Tuesday, July 31, 2007

India-Iran Relations

India said to have intelligence posts in Iran: report
By Khalid Hasan: Daily Times, August 1, 2007

WASHINGTON: India has developed intelligence outposts in Iran, including the Indian consulate in Zahedan and a relatively new consulate in Bandar Abbas, which provides India significant power-projection advantages in any future conflict with Pakistan, according to Christine Fair of the US Institute of Peace.

She writes in the current issue of Washington Quarterly “in the past, India helped Iran develop submarine batteries that were more effective in the warm-weather Persian Gulf waters than its Russian-manufactured batteries and is planning to sell Iran the Konkurs anti-tank missile.”

The South Asia scholar is quoted in an article by Bret Stephens appearing in the Wall Street Journal on Tuesday. He is unimpressed by US undersecretary of state Nicholas Burns’ defence of the 123-Agreement recently concluded between the Indian and US government. Burns argued, “Unlike Iran...India has not violated its nuclear obligations”. Stephens points out that on March 19 DefenseNews ran a report about an Indo-Iran agreement, “which follows the broader strategic partnership accord the two countries signed in 2003, emerged from high-level talks held here during the March 4-9 visit of Rear Admiral Sajjad Kouchaki Badlani, commander of Iran’s Navy”. In September 2004, the US imposed sanctions on Chaudhary Surendar and YSR Prasad, both former chairmen of India’s state-run Nuclear Power Corporation, “for allegedly passing nuclear secrets to Tehran”. Though the sanctions on Dr Surendar were later dropped, they remain in force against Dr Prasad, who is believed to have passed on “the technology needed to extract tritium from heavy-water nuclear reactors”. Iran is currently building such a reactor in Arak. Tritium can be used to boost the yields of atomic bombs.

Stephens notes that last year, the State Department slapped sanctions on two Indian companies for selling Iran precursor chemicals for rocket fuel and chemical weapons. In April, the Department of Justice released a 15-count indictment against two Indian individuals “on charges of supplying the Indian government with controlled technology,” including “electrical components that could have applications in missile guidance and firing systems”. Advocates of the US nuclear deal with India recognise these facts, but they argue that they are largely driven by India’s need for energy, which explains the 700-mile gas pipeline being built between India and Iran.

Stephens believes that India’s relationship with Iran is driven as much by the desire to encircle Pakistan and gain access to Afghanistan as it is by energy concerns. Then, too, nuclear power, which can only provide base load electrical demand, cannot by itself supplant the need for hydrocarbons. “Any time you increase the base load generating capacity of a country, you generally must increase the amount of peak load capacity to match it,” according to non-proliferation expert Henry Sokolski. “And the most efficient peak load generators are natural-gas fired.” Put simply, it’s hard to see how building nuclear power will reduce India’s interest in Iranian natural gas, Stephens points out. He concludes, “But if Congress is going to punch a hole in the NPT to accommodate India — with all the moral hazard that entails for the non-proliferation regime — it should get something in return. Getting India to drop, and drop completely, its presumptively ceremonial military ties to Iran isn’t asking a lot.”

For complete article of Christine Fair in Washington Quarterly, click here

Is India, or Will it Be, a Responsible International Stakeholder?

Is India, or Will it Be, a Responsible International Stakeholder?
Xenia Dormandy; Washington Quarterly, Summer 2007, Volume 30, No. 3

Xenia Dormandy is executive director for research at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University and former director for South Asia at the National Security Council.

It has become a cliché that the key strategic challenges facing Washington and the wider international community, such as energy, water, terrorism, economic development, and nonproliferation, cannot be solved by the United States alone. Although the United States unarguably retains its post–Cold War preeminent position, events since the September 11 attacks have shown the limitations of Washington’s hard and soft power. Meanwhile, the power of Europe and Japan are waning as they face internal distractions that limit their influence, while China’s is rising globally and in Asia, arguably the most important region to the United States strategically. China’s increasingly high military spending has built strong and capable armed forces, and its economic power is developing swiftly, with annual growth averaging nearly 10 percent over the past 20 years. From a low following Beijing’s crackdown on the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, China’s influence is growing as well.

These power fluctuations compel the United States to seek out like-minded allies that will proactively help to resolve global as well as Asian challenges. In September 2005, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick asked whether China would rise peacefully to become a “responsible stakeholder” that “recognize[s] that the international system sustains their peaceful prosperity, so [that] they work to sustain that system.” He went on in the speech to solicit China’s cooperation on a number of global issues, including North Korea, nonproliferation, and terrorism. Considering India’s significant rise over the past few years, the same question could be asked of India. Largely unnoticed by the global community, India has ascended to the world stage over the past 15 years, building on its economic reforms of the early 1990s and nuclear tests in 1998. In addition to an economic growth rate second only to China’s, at 8 percent annually over the past three years, New Delhi continues to retain its position as leader and cofounder of the Non- Aligned Movement (NAM) and unofficial head of the developing world. India has the third-largest army, fourth-largest air force, and seventh-largest navy worldwide and is eagerly lobbying to be considered a global player, actively seeking a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

Both President George W. Bush and then–Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee have described the bilateral relationship as that of “natural partners.” The United States has made India one of its central foreign policy foci and a powerful success story, especially since President Bill Clinton’s triumphal five-day visit in 2000. Considering its capabilities, will, interests, and values, India would seem to make an ideal partner in the region and even globally. Will India live up to the U.S. definition of an “international stakeholder”? What might be the constraints on its desire or ability to do so?

For Complete article (pdf), click here

A US Alliance With One Man: Paula Newberg



A US Alliance With One Man
Turmoil in Pakistan’s government may make a change in leadership inevitable
Paula R. Newberg; YaleGlobal, 31 July 2007

WASHINGTON: Trouble, we're told, comes in threes. But for Pakistan,this year has brought twice this number of problems - with more, no doubt, to come. Rising border instabilities with Afghanistan, renegade Islamic militancy in the heart of the capital, and a resurgent Taliban - the bread and butter of Pakistan's relationship with the US - have been overshadowed by the deepening problems of Pakistan's failing governance. General Pervez Musharraf's claimed prerogative has already provoked the judiciary to crisis. Rising civic opposition to the militarized executive branch exposed deep cracks in the army's edifice, and the mangled political system is ill- repared to accommodate the return of civilian politics.

Indeed, until the Supreme Court reversed his dismissal of the chief justice, Musharraf appeared to believe that constitutional confrontation would give him control over anticipated elections. But it is the sheer absence of control - even under conditions of army command - that pushed Musharraf to open negotiations with exiled former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto for her return to Pakistan and made 2007 a critical year for Pakistan at home and abroad.

Phrased simply, Musharraf framed the vision of the state over which he now presides when he seized power in 1999. He has since created a political system that does not work and a political environment that fosters tremendous domestic confusion and unintentionally catalyzes the political opposition. In this, he has been aided and abetted, since 2001, by foreign allies who believe their own needs trump those of
Pakistan's citizens.

As politics crumble in Pakistan, foreign support for Musharraf appears to brush aside Pakistan's needs. Those who consider withdrawing support for the general, however, may fear the forfeiture of their regional interests and perhaps the unraveling of Pakistan's internal security. Until Pakistan resolves the question of how to govern the country, everything else hangs by an ever-thinning thread. Driven by the exigencies of the immediate and by inertia favoring the known, the general's foreign backers, including the US, may drift toward political tragedy.

In some ways, Pakistan's current problems aren't new. Military governments have taught Pakistanis - and should have taught the world - the futile art of illegitimate army rule. Since the 1950s, promises of military discipline and praetorian strategy have never been fulfilled, even though foreign allies often encouraged this form of central rule. Musharraf, a self-described moderate modernizer, created a new kind of corrupted politics by appropriating the vocabulary of generals Ayub Khan, founder of Pakistan's handshake military-industrial complex, and Zia ul Haq, founder of recondite military-mullah relationships.

Today, the diffuse relationship between religion and the state has become dangerously unstable. Almost all civic institutions, and many of the country's largest businesses, are run by military men. As malign as the global anti-terror campaign may have been to Pakistan - where the war on terror is a serious war - Musharraf inflicted the primary injuries when he appropriated the offices of president and army chief.

Such tactics create vulnerabilities where they are most hazardous. Political manipulations led to the rise of Islamist parties in the Frontier - beyond the control of Afghanistan, the US and, ultimately, the army. Claiming to neutralize politics, Musharraf exiled party leaders Bhutto and Mian Nawaz Sharif; found a pliable prime minister; mimicked a 1960s-era electoral system that effectively disabled political parties; and then patronized the rudderless Muslim League,
along with the Karachi-based and occasionally gun-happy Muttahida Qaumi Movement, to achieve a limp parliamentary majority.

Every action failed. Parliament is restive, party members clamor for the return of their leaders and younger generations - the majority of Pakistanis - may well turn their backs on old-school politics anyway.

