Wednesday, February 07, 2007

Taliban Maneuvers in Afghanistan

TALIBAN TAKEOVER OF TOWN COULD MARK START OF MILITARY OFFENSIVE
Ahmed Rashid: Eurasia Insight 2/05/07

The fall of Musa Qala , a small town in Afghanistan ’s southern Helmand Province , may herald the start of an offensive by the Taliban in order to preempt NATO reinforcements that are arriving in southern portions of the country. The Taliban attack came amid a regular rotation of commanders of the NATO force, with British Gen. David Richards, an expert at negotiations, giving way to an American, Gen. Dan McNeill.

Several hundred Taliban insurgents overran Musa Qala on February 2. The attack laid waste to an agreement there, brokered last fall by Richards and local tribal elders, under which NATO troops agreed to withdraw from the town in return for a commitment by local Afghan leaders to oppose the Taliban. On February 4, a NATO air strike killed the Taliban commander, identified as Mullah Abdul Ghaffar , who was supposedly in charge of the Musa Qala operation.

The retaliatory air strike came shortly before Richards relinquished command of the 33,000-strong NATO force, including 14,000 Americans. A separate American force, numbering roughly 8,000, operates in Afghanistan independently of NATO command.

Officials in several European countries have quietly expressed concern about placing an American general in charge of the NATO force. Richards tried to create a less harsh, more economic-development-oriented identity for NATO in Afghanistan , as compared to the ‘’kicking-down-doors’’ image that US forces have. Many local analysts expect NATO forces to embrace a more aggressive stance under McNeill, who is believed to oppose the type of local peace arrangements that Richards promoted. The danger at this point is that an overly aggressive NATO force in Afghanistan could alienate Afghans, and thus cause the Taliban’s support base to grow.

Regardless of the approach adopted by McNeill, most experts expect that NATO will soon face a spring offensive by the Taliban.

Richards’ legacy remains controversial both in Afghanistan and in NATO member states. Critics, including Afghan President Hamid Karzai and senior US officials, have frequently accused Richards of being too soft; toward Pakistan, which has done little to stem the Taliban’s ability to infiltrate into Afghanistan; toward European members of NATO that have refused to drop the restrictive caveats that their troops operate under; and even toward the Taliban.

‘’I give the Pakistan government and army more credit for what they are achieving than most do, but we all agree that they have to do much more,’’ said Richards, rolling back his previously favorable statements in support of President Pervez Musharraf . [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Richards defended his record strongly. “The Taliban actually failed to achieve a single one of their military objectives in 2006 - the defeat of NATO, seizing Kandahar , kicking the Brits out of Helmand or a reign of terror in Kabul – nothing was achieved,” he said.

Even many of Richards’ critics admit that the British general’s room for maneuver was hampered by a variety of tactical and strategic problems, including an under-manned and under-equipped NATO force, a lack of international commitment, and a muddled chain of command involving Washington , London and Brussels . Ironically, his diplomatic efforts to expand the NATO force are now bearing fruit - just as he leaves the country.

“My successor [O’Neill] will have another 5,000 troops – three crack US battalions of the 82 Airborne Division, 1,000 Poles and more Brits,” he said. A mobile reserve force of 1,000 US troops -- something that Richards pleaded for during his tenure as the force commander but never received -- ‘’is now kitting out in Kandahar ,’’ he added.

Richards also pointed out that the Afghan National Army (ANA), which now has 40,000 trained troops, is set to undergo a significant expansion over the next two years. The ANA’s size is expected to grow to 70,000 troops over that time, and it will receive roughly $8 billion in aid to modernize its arms and equipment.

“The platform I have given my successor can be exploited – we can hold the ring and more in 2007, and by the end of year things could be looking very good,” said Richards.

Pakistan is said to want Richards to remain active in Afghanistan – to serve as a diplomatic mediator in the feud between Musharraf and Karzai . Pakistani officials say they see Richards as an ideal mediator – a job he could do part time from his NATO command post in Germany . However, a host of other leading players would have to sign off on the new role for Richards, including Karzai , Britain , the United States , the NATO Secretary General, the UN and key European allies.

Editor’s Note : Ahmed Rashid is a journalist and the author of "Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia " and "Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia ."

Closure of Camps in Pak-Afghan Border Areas - Lets hope for the best...

Pakistan, Afghanistan finalise camp closure plans: Sardar Rind
The News, February 7, 2007

ISLAMABAD: Four Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan’s border provinces will be closed this year as part of both government’s plans to manage the Afghan population in Pakistan that also include new return modalities starting in spring 2007.

Addressing a joint press conference here Wednesday Minister of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON) Sardar Yar Muhammad Rind said that the decision was reached at the 12th Tripartite Commission meeting held here among Pakistan, Afghanistan and the UN refugee agency UNHCR.

Afghanistan's Minister for Refugees and Repatriation Ustad Muhammad Akbar Akbar, UNHCR's representative in Pakistan Guenet Guebre Christos, senior officials of Ministry of SAFRON and UNHCR were also present.

Talking to media persons, Sardar Yar Muhammad Rind who oversees refugees issues noted that the four camps would be closed this summer.

Katchagari and Jungle Pir Alizai will be closed by June 15,while, Jalozai and Girdi Jungle will be closed by August 31 this year, he added.

The Minister said affected Afghans will be given a choice between voluntary repatriation assisted by UNHCR and - for those who can not return in the immediate future - relocation to existing camps in Pakistan.

About ongoing registration process of Afghans population in the country, he said over 2.1 million had already been registered adding the exercise was near completion.

"Registered Afghans are given Proof of Registration (PoR) cards with a validity of three years that will be linked to new return modalities starting this spring", Sardar Rind added.

Under the new arrangement, PoR holders who wish to repatriate must deregister their card before leaving Pakistan in order to receive an enhanced reintegration package when they arrive in Afghanistan, the Minister added.

To a question about Afghans without PoR, he said they will be subject according to the laws of the land, adding, they will be given only grace period of six weeks if they wish to avail of UNHCR assistance.

India Rising....

Massive turnout at India air show
Some 500 aircraft companies from around the world have flocked to an air show in southern India hoping to cash in on the country's booming aviation sector.
BBC: February 7, 2007

The five-day event at the Yelahanka air base in Bangalore will showcase a range of new civilian and military aircraft.

India plans to buy 126 fighter jets for its air force to replace its fleet of ageing Soviet-era MiG-21s.

Industry estimates suggest India will need more than 1,000 planes over the next two decades as air travel booms.

Air traffic in India could double by 2010 to 50 million passenger journeys a year on the back of a growing economy, according to one estimate.

'Decision soon'

Some 45 foreign delegations and 35 air force chiefs from various countries are attending the five-day air show.


India is being viewed by the US as a major link in the global supply chain
Ron Somers,
USINDIA Business Council

Indian Defence Minister AK Antony, who officially opened Aero India, said a decision on the purchase of the fighter jets would be made very soon.

"It [the request for proposals] is almost in the final stage... I can assure that a decision in this regard will be taken very quickly," he told reporters.

The BBC's Habib Beary in Bangalore says the deal is estimated to be worth more than $10bn.

He says the race is primarily between Lockheed Martin's F-16s, the Gripen made by Sweden's Saab, Russia's MiG-35, the Eurofighter from Europe and the Rafale made by French company Dassault.

Hundreds of civilian aircraft and fighter jets will be displayed during the air show, which is being attended by more international visitors than ever before.

More than 50 US firms are among companies present.

Ron Somers, president of the USINDIA Business Council, said it was no longer about the US selling equipment to India.

"What is important is that India is being viewed by the US as a major link in the global supply chain, which will create thousands of jobs," he told the AFP news agency.

Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/6337391.stm

What motivates suicide bombers in Pakstan?

Suicide hits ‘response to Musharraf’s policies’ By Rahimullah Yusufzai
The News, February 7, 2007

PESHAWAR: A man introducing himself as a militant claimed responsibility for Saturday’s suicide attack against a Pakistan Army convoy in Tank district in southern NWFP and threatened more such bombings in retaliation for the pro-US policies of President Pervez Musharraf.

Identifying himself as Ashfaq Ahmad, the caller said the suicide bombing in Tank against the military was a success while the one in Lakki Marwat town ended in failure. “The attack in Lakki Marwat was bungled as the suicide bomber was killed during preparations for the act,” he explained in a call to The News.

It was not possible to determine the authenticity of the caller. It could be a hoax or an attempt to divert attention of the investigators. In the recent past, callers have phoned reporters and newspaper offices to claim responsibility for some of the suicide attacks.

Speaking in Punjabi-accented Urdu, the caller refused to identify the suicide bombers and the group to which they belonged. He also did not want to identify the particular group to which he was affiliated. “We are all the same. It doesn’t matter if we are from one group or the other because we have a similar agenda,” he argued.

The caller spoke in a low, soft and calm voice. He wasn’t in a hurry but was somewhat irritated when this correspondent repeatedly asked him to produce believable evidence of his group’s involvement in the suicide bombings. Eventually, he said he would try to provide videotape containing the final statement of the suicide bombers before embarking on their mission.

When told that the authorities were pointing accusing fingers at the tribal militants’ commander Baitullah Mahsud for the spate of recent suicide bombings in the NWFP and Islamabad, the caller said all anti-US and anti-Musharraf groups were united in their resolve to fight those trying to implement the American agenda in the Islamic countries. “Musharraf is bombing and killing his own people at the behest of America. He is handing over Muslims to the US,” he alleged.

