in the C130 crash, near Bahawalpur and I happened to be the only surviving senior most general, as the natural heir to General Zia. On arrival at the General Headquarters, I called the naval and air chiefs, my legal and security advisors for discussion and we decided to hand-over power to the Chairman Senate. Thus, within three hours of General Zia's death, the Constitution was restored and the nation was relieved to hear the good news of elections in 90 days.

Elections were held as promised and Benazir Bhutto was elected as the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Within four months of her election as Prime Minister, she called a meeting of the Nuclear Command Authority in April 1989, co-chaired by the President Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan. It was in this meeting that the policy of Nuclear Restraint was adopted. The policy of Nuclear Restraint was single in conception and unique in the sense, that no other nuclear capable state, so far has adopted such a policy of nuclear sanity. The salient points of this policy were:

1. As the minimum credible deterrence, the 'correlation of one to seven' was considered sufficient to maintain the balance of terror against India who at that time possessed the capability of 60-70 atomic warheads. This command decision of such a strategic vision, continues to be followed, even now.
2. Enrichment of uranium was brought-down to 3% and below.

3. No hot-tests were to be carried-out to maintain the policy of ambiguity.

4. In case of real threat to our nuclear assets, the 'option of First Strike' was to be maintained.

5. The 'second strike' capability was to be developed, in case of pre-emption by India.

6. 'A force-in being concept' was to be followed, thus, not necessitating 'push-button readiness' of USA and Russia.

7. R&D was to continue for the refinement of the device and the delivery system.

In 1990, a very serious threat developed, as a result of Indo-US-Israel nexus, planning to destroy our nuclear assets. After confirmation from various sources, as the threat became very imminent, the Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto called an urgent meeting of the NCA. This meeting was co-chaired by the President, Ghulam Ishaq Khan and the Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. After long deliberations the following decisions were made:

» The foreign minister was sent to Delhi, to convey to the Indians that no matter, who attacked Pakistan's nuclear assets, Pakistan would retaliate massively against India.

» A squadron of F-16s armed with nuclear warheads was moved to Mauripur base to attack on orders, Indian nuclear facilities at Trombay, Trinchomaly and other places.

As the American satellite picked-up these activities, there was panic in Delhi and Washington. Mr. Robert Gates came rushing to Pakistan to pacify the Pakistani leadership. Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan forcefully conveyed the meaning of 'first strike option', and Pakistan's decision to use it against India, if the activity of the Indo-US-Israel nexus did not seize forthwith. And it did.

The 'deterrent response' worked till 1998, when India carried-out second series of explosions, to test Pakistan's policy of 'nuclear ambiguity'. The then Prime Minister Mr. Nawaz Sharif took time to respond. The tunnels under the Chaghi mountains and at Kharan were re-opened, and the infrastructure was revived, while the consultations continued. The Prime Minister, consulted his cabinet ministers and only few favoured atomic explosion. The foreign office also was not in favour, with the exception of a few like the then foreign secretary. Only the Chief of Air Staff supported the counter explosion, thus the burden of responsibility lay mainly on the shoulders of the Prime Minister, who did not hesitate to carry-out five different tests on 28 May at Chaghi, simultaneously and the sixth one at Kharan on 30th May, to prove that Pakistan's capability was superior to the one demonstrated by India. How our team of scientists conducted these tests using the tunnels closed-down some 15 years earlier, is a marvel of courage, conviction and devotion to the cause of the nation.

The counter explosion thus established the balance of nuclear power in South Asia, as desired by late Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The world at large accepted Pakistan as a 'nuclear capable state'. The Defence Minister of India acknowledged that "a perfect nuclear deterrence, exists between India and Pakistan," as the guarantee for peace. With mission accomplished, the policy of nuclear restraint continues to maintain perfect 'balance of terror' in South Asia. Thus, the story of Pakistan's nuclear programme ends here, and what we hear about it now is all hearsay. Yet, every story has a moral to tell, so has the story of our nuclear weapon programme – a feat of courage, commitment and dedication.