For foreign interlocutors - the US, China, the European Union and Japan - such machinations may seem old hat: As long as Musharraf copied the familiar, the outcomes were not surprising. To the degree that policies based on fear and convenience underscored government actions, they, too, were familiar - fear that militant Islamists would rise if the army did not keep them at bay, fear that a return to party politics would compromise Pakistan's security.

But Musharraf's judgment backfired, and the creeping blandishments of impatient authoritarianism wreaked havoc. Four months after Musharraf fired the chief justice for giving a judicial forum to legitimate questions, the Supreme Court stood its ground, unveiling the lie beneath his vendetta and giving sustenance to Pakistan's civic opposition.

The next day, the government proved incapable of restraining the extremist Red Mosque in Islamabad, and bloodshed was the result. The Taliban and Al Qaeda quickly responded with retributive killings, and Washington has revived old talk of military action inside Pakistan. Musharraf's agenda and his remaining credibility imploded.

Sadly, Pakistanis are as likely to blame the US as they are to blame Musharraf for this sorry state of affairs, and they're not entirely wrong. When security forces finally acted against the Red Mosque, bystanders were certain that Musharraf had acted on US instructions - as they assumed he did when the army was called out in the Frontier. Since late 2001, the Bush administration has praised Musharraf for
Pakistan's role in fighting terrorism, conflating the general with his country and US policy with Pakistan's.

The problem the US now confronts is more dangerous than public diplomacy, however. Its security relationship with Pakistan is grounded in profound illegality. Pakistan's constitution, upheld by its highest court, forbids Musharraf from holding concurrently the offices of president and army chief. Despite promises to withdraw from one or the other - and should he wish to remain president, to run for re-election - he has not stepped down.

The Bush administration has indicated - in public, at least - that the
choice is Musharraf's. But the math is simple: Were the offices to be
separated, a new president could replace the army chief; a new army
chief could refuse to act on the orders of the old president; and both
would serve at the will of the parliament. Moreover, if Musharraf were
to run for president, he could lose. Constitutional manipulations
required to accommodate his need to remain in office and Bhutto's
ambition to return to power - allowing her to stand for a third term,
while waffling on his status as army chief and president - substitute a
short-term fix to a deeply seated governance problem.

In each instance, Pakistan's cooperation with the US and others would
no longer be a done deal. In this sense, the current US-Pakistan
alliance clearly acts against Pakistan's constitution, continues the
structural disruptions that military rule visits on the state and
ultimately undercuts the substance of alliance between the two
countries.

The US could fix its part of this existential problem, of course, by
stating outright that the rule of law is a greater long-term interest
than any one political or military actor, its alliance is with
Pakistan, not Musharraf. This won't dispel the likely contrivances of
ambitious politicians in both countries willing to deal with
opportunistic generals and politicians, and doesn't necessarily bring
about conditions that help Pakistanis return power to legitimate
civilian government.

At best, this is a first step toward a rational policy that recognizes
Pakistan's profound difficulties as it tries to correct the desperately
complex political and military environment wrought by US complicity
with the worst of military rule. But it is a critical step for both
countries. Without a change in posture, the US will be unprepared to
reap the benefits of inevitable changes in Pakistan. Then, no one's
interests will be served.

Elections, Democracy and Stability in Pakistan: ICG Report

Elections, Democracy and Stability in Pakistan
International Crisis Group; Asia Report N°137, 31 July 2007

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

President Musharraf faces the most serious challenge to almost eight years of military rule. Opposition has gathered momentum following his failed attempt to remove the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Moderate political parties, all segments of civil society and the public at large are vociferously demanding restoration of democracy and rule of law and the military’s withdrawal from politics. The choice is not whether a transition will come but whether it will be peaceful and orderly, through free and fair elections, or violent. Musharraf and the high command are tempted to retain their power at all costs. Several of their options – particularly emergency – could portend disaster. Rigged or stalled elections would destabilise Pakistan, with serious international security consequences. Especially the U.S., needs to recognise its own interests are no longer served by military rule (if they ever really were) and use its considerable leverage to persuade the generals to return to the barracks and accept a democratic transition through free and fair parliamentary, followed by presidential, elections this year.

Bent on gaining another presidential term and retaining the office of army chief, Musharraf wants the present national and provincial assemblies (collectively the presidential Electoral College), which are themselves the product of the rigged 2002 polls and end their own five-year terms this year, to re-elect him. Opposition parties, including the main civilian contenders, Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Nawaz Sharif’s Muslim League (PML-N), reject that. They also rightly fear that elections for new assemblies, if held at all, are likely to be rigged.

However, Musharraf can no longer count on a pliant judiciary endorsing his re-election by the current, stacked assemblies, his retention of the dual offices of president and army chief or any other unconstitutional act. Another stolen election would be strongly resisted by the opposition parties and civil society and could possibly lead to a violent confrontation between the military and protestors.

A rigged election would also not serve international interests. Now, as before, Musharraf has little choice but to support the Islamist parties to counter his moderate opposition. The pro-Taliban Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI)’s help is essential to him, particularly in Balochistan, where the staunchly anti-military Baloch nationalist parties would likely win a free and fair poll. In the national parliament too, Musharraf would need the Islamists’ support to get renewed approval of his dual hats. If the Islamist parties gain five more years of power in Balochistan and Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), their militant allies – Pakistani, Afghan and transnational – will benefit, and the moderate parties, which still retain the support of the vast majority of the population, will lose.

With his military government fast losing all claims to public support and legitimacy, Musharraf could decide to compromise with the national-level moderate parties, reaching, for instance, a power-sharing accord with Bhutto’s PPP, which would likely win a free and fair election. Speculation about such a compromise was revived by their meeting in Abu Dhabi on 27 July. By agreeing to hold such an election and give up his army post in return for the PPP supporting him for president, he could retain some legitimacy and policy-making influence. Given the momentum of the pro-democracy movement, however, this option may no longer be viable. Even if Bhutto is still amenable, Sharif’s PML-N rejects any further role for Musharraf, in or out of uniform, and the Supreme Court might be reluctant to give him a pass on the two-year constitutional bar on a retired general standing for public office.

Musharraf and the high command could still refuse to see the writing on the wall and impose a state of emergency, suspending democratic rights and freedoms postponing general elections for a year and in effect imposing absolute military rule. Citing the threat of heightened militancy as a pretext for the action, he could then use the emergency powers to postpone national elections. This would fuel pro-democracy protests and civil disobedience, forcing the military either to back down or resort to violence. Such repression would cause citizens, especially in those regions such as Balochistan that have already suffered from military excesses, to lose belief that political change can come through peaceful and democratic means.

In the face of such unattractive options, it is also possible that the generals would conclude that a democratic transition is their best course. This would require them to withdraw their support from Musharraf and agree to genuine elections. Whether they reach such a decision, however, depends importantly upon how the international community uses its considerable leverage with the high command.

It is vital, therefore, that the international community understand its interests are best served by a stable, democratically-governed Pakistan. Since the 11 September terror attacks, the U.S. has provided the bulk of $10 billion in aid to the military, believing that the military is their reliable partner and the only institution with the capacity to govern and to combat militants. On the contrary, by excluding moderate parties, military rule has fanned extremism; by alienating the smaller provinces and virtually blocking all institutions and channels of meaningful participation, it threatens to destabilise a country of 160 million people in a strategic and volatile neighborhood. By permitting the Taliban insurgents, aligned with jihadi political parties, to operate from Pakistani sanctuaries, it has endangered the fragile democracy in Afghanistan.

The U.S. should use its considerable influence to persuade the generals to give up power, offering political and material incentives if they do so and threatening sanctions if they thwart democratic change. A free, fair and transparent election this year is the first, necessary step in the peaceful political transition that is needed to bring Pakistan to moderate, democratic moorings.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Pakistan Government:

1. Hold timely, free, fair and transparent national and provincial assembly elections this year, before presidential polls, so that assemblies with a new popular mandate can serve as the presidential Electoral College.

2. Appoint a neutral, caretaker government formed in consultation with the main opposition parties in parliament, once the election schedule is announced, to supervise the general elections.

3. Ensure the independence and autonomy of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) by:

(a) appointing a new Chief Election Commissioner in consultation with the parliamentary opposition parties; and

(b) empowering the ECP to enforce its Code of Conduct, especially provisions relating to the use of government resources for election campaigning, including the announcement and/or inauguration of public sector development schemes that might influence votes.

4. Suspend the current local governments once the election schedule is announced and appoint administrators to serve until the elections are held and results announced.

5. Forbid involvement of intelligence agencies at any stage of the electoral process and refrain from using the civil administration to influence the outcome.

6. Provide a level playing field by:

(a) releasing political prisoners;

(b) allowing the unconditional return from abroad of political leaders and repealing the bar on a prime minister serving more than two terms; and

(c) affording all political parties freedom to organise public rallies and mobilise voters and giving them equal access to state media.

7. Share preliminary electoral rolls with all political parties and ensure that potential voters are given ample opportunity to exercise their right of franchise.

8. Ensure the security of domestic and international election observers and provide them unfettered access to the electoral process.