When asked again as to why they were carrying out suicide bombings in their own country, the caller said it was in retaliation for the military operations and the killing of innocent people. “We have already carried out a number of suicide attacks and would do so again,” he stressed.

In the suicide attack on Saturday, the bomber crashed his Pajero jeep into a military vehicle on the Dera Ismail Khan-Tank road at Barakhel village about eight kilometres from Tank. Apart from the suicide bomber, two soldiers were killed and six sustained injuries in the attack.

The same day, a suspected militant was killed while trying to plant a bomb in a bazaar in Lakki Marwat town, which is headquarters of the district bearing the same name and bordering Tank. On Sunday, the police claimed it had recovered another bomb in a bazaar in Lakki Marwat.

It may be added that a man identifying himself as Abdullah had phoned the offices of an Urdu daily in Peshawar after the suicide bombings in late January and Dera Ismail Khan to claim responsibility for the attacks. His phone call was traced to a public call office (PCO) in Dattakhel near Miranshah, headquarters of North Waziristan tribal agency.

Earlier, a caller had claimed that his group was responsible for the suicide bombing at the Pakistan Army training centre at Dargai in Malakand Agency. He said the attack, which killed 42 soldiers, was to avenge the death of 80 students and teachers of a Madrassa which was bombed by Pakistan Army on October 30 last year. Residents of Chingai village in Bajaur Agency where the Madrassa was located and in rest of NWFP believed the US-operated pilotless Predator plane was behind the attack. However, the Pakistan Army insisted its gunship helicopters had launched the attack against the Madrassa because it was being used to train suicide bombers.

Monday, February 05, 2007

Pakistan in the US media: Onions, Gulab Jamuns and Islamic bombs

Pakistan in the US media: Onions, Gulab Jamuns and Islamic bombs
By Anwar Iqbal
(Read at the SAJA conference, National Press Club, Washington - February 2, 2007)

South Asia’s presence in North America is stronger outside than in the media. Where I live, we have a halal meat grocery, an all vegetarian grocery, a chutney restaurant and a Nirala sweets shop that sells gulab jamuns and burfis.

There are no gulab jamuns and burfis in the media. The US media, as far as Pakistan is concerned, are focused on the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and the Islamic bombs in Islamabad .

So far no one has checked these bombs to see if they are properly circumcised to be Islamic. But everyone believes that the bombs will one day be stolen by the Osama bin Ladens and Mullah Omers of this word.

The media’s suggestion for snatching the Islamic bombs from Islamabad ’s custody is easy: topple President Musharraf, have him killed or simply wait till he dies a natural death. Then bring the mullahs and hand over the bombs to them at a grand ceremony at Peshawar ’s Nasir Bagh refugee camp, properly televised by CNN and Fox News.

London tabloid -- The Sun -- should have special rights to run uncensored pictures of these unveiled Islamic bombs, replacing its page-3 girls for a day.

I hope Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif are reading the US media to learn how to unseat the military. So far all their efforts to convince the army to return to the barracks have failed.

Pakistan is also often taken to task for allowing cross-border movement of the Taliban. I remember visiting the Taliban once in Kandahar along with Mr Karzai long before he became the president of his country. They were smelly, hardly took shower, ate onions and burped on your face. I do not blame the Pakistani government for sending them out. I would not want them in my country either.

Again, the media’s suggestion for getting rid of the problem is simple: invade the tribal territory separating Afghanistan and Pakistan , catch all bearded people, tie them to the nearest tree or the lamp post and shoot them. But the problem is that there are no trees and very few lamp posts in that area.

The other suggestion is to extend Islamabad ’s jurisdiction to the tribal belt and all the Taliban will become law-abiding citizens of Pakistan . Unfortunately, Islamabad does not have enough clerks to extend its jurisdiction to this area. After all, you need hundreds, if not thousands, of babus to run a thousand-mile long territory.

If you do not have the babus, as the clerks are called in our part of the world, who will take bribes for telephone and electricity connections? Who will sell railway tickets in the black market? Who will prevent tribal children from enrolling at schools without bakhshish?

The US media are, obviously, not concerned with such mundane details. Their approach is nice and clean. Catch an unnamed US official source. Make him or her share the bright idea he or she conceived while reading the day’s newspapers in the restroom and there you go.

I am eternally grateful to the media for not having yet another bright idea when Kabul announced that President Karzai had his first child last week. Had they gone to one of their unnamed sources, I fear the source would have blamed it on Pakistan .

I shudder to think what bloodshed such a baseless allegation would have caused! This time all the mullahs, the babus and the misters would have joined Mr Karzai in waging a jihad against Pakistan .

And this would have been no vegetarian jihad. A lot of meatballs would have flown across the Durand Line in both directions.

One of my friends, when I asked her to explain what she thought of Pakistan ’s coverage in the US media, said if you go by what the media, say everyone in Pakistan is a mullah.

Do the people focus on what an obscure or particularly funny priest says when they talk about the United States or Canada , she asked. Obviously not, she said. But when it comes to Islam, she, said, the media presents an obscure London priest called Bakari as the sole representative of more than a billion Muslims.

She said that Pakistan has four official and dozens of unofficial nationalities who speak their own languages, have their own culture and distinct musical traditions. But you see none of these in the media, she complained.

I do not. I wish everybody in Pakistan was a mullah. Then I would not have had to pay a mullah to bless my child after his circumcision. I would have simply gone to my next door neighbor.

Sunday, February 04, 2007

Bridging the gap between the West and the Muslim World: PBS

Interview With Sheik Hamza Yusuf
Frontline World: PBS
Hamza Yusuf was born in Washington State and grew up in Northern California, where he lives with his wife and five children. He converted to Islam in 1977 and spent 10 years studying Islam in the Middle East where he followed a more classic interpretation of the religion. After the attacks of 9/11, Yusuf emerged as a respected Islamic scholar, advising both the White House and the Arab League. In recent years, he has focused his teachings on bridging the widening gap between the West and the Muslim world. In this interview, he talks about "tyranny" and "incompetence" on both sides and offers his prescription for creating more common ground. This is an edited transcript of an interview that took place in September 2006.

Q: Linden MacIntyre: What are the roots of Muslim rage?

A: Hamza Yusuf: If you had one word to describe the root of all this rage, it's humiliation. Arabs in particular are extremely proud people. If you look at what happened in Lebanon recently, the Arabs kind of raised their head-- they think it's a big victory, the fact that their whole country was destroyed and over a thousand people were killed, many of them children. Why is it a victory? Because they fought back. That's all. "OK, you can crush us into the Earth, but you're not going to get us to submit." And I think that's deeply rooted in Muslim consciousness, the idea of not submitting to anything other than God. "You can abuse me, but you're not going to win me over. But if you treat me with respect and dignity, I'm going to fall in love with you. I'm going to sing your praises all over the world because you're powerful and you treated me with human dignity."

Q: Where do they see the proof of the humiliation?

A: It's everywhere. You don't think it's humiliating to have a foreign force come into your land? You see, Muslims don't have this nation state idea. There's a tribe called Bani Tamin. It's one of the biggest tribes in Saudi Arabia and in Iraq, and they're intermarried. The West doesn't seem to understand that. The Moroccans feel the Iraqi pain as their own. It's one pain. So when you see some American soldier banging down a door and coming into a house with all these women in utter fear who've done nothing, that's humiliation, and it's going to enrage people. And what are we doing there? There are no weapons of mass destruction. They were never a threat to us. You know, Shakespeare wrote a play called Julius Caesar, and it was all about the danger of pre-emptive strikes. Brutus is convinced by Cassius to kill Caesar. Why? Because Caesar's ambitious, because he might declare himself king. And the end of that play, everybody dies; it's just disaster. That's the tragedy of pre-emptive strikes.

Q: What goes through your mind when you hear about all these roundups of young Muslims who are supposedly plotting things in London and in Toronto?

A: We keep being told about these roundups, and in the end, they're more aspirational than operational. I'd love to have been in the meeting when they thought that one up. It seems to me that they're just a lot of bumbling fools out there.

Q: On which side of the equation?

A: On both sides. I mean, that's part of the problem. Violence is the last refuge of the incompetent, and I think that's really what we're dealing with here, incompetence. Both sides have been incredibly ineffective at achieving their goals-- at least their stated goals.

Q: I'm trying to get a measure of just how concerned people should really be though.

A: Listen, hurricanes are a much greater threat to us right now. Katrina did much more damage than anything the terrorists could ever put together. Yeah, there's nuclear weapons are out there and that certainly is a concern. That's the job of these intelligence people to stop that, right? But stop making us all live in fear and telling us about orange and red levels. All that nonsense just simply has to stop. We need to calm down and think at a deeper level. People can't think when their minds are clouded with fear. The fear tactic is a tactic that's used by people who want to maintain control, and it's very effective.

A democracy is predicated on an educated citizenry. You cannot have a democracy with people that are more interested in what Nicole Kidman is doing or whoever the latest fashion model is. If that's your interest, democracy can't survive. You also have corporate interests here. We have an arms industry in the West that is our No. 1 industry. It's bigger than anything-- automobiles, everything. Now if you don't have reasons to build weapons, where do all those contracts go?