The Moral: Nuclear weapons are not a weapon of war. These are weapons of peace. These serve as great equalizer between two rivals. If only one possesses such capability, as in the region of Middle East and others do not, peace remains elusive. Nuclear capability also does not compensate for conventional military capability. Conventional war will occur despite nuclear deterrence, as was the case in 2002, when India massed its forces on our borders, threatening Pakistan of dire consequences, yet it dared not cross our borders, not because they were scared of our nuclear weapons, but because, they did not have had enough of 'combat infantry' to support land offensive. The bulk of their combat infantry was committed in Kashmir. Therefore, the notion of reducing our conventional military capability, because we have nuclear weapon, is a self defeating idea. Nuclear deterrence, also is the cheapest option. For example, in 1990, when Dr. A.Q.Khan presented the balance sheet of the expenses made on the programme since 1975 to 1990, the total expenses was less than US$ 300 million, which is less than the cost of one submarine we purchased from France, which can carry the nuclear warhead, and less than the cost of eight F-16s. We now have the missiles, which cover all territories of India, supported by an effective command and control system, to operationalize the capabilities into a meaningful deterrence, which is the ultimate purpose.

Nuclear deterrence means credibility of the weapon system, means of delivery, an effective command and control system, and the will to use this capability, when the threat to our nuclear assets become imminent, as in 1990. Nuclear weapons cannot redeem conventional military defeat, and yet if one prefers to use nuclear weapons under such extreme conditions, one would invite mutual destruction, whereas the conventional military defeat provides the opportunity to live another day, and rise again to avenge the defeat.

Nuclear weapons have been used only once in 1945 against Japan, because there was no fear of retaliation. If there was a possibility of only one nuclear bomb the Japanese could drop on United States territory, the Americans would never have attacked Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These two bombs killed over 350,000 human beings – almost the same number of innocent Germans who were killed at the same time, by the allied air force, at Dresden, where the refugees were swarming against the advancing Soviet armies towards Berlin. For three days the allied air force used all the deadly weapons in their arsenal, including the napalms, for the orgy of massacre. Was this act less criminal and less deadly than the weapon of mass destruction against Japan? In both cases, it was the criminality of mind which executed the indiscriminate orders to kill. In our neighbourhood, in Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq, more than five million people (50,000,00) have been killed during the last 25 years, mainly due to foreign aggression. So, which is more deadly? The nuclear bombs, or foreign aggression caused by world leaders, having criminal disposition.

Having achieved the objectives of the Nuclear weapon programme in 1998, Pakistan is concentrating on nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, particularly for power generation. Since, Pakistan is gifted with large deposits of uranium – almost 20% of the world deposits, it is imperative that Pakistan undertakes setting-up of a number of nuclear power plants to off-set, energy shortfalls, as well as to reduce dependence on oil. Pakistan has always relied on its conventional forces for security and not the nukes, because the recent events have proved that the nukes could not prevent disintegration of the Soviet Union, nor these could save Israel from their shameful defeat at the hands of Hizbullah. The United States and the Europeans also could not escape defeat in Iraq and Afghanistan, at the hands of the rag-tag freedom fighters. The challenging strategy of the contemporary wars, therefore places greater reliance on 'men and missiles' and not the large armed forces equipped with high-tech weapons and equipment. The world has yet to learn this lesson of war, being fought by "Shadow Armies led by committed believers", who have defeated the mightiest of the mighty in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon, proving the fact that 'men and missiles' are the main contributing factors of success in war and not the nukes.

The concept of nuclear strategy of "minimum credible deterrence" is contained in Pakistan's Policy of Nuclear Restraint, based on the minimum capability to be retained against the much larger capability of the adversary – India. It envisages a very reliable delivery system and the 'will to use it' under an 'extreme situation'. It is India specific. The 1990 threat to Pakistan's nuclear assets was such an extreme situation, which was warded off by demonstrating the capability to use the 'option of first strike.' The strategy conceptualizes a 'force-in-being capability criteria', and not a push-button-readiness posture, because it is not relevant to our environment.

Therefore what is "essentially and most urgently needed for a more sustainable and durable internal and external security and peace" in the region is, not to disturb the existing level of nuclear deterrence in South Asia, not to create the hoax of Pakistan's nuclear assets falling in the hands of extremists; and not to fool the Pakistani nation by saying that its "nuclear capability alone can ensure its physical survival." It is the people who are the guarantors of nation's survival, and not the weapons of high tech; nor the weapons of mass destruction.

The writer is Chairman FRIENDS. E-mail: fr786pak@isb.comsats.net.pk