To the Political Parties:

9. Pool resources to expose electoral malpractice and fraud.

10. Do not accept military support during the election process or in the process of government formation.

11. Agree on and adhere to a common code of conduct for the elections.

To the United States, the European Union and Other Members of the International Community:

12. Strongly and publicly warn against imposition of emergency rule or any other measure to stifle constitutionally-guaranteed freedoms of speech, association, assembly and movement.

13. Urge the military high command to accept a return to democracy, including by concurring in the following steps:

(a) return of exiled party leaders;

(b) free and fair general parliamentary elections before a new president is selected;

(c) the new assemblies acting as the presidential Electoral College; and

(d) separation of the posts of president and army chief.

14. Assist the democratic transition by:

(a) sending adequately resourced and staffed election observation missions at least three months in advance of the elections to assess whether the polls are held in an impartial way and meet international standards;

(b) conditioning military assistance to the government on meeting international standards for free, fair and democratic elections and making such assistance after the elections conditional on the military accepting the supremacy of civilian government; and

(c) providing strong political and financial support to an elected civilian government.

Islamabad/Brussels, 31 July 2007

For Complete Report (pdf), click here

Inside the booming madressah economy

Inside the booming madressah economy
By M Ismail Khan: The News, July 31, 2007

Take this with a pinch of salt, but let us admit that two weeks from its 60th birthday, Pakistan is ticking at a point where the question of who runs the country means little in relation to how it can be run. The gender of the next prime minister is of little importance, nor does it make a difference if the next president puts on a shirwani or a burqa, what really matters for the people is that they have a leader who is wise enough to understand the difficult challenges and strong enough to overcome them. One such impossible task at hand is to put the genie of the madressahs back into its original bottle.

Neutrally speaking, President Musharraf's eight-year rule, like the earlier two military governments of the 60s and 80s, turned out to be a period of decent economic growth. I do not mean to say that military governments are better economic managers and therefore there is no need for the country to return to 'true democracy'. But since 'growth' is all about data and figures there is hardly anything one can do to prove it otherwise. But one inherent dilemma which cuts across all military led governments has been the tremendous social and political pressures it leaves behind for the precarious civilian set ups to deal with, that ultimately proves to be the main reason for demise of civilian dispensation and the country's return to military rule. The phenomenal rise of madressahs during the recent years can be seen in the light of this vicious cycle in store for the next government, if there is one coming.

Like the growth in real estate and services, Pakistan is witnessing a massive boom in the madressah sector; according to researchers during the last eight years there has been over 150 per cent increase in the number of madressahs in and around Islamabad alone, a trend following the rise of real estate value in the capital.

At the time of independence, Pakistan inherited a meagre 200 odd madressahs, which as per government's conservative estimates has now increased to over 17000 (though some analyst put this number at 25-30,000). These religious schools are catering to about 2.5 to 3 million students and employ thousands of mullahs as teachers, mentors and instructors. How has this country managed to trigger and then sustain such a spectacular growth in madressahs is a secret worth sharing with the posterity.

A key driver of growth in the madressah sector, we are informed, is poverty -- an endemic problem of all developing countries -- something successive governments in the last six decades have wowed to eliminate but end failing to even reduce it to a manageable level. Interestingly on the one hand the country has struggled to improve enrolment in formal schools and has been grappling with issues of large scale drop outs at primary and secondary levels, on the other hand there is a stiff competition going on in the rural areas, where Pakistan's majority of poor live, to enrol their kids in madressahs mainly situated in cosmopolitan cities and sub-urban areas.

Perhaps there is more to it then the so-called poverty; it is indeed easy to blame the poor. But this could also be because of other reasons including failure of formal education system, social safety nets, and simply madressahs outperforming the formal education sector through better packages e.g. free education, food, boarding and almost free educational material. One cannot write off the growing religiosity, again not just in Pakistan, but all over the world, and not among Muslims but also amidst people adhering to other faiths.

There is also a need to analyse the source of funding of these madaris against the theological inclinations. Compared to Barelvis and Jam'at Islami driven schools, a number of Ahle-Hadith and Deobandi madaris have seen a big jump in numbers. The number of Shia madressahs has also grown sharply. But the biggest gain has been made by the Deobandi religious schools that have reportedly crossed the figure of 10 thousand. Taliban, including the ones in Islamabad, are products of Deobandi madressahs, while credit for introducing the likes of Lashkar-e-Taiba has been claimed by some Ahle-Hadith madaris in the past; hopefully President Musharraf might have broached these worrying trends to his interlocutors during the recent visit to Saudi Arabia. Philanthropists in brotherly countries including Iran must find overt, transparent and legal ways to collaborate and support a better madressah system, so that the government, media and more importantly public can play their role in the public interest.

Traditionally, madressahs have played a good role in imparting religious education and promoting literacy among downtrodden segments. It is also correct that only a small portion of the country's madaris can be branded as truly radical, but there is no guarantee that the moderate ones will stick to the right path or will not change their course at some point. What happened in the Lal Masjid / Madressah Hafsa and its aftermath has sent shivers down the spine of the ordinary souls. There is a need to strategically revisit the so-called madressah reforms. Conducting registration, teaching science, English and computer or equating the madaris' degree with the formal system will not work unless the institutions are cleansed from dangerously biased teachers, money and ideologies sowing the seeds of hatred and prejudices.

Many politicians and civil society activists openly raise fingers at certain quarters in the government for indoctrinating religious schools, first for the purpose of curving a strategic depth to Afghanistan and later for jihad in Kashmir; even if this is true, politicians and the civil society cannot absolve themselves from their responsibilities. What have we done to arrest this dangerous drift, except for organising a cultural extravaganza at Trafalgar Square in London? There is no reason why the public cannot and should not stand up to save the country from threats of anarchy and self-destruction which the growing number of suicide bombings have started to present.

The writer is based in Islamabad; he has a background in media, public policy and development. Email: ismail.k2@gmail.com

A Sino-American Turf Battle In Pakistan: A Different Perspective

A Sino-American Turf Battle In Pakistan?
Ahmed Quraishi - 7/30/2007: Global Politician

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan—An anti-American Islamic fanatic is arrested in Afghanistan, flown to Guantanamo Bay and then released back to Afghan authorities. He’s supposedly seething with anti-Americanism. But after crossing the border and returning to Pakistan, his first mission is to kidnap and kill a Chinese engineer.

In doing so, Abdullah Mehsud also becomes the first Pakistani to kill a Chinese citizen on Pakistani soil in a high profile case, creating an unfortunate precedent in the sixty-year long history of close Sino-Pak ties.

Mehsud was anti-American. Or was he? We haven’t seen him target any high or low profile American assets since the famous 2004 kidnappings. But he has single handedly done what others failed to do: he effectively scuttled Chinese help in a major Pakistani development project.

His sick explanation for this was, “I wanted to embarrass the government of President Pervez Musharraf.”

This twisted logic has resurfaced again in the past few weeks with suicide attacks in Pakistan targeting both Pakistani soldiers and Chinese citizens in a single wave, starting with the kidnapping of seven Chinese citizens in the Pakistani capital by thugs working for Rashid Ghazi, the terrorist leader of the Red Mosque brigade. Mr. Ghazi maintained strong ties to some fringe extremist elements in the border area with Afghanistan. His contacts included foreign fighters with shadowy backgrounds.

Targeting Pakistani soldiers and Chinese interests is a strange combination. Islamic radicals, who used to kill the Americans, are now ironically targeting the Pakistani military and Chinese citizens. What’s going on?

Chinese ambassador Luo Zhaohui told me recently that ten private Chinese citizens working in Pakistan died in terror attacks in three years. “And the venue has also changed,” he says, “from rural areas to big cities like Islamabad and Peshawar. The motivation has also changed and become more diversified. So I think maybe the security risk my people face here is up.”

After the Red Mosque operation, some analysts in the Pakistani strategic community detected a clear attempt at provoking a confrontation inside Pakistan between religious elements on one side, including the moderate ones, and China on the other. This attempt took the shape of successive attacks against Chinese interests here coupled with suspicious press leaks meant to inflame Muslim passions against China.

A case in point: London’s Sunday Times revealed quoting unnamed sources that China is summarily executing Chinese Muslim militants arrested and handed over by Pakistan. This report is meant to inflame rightwing segments of the Pakistani public opinion, already angry at Islamabad for handing over terror suspects to Washington.

In the sixty-year history of confrontation between Islam and the West over Palestine/Israel, this appears to be the first real attempt at dragging China into the battle. But the real loser here – if this plan works out – is none but Pakistan, China’s strongest Muslim ally.

China is helping Pakistan launch one of the region’s hottest pieces of real estate: the Gwadar seaport on the mouth of the strategic Arabian Gulf. This piece of land is so hot that business interests from Dubai and Singapore virtually fought a battle in order to get the management rights for the port. Gwadar gives China’s massive western provinces an energy and trade outlet. Pakistan gets to give Central Asia the shortest trade route to the sea.