Q: Your job is to recruit young people into a more constructive project.

A: Well, I'm not a recruiter ….

Q: You are definitely an influence.

A: I've got my own personal projects, like my school and my seminary. But at this point in my life, I'm actually just trying to put some balance out there because I feel that there's an incredible amount of disequilibrium in the way people are acting and the way they're thinking. There are irrational fears. If you see a woman wearing a hijab and fear is your first thought, something's really wrong. How do you racially profile terrorists when 90percent of the world falls into that? Mexicans look like Arabs, for God's sake, and anybody can change their name. I mean Abdullah can change his name to Eduardo. It's not going to be difficult, if they're clever. So how do you profile people?

Q: Six years ago, there were probably the same number of disenchanted young people in chat rooms and coffee houses complaining and plotting. But given the last five years, what are the chances now that it is going to become a more real and a more sinister force?

A: A major fear for me is that it will get worse with the profiling, with the alienation. I think especially for the young people and especially in the more underprivileged groups, but don't rule out the privileged as well. In the Communist period, the revolutionaries, the leaders were almost always-- Che Guevara, people like that-- they were always from the middle class and the educated. And empathy is a very powerful emotion. If you watch Al Manar Television in Lebanon, it's associated with Hezbollah. If you watch that for any length of time, you're going to get very angry. It's as simple as that. They show babies blown up, they show horrible scenes, and people see that and they get angry. There's always going to be a segment of angry people who are going to go out and do something.

Part of the real crisis of the modern age is that the individual has the power to do what pre-modern armies really couldn't even do. In the pre-modern world, you just couldn't do a lot of damage. In the modern world, you can. So we have real concerns. You have to go to a deeper level. Henry David Thoreau said for every thousand people hacking away at the branches of evil, there's only one person hacking away at the roots of evil. I really think we need to go to a deeper level and look at what the root of this situation is. There are a lot of people prevaricating out there, who just don't want to deal with the "why" question.

Q: It's become treasonous to talk about "why." So how do you get around that?

A: People need to know. It's the responsibility of the fifth estate-- the journalists. They need courage. I'm amazed at the courage of the journalists on the frontlines in Iraq, but we need intellectual courage in our community. We need to get rid of this hegemonic discourse that doesn't allow for any dissent, where people's jobs and careers are threatened by asking questions, because we have to ask questions.

Q: Well, let's start now. Why?

A: Why? We have a thousand years of cold war between the West and Islam. Let us not forget that the West in many ways defined itself, Europe defined itself vis-à-vis Islam. The Song of Roland is really one of the earliest pieces of Western literature, and it's about the antagonism with Muslims. So I think Islam has always been this nebulous "other" that we're afraid of, and that is part of our consciousness. The Crusades are also part of our consciousness. And the colonial period. But ultimately what you have is extremely repressive regimes. The reality is, almost all these Muslim governments are persecuting active Muslims, not terrorists. When you have very powerful secular tyrants, religion poses a very serious threat, and religion is a very powerful force in the Muslim world. So the repression of Islam, which has been going on for so long, has resulted in certain extreme views that have emerged within the religion. But you have to look at the reasons. Now we in the West have supported many of these regimes and see them as our interest. I personally don't think democracy is viable right now in the Muslim world. You need just governments, but you need strong governments. I think you can have situations that are not democratic but still are rooted in a concern about the people, the welfare of the people.

Q: How realistic is it to place hope on benevolent dictatorships?

A: I'm not talking so much about dictators. At this stage, you have to build democratic institutions, and in that way, the West can help. Look, we give $1billion in aid to Egypt. Do you know how much juice that is on the negotiating table, in terms of what you demand of Egypt? Because if you cut off that billion dollars, you're cutting off the lifeblood of the Egyptian government. America has an immense amount of power, but it doesn't use it in any benevolent way. It uses it to maintain a status quo. The same is true for almost all these Muslim countries.

Q: So what's your biggest challenge?

A: I have challenges in both worlds. I'm very active in the Muslim world. I have very popular television programs in the Muslim world, which have, I think, a very positive impact. So I'm working there. I go quite often to the Muslim world. And then I have my challenges here. I'm one person.

Q: But there are people in the Muslim world who think you're a heretic.

A: I think the majority of Muslims that know about me -- and there are quite a few in the Muslim world that do-- generally have a very good opinion of what I'm doing. I have rarely met belligerent Muslims. Every once in a while I'll come across somebody who's just got an axe to grind. But it's actually quite unusual for me. The majority of Muslims I meet, I see smiles on their faces. I get hugs. People tell me, "Keep up the good work." I really believe that most Muslims are very decent people. I've lived in the Muslim world. I'm always struck by their incredible generosity, by their simplicity, by their love of some really basic virtues and values that I share and that most Western people share. This is my experience as a Western person, a convert to Islam.

Q: What was your experience after your speech the other night [at the Islamic Society of North America conference in Chicago], in which you talked about the fundamental humanity of people of the Jewish faith?

A: The Jewish situation's bad. I have to admit that. There is an immense amount of ignorance, particularly in the Muslim world. I think less so here, but we have that problem here also. There is an anti-Jewish sentiment. It's far more politically driven, and I think Muslims have forgotten, that's all. I think they need reminders, and I think when you remind them, they tend to respond, and that's been my experience. I was not raised as an anti-Semite. My sister converted to Judaism, is married to a Jewish man. I have nephews that are Jewish. I was not raised with any prejudice at all. But I was infected when I lived in the Muslim world. I lived in the Arab world for over 10 years, and I think I did get infected by that virus for a period of time. But I grew out of it and realized that not only does it have nothing to do with Islam, but it has nothing to do with my core values. And I've rejected that and called others to reject it. I think it's something that really needs to change in the Muslim community, and I think it will.

Q: What is your evaluation of the response of the last five years of the security apparatus, both as an American and as a Muslim?

A: Well, I think we've all become much more acutely aware of the state apparatus in terms of monitoring. I don't like the feeling that I have to think about what I say when I say things. It's not healthy, and I think a lot of people feel it now in a way that they've never felt it before, and that troubles me deeply about my country. I think that there needs to be a return to some real central values about this country. I think Guantanamo Bay is absolutely an unacceptable event in American history. It's going to be looked at as a really black period in our legal tradition.

Q: At what point does this more intense, heavy-handed security become counterproductive?

A: Personally, I think the intensified security has already become counterproductive. They need to do their job, but they don't need to do it constantly in our face. The intelligence community has a job to protect. The first principle of any government is to protect its citizens. But you also protect your citizens by being just to other countries and other peoples. You endanger your citizens by reckless behavior. You endanger your citizens by hubris. You endanger your citizens by the inability to actually apologize or to ask forgiveness for your mistakes. And that's something I find the most troubling about the whole situation, because I think real security is based on having benevolent policies.

Q: So what's your prescription?

A: My prescription is that we need to dismantle the pyramid of domination and we need to rebuild a house of mutual respect.

Q: Give me that in bread-and-butter terms.

A: In bread-and-butter terms, I truly believe that we need to stop being so paternalistic in our attitudes toward Muslims, toward other countries, and begin to actually speak to them as if they were human beings, fully enfranchised, with the dignity that goes with that. To stop drawing lines in the sand, to stop dictating to people as if you have some God-given authority to do that, and to really start trying to talk to people and see what you can do. I think we need commerce that is mutually beneficial and we need to stop all of this hegemonic commercial tyranny that goes on in the Middle East, in Central and South America. I mean people forget, you know, the South Americans probably hate us more than the Arabs do.

Q: How much more difficult has it become to achieve this kind of rationale?

A: We're at the lowest ebb right now. It's going to be very difficult to get back our credibility. In the recent war with Lebanon, it was so one-sided. If you watched Arab television and then CNN, it was like two different universes. That's really troubling to me because like the Chinese say, "There are three truths. There's my truth, your truth and then the truth." If I'm unwilling to let go of my truth and you're unwilling to let go of your truth, we cannot see objectively this truth that's in the middle, between us. There's good and bad in all of us, and I want to get rid of the cartoon scenario of George Bush's world and Osama bin Laden's world, and I want to see it nuanced. I want to see more intelligence here.

Q: We know from history that wars are generally fought by young men. What are you saying to these young people to prevent the sudden explosion of this sort of negative potential?

A: You have to give them hope. And there's something attractive about war to young men. They need to see war for what it is. If Robert E. Lee in the Civil War said war was hell, what would he make of 20th-century and 21st-century warfare? I think we have to see war as the despicable creature that it is and really work for peace. They say if you don't sweat for peace, then you bleed for war.

Q: But can you pull that off from inside Islam?

A: Muslims are peace-loving people generally. Among the young, yes, there are some militant attitudes. But a lot of it arises out of chivalry-- and don't underestimate the chivalrous impulse in men. A lot of these young men see women being-- you know-- they see soldiers breaking into houses with Muslim women. It's really beyond the pale for the average Muslim man, and something rises up in them. And it can turn to deep resentment and rage. But generally I think the impulses are actually quite noble.

Q: So what do you say to the average person who sees some kind of a sinister threat under every hijab and behind every beard?

A: People have to be exposed to Muslims, just experience Muslims; talk to them. Reach out, read about Islam, try to find out about it. There are 20,000 Muslim physicians in the United States, Americans putting their lives in the hands of Muslims every day. You're going under and the anesthesiologist is a Muslim, right? He's looking out for you. He doesn't want you to die in that operation because you're an infidel. He's doing his job. As is your pediatrician who's trying to heal your child. And the mechanic who's fixing your car? He's not putting a bomb in your car. It's Abdullah, the guy down at the Chevron station, right? I mean it's one-fifth of the world's population for God's sake-- one out of five people is a Muslim.

Muslims have been an almost entirely benevolent force in the 20th century. They did not wreak the havoc the Western powers wreaked on the world. They have not come anywhere near to the environmental degradation that we've done to the planet. So I think Muslims need to be seen in the proper light. They're mostly decent, hardworking people, people with deep family values, and they want to live in peace. My experience on this planet, almost 50 years, is that if you treat people with respect, they tend to treat you with respect.

Shias and Sunnis: The Widening Gulf?



Shias and Sunnis
The widening gulf
Feb 1st 2007 | CAIRO
From The Economist print edition

Amid Sunni fears of a growing “Shia arc”, tensions between the main Muslim sects are widening, while some governments are exploiting them

ISRAEL and America are stirring conflict between Sunni and Shia Muslims so as to plunder their wealth, declares Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Israel and America are stoking Sunni fear of Shias to distract from the true cause of Palestine, says the supreme guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mehdi Akef. Evidently, there is a meeting of minds between the leader of the most powerful Shia state and the head of the world's most influential Sunni political movement.

On the ground across much of the Middle East, the spectre of fitna, or sectarian schism, has rarely loomed larger. This week in Iraq, yet another round of bombs deliberately targeted Shia civilians, killing scores. Shia militias responded by lobbing mortars into Sunni districts and by snatching and executing Sunni men. A series of deadly attacks against Shia mosques in Pakistan added a dozen more victims to the estimated 2,000 killed over 15 years of sporadic sectarian violence. In Lebanon, a row in a college cafeteria snowballed into running street battles between followers of rival Sunni and Shia parties; four were killed. The preacher at a slain Sunni youth's funeral described him as a “martyr to Arabism”—a subtle jibe at the ostensibly “Persian” Shias and their leading party in Lebanon, Hizbullah.

This was the week of Ashura, a Shia festival that commemorates martyrdom and has often proved a tense period in places where Islam's two main sects both reside. Yet communal feelings are rising even where Shias, around 15% of the world's Muslims, have little or no presence. In December, Sudan's authorities closed Iran's stall at a Khartoum book fair after Sunni activists accused it of spreading Shia propaganda. Algerian newspapers say Shia missionaries are inveigling Sunni children to convert. Supporters of Fatah, a secular Palestinian party, have taken to chanting “Shia! Shia!” at backers of the Islamist (and Sunni) Hamas party, in a dig against its strong ties to Iran. In Jordan, villagers turned back pilgrims going to a local Shia shrine. Shias say that last month's attacks by vandals in the American city of Detroit on two Shia community centres and some Shia-owned businesses were sectarian.

Some of the alarm appears to be orchestrated. In the culmination of a month-long barrage of innuendo against Iran in Egypt's state-owned press, a recent editorial in the staid Cairo daily, al-Ahram, charged the Islamic Republic with undermining chances for peace in Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon. The goal, it suggested, was to weaken Sunni Arab states so as to realise “Safavid dreams” of Shia expansion, a reference to the 16th-century dynasty that enshrined Shiism as Iran's state religion. Citing unnamed Egyptian officials, the same newspaper floated charges that Iranian intelligence agents were responsible for the kidnap and murder of Egypt's ambassador in Iraq in July 2005.

A similar campaign has unfolded in Saudi Arabia, where increasingly internet chat sites, several of which are widely believed to be infiltrated by police agents, are rife with spurious tales of Shia perfidy. A typical item affirms that, when told of Sunni fears of a “Shia crescent” spreading across the region, Iran's president said he envisioned not a crescent but a full moon. While a columnist in one Saudi daily asserted, falsely, that Shias believe they must perform ablutions if they happen to touch an “unclean” Sunni, 38 senior Saudi clerics issued a call to arms in defence of Iraq against the “Crusader-Safavid-Rejectionist plot” that seeks to uproot Sunni Islam.

Such alarmism reflects, to a degree, a desire by the Sunni, American-allied governments of countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia to staunch what they see as a rising tide of Iranian influence. The capture of power by Iraq's long-oppressed Shias is perceived as having, for the first time in history, removed the main Arab bulwark against Persian expansion. Much as most loathed Saddam Hussein, the style and timing of his execution, on a day celebrated by Sunnis as their main annual feast, smacked to many of an ugly Shia triumphalism. Iran's wider assumption of leadership for Islamist “resistance” movements, underscored by the electoral success of Hamas and by Hizbullah's spirited fight in last summer's war with Israel, gives Arab leaders even worse jitters.

At the same time, their American ally is demanding support for its policy of boxing in Iran. Unable to lend much material weight to America's efforts, fearful of a negative backlash should America actually strike Iran, and unwilling to be seen as acting in Israel's interest, Arab countries appear to have chosen to exploit sectarian feelings to send a shot across Iran's bows.

With typical circumlocution, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia recently said as much. “We have advised them not to expose the region to dangers,” he said, declining to name the country to which he referred. “We don't interfere in anyone's affairs, [but] any state which resorts to unwise acts must bear the responsibility in front of the other countries in the region.”

Bark against the arc
The Saudi intent to thwart Iran's regional ambitions is clearest in Lebanon. The kingdom has lent strong financial and diplomatic support to the government of the prime minister, Fouad Siniora, whose coalition of Sunni, Druze and some Christian parties has been deadlocked in a duel with a grouping headed by Hizbullah. But what has squeezed the Shia party most is loss of the stature it recently gained among a wider Arab public. Seen last summer as the vanguard of the struggle against Israel, it is now viewed by many Sunnis as little more than a cat's paw for Iran.

As Iraq's agony has made clear, sectarianism is a dangerous genie. It was with a view to cooling recent excesses that Qatar, a rich Gulf emirate, invited some 400 top Sunni and Shia religious figures to a dialogue last month. In the event, rhetoric at the conference proved embarrassingly hot. Iran's chief delegate, Ayatollah Muhammad Taskhiri, was besieged with accusations. Iran was failing to stop the ethnic cleansing of Baghdad's Sunnis, he was told. It persecuted its own Sunni minority. Its agents were trying to convert Sunnis and spread Shia texts that insult historic figures revered by Sunnis. Why, retorted Shia delegates, did Sunni clerics so rarely condemn the slaughter of Iraq's Shias? And what of the disenfranchised Shia minorities in Sunni countries?

A message from a senior Lebanese Shia cleric, Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, provided a useful cold shower. If Sunnis and Shias did not cease their wrangling, he said, Muslims would end up turning to secularism as their saviour.

Copyright © 2007 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All rights reserved.

Taliban Resurgence: Can Pakistan stop it?

Pakistan Says Taliban Activity Is Hard to Stop
By SALMAN MASOOD
New York Times, February 3, 2007

RAWALPINDI, Pakistan, Feb. 2 — Faced with mounting criticism that Pakistan is not doing enough to thwart incursions into Afghanistan by Pakistan-based Taliban militants, the president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, said Friday that securing the porous border was not the sole responsibility of this country.

He also insisted that despite some lapses, Pakistan’s security forces were fully behind him in an effort to root out the resurgent Taliban.

“Pakistan will not be allowed to be made a scapegoat,” he said, adding that securing the border was also the responsibility of Afghanistan and American and NATO forces.

Pakistan and Afghanistan have traded accusations in recent months over who bears responsibility for enabling the Taliban to regain strength and mount attacks on NATO and allied troops in Afghanistan.

While General Musharraf acknowledged that the Taliban were getting support from within Pakistan, he denied accusations that his security agencies were abetting the insurgency. “This is so preposterous I do not even want to comment,” he said. Maintaining that the Pakistani military is a professional force, General Musharraf said there was “no question of anyone abetting.”

A correspondent for The New York Times, Carlotta Gall, recently reported that she had found anecdotal evidence in and around Quetta to support charges by Western diplomats and Pakistani opposition figures that the Pakistani intelligence agencies were encouraging the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.

General Musharraf said fighters had been able to slip over the border in part because Pakistan’s border guards were poorly armed and were up against “well-trained, well-armed and well-motivated people.” He said he would arm the guards better and provide them with security.

The president also denied allegations that some Taliban leaders were taking refuge in Pakistan. Last month the Afghan Intelligence Service announced that it had detained a Taliban spokesman who said the Taliban leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, was in Pakistan. General Musharraf said he was “500 percent sure” that Mullah Omar was in Afghanistan. He said Mullah Dadullah, a top Taliban commander, and other top leaders were also in Afghanistan.

The president did say Mullah Dadullah had escaped arrest three times in Pakistan, though he did not mention when.

General Musharraf also defended the peace deal reached late last year with tribal militants in North Waziristan, a semiautonomous tribal area straddling the border with Afghanistan, calling it “a partial success.”

Diplomats and intelligence officials from several countries have said Islamic militants are using the peace deal to consolidate their hold in northern Pakistan and are openly flouting the terms of the accord, in which they agreed to end cross-border help for the Taliban. But the president said that his government was trying to wean the local population away from the militants and that using military force was not the answer.

