Unilateral Strike Called a Model For U.S. Operations in Pakistan??

Unilateral Strike Called a Model For U.S. Operations in Pakistan
By Joby Warrick and Robin Wright, Washington Post, February 19, 2008; A01

In the predawn hours of Jan. 29, a CIA Predator aircraft flew in a slow arc above the Pakistani town of Mir Ali. The drone's operator, relying on information secretly passed to the CIA by local informants, clicked a computer mouse and sent the first of two Hellfire missiles hurtling toward a cluster of mud-brick buildings a few miles from the town center.

The missiles killed Abu Laith al-Libi, a senior al-Qaeda commander and a man who had repeatedly eluded the CIA's dragnet. It was the first successful strike against al-Qaeda's core leadership in two years, and it involved, U.S. officials say, an unusual degree of autonomy by the CIA inside Pakistan.

Having requested the Pakistani government's official permission for such strikes on previous occasions, only to be put off or turned down, this time the U.S. spy agency did not seek approval. The government of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf was notified only as the operation was underway, according to the officials, who insisted on anonymity because of diplomatic sensitivities.

Officials say the incident was a model of how Washington often scores its rare victories these days in the fight against al-Qaeda inside Pakistan's national borders: It acts with assistance from well-paid sympathizers inside the country, but without getting the government's formal permission beforehand.

It is an approach that some U.S. officials say could be used more frequently this year, particularly if a power vacuum results from yesterday's election and associated political tumult. The administration also feels an increased sense of urgency about undermining al-Qaeda before President Bush leaves office, making it less hesitant, said one official familiar with the incident.

Independent actions by U.S. military forces on another country's sovereign territory are always controversial, and both U.S. and Pakistani officials have repeatedly sought to obscure operational details that would reveal that key decisions are sometimes made in the United States, not in Islamabad. Some Pentagon operations have been undertaken only after intense disputes with the State Department, which has worried that they might inflame Pakistani public resentment; the CIA itself has sometimes sought to put the brakes on because of anxieties about the consequences for its relationship with Pakistani intelligence officials.

U.S. military officials say, however, that the uneven performance of their Pakistani counterparts increasingly requires that Washington pursue the fight however it can, sometimes following an unorthodox path that leaves in the dark Pakistani military and intelligence officials who at best lack commitment and resolve and at worst lack sympathy for U.S. interests.

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Comments

Some interesting principles at play here: is it no longer an act of war to strike across another country’s border? How much collateral damage is acceptable…and to whom? Should the U.N. open a debate about re-writing international law?

Some interesting tactical issues at play as well: to what extent does this tactic strengthen al Qua’ida as it calls on Muslims worldwide to oppose what they portray as an aggressive and threatening Washington? Why is this in-your-face tactic preferable to police work? How should Washington respond when another country decides to go after a feared enemy it identifies within the borders of the U.S….or, say, Israel?

Then there’s a fundamental question about the type of world we are in the process of constructing if we legitimize such behavior. The global political system, like it or not, is an interdependent, co-evolving system: we all affect each other; change your behavior and you change both your opponent and yourself.

The implications of unilateral military strikes across international borders would make a great academic workshop topic.

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