India and Iran have been working overtime to thwart this Sino-Pakistani project. The Americans, too, don’t want to see China establishing a foothold in Pakistan, at the crossroads of South, Central and West Asia. The Americans have not said anything yet. But actions speak louder than words. Example: the shadowy terrorist organization named Balochistan liberation army.

India and some elements in U.S.-occupied Afghanistan have created this outfit, commonly known as the BLA. It has real training bases in Afghanistan where there is no government beyond Kabul and where the Americans, too, are not in control. This is the same place where India has more ‘consulates’ than any other country in the world with diplomatic ties to Afghanistan. Most of these consulates are, ironically, close to Pakistan’s western provinces.

The Indians are doing something else near Pakistan’s western border: building an airbase in Tajikistan and transferring military aircraft there. Indian diplomats in Pakistan are often embarrassed when their Pakistani friends ask them about the purpose of this overzealous attempt at projecting power. They simply don’t have a convincing answer.

The point is, since the fall of Taliban regime in Kabul and the sudden rise of foreign influence inside Afghanistan, including that of the Americans and the Indians, Pakistan’s western regions close to Afghanistan are witnessing the worst kind of destabilization.

The last time our western regions were this unstable is when Afghanistan was a Soviet proxy and being used as a forward base for stirring a communist takeover in Pakistan.

BLA is a killer of Pakistanis and Chinese, a shadowy terrorist organization in the classic mold of the Cold War foreign-trained and financed proxy groups.

Washington refuses to designate the BLA a terrorist organization. Pakistani authorities have known for months now that both Abdullah Mehsud, the supposed Pakistani Taliban leader, and the cadres of BLA, are in Afghanistan.

This week, Pakistani security personnel swooped in on Mehsud after he sneaked in from Afghanistan and blew him to pieces. The right move at the right time.

These days Washington is lecturing us, the ungrateful Pakistanis, about how we don’t trust America despite the ten billion dollars in aid since 9/11. Pundits like the U.S. presidential hopeful Rudy Giuliani has gone to the extent of demanding the overthrow of the Pakistani administration and maybe even invading Pakistan.

The Americans expect us to bend backwards for them when they don’t demonstrate even the slightest consideration for their ally’s legitimate security and strategic concerns in the region.

But if Washington is trying to meddle in our affairs, it is because the Pakistanis don’t have a strong political system. Our messy domestic politics have always been a nagging security concern for us. And since the fabricated 9 March ‘crisis’, our failed political system in its present form has actually become a national security threat and liability, providing openings for more emboldened foreign interference, with money flowing in from multiple sources to create instability and ensure the win of certain elements over others in our domestic context.

Ahmed Quraishi is a Pakistani public affairs professional. He heads the Pakistan Task Force at FurmaanRealpolitik, an independent Pakistani think tank based in Islamabad. He also produces and hosts a weekly foreign policy show for PTV World.

Muslims Speak Out By Tariq Ramadan

Muslims Speak Out By Tariq Ramadan
Washington Post Blo - July 25, 2007

1 . WHAT IS JIHAD? UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS DOES ISLAM SANCTION THE USE OF VIOLENCE? WHAT WOULD YOU TELL SUICIDE BOMBERS WHO INVOKE ISLAM TO JUSTIFY THEIR ACTIONS?


The concept of "jihad" has different meanings and a scholar such as Jalal ad-Dîn as-Suyutî (15th century), while studying its scope, highlighted 80 different dimensions, uses and objectives related to its place in Islamic teachings. Its root "ja-ha-da" means "making an effort", "exerting oneself" in order to promote good or to resist wrongdoing, evil or oppression. Every individual trying to resist her/his own negative temptations is engaged in "jihad" and the first time the word is used in the Qur'an (25:52), it refers to an intellectual and spiritual resistance by the means of the Qur'an itself.


In all its dimensions, the essence of "jihad" is "to resist" in the name of justice and dignity. When there is an armed aggression, Muslims have the right to protect themselves and to defend their rights. Here "jihâd" means "qitâl" (armed struggle). The use of violence and weapons must be adjusted to the nature of the aggression itself: an armed aggression may justify an armed resistance if there is no other way to come to a peaceful agreement. But the use of violence and weapons must be proportionate and never target innocent people, women, children, the elderly, and even fruit trees as Abû Bakr, the first successor of the Prophet, stated following Muhammad's teachings. Jihad never means "holy war" in order "to impose" or "to propagate" Islam everywhere. In fact jihâd and qitâl mean exactly the opposite of what we commonly think: rather than being the justifying instruments of war, they are the imposed measures to achieve peace by resisting an unjust aggression.


In specific situations – when one faces an army and has no weapons or other means to resist – it may be understandable and justifiable to consider sacrificing one's life in attempts to reach the armed soldiers. Here we are not far from a kind of suicide but it is related to three specific conditions: 1. It must be in a time of declared war; 2. when no other means of resisting are available; 3. the targets must be exclusively the army of the enemies and its armed soldiers. Today's suicide bombers who are killing innocent people are not only not respecting the Islamic teachings as to the ethics of war but are in fact indulging in anti-Islamic actions.


2. HOW DOES ISLAM DEFINE APOSTASY? IS IT PERMISSIBLE FOR A MUSLIM TO
CONVERT TO ANOTHER FAITH? HOW CAN LAWS AGAINST APOSTASY AND BLASPHEMY BE RECONCILED WITH THE KORANIC INJUNCTION OF "NO COMPULSION IN RELIGION"?


In the Islamic legal tradition, "apostasy" known as "ridda" is related to changing one's religion and its injunction is mainly based on two prophetic sayings (ahadith) both quoted in sahih Bukhari (9,83 and 84): "The one who changes his religion, kill him" and another tradition noting that among the three categories of people who can be killed is "the one who leaves the community". The great majority of the Muslim scholars, from all the different traditions and throughout history, have been of the opinion that changing one's religion is prohibited in Islam and should be sanctioned by the death penalty.


Nevertheless we find, in very early studies and writings, several Muslim scholars having a different approach. The jurist Ibrahîm al-Nakha'î (8th), Sufyân ath-Thawrî (8th) in his renowned work on the prophetic tradition (Al-Jâmi' al Kabîr, Al-Jâmi' al-Saghîr) as well as the hanafi jurist Shams ad-Dîn as-Sarakhsî (11th) – among others- hold other views. They question the absolute authenticity of the two prophetic traditions quoted above. They also argue that nothing is mentioned in the Qur'an pertaining to this very sensitive issue and add that there is no evidence of the Prophet killing someone only because he/she changed his/her religion.


The Prophet took firm measures, only in time of war, against people who had falsely converted to Islam for the sole purpose of infiltrating the Islamic community to obtain information they then passed on to the enemy. They were in fact betrayers engaging in high treason who incurred the penalty of death because their actions were liable to bring about the destruction of the Muslim community and the two prophetic traditions quoted above should be read in this very specific context.


In light of the texts (Qur'an and prophetic traditions) and the way the Prophet behaved with the people who left Islam (like Hishâm and 'Ayyash) or who converted to Christianity (such as Ubaydallah ibn Jahsh), it should be stated that one who changes her/his religion should not be killed. In Islam, there can be no compulsion or coercion in matters of faith not only because it is explicitly forbidden in the Qur'an but also because free conscious and choice and willing submission are foundational to the first pillar (declaration of faith) and essential to the very definition of "Islam". Therefore, someone leaving Islam or converting to another religion must be free to do so and her/his choice must be respected.


One might hope that anyone, be she/he a Jew, a Hindu, a Buddhist, a Christian, a Muslim or anything else, would show as much respect towards the religious or spiritual community she/he is leaving as the latter must express towards her/him.


3. WHAT ARE THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN ISLAM? HOW DOES ISLAM'S VIEW OF
MALE-FEMALE EQUALITY DIFFER FROM THE WESTERN VIEW?


The issue of "women is Islam" is a charged topic with preconceived notions, stereotypes and prototypes, claims and counter-claims on all sides. It is always about a woman's role, what rights she does or does not have in Muslim societies in opposition to the West. In these dueling lists of rights, only the fighting words are sharpened but no insight is gained. For a fruitful discussion, it is imperative to change the terms of discourse. And as a first step, it is necessary to recall that the Qur'an was revealed over a 23 year period and in a specific historical context: it is important to take these two factors into account. The first helps us to avoid a literalist reading of some verses by being cognizant that they have to be understood through a sequence of different verses leading us to the global message. The second forces us to consider the cultural environment within which the Qur'an was revealed and alerts us not to confuse some cultural contextual features (whether historical or contemporary) with the universal Islamic teachings. These are indeed the two main problems we find when it comes to the women issue: literalist reading and cultural understanding.


It is difficult, in this limited space, to list all the rights of women in Islam and in fact it may be the wrong way to start the discussion. For centuries, Muslim scholars have talked about women in terms of their roles (daughter, wife, mother, sister) and the respective rights and responsibilities related to their family or social functions. It is high time to change our perspective and start talking about "women" as "women", their being, not their roles or functions. This should be considered their first right: the right to be and to be autonomous ontologically, religiously, socially and economically. Approached from that angle, the perspectives of the whole debate change and it becomes necessary to be quite critical as to the long Islamic legal tradition dealing with the woman issue. We are in dire need of a constructive critical reassessment of the Islamic discourse and understanding on women.