General Musharraf provided details of plans to fence the porous and craggy Pakistani-Afghan border — a solution to curb cross-border movement that Pakistan has advocated but Afghanistan has rejected.

He said Pakistan would selectively fence 22 miles of the border in North-Western Frontier Province and would later erect a 155-mile fence in Baluchistan Province. He said plans to mine the border had been suspended, “due to sensitivities of the international community.”

US-Iran Relations

Former military chiefs urge talks with Iran
CNN: February 4, 2007

LONDON, England (Reuters) -- Three former senior U.S. military officials warn that any military action against Iran would have "disastrous consequences" and urged Washington to hold immediate and unconditional talks with Tehran.

The Bush administration has increased the regularity and vehemence of its accusations against Iran, prompting speculation it could be laying the ground for military attack against the Islamic state.

Washington has also sent a second aircraft carrier to the Gulf, a move seen as a warning to Iran, which the United States accuses of seeking atomic arms and fueling instability in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East. Iran denies the charges.

In a letter to London's Sunday Times newspaper, the three former U.S. military leaders said attacking Iran "would have disastrous consequences for security in the region, coalition forces in Iraq and would further exacerbate regional and global tensions," they wrote.

"The current crisis must be resolved through diplomacy," they said.

The letter was signed by retired Army Lt. Gen. Robert Gard, a former military assistant to Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, retired U.S. Marine Corps Gen. Joseph Hoar, a former commander in chief of U.S. Central Command; and retired Navy Vice Adm. Jack Shanahan, a former director of the Center for Defense Information.

Friday, February 02, 2007

Turning a blind eye...

President admits terror war lapses
Daily Times, February 3, 2006
Islamabad: President Pervez Musharraf said that some members of the security forces had turned a “blind eye” towards Taliban militants. But Musharraf rejected allegations that the ISI was collaborating with the insurgents, saying that the ISI was closely working with US intelligence. “We had some incidents I know of that in some posts, a blind eye was being turned. So similarly I imagine that others may be doing the same,” he said. He gave the example of a typical checkpost on the Afghan border, saying it was difficult if only two men on guard are faced with a group of “20 well-armed, well-trained and well-motivated people challenging them”. staff report/agencies

Thursday, February 01, 2007

Iran Vs. Saudi Arabia: Who can be a better US ally?

Not-So-Strange Bedfellow
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN January 31, 2007, NYTimes

Here’s a little foreign policy test. I am going to describe two countries — “Country A” and “Country B” — and you tell me which one is America’s ally and which one is not.

Let’s start: Country A actively helped the U.S. defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan and replace it with a pro-U.S. elected alliance of moderate Muslims. Country A regularly holds sort-of-free elections. Country A’s women vote, hold office, are the majority of its university students and are fully integrated into the work force.

On 9/11, residents of Country A were among the very few in the Muslim world to hold spontaneous pro-U.S. demonstrations. Country A’s radical president recently held a conference about why the Holocaust never happened — to try to gain popularity. A month later, Country A held nationwide elections for local councils, and that same president saw his candidates get wiped out by voters who preferred more moderate conservatives. Country A has a strategic interest in the success of the pro-U.S., Shiite-led, elected Iraqi government. Although it’s a Muslim country right next to Iraq, Country A has never sent any suicide bombers to Iraq, and has long protected its Christians and Jews. Country A has more bloggers per capita than any country in the Muslim Middle East.

The brand of Islam practiced by Country A respects women, is open to reinterpretation in light of modernity and rejects Al Qaeda’s nihilism.

Now Country B: Country B gave us 15 of the 19 hijackers on 9/11. Country B does not allow its women to drive, vote or run for office. It is illegal in Country B to build a church, synagogue or Hindu temple. Country B helped finance the Taliban.

Country B’s private charities help sustain Al Qaeda. Young men from Country B’s mosques have been regularly recruited to carry out suicide bombings in Iraq. Mosques and charities in Country B raise funds to support the insurgency in Iraq. Country B does not want the elected, Shiite-led government in Iraq to succeed. While Country B’s leaders are pro-U.S., polls show many of its people are hostile to America — some of them celebrated on 9/11. The brand of Islam supported by Country B and exported by it to mosques around the world is the most hostile to modernity and other faiths.

Question: Which country is America’s natural ally: A or B?

Country A is, of course. Country A is Iran. Country B is Saudi Arabia.

Don’t worry. I know that Iran has also engaged in terrorism against the U.S. and that the Saudis have supported America at key times in some areas. The point I’m trying to make, though, is that the hostility between Iran and the U.S. since the overthrow of the shah in 1979 is not organic. By dint of culture, history and geography, we actually have a lot of interests in common with Iran’s people. And I am not the only one to notice that.

Because the U.S. has destroyed Iran’s two biggest enemies — the Taliban and Saddam — “there is now a debate in Iran as to whether we should continue to act so harshly against the Americans,” Mohammad Hossein Adeli, Iran’s former ambassador to London, told me at Davos. “There is now more readiness for dialogue with the United States.”

More important, when people say, “The most important thing America could do today to stabilize the Middle East is solve the Israel-Palestine conflict,” they are wrong. It’s second. The most important thing would be to resolve the Iran-U.S. conflict.

That would change the whole Middle East and open up the way to solving the Israel- alestine conflict, because Iran is the key backer of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah and Syria. Iran’s active help could also be critical for stabilizing Iraq.

This is why I oppose war with Iran. I favor negotiations. Isolating Iran like Castro’s Cuba has produced only the same result as in Cuba: strengthening Iran’s Castros. But for talks with Iran to bear fruit, we have to negotiate with Iran with leverage.

How do we get leverage? Make it clear that Iran can’t push us out of the gulf militarily; bring down the price of oil, which is key to the cockiness of Iran’s hard-line leadership; squeeze the hard-liners financially. But all this has to be accompanied with a clear declaration that the U.S. is not seeking regime change in Iran, but a change of behavior, that the U.S. wants to immediately restore its embassy in Tehran and that the first thing it will do is grant 50,000 student visas for young Iranians to study at U.S. universities.

Just do that — and then sit back and watch the most amazing debate explode inside Iran. You can bet the farm on it.

Who can challenge religious parties in Pashtun dominated areas of Pakistan?

Asfandyar Wali: Profile of Pakistan's Progressive Pashtun Politician
By Hassan Abbas
Terrorism Monitor: Volume 5, Issue 2 (February 1, 2007)

On January 10, Pakistan's secular and Pashtun nationalist Awami National Party (ANP) won a critical electoral battle in Bajaur Agency. The ANP political party is led by the seasoned politician Asfandyar Wali Khan. The election struck a blow to pro-Taliban elements in the region, and also marks the revival of a party that appeared to be hibernating during the recent Talibanization process. The Pakistani military's hidden alliance with religious political parties made it difficult to effectively tackle the Taliban threat in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in the United States. After 2003, the military opted for a show of brute force in Pakistan's tribal belt which created more problems than it solved. The ANP was routed in national and provincial elections in 2002 because anti-Musharraf and anti-American sentiments were at their peak leading to support for the religious alliance Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). The mistakes committed by the United States in Afghanistan in terms of not providing enough financial resources for reconstruction and overwhelming dependence on military options to tackle extremists also contributed toward the marginalization of the liberal and progressive forces in the region, including the ANP.

Nevertheless, the potency of Pashtun nationalist forces should not be underestimated. Given their checkered history and traditional support base, they are potentially an effective and viable political force to challenge the religious extremists in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the adjacent Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). This analysis profiles Asfandyar Wali and his party, which has shown determination in reversing the radical Islamist political trends in the Pashtun-dominated areas of Pakistan.

Background: History of the Awami National Party

The ANP was formed in 1986 through the merger of several left-leaning political parties. Khan Abdul Wali Khan (the father of Asfandyar Wali) was elected as its first president. Wali Khan, son of the legendary Pashtun political leader Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, died in 2006. Ghaffar Khan was known as Bacha Khan and as "Frontier Gandhi" because he was a close associate of India's leader Mahatma Gandhi. A believer in non-violence, Ghaffar Khan was an ardent supporter of the idea of a united, independent and secular India. To achieve this goal, he founded a political movement known as Khudai Khidmatgar (Servants of God), also commonly referred to as the Surkh Posh (Red Shirts), during the 1920s. It became a powerful force in the Pashtun-dominated region. The Pashtuns and tribal elders of the region, however, voted to join Pakistan in 1947, as the idea of the nation of Pakistan proved to be quite attractive to the Muslim identity felt among the majority of Pashtuns. Geographic disconnection with the newly emerged independent India also led many Pashtuns to opt for Pakistan, despite being adherents of Ghaffar Khan who was aligned with the Indian National Congress. Ghaffar Khan was thrown in jail by the newly formed state of Pakistan, yet Pashtun nationalism continued to remain very relevant to the politics of the area.

Ghaffar Khan, who had briefly championed the cause of Pashtunistan (an independent state for Pashtuns) in 1947, spent most of his life either in jail, on house arrest in Pakistan, or in exile in Kabul. He died in 1988 and was buried in Jalalabad, Afghanistan as per his wishes. His name is highly respected and popular among Pashtuns on both sides of the border.

