What the Saudis Want from Annapolis

What the Saudis Want from Annapolis
By Scott Macleod/Paris, TIME, Sunday, Nov. 25, 2007

Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal tells TIME that he is optimistic about this week's Middle East peace conference in Annapolis because of what he calls U.S. determination "to see this through." Continuous U.S. mediation in post-conference negotiations, including pressure on Israel, he says, "can turn things around" and lead to a comprehensive settlement before President Bush's term expires in 13 months.

But, speaking in Paris just hours before his scheduled arrival in the U.S., Prince Saud warned Israelis that they would have no peace until Israel withdrew from Arab territories captured in the 1967 war. Saud, who will be the highest-ranking Saudi to ever attend a peace conference with the Jewish state, added that he would not shake the hand of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert or make a symbolic visit to Jerusalem before a peace deal. "The hand that has been extended to us has been a fist so far," he said. He warned Israelis against seeking a surrender, adding, "We don't need a Versailles for the Arab world, a peace that will only be an instigator of future wars."

TIME: Are you optimistic about Annapolis?
Saud: One of the elements of optimism is the sense of determination of the United States to see this through. Peace without the complete and direct involvement of the United States is impossible. The assurance that it is going to be a comprehensive peace that is pursued, to tackle the main issues of borders, Jerusalem, refugees, is certainly one of the elements.

Did you have reservations about attending?
We were fearful of failure. For us, of course, and what the turn of events after a failure would be. But also for the United States. We were anxious that the credibility of the United States is maintained.

Why were you afraid for yourselves?
We have assiduously worked for a strategy for peace. We have convinced our people of the viability of that strategy. If failure occurred, people would turn away from this strategy. Undoubtedly, failure will increase the trend toward radicalism, and undoubtedly it will provide terrorists with further means of recruitment.

Are you confident in the Bush Administration's steering of the peace process?
We have confidence in that. I hope we are proven right. Both sides alone won't reach an agreement. It is obvious from the last 60 years of experience with negotiations. With their continuous involvement, and serious intent, this can turn things around [if the United States really is going to put its weight behind its proposals].

Have Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas achieved anything in their talks?
No, that is one of the great disappointments. Everybody had hoped by the time they reached the conference, that Olmert and Abbas had reached some kind of understanding especially about what needs to be done on the ground, issues like a freeze on settlements, the wall, and other issues that make Palestinian life easier. How reasonable is it to assume that you can have negotiations for removing the occupation and at the same time the Israelis are acquiring more land and building more settlements? Here is an obvious area where an intermediary has to step in and say, "No, this can't be."

Do you think Olmert is sincere?
Israel has to make a choice. They have lived for the last 60 years basing their policy on force. Yet they are not closer to achieving peace or security than they have been in the past. It is time for them to try a different policy, a policy of accepting to live with the Palestinians and live in the neighborhood. We don't need a Versailles for the Arab world, a peace that will only be an instigator of future wars.

What do you think of Olmert?
I don't know the man.

He responded positively to the Arab peace initiative and Saudi involvement in the peace process.
Does he accept the principles of the peace proposal totally? Withdrawal for total peace? This will be a test for him in this next conference.

Will you try to get to know him at the conference, shake his hand and have a chat?
No, this is not theater. We are going seriously for peace negotiations. We are not going there just to take pictures of somebody shaking somebody's hand. We can't give false impressions to people. The hand that has been extended to us has been a fist so far. Once it opens for peace, it will be shaken.

Shaking his hand could send a signal to Israelis that there is a partner for peace.
We are there to support Mahmoud Abbas, the Syrians and the Lebanese to get their territory. We are there in all honesty, if peace is achieved, to pursue that what was promised in the Arab peace plan. That is normalization, after the peace. We are not going to be party to gestures that could be interpreted as normalization before peace is attained.

What will the Saudi role be after the Annapolis conference?
Saudi Arabia is not looking for a unique role for itself to play. We will not of course negotiate in place of the Palestinians or the Syrians or Lebanese. But we will help in any way that we can if asked by these sides to help.

Would you visit Jerusalem?
No. Not before peace. We will visit only Jerusalem that is liberated.

What is your time frame for reaching a comprehensive peace agreement?
The time frame is very clear. It is until the end of the Bush Administration.

Can it happen?
Of course. Every man on the street and every woman on the street, not only the politicians, knows what the settlement will look like in the end. It just needs the action to bring it about. It looks like the 1967 border, with delineation of that border. It looks for a negotiated solution for the Palestinian [refugees] return. It looks for a return of East Jerusalem as part of the Palestinian territories.

And Arab acceptance of Israel's legitimacy as a state?
Of course.

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Also See:
Abbas' Road to Capitulation: Annapolis and Beyond By Kim Bullimore - The Palestine Chronicle

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