Not only is it necessary to say that female circumcision, domestic violence, forced marriages are not Islamic but we need a comprehensive approach as to the Muslim woman identity within the Islamic communities and societies. It is imperative for Muslim women to be more autonomous, to have equal access to knowledge as men (especially in religious matters), to receive equal pay for the same work and competence, to share social status and political power in their societies and to set the scene for the much needed debate around the role of men in the Islamic societies and communities. A new perspective that focuses on the woman as a psychological and spiritual being will read the sacred texts with fresh eyes (including those of female scholars) and liberates the Muslim women from within by challenging narrow religious interpretations and oppressive cultural practices and is propelled by faithfulness to Islam's global message.


To speak about Islam promoting "complementarity" between men and women as opposed to the West's call for total "equality" is not only misleading but it is wrong. There is room for a deep reassessment of this issue from within the Islamic scriptural texts themselves and this is what, Muslim men and women, together should work on/for in the name of their religion to resist all discriminatory practices and views promoted by narrow literalist or cultural understanding.

Posted by Tariq Ramadan on July 25, 2007

Sunday, July 29, 2007

The Reality about BB-Musharraf Deal?



BBC: Bhutto lays down Pakistan terms: July 29, 2007

Bhutto ready to share power if Musharraf drops military role
· Joint rule seen as best way to beat extremists
· Deal could rescue beleaguered general
Declan Walsh; July 30, 2007, The Guardian

Pakistan's exiled opposition leader, Benazir Bhutto, has said she can share power with President Pervez Musharraf, but only if he quits as army chief.
Ms Bhutto's comments, in a television interview, followed a secret meeting with General Musharraf on Friday in the United Arab Emirates. Confirmation of the encounter by a cabinet minister intensified media speculation on the future of Pakistan's troubled government. "Deal done, sealed," said one newspaper headline.

But there was little hard information about what transpired in the meeting, which followed months of quiet negotiations. The sticking point appears to be whether Gen Musharraf can retain his dual role as president and head of the army. In an interview with the local KTN station late on Saturday, Ms Bhutto said: "We do not accept President Musharraf in uniform. Our stand is that, and I stick to my stand."

In theory, a deal would make sense for both leaders. Gen Musharraf, who took power in a bloodless coup in 1999, wants to remain as president after elections due within the next six months. But after a series of political bungles and rising Islamist violence, he is unpopular and isolated.

Ms Bhutto, considered Pakistan's most popular politician, has been in exile since 1997. She finds her return to power blocked by longstanding corruption charges and a bar on anyone standing as prime minister three times - she served as prime minister in the late 80s and the mid-90s.

Gen Musharraf's woes have intensified since the Red Mosque siege this month and a wave of suicide attacks that have killed almost 200 people. The latest, in Islamabad while he was meeting Ms Bhutto on Friday, killed at least 14 people.

In recent weeks several mid-ranking parliamentarians from Gen Musharraf's political vehicle, the PML-Q, have defected to Ms Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples party (PPP). Gen Musharraf has previously derided Ms Bhutto as corrupt and ineffective, but her left-leaning stance is close to his in Pakistan's conservative political spectrum. Supporters of a deal say the two could mount a united front against Islamism - a prospect likely to please western allies.

But in Pakistan, opinion is split between idealists calling for an unconditional exit of the military from politics, and pragmatists who say compromise is necessary.

"We are trying to show Musharraf that civilians have to play a role in this country," said a senior PPP figure.

"I don't think Pakistan will move towards democracy if Musharraf remains as chief executive," said Hasan Askari Rizvi, a political commentator. "It will only strengthen the military's role in politics, because it shows what they can get away with."

There are many potential hurdles before a deal. The recent supreme court verdict in favour of chief justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry signalled the emergence of an assertive judiciary that could scupper Gen Musharraf's plans. The ISI intelligence service, which rigged several polls in the 90s, remains a mercurial presence. And Ms Bhutto's dalliance with Gen Musharraf could cost her support within her own party.

Then there is the issue of ego. Gen Musharraf has a bluff, militaristic style; he recently said his uniform was his second skin. Ms Bhutto has a reputation for being domineering, and in previous governments shared power only grudgingly.

See Daily Times Story on the subject: Pakistan faced with threat of Islamist revolt: No deal with uniformed president: BB

Consequences of Abdullah Mehsud's Death

Pakistan: The Implications of a Jihadist Commander's Death
STRATFOR; July 28, 2007
Summary

One of the most senior Pakistani Taliban commanders active in the
country's tribal belt, Abdullah Mehsud, killed himself July 24
during a raid in the province of Balochistan. Mehsud's rank, along
with the timing and location of his death, provide several insights
into the problems that thwart effective counterjihadist efforts. In
the past, the elimination of a high-value target helped Pakistan
satisfy U.S. concerns; however, Mehsud's death will increase the
pressure on Islamabad to show more progress.

Analysis

Perhaps the most publicly renowned Pakistani Taliban commander,
Abdullah Mehsud , killed himself July 24 by detonating a hand
grenade in order to avoid capture from a house in the town of Zhob
in Balochistan province. Mehsud's two brothers and a third Taliban
leader were arrested in the raid provincial police conducted on the
house, which allegedly belongs to a senior leader of the country's
main Islamist political coalition, the Mutahiddah Majlis-i-Amal
(MMA).

Mehsud's status, the circumstances of his death and the timing of
the incident point to a number of problems associated with
counterjihadist operations in Pakistan. For starters, it is hard to
swallow the idea that authorities just happened to stumble upon the
intelligence pertaining to Mehsud's whereabouts and then caught up
with him within hours of U.S. threats of unilateral action against
jihadists in northwestern Pakistan. The likely reason the
government was able to track down Mehsud quickly is that Pakistani
intelligence has at its disposal certain resources that it brings
to bear in a very selective and limited manner in response to
domestic and foreign policy needs.

The historic links between jihadist forces and Pakistani
intelligence have led to contacts that both sides recently have
been using in their war against one another. The jihadists have
been aggressive in using their connections to the state's security
and intelligence apparatuses to conduct their operations. The
state, however, is only now beginning to employ its connections
within the murky jihadist universe to undercut the militants.

Clearly, Pakistani intelligence has been in touch with elements who
had information concerning Mehsud's whereabouts. These elements
with ties to both sides were called upon to offer their assistance
at a difficult time, and they obliged. This is not the first time
this has happened. As recently as May 14, Pakistani authorities
made a similar demonstration of abilities when they relayed
intelligence to Afghan and NATO forces about the whereabouts of the
Afghan Taliban's senior-most commander, Mullah Dadullah, who was
then killed in an operation .

While not as illustrious as Dadullah, Mehsud was the best-known
Pakistani Taliban commander operating in the Waziristan agencies of
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The
30-something-year-old Mehsud, who lost one leg while fighting
alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan before the extremist movement
seized Kabul in 1996, had quite a jihadist career. He was among
those jihadists who surrendered to northern alliance forces in the
city of Kunduz in late 2001, after which he was transferred to the
Guantanamo Bay detention facility. U.S. military officials released
him in March 2004 after concluding that Mehsud did not pose a
threat.

After returning to the tribal belt, Mehsud resumed his old
activities and, after the killing of another top Pakistani Taliban
commander, Nek Mohammed , emerged as a major figure. Mehsud was
behind the abduction of Chinese engineers in 2004 shortly after
his return and a rash of suicide attacks against Pakistani security
forces. Like his predecessor, Mehsud struck and then scrapped a
peace deal with Islamabad. He was also reportedly engaged in the
recent fighting between jihadists and pro-government tribal
militias. In the wake of the Red Mosque operation , Mehsud
declared war against the Pakistani state and is believed to have
been behind the latest wave of suicide attacks against security
forces.

There are two noteworthy aspects of the location where Mehsud was
tracked down. First, it is in the Pashtun corridor in the
northwestern part of Balochistan, which runs roughly between FATA's
South Waziristan agency to the north and the provincial capital of
Quetta in the south. The town of Zhob -- the likely location of
Taliban leader Mullah Omar -- is in this area. Second, the house
where Mehsud killed himself belongs to Sheikh Mohammed Ayub, who is
allegedly the district leader of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Fazlur
Rehman (JUI-F) -- led by Maulana Fazlur Rehman, leader of the
opposition in Pakistan's parliament. JUI-F is not only the largest
component within the MMA alliance, it also holds the majority of
Cabinet positions in Balochistan's coalition government with the
pro-Musharraf ruling Pakistan Muslim League party. The leader of
JUI-F in the province, Maulana Muhammad Khan Sherani, who has a
close relationship with the Musharraf government, said the house's
owner was no longer with the party since he had been expelled four
months ago because of indiscipline.