Wali Khan was no different. Despite being called a traitor by some (due to his family's links with India and their brief campaign in 1947 for an independent Pashtunistan), he was an important political leader in his own right. He was a strong proponent of provincial autonomy and a leading light in the National Awami Party (NAP), a national political party with leftist inclinations. In the 1970 elections, NAP, led by Wali Khan, did well in the NWFP and in Balochistan province, earning a place in the ruling coalitions in both of the aforementioned provinces. These governments, however, were short lived as Wali Khan was again jailed and his party barred from politics by the federal government on the controversial pretext of conspiring against the state of Pakistan.

In summation, when the ANP emerged in 1986, the party was neither new to politics nor led by any armchair politician. Since then, it has participated in five national and provincial elections. It continued to have a presence in the National Assembly (except in 2002) and always had a fair representation in the NWFP assembly. For instance, in the NWFP legislature, out of a total of 80 seats, the ANP secured 10 seats in 1988, 23 seats in 1990, 18 seats in 1993 and 32 seats in 1997. In the 2002 elections, the ANP could manage only seven seats in an expanded assembly of 124 as a result of the fallout from U.S. involvement in Afghanistan.

Who is Asfandyar Wali?

Asfandyar Wali, the elected president of ANP, is also heir to the legacy of Ghaffar Khan. An astute politician, he has been an elected senator since 2003. Previously, he served in the NWFP provincial assembly (1990) and two national assemblies of Pakistan (1993, 1997).

He holds an MBA and was a political activist associated with the Pakhtun Student Federation during his college days. His home, Wali Bagh in Charsadda, was an ideal nursery for political training since this has been the headquarters of Pashtun nationalist forces for more than half a century. The political upheavals that his family faced groomed him further. During the 1990s, the ANP lost some of its credibility due to corruption scandals that it had been associated with while in the government. The party, however, was then run by Naseem Wali (wife of Wali Khan and stepmother of Asfandyar Wali). Therefore, Asfandyar's reputation escaped this stigma since he was not in the driver's seat of the party's decision-making process. Since then, some notorious and corrupt ANP leaders were sidelined (and in some cases removed from party positions) by Asfandyar Wali when he took over the party leadership in 2000.

In terms of political orientation, the ANP is a nationalist Pashtun party that aspires to make Pakistan a truly democratic state. It also pushes for provincial autonomy and social justice. It was one of the very few political forces in Pakistan that was openly critical of how the Afghan resistance against the former Soviet Union in the 1980s was labeled as a jihad and sponsored from Pakistan (with the help of U.S. and Saudi money). Framing the conflict in religious terms meant increased influence of Islamic parties and decreased relevance of secular parties like the ANP. The ANP remained critical of Pakistan's pro-Taliban policies in the pre-9/11 phase. Their warnings, however, fell on deaf ears.

In the present political context, the ANP is actively challenging the NWFP religious alliance MMA and is critical of Musharraf's policies in the tribal belt. Despite official obstacles, Asfandyar visited Pakistan's tribal areas in November 2006 to hold political consultations with his supporters to the dismay of pro-government tribal elders (Dawn, November 18, 2006). If Afghan President Hamid Karzai respects and trusts anyone in Pakistan, it is the ANP and Asfandyar Wali. The idea of a regional Pashtun peace jirga (that was discussed at the recent Bush-Musharraf-Karzai meeting in Washington) was a brainchild of the Asfandyar-Karzai dialogue. Asfandyar had articulated his support of this idea when he visited Washington in early 2006. The Pakistani government, however, is wary of this concept despite its commitment to the United States to undertake such an exercise since it fears that such an arrangement may lessen the Pakistani government's direct role in the Pashtun areas. Islamabad, therefore, is now backtracking by delaying and modifying the spirit of the regional jirga idea.

In Pakistan, it is difficult to challenge the military-intelligence establishment. Asfandyar, however, continues to do so, and recently he argued that the Pakistani government, instead of introducing new political or economic reforms in the tribal areas, has turned the region into a battlefield by using it as "a sanctuary for their guests" (Daily Times, September 28, 2006). Responding to Pakistan's recent proposal to fence and mine the Pak-Afghan border in an effort to control the Taliban's movements, he bluntly called it a conspiracy to divide the Pashtuns.

An Interview with Asfandyar Wali: A Way Out

In a telephone interview with Asfandyar Wali on January 13, he argued that a Pashtun peace jirga involving Pashtun nationalists, civil society actors and religious players from both sides is the last hope for the region. He interpreted the recent ANP victory in the Bajaur elections as a bright spot in the overall troubling scenario and made a case for allowing liberal political parties to operate and function in the tribal areas. This can only happen, he emphasized, if the Political Parties Act of Pakistan is extended to FATA.

In reference to the causes of conflict in the tribal areas, he lamented the fact that only pro-government maliks (tribal elders who are on the government payroll) are engaged and mushiraan ("people's" maliks who are financially independent) were completely ignored. This led to a failure in resolving the crisis in FATA. Furthermore, he thinks that Pakistan should have distinguished between the pre-9/11 foreigners who are by now well settled in the area and the post-9/11 foreigners that came in to find a sanctuary.

He also believes that fundamentalist forces are now battling for influence and territory in Sind and Punjab provinces. He was very confident that the "ANP is in a position to take on MMA in NWFP and tribal areas, but we are not in a position to take on the establishment." When asked what his expectations are from the international community and the United States, he replied: "the international community should ensure a level playing field for all political forces in the region." Elaborating on this further, he narrated a humorous Pashto proverb that can be roughly translated as: "I don't need any charity, but please chain your dog."

Conclusion

Critics of ANP argue that supporting Asfandyar and his party might lead to the cessation of the NWFP from Pakistan and even to the unification of Pashtun areas in Pakistan and Afghanistan. This is unlikely since the Pashtuns of Pakistan are well entrenched in the political system and have been integrated socially and culturally into the national fabric of the country. Another relevant criticism fired at the ANP is its provincial or nationalist identity. Since its inception, however, the ANP has always had some representation in the National Assembly and the Senate of Pakistan and has never called for a separate homeland. What it has asked for is more provincial autonomy, which is within the restraints and provisions of the federal constitution of Pakistan.

The ANP as a political party, however, needs better organization. To be able to pursue its liberal and progressive agenda it will have to join hands with other secular forces in the NWFP as well as in other parts of Pakistan. The Bajaur by-election was a test case for the ANP. The seat was vacated by Haroon ur Rashid, an MMA representative who resigned his seat in protest against the bombing of a madrassa in which 80 people were killed (Daily Times, January 15). The ANP won because the MMA boycotted the election and other political parties (the Pakistan Peoples Party and the Muslim League-N) supported its candidate. Still, it was a success since a member of Pakistan Muslim League-Q, supported by President Musharraf's followers, was also a candidate.

The crux of the matter is that Asfandyar Wali and the ANP are potentially capable of reversing the Talibanization trend in the tribal areas provided that the Pakistani establishment recognizes the high stakes involved, such as the growing influence of religious extremists in the region and the increasing number of suicide attacks within Pakistan itself. One may also hope that U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' policy statement declaring "success in Afghanistan is our top priority" leads to significant financial investment in the development of Afghanistan, crippling the appeal of the Taliban in the region (The Nation, January 18). Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's latest announcement that President Bush would ask Congress for $10.6 billion in aid for Afghanistan will, if approved, be a step forward for peace and stability in the region.

Shia-Sunni Conflict in Iraq

Senate Foreign Relations Committee
January 17, 2007: Vali Nasr
Professor, Naval Postgraduate School and
Adjunct Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations

Since 2003 Shia-Sunni conflict has emerged as a major divide in Middle East politics, and radically changed the regional context for U.S. policy. Sectarian violence is no longer just limited to Iraq, but has expanded in scope to influence regional development from the Persian Gulf to Lebanon, adding new complexity to the conflicts in the region and presenting a serious foreign policy challenge to the United States. Taking stock of the risks and visible dangers that this change presents is a significant challenge facing U.S. policy in the Middle East.
In Iraq sectarian violence has derailed the effort to build a viable state, and is today the single most important threat to the future of that country. In Lebanon following the summer war between Israel and Hezbollah a sectarian rift opened between Shias on the one hand, and Sunnis and Christians on the other. That rift is deepening as Hezbollah pushes to unseat the Sunni-led government in Beirut. Lebanon and Iraq have in turn escalated tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The competition between the two regional rivals has in recent months taken an increasingly sectarian tone. The sectarian competition even extends to extremist jihadi organizations associated with al-Qaeda. These groups have supported al-Qaeda elements in Iraq, and have intensified their anti-Shia rhetoric and attacks in the Middle East and South Asia.

All this suggests that Iraq has introduced sectarianism to conflicts and rivalries the Middle East. The Shia-Sunni rivalry in religious as well as secular arenas will likely be an important factor in the near future. This trend was clearly evident during the war in Lebanon last summer when Hezbollah’s growing influence elicited a sectarian reaction from Arab capitals as well as a number of extremist jihadi web sites. The condemnation of Hezbollah as a Shia organization indicated that although the conflict itself was not new, the response to it was not decided by the Arab-Israeli issue alone but sectarian posturing.

For the United States the rising sectarian tensions present a number of challenges:

1. Sectarian violence will determine the fate of Iraq and what that will mean for U.S. standing and interests in the Middle East.