Regardless of whether Ayub is still part of the JUI-F, Mehsud's
capture from Ayub's house is a classic representation of the fluid
nexus involving radical Islamists of various shades and the
Pakistani state. These complex relationships are what allow
jihadists to sustain themselves and their activities and at the
same time prevent the Pakistani state from effectively pushing
ahead with counterjihadist efforts.

Pakistan's elimination of Mehsud -- just days, if not hours, after
the highest political offices in Washington threatened Islamabad
with unilateral military action against jihadists in northwestern
Pakistan -- will not elicit as much praise from the United States
as it will trigger increased pressure to "do more." This is
because, from the U.S. viewpoint, it is clear that the Pakistanis
can do a whole lot more in the war against jihadists. Also, Mehsud
was more of a threat to the Pakistanis than to Afghanistan , NATO
or the United States. There is still the matter of going after al
Qaeda and the real Taliban in Afghanistan, and there will be both
more action against high-value targets and more jihadist attacks in
the coming days.

US Congress Jolts Musharraf

Editorial: US Congress jolts General Musharraf
Daily Times, July 29, 2007

There is much disturbance in the dovecotes of Islamabad after the announcement that the White House has agreed to sign into law a counter-terrorism bill passed by the US Congress that also proposes new conditionalities on US assistance to Pakistan. Already, some retired Pakistani diplomats have appeared on TV channels to advise the government to “break off” with the United States and go its own way, which means listening to the “voice of the people” condemning the US as a “crusader against Islam”. The parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, too, has welcomed a similar briefing from an ex-foreign secretary.

The contents of the overwhelmingly bilaterally supported bill — which looks and sounds like the dreaded Pressler Amendment of 1985 — require Pakistan to make “demonstrated, significant and sustained progress towards eliminating terrorist safe havens from Pakistan”. One provision, which has got lost in the anti-US chorus, also makes US assistance conditional to democratic reforms in Pakistan, rule of law and parliamentary elections scheduled for 2007. There is also the inevitable reference to the issue central to the Pressler Amendment: proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies, without naming Pakistan’s “national hero”, Dr AQ Khan, whom the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) wants for interviews.

The White House is understandably uncomfortable with the stiff conditionalities it contains for Pakistan, but there is really very little it can do to water them down as they are linked to the strategy of “strengthening American security to prevent future terrorist attacks” and is consciously presented as a follow-through on the bipartisan 9/11 Commission Report. The bill is called the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007. However, it repeats the Commission’s assessment that Pakistan is an important ally with creditable performance in the execution of American plans to act against Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

The bill then enumerates the “problems” that have cropped up in US relations with Pakistan. (1) Curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology; (2) Combating poverty and corruption; (3) Building effective government institutions, especially secular public schools; (4) Promoting democracy and the rule of law, particularly at the national level; (5) Addressing the continued presence of Taliban and other violent extremist forces throughout the country; (6) Maintaining the authority of the government of Pakistan in all parts of its national territory; (7) Securing the borders of Pakistan to prevent the movement of militants and terrorists into other countries and territories; and (8) Effectively dealing with Islamic extremism.

After having placed the conditionality of certification in the US President — which was also done for five years after the passage of the Pressler Amendment — the new bill wants the Administration to consolidate American policy in Pakistan, designating it as an important “strategic” ally who must cooperate in the programme to “combat international terrorism, especially in the frontier provinces of Pakistan, and to end the use of Pakistan as a safe haven for forces associated with the Taliban”. This is to be followed by a “dramatic increase in the funding for programmes of the United States Agency for International Development and the Department of State that assist the government of Pakistan”, but only “if the government of Pakistan demonstrates a commitment to building a moderate, democratic state, including significant steps towards free and fair parliamentary elections in 2007”.

Is there a provision allowing the White House wiggle-room to deal more autonomously with Pakistan? Yes, there is. This lies in the provision that says that President Bush can delay the restriction under the bill for one year. He would be required to submit a report to a Congressional committee — in classified form if necessary — describing the long-term strategy of the United States “to engage with the government of Pakistan to address the issues described in the bill and carry out the policies suggested by Congress in order to accomplish the goal of building a moderate, democratic Pakistan”.

The 2008 and 2009 fiscal years may see military assistance to Pakistan blocked for 15 days till the presidential certification to the Congressional committee has been submitted. What will the certification be required to ensure? The bill says: “that the government of Pakistan is making all possible efforts to prevent the Taliban from operating in areas under its sovereign control, including in the cities of Quetta and Chaman and in the Northwest Frontier Province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas”.

When will the bill stop “biting”? The conditionality here is not the “outing” of Dr AQ Khan as some of our anti-American conspiracy theorists say, but more ominously, after the elimination of the Taliban as a threat. The bill says: till the “Taliban, or any related successor organisation, has ceased to exist as an organisation capable of conducting military, insurgent, or terrorist activities in Afghanistan from Pakistan”.

There is no other bill relating to foreign policy that is so specific. The White House is rightly upset because the legislation will cut the ground from under the feet of President General Pervez Musharraf who is desperately trying to win popular support for his counter-terrorism campaign in Pakistan. The “pain” his campaign inflicts on his political partners in the shape of loss of popularity among the masses who are viscerally opposed to America may become unbearable. The protest against America may also become deafening with more calls to “break off” relations with the United States.

Of course, there should be some relief for pro-democracy forces in the conditionalities relating to democracy, requiring General Musharraf to change his own dual office and link up with moderate forces that may shore up support for actions that his government or the one that follows him may take in countering terrorism. Out of all the parties, only some elements in the ruling PML are aware of this obligation. Their assent to President Musharraf’s meeting with the PPP chairperson Ms Benazir Bhutto in Abu Dhabi could be part of a policy to head off the mischief of the move by US Congress. (Some PML politicians have already started joining the PPP in anticipation of the coming political change.)

President Musharraf’s own mistakes have weakened him internally as he faces heavy odds in his fight against extremism and terrorism. His only plank, the ruling PML, has been becoming more and more timid as these mistakes eat into its popular base and defame it by association. His next chessboard move — very much prompted by the US — will give him reprieve if he agrees to doff his uniform and uses a less embattled combination of democratic forces to face up to the terrorist challenge to Pakistan’s survival. *

Another Red Mosque in the Making

Another Lal Masjid surfaces
Daily Times, July 29, 2007

GHALANAI: Masked Taliban gunmen occupied the tomb of freedom fighter Haji Sahib Turangzai and a nearby mosque – and named it Lal Masjid – at Ghazi Abad in Lakrou Tehsil, some 40 kilometres north of Mohmand Agency headquarters Ghalani. Taliban leader Umar Khalid told reporters that they had named the mosque Lal Masjid and that the place was the centre of the jihad launched by Haji Sahib Turangzai against the British rulers. “We want to take forward the missions of Haji Turangzai and Lal Masjid’s slain khateeb Ghazi Abdul Rashid,” he added. Khalid also said they were setting up two madrassas, one each for boys and girls, and added that the boys’ madrasa would be named after Haji Sahib and the girls school would be named Jamia Hafsa Umm-e-Hassan. The Taliban leader said any govt effort against them would be resisted. He claimed around 3,000 men in Mohmand Agency were ready to sacrifice their lives for Shariah. staff report

Judges, Lawyers and Civil Society Ready to sacrifice everything for rule of law: CJ


Picture: AP (From NDTV)
Bench, bar ready to do all for rule of law: CJP
Daily Times, July 28, 2007

ISLAMABAD: Chief Justice of Pakistan Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry has said that Pakistan’s judges, lawyers and civil society are now prepared to “sacrifice everything” to ensure rule of law and the Constitution.

“The last four months in our national history have changed something forever. I feel proud to say that not only the judiciary and 90,000-plus black-coated fraternity, but the entire civil society is ready to sacrifice everything to uphold the Constitution and achieve rule of law,” the chief justice said at the inaugural session of the Access to Justice Development Fund (AJDF) workshop organised by the Law and Justice Commission.

“We should draw lessons from our past history. Let us seize this defining moment in our history, wherein not only has the holder of a constitutional post been restored to his office, but the hope of a better future for the entire country stands revived,” he said.

However, Justice Chaudhry warned that the responsibilities of legal officers had now increased. “The people of Pakistan are today looking towards the bar and the bench. Let’s not fail them. Let’s not allow any unconstitutional or extra-constitutional measures to disrupt the smooth sailing of the ship of our destiny. Let the bar and the bench provides a vision and a direction for realising the dream of achieving good governance and across the board accountability,” he said.

He also stressed the importance of a free media. “Let’s together ensure the sustained growth of an independent judiciary and a fearless media for these two institutions are the guardians of public interest and rights,” he said.

He said the Supreme Court should be a symbol of hope for the people of Pakistan that they could get quick and inexpensive justice at their doorsteps. “Being chief justice of Pakistan and chairman of the Law and Justice Commission and National Judicial Policy Making Committee, I feel duty bound to focus my attention on judicial institutions and their capacity to respond to the legitimate expectations of our citizens,” he said. “Strong and well-functioning political, bureaucratic, judicial and civil society institutions and networks are a hallmark of a living society.”

Repeated constitutional deviations in Pakistan’s history hurt the judiciary, like other institutions, he said. The judicial institutions could not develop a self-sustaining mechanism and credibility to consistently exercise power of judicial review at the apex level and provision of quick and inexpensive justice at the doorsteps of the people, Justice Chaudhry said.

He said his Supreme Court had pursued a strategy to reduce the backlog of cases in the higher and lower courts. “I am cognisant of the fact that if we are successful in our delay reduction strategy, it will be a great service to the general public who are much troubled and grieved by the delays in the dispensation of justice.”

He said the Supreme Court had taken a major step by establishing a Human Rights Cell for the redress of grievances. “There has been an increase in public interest litigation in recent years, a trend which I expect will continue,” he said. The chief justice expressed satisfaction over the performance of the Law and Justice Commission and projects being completed through the Access to Justice Development Fund.

Justice Abdul Hameed Dogar, Justice Muhammad Nawaz Abbasi and Justice M Javed Buttar of the Supreme Court, Federal Shariat Court Chief Justice Haziq-ul-Khairi, Sindh High Court Chief Justice Sabihuddin Ahmed, Peshawar High Court Chief Justice Tariq Pervez and officials of the Supreme Court Bar Association also attended. app

Table for Two?


VIEW: Table for two? — Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi
Daily Times, July 28, 2007

The reported meeting between Benazir Bhutto and General Pervez Musharraf in Abu Dhabi on July 27 is the latest effort by the two leaders to cultivate a working relationship. Benazir Bhutto said in an interview given a week ago that her past dialogues with the presidency did not result in any understanding on the President’s re-election and her return to Pakistan. She maintained that such an understanding might no longer serve the interest of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), as the Supreme Court’s rejection of the presidential reference against the chief justice has made Musharraf’s credibility crisis more acute.

Despite this, it seems that Benazir Bhutto has not given up the idea of cultivating a political understanding with Pervez Musharraf. She has claimed to pursue the off-again, on-again interaction for the sake of achieving the twin objectives of guaranteeing fair and free elections and returning the military to the barracks. But in fact she has taken a dual-track approach. While interacting with Pervez Musharraf she continues to work with opposition political parties to mount pressure on the government to open up the political system. It is a delicate balancing act — engagement with the presidency without endorsing its policies, as well as cooperation with opposition parties but holding back on street agitation against the government. Benazir also wants to maintain a discreet distance from the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), which overplays the Islamic card and has the reputation of supporting the Taliban and other militant Islamic groups.

Contact between Benazir Bhutto and the presidency was initiated in 2004. It was encouraged by Pakistani and foreign friends who wanted to see a working relationship between the two for the sake of the future of Pakistani politics and for addressing the democracy deficit. They came close to an understanding in April 2005 but a section of the presidency’s army/intelligence affiliates and the top leadership of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) succeeded getting the process stalled. The PML leadership, especially the chief ministers of the Punjab and Sindh, continue to oppose the deal.

The domestic situation has changed so dramatically during the last couple of months that the potential deal has become irrelevant. Four recent developments have limited Pervez Musharraf’s political options and raised serious doubts about the ability of the PPP-Presidency deal to secure the president another term or enable Benazir Bhutto to get rid of the pending court cases and facilitate her party’s ascendancy to power.

First, the presidential reference against the chief justice of the Supreme Court can be described as President Musharraf’s and his affiliates’ self-inflicted wound. The resulting protests helped to restore civil society’s self-confidence as harbinger of political change through collective action.

This trend was reinforced by a second development: the dismissal of the presidential reference by the full bench of the Supreme Court. This has eroded whatever was left of the moral basis of the authority of the Musharraf government. The opposition is now expected to challenge in the Supreme Court Pervez Musharraf’s candidature for a second term when he formally files his nomination papers.

Some federal ministers and others close to the seat of power tried to save face by declaring that the government would honour the judgment and that a complex problem has been resolved amicably. It is doubtful if the government had any option other than accepting the judgment. After facing a virtual revolt from lawyers, societal groups and political parties, the presidency was no longer in a position to make any counter move against the Supreme Court.

The government’s problems have been exacerbated by the Red Mosque episode. It has alienated Islamic groups across the spectrum — from pressure groups to political parties to militant cadres. They have exploited with remarkable success the widespread popular perception that the government resorted to excessive force to overcome resistance from within the mosque’s precincts. The protest and violence by militant Islamic cadre on the re-opening of the Red Mosque on July 27 showed that they mean to continue their confrontation with the government, ostensibly to deter it from taking similar action against other militant groups.

The fourth major development is the recent spate of suicide attacks and stepped-up violence by militant Islamic groups in the tribal areas, NWFP and elsewhere. These attacks could not be launched in the immediate aftermath of the Red Mosque incident unless the militant groups were already operational and had a strong cadre. This exposes the hollowness of government claims of controlling militancy in and around the tribal areas. The groups are not merely entrenched in the tribal areas but have also developed the capacity to launch suicide attacks in other parts of Pakistan, including Islamabad.

These developments have undermined the government’s credibility to such an extent that any political understanding with the PPP is not likely to rescue it. The situation is expected to become more precarious for Pervez Musharraf if he decides to get himself re-elected in uniform from the existing assemblies. He needs to work towards an honourable exit rather than staying on in power by seeking an alliance with the PPP or by other means.

Similarly, Benazir Bhutto and the PPP cannot salvage themselves through a unilateral arrangement with the presidency. The PPP-presidency understanding may give some relief to Benazir Bhutto from her court cases, but it does not serve the PPP’s long-term political interest. The time for an agreement is long gone and the PPP must return to the people and seek power through them.

Further, Benazir Bhutto’s agenda for excluding the military from politics cannot be facilitated by an understanding with Pervez Musharraf. The military’s corporate interests and the top commanders’ stakes in governance have increased so much they may not voluntarily return to their professional domain.

The answers to the following two questions are likely to influence the military’s political profile in the post-Musharraf period.

Can Pakistan’s political actors work in harmony and respect the constitution in letter and spirit if the PPP comes to power through a backdoor deal? Other political parties can then be expected to return to the old tactics of leaving no stone unturned to dislodge the political rival from power. One of the options available to them is to cultivate the top brass of the army to dislodge the civilian government.

Second, will the challenges of religious extremism and violence, as well as external security pressures, restrict the policy options of any civilian government? Military cooperation will be needed to address these challenges. Therefore, the civil government will have to maintain cordial relations with the top commanders and give weight to their professional opinion on internal and external security challenges.

The PPP’s will not see its political agenda materialise by coming to solo arrangements with Pervez Musharraf. It needs to work with other political forces for achieving the twin objectives of Pervez Musharraf’s exit and Pakistan’s transition to a more participatory and pluralist political system. This will mark the beginning of efforts to address more complex issues like the democracy deficit, extremist terror and imbalanced civil-military relations.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst

Research on Pakistan's Nuclear Program

Book on Pakistan’s nuclear programme: SPD facilitating researchers’ access to scholars and scientists
By Azaz Syed: Daily Times, July 28, 2007

ISLAMABAD: The Strategic Plans Division (SPD) has helped two researchers from an American think tank who are writing the first ever comprehensive account of the country’s nuclear programme, by facilitating access to Pakistani scholars and former nuclear scientists, Daily Times has learnt.

The researchers – Dr Peter R Lavoy and former Pakistan Army Brigadier Feroz Khan from the Centre for Contemporary Conflicts (CCC) affiliated with the Naval Postgraduate School’s Department of National Security Affairs, California, US – are writing a book from a historical perspective. The California-based Centre for Contemporary Conflicts conducts research on different security issues and conveys its findings to US and allied policy-makers and military forces.

The Strategic Plans Division confirmed to Daily Times that it was facilitating the two researchers. “Yes we facilitated them so that they could have the Pakistani perspective,” said a senior SPD director, adding that the authors were free to contact any Pakistani scholar in the field who may want to help them in their research.

“We welcome research work by anyone including Pakistani scholars and have briefed a large number of people on nuclear matters on different occasions. We are open to facilitating any serious work by scholars,” the SPD director said when asked why the unprecedented access was provided. The director said the purpose of giving access to these scholars was to avoid misleading propaganda in international forums against Pakistan’s nuclear programme.

It was learnt that during their visit to Pakistan the researches met a number of personalities who had been directly or indirectly involved in the development of the country’s nuclear programme.

The persons the researchers met include Dr Mubashir Hasan, a former finance minister in Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s tenure in which Pakistan started building nuclear power, and some scientists who served in the nuclear programme. However, the names of the scientists were not made public.

Dr Lavoy and Brig (r) Khan also tried to contact former nuclear scientist Sultan Bashiruddin and some other key scientists who remained in custody for alleged proliferation activities and were subsequently released, but they refused to meet them.