2. Sectarianism will play an important role in deciding regional alliances in the Middle East and how various states and sub-state actors will act. Sectarianism will compete with as well as interact with other concerns such as the Arab-Israeli issue, political and economic reform, and support for U.S. policies, most notably the global war on terror. This will complicate the management of U.S. interests.

3. Sectarian conflict will color relations of Middle East states, but conflicts where they occur are likely to be waged by non-state actors—militias and political organizations. This will contribute to regional instability and increases the likelihood of violence.

4. Sectarian conflict is a radicalizing force. Shia and Sunni militias will inevitably gravitate toward more radical ideas to justify their actions. In Iraq, the greatest violence against Shias was perpetuated by the Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab Zarqawi and his al-Qaeda forces. In the Arab world and Pakistan violent anti-Shiism is the domain of radical pro-al-Qaeda clerics, websites and armed groups. Sectarianism—especially among Sunnis—is a driver for radical jihadi ideology. Among the Shias in Iraq sectarian violence has had a similar effect. It has shifted power within that community to the radical forces of Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army. The specter of U.S. confrontation with Shia militias and Iran will likely accelerate this trend.

5. The sectarian dimension of regional politics is of direct relevance to the growing tensions in U.S.-Iran relations. Conflict between the United States—in alliance with Sunni Arab regimes who view the Iranian challenge in sectarian terms—and Iran will exacerbate sectarian tensions, and further embed them in regional conflicts.

Roots of the Problem


Shias and Sunnis represent the oldest and most important sectarian divide in Islam, the origins of which go back to the seventh century to a disagreement about who the Prophet Muhammad’s legitimate successors were. Over time, the two sects developed their own distinct conception of Islamic teachings and practice which has given each sect its identity and outlook on society and politics. Shias are a minority of 10-15 percent of the Muslim world, but constitute a sizable portion of those in the arc from Lebanon to Pakistan—some 150 million people in all. They account for about 90 percent of Iranians, 70 percent of Bahrainis, 65 percent of Iraqis, 40 percent of Lebanese, and a sizable portion of the people living in the Persian Gulf region. Despite their demographic weight outside Iran the Shias had never enjoyed power.

The Significance of Developments in Iraq

No where was the plight of the Shia more evident than in Iraq. Under Saddam Iraq was a sectarian state that had routinely brutalized Shias. After the first Iraq war in 1991 the Kurdish areas of Iraq were removed from Saddam’s control. In the Arab south that he ruled the Shia portion of the population is even larger, approximating 80 percent. After that war the Shias in the south rose in a rebellion which was brutally suppressed with as many as 300,000 Shias dying and many more escaping to Iran. Between 1991 and 2003 Saddam’s rule was sustained by suppression of Shias. The sectarianism that we see in Iraq has its roots in the sectarianism that was practiced by Saddam’s regime.

The U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003 was of symbolic importance to the Middle East. The war ended minority Sunni rule in Iraq and empowered Shias, and this has in turn led to a Shia revival across the Middle East that as a cultural and political force will shape regional politics. Iraq has encouraged the region’s Shias to demand greater rights and representation, but also to identify themselves as members of a region-wide community that extends beyond state borders. The Shia revival has also raised Iran’s status as the region’s largest Shia actor. It was for this reason that Shias initially welcomed America’s role in Iraq—the most important Shia spiritual leader, the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani encouraged the Shia to embrace the political process introduced to Iraq by the United States by voting and joining the newly established security forces.

However, the shift in the sectarian balance of power met with Sunni resistance, first in Iraq but increasingly in Arab capitals. The fall from power of Sunnis in Iraq has ended their hegemonic domination of regional politics and diminished the power of Sunni regimes and ruling communities. This has led to a Sunni backlash that is reflected in the ferocity of insurgent attacks in Iraq since 2003, criticism of U.S. policy in Iraq in friendly Arab capitals and unwillingness to help the new Shia-led Iraqi government, and growing anti-Shia and anti-Iranian tenor of radical jihadi propaganda.

The insurgency that the United States confronted during the first two years of the occupation was largely Sunni in character. It drew on the Sunni belief in manifest destiny to rule, anger at loss of power in Baghdad, and the resources of Sunni tribes, foreign fighters, radical ideologies, and Ba’ath party and former Sunni officer corps to wage a campaign of violence against the U.S. occupation and also to prevent the Shia consolidation of power in the belief that a hasty U.S. departure will lead to a collapse of the current government and restoration of Sunni rule.
For the first two years of the occupation the Shia showed great restraint in the face of insurgent attacks on Shia targets, heeding the call of Ayatollah Sistani not to “fall into the trap of a sectarian war,” but also trusting that the United States would defeat the insurgency. All that changed in 2006 as Shias abandoned restraint favoring retaliation. Radical voices of the like of Muqtada al-Sadr drowned Sistani’s call for restraint and moderation. Two developments were instrumental in changing Shia attitude:

1. The bombing of the Shia holy shrine in Samarrah in February 2006. The Samarrah bombing was a psychological turning point for Iraqi Shias. It gravely threatened the Shia’s sense of security and put to question the feasibility of reconciliation with Sunnis. It also raised doubts in Shia minds about the United States’ ability and willingness to defeat the insurgency—whose violent capabilities and ferocious anti-Shiism was undeniable. Many also questioned the wisdom of exercising restraint, arguing that it had only emboldened the insurgency. The doubt provided an opening for Shia militias to step into the breach to provide security to Shia communities, but also to establish a “balance of terror” by attacking Sunni civilians. Iraq never recovered from the impact of Samarrah and fell victim to the vicious cycle of sectarian violence. The political process failed to focus the country back on reconciliation.

2. The Shia anger and reaction to the Samarrah bombing was aggravated by a shift in U.S. strategy in Iraq that would alienate the Shia and deepen their distrust of the United States. This would in turn reduce American influence over Shia politics—now at its lowest point—and raise the stock of anti-American forces of Muqtada al-Sadr, and his Mahdi Army, which would escalate attacks on Sunnis as it spread its control over Baghdad and the Shia south.

The United States had hoped that the December 2005 elections would turn Iraq around. The United States had persuaded Sunnis to participate in the elections and join a national unity government, hoping to thereby end or at least damp down the insurgency, but that did not come to pass. Hoping to win the support of Sunni politicians Washington began to distance itself from the Shia. It pressured the Shia on the issue of their militias, as well as the unpopular notion of amnesty for former Ba’athists. Shias resisted. Especially after Samarrah they saw the insurgency rather than their own militias as the problem—Shia militias, they pointed out, were often the only forces effectively defending Shia neighborhoods against car bombs. Shias also saw the overt U.S. push for a national-unity government as coddling the Sunnis and, worse yet, rewarding the insurgency. With the insurgency in full swing, Shias worried that American resolve was weakening. This convinced them more than before that they needed their armed militias—reflected in their cool reception to the surge of 20,000 troops announced by the administration.

2006 proved to be a turning point in U.S.-Shia relations. U.S. strategy during that year became one of shifting the focus of its military operations from fighting the insurgency to contain Shia militias in the sectarian fight in Baghdad. The Shia saw this as a tilt away from them toward the Sunnis—addressing their security demands rather than those of Shias. That this happened at a time of great anxiety in the Shia community following the Samarrah bombing did not help the U.S. position. In particular, that a year on the U.S. strategy of working more closely with Sunnis had not weakened the insurgency—which still by some estimates accounts for 80 percent of U.S. casualties in Iraq—nor had it reduced the rate of attacks on Shia targets. What it achieved was to create doubts as to whether the United States was a reliable ally. Those doubts benefited Muqtada al-Sadr and weakened moderate Shia voices.
It is now clear that Shias are not willing to give up on their militias—which they believe is the only credible bulwark against sectarian attacks by the insurgency without security guarantees from the United States. That means that the United States will get cooperation from Shias on the issue of militias only after it has shown gains in containing the insurgency. Shias will resist disarming so long as the insurgency is a threat.

The radicalization of Shia politics is likely to worsen if the U.S. military directly targets Shias forces in Baghdad. That could provoke a Shia insurgency in Baghdad and the Iraqi south—among the largest population group in Iraq—which would present the United States with a vastly broader security challenge, one that can overwhelm U.S. forces. The United States today is hard pressed to defeat the insurgency that it is facing, but runs the danger of provoking a potentially larger one.

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How to Rescue Afghanistan?

Discarding An Afghan Opportunity
By Selig S. Harrison
Washington Post: January 30, 2007

The British Raj learned the hard way a century ago that the Pashtuns, Afghanistan's largest and historically dominant ethnic group, will unite to fight a foreign occupation force simply because it is foreign. Applying this lesson to the Afghan crisis today, British generals have been attempting in vain to change a high-profile U.S.-NATO military strategy that is helping the Taliban consolidate Pashtun support in southern Afghanistan.

Bombing and strafing attacks on suspected Taliban hideouts killed at least 4,643 Afghan civilian noncombatants from October 2001 to Oct. 1, 2006, according to an exhaustive study by University of New Hampshire economist Marc W. Herold. The result has been the steady growth of anti-American sentiment focused on the U.S.-backed regime of President Hamid Karzai.

"The cruelty is too much," Karzai declared last month. In tears, Karzai said that the coalition forces are "killing our children. We can't prevent the terrorists from coming from Pakistan, we can't stop the coalition from bombing the terrorists, and our children are dying because of this."