The two researchers declined to provide details. Brig (r) Feroz Hassan did not reply to an email written to him. Dr Lavoy replied to the mail, but refused to share the details of their research work until it was completed.

The book is likely to hit the bookstores by early next year.

"600 Suicide Bombers" trained in Red Mosque and Hafsa Madrassa

600 ‘suicide bombers’ lurking in twin cities
* ‘Walking bombs’ left Lal Masjid before final military operation
By Sharif Khan; The News, July 28, 2007

ISLAMABAD: The federal capital is likely to suffer from more suicide bombings as around 600 suicide bombers are hiding in madrassas and mosques within and around the limits of Islamabad and Rawalpindi, sources told Daily Times on Saturday.

“Around 600 students of Jamia Hafsa and Jamia Fareedia have not returned to their homes after the Lal Masjid operation. These are the people called ‘missing students’ and they are hiding in madrassas and mosques in and around the two cities. These are walking bombs and are determined to blow themselves up any time, anywhere,” said a source directly involved in the ongoing investigation of suicide blasts in the country.

“During interrogation, former Lal Masjid prayer leader Maulana Abdul Aziz said that five to six hundred students of the two madrassas had been trained, equipped and brainwashed to carry out suicide attacks. These students left the madrassa according to a plan before the final operation against the mosque was launched,” the source said, adding that some female students had also been trained to provide support to these bombers.

“During the debriefing of students captured from Lal Masjid and Jamia Hafsa, the security agencies learnt that the teenaged students believed that President Pervez Musharraf and his team were kaafirs (non-believers) and agents of the US and had to be killed. The bombers are targeting army and law enforcement personnel to avenge the killings of their colleagues and Abdul Rashid Ghazi,” said the source.

According to intelligence reports, at least 60 operatives are masterminding the attacks against security personnel.

“Investigations have revealed that these operatives are operating from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas,” the source said, adding that military actions alone against the militants would not bear the desired results. “Neither the operation nor massive killings can resolve this issue. It will instead trigger an unending bloodbath throughout the country,” the source quoted Maulana Aziz as telling his interrogators.

Saturday, July 28, 2007

Aitzaz Ahsan: A Lawyer who turned a Judge into a National Cause



A Lawyer Who Turned a Judge Into a National Cause
By SOMINI SENGUPTA; New York; July 28, 2007

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, July 25 — In the hands of a lesser political bloodhound, the matter might have been simply a court case to decide the fate of the chief justice of Pakistan.

In the hands of Aitzaz Ahsan, one of the country’s best known lawyer-politicians, the case of the chief justice was rendered a case of justice under military rule. What could have been no more than a polite exchange of arcane constitutional arguments became over the last four months a political finger in the eye of the Pakistani president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf.

The chief justice, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, was removed by the president in March on charges of misconduct. Mr. Chaudhry appealed to the Supreme Court, which ruled a week ago that General Musharraf’s action was illegal, and restored him to the post.

As the principal counsel for the chief justice, Mr. Ahsan not only led the legal challenge but also saw to it that it fueled a popular protest movement. Playing chauffeur, Mr. Ahsan drove Mr. Chaudhry on spirited cavalcades through some of Pakistan’s largest cities. Lawyers in black piled on top of Mr. Ahsan’s Mitsubishi Pajero, shouting slogans for judicial independence.

The streets throbbed with supporters, including cadres from Mr. Ahsan’s Pakistan People’s Party. They threw rose petals to greet the chief justice.

The road shows were part of a careful calculation, one intended to bring maximum pressure on General Musharraf.

“It had to be a forensic exercise,” Mr. Ahsan said a few days after his victory, in one of the first interviews in his law office here in the capital. “To win the people we had to go the hustings, but we could lose the judges that way. Judges are conservative. They don’t want the chief justice addressing rallies. They would think he wasn’t one of them.”

Mr. Ahsan made sure the chief justice addressed mainly lawyers’ congregations. In court, he steered clear of political arguments, until the day before the verdict, when he threatened to depose the president and his intelligence chiefs in court if the bench failed to decide for the chief justice.

The Supreme Court did just that. And dancing broke out in the streets.

“It’s certainly a moment for me of great humility,” Mr. Ahsan said.

Gloating, Mr. Ahsan well knows, does not look good in politics.

The morning of the interview, the phone did not stop ringing with calls of congratulations. Mr. Ahsan, in short sleeves and navy blue pants, growled graciously into the handset, smiling, thanking. Raising a finger, he said he did not like to be photographed while on the phone. That is how movie stars in Pakistan are often photographed, he said.

Mr. Chaudhry’s supporters said that he had been suspended because he potentially threatened General Musharraf’s bid to remain army chief and seek re-election as president when his term expires this year. That bid was expected to be challenged in the Supreme Court, where Mr. Chaudhry had acquired a reputation as anything but pliant. The opposition vows to challenge it still. And the lawyers, Mr. Ahsan says, will again rise up.

“The day Pervez Musharraf announces he is standing for re-election, the bars are going to strike, the courts are going to close across Pakistan, and lawyers are going to be on the street,” he said.

As a lawyer and a politician, Mr. Ahsan has had a front-row seat on many milestones in Pakistan’s turbulent history of democracy and dictatorship. He recalls being jailed seven or eight times under the former president, Gen. Muhammad Zia ul-Haq. He was law minister in the first democratically elected government to take over after General Zia’s; a black-and-white photograph in his law office in Lahore shows Mr. Ahsan on his feet, addressing the first news conference of the new government and announcing amnesty for thousands who had been jailed and court-martialed by General Zia. The photograph was taken on Dec. 2, 1988. In it, Mr. Ahsan is standing next to his prime minister and party leader, Benazir Bhutto.

He represented Ms. Bhutto, now in self-imposed exile in Dubai and London, when she was accused of corruption. More surprising, he accepted the case of a longtime political foe, the former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, in 1999, when General Musharraf ousted him in a coup and threw him into jail.

Mr. Ahsan is a natural raconteur. He composes his words carefully, deliberately, almost always while staring ahead, rather than at his interlocutor. It is with particular relish he tells of his run-ins with power.

One dates to a night in November 1992, during Mr. Sharif’s government, when hundreds of Pakistan People’s Party workers had camped out on his front lawn in preparation for an opposition rally the next morning. An armored personnel carrier broke through the gate, and the riot police stormed in. Party workers, he recalled, retaliated by thrashing the police. “The police ran,” he said.

Mr. Ahsan has been among Pakistan’s most consistent opponents of military rule and of American backing for Pakistan’s military rulers, from General Zia to General Musharraf.

“This time the military has lost all its legitimacy and authority to rule,” Mr. Ahsan began.

“You know, Pakistan is not Saudi Arabia, it’s not Kuwait,” he said. “It’s not a Middle Eastern Muslim country. It’s a South Asian Muslim country. South Asia as a whole has democratic instincts, democratic guts. What you’ve seen over the last couple of months you wouldn’t see in a Jordan or a Syria.”

This is one of Mr. Ahsan’s favorite talking points, that Pakistan belongs to South Asia, and not to the Middle East, and the theme of his 1997 book, “The Indus Saga and the Making of Pakistan.” His shelves are packed with Pakistani law books, along with books on the Indian Constitution and “The 9/11 Commission Report.”

Over the mantel, where in most Pakistani offices one would find a giant portrait of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the nation’s founder, Mr. Ahsan has hung a friend’s painting of the giant mango tree in the middle of his garden. Ms. Bhutto’s photograph sits on a corner table. The more prominently displayed image is of him in the driver’s seat of his Pajero, with Mr. Chaudhry next to him and at least seven lawyers piled on the roof.

“It is, I feel, the end of the road for the military,” he maintained. “It is the end of the road for Pervez Musharraf. Nobody should bet on him, not even the Americans.”

Pakistan's Pashtun 'problem'?

SPEAKING FREELY
Pakistan's Pashtun 'problem'
By Haroun Mir Jul 26, 2007; Asia Times

At least since September 11, 2001, most of the perpetrators of terrorist actions in the West have been Arabs or Pakistanis, yet the victims of the West's military reactions have been Afghans and the Pashtun tribes living in Pakistan.

The majority of Pashtuns have fallen prey to Arab and Pakistani propaganda against the West. The continued insurgency in Afghanistan and the sudden deterioration of the situation in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province make the Pashtun tribes the prime target in the "war against terror".


They have lived in poverty and become the proxy soldiers in the confrontation between the West and the Islamic extremists. The radicalization of young Pashtuns in madrassas (seminaries), generously financed by Saudi Arabia, menaces the cohesion of Pashtun tribal structure.

About 30 million to 35 million Pashtuns live in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, but they are divided and engaged in internal feuds. Only once - and for a short period - have they stood united. This was under the rule of Ahmad Shah Durani (1747-73), who created modern Afghanistan and conquered significant territories in India and Iran. Ever since British rule in India, Pashtun tribes have been in conflict either against foreign intruders or among themselves.

They have deliberately been kept away from modern education and economic development. During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s, they were tools in the hands of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. And today they are the direct victims of the "war on terror".