The British model for a new approach to defusing the Taliban insurgency has unfolded recently in the Musa Qala district of Helmand province. Following bitter clashes last summer between British and Taliban forces, the Musa Qala tribal council, acting with British approval and backed by Helmand's governor, Mohammed Daud, negotiated a cease-fire in early September that led to a 15-point peace agreement. The accord provided for an end to the Taliban offensive, the withdrawal of British forces and the creation of a local militia that would replace the ineffectual central government police and army units in the district. After peace prevailed for 35 days, the British pulled out on Oct. 17.

Peace still prevails. Nevertheless, Karzai, under intense U.S. pressure, fired Daud and appointed a new governor who disowned the accord as a sellout to the Taliban.

The British commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan stands by the agreement, but U.S. spokesmen say that his American successor will order British forces to resume fighting in Musa Qala when he takes over shortly.

Attacking the peace deal, U.S. Ambassador Ronald Neumann declared that "if you have an area that is under the Afghan government flag but is not under the actual authority of the Afghan government, then you are losing in a very big way." Other critics emphasize that Taliban fighters were not disarmed under the agreement.

But the accord has given tribal elders the whip hand over the Taliban in the area and is so popular that many neighboring districts want to emulate it. Why criticize the agreement before the elders' ability to contain Taliban influence could be tested? Is it really "losing in a very big way" if Pashtun leaders make local peace deals that work? Only if "victory" is defined in terms of an unrealistic goal of rapid centralization in a still-feudal society that has never been centralized.

For three centuries the Afghan state has been just barely a state, and ethnic and tribal communities paid obeisance to Kabul only if it accorded them autonomy. The communist regime installed by Moscow in 1978 aroused bitter opposition by attempting to centralize overnight. Now the U.S.-backed Karzai government is making a similar mistake by rushing to create a centralized regime instead of keying the process to the gradual development of a national economic infrastructure.

The central government has a critical role to play in combating the Taliban, but primarily through more effective economic assistance, with less accompanying corruption, not through military intervention that bypasses the tribal structure. The fledgling national police and army have a role in areas where tribal leaders want their help. But they are tainted in the eyes of many Pashtuns by their identification with a Kabul regime dominated by non-Pashtun ethnic rivals.

In 2001 the United States lined up with the Tajik ethnic minority, whose small military force, the Northern Alliance, helped dislodge the Pashtun-based Taliban and has subsequently dominated the Karzai government. Tajik generals and their proxies still control the army as well as key secret police and intelligence agencies hated by the Pashtuns. Karzai, a Pashtun, has attempted to soften Tajik domination with Pashtun appointments to top security jobs, but the real power remains in the hands of a U.S.-backed Tajik clique.

The Taliban is effectively exploiting Pashtun dissatisfaction with Kabul, recruiting many of its fighters from disaffected tribes in the Ghilzai branch of the Pashtuns, who resent the favoritism Karzai has shown to higher-status tribes such as his own Durranis. Mullah Omar, the key Taliban leader, is a Ghilzai.

But there are two other important reasons for the Taliban's growing strength: the support it is getting from Pakistan and Pashtun anger over the civilian casualties resulting from the indiscriminate use of U.S. air power.

To prevent a continued Taliban upsurge, the United States should condition future economic and military aid to Islamabad on meaningful measures to shut down Taliban camps and staging areas on the Pakistani side of the border. At the same time, the Pentagon should shift to a low-profile military strategy in which air attacks are the rare exception and peace initiatives like those of the Musa Qala elders are welcomed.

The writer covered Afghanistan as South Asia bureau chief of The Post and is the author of "Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal." He is director of the Asia program at the Center for International Policy.

Former Indian Intelligence Chief Speaks...

Army strongest political party in Pak: Ex-RAW chief
Press Trust of India
New Delhi, January 30, 2007

Describing Pakistan Army as the "strongest political party", a former RAW chief has said stifling of the mainstream democratic forces and their exclusion from the proposed general election would lead India's western neighbour towards Talibanisation.

"So long as its rulers keep the mainstream democratic forces stifled and lean heavily on the mullah nexus for their own survival, Pakistan will inevitably slip towards Talibanisation", Vikram Sood, former Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat, has said.

Observing that the mullah-military tie-up "that stifles democracy" would remain a stumbling block in Indo-Pak relations, he said the army was the "strongest political party in Pakistan" and warned that anti-incumbency being a strong factor was bound the adversely affect the country.

"This is bound to happen in Pakistan one day and that would affect the entire country where the political systems have been cramped for so long", Sood said in an article in the forthcoming issue of the premier journal Indian Defence Review".

He referred to the spate of assassination attempts, suicide attacks and events in Balochistan, Wazsiristan and Bajaur were "not a happy signal for the Pak armed forces. The anti-incumbency factor as we call it here can afflict the Pakistan Army as well".

He warned that Pakistan getting closer to Russia and even Israel was also a possibility.

Pakistan must realise that Kashmir and India "may seem caught up in an unhappy marriage today but a marriage it is and it is not going to be annulled. This understanding and then acceptance is long way away in Pakistan", Sood said.

He said a booming Indian economy with its 300 million middle class would only lead to "greater integration of regions including Kashmir, draw the average Kashmiri into the Indian mainstream and lessen the appeal or fear of radical Islamic terrorist wishing to Talibanise Kashmir".

On Bangladesh, the officer expressed doubts about free and fair polls, its results, will these be the last elections, will the Army take over and will the country turn increasingly radical, pro-Pak and inimical to India.

"Bangladesh, surrounded on three sides by India and crucial to India's economic development, has the choice either to become the birthplace for the next Islamic revolution or a modern economic state", Sood said, adding that closer ties with New Delhi would generate economic benefits to Dhaka.

Observing that all of India's neighbours were among the top 25 on the Failed State Index for 2006 prepared by the Washington-based Fund for Peace, he said this did not augur well for India.

Demographic pressures, refugee influx, a legacy of groups seeking vengeance, a security apparatus operating like a state within a state and other problems would continue to affect it, Sood said warning that "the year ahead is not going to be easy" for India.

Pakistan still in the "eye of the storm"

Pakistan in the ‘eye of storm’: Mushahid
By Khalid Hasan
Daily Times, February 1, 2007

WASHINGTON: Senator Mushahid Hussain told a community meeting here on Tuesday that one must not lose sight of the fact that Pakistan has been in the “eye of the storm” for the last quarter century, having fought the last battle of the 20th century Cold War and the first war of the 21at century against terrorism.

Pakistan, he emphasised, is playing the pivotal role in the war against radical and extremist forces and ideas. The trading of charges must end and the blame game being played today should come to a stop. Failures of others should not be dumped at Pakistan’s door, nor should Pakistan be held responsible for the inadequacies of others, he added. He said those involved in the present conflict must not repeat the mistakes of the past, though that was what appeared to be happening. He was of the view that the United States has “outsourced” the war in Afghanistan to those who do not have their heart in it, nor the determination to win.

Mushahid rejected charges that Pakistan is backing the Taliban. “Why should we back the Taliban? How is it in our national interest to do so? Is it logical that Pakistan should be on the side of those who have tried to kill President Musharrf more than once – and very nearly succeeded – and Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz at least once? There have been three suicide bombings, including one in the heart of Islamabad.” He said.

Referring to the bill just passed by the US House of Representatives and sent to the Senate, asking for sanctions against Pakistan in case it does not comply with certain US wishes, he said it is time the United States decides who its friends are and who its friends are not. He added, “I hope Mr Negraponte does not hold Pakistan responsible for the return of the Sandanistas in Nicaragua.”

Mushahid, who is chairman of the Senate foreign relations committee, referring to the oft-repeated demand from Washington that Pakistan should “do more” to block the Taliban and scotch their resurgence, said, “I think the US needs to ‘do more’. It should review its policy, make course corrections and understand that the three basic recommendations of the Iraq Study Group apply in equal measure to Afghanistan. They are: there can be no military solution; neighbouring countries like Iran and Syria should be involved in the peace process; and Washington should talk to the resistance.” He disagreed with a member of the audience, who claimed that Pakistan is “subservient” to the US.

Mushahid asserted that Pakistan has always acted in its national interest and on numerous occasions it has refused to go along with Washington’s wishes. He added, “It is the US that treats Pakistan as a girl friend for a rainy day.” To another question, his reply was, “Generals, journalists and politicians do not retire”.

US has no strategic interest in united Iraq - Bolton

US has no strategic interest in united Iraq-Bolton
29 Jan 2007 Reuters

PARIS, Jan 29 (Reuters) - The United States has no strategic interest in ensuring that Iraq remain united, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton said in an interview published on Monday.

Bolton, a close ally of U.S. President George W. Bush who stepped down after Democrats made it clear they would block his renomination, also told Le Monde newspaper the United States should have handed power over to Iraqis more quickly.

"The United States has no strategic interest in the fact that there be one Iraq or three Iraqs," the newspaper quoted Bolton as saying.

"We have a strategic interest in ensuring that what emerges is not a completely failed state that becomes a refuge for terrorists, or a terrorist state," he said.

"In retrospect, we should have transferred authority to the Iraqis more quickly after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein," Bolton said, adding: "We did the Iraqis a disservice by depriving them of political responsiblities."

As for who led the country now, Bolton said Washington had no interest in any particular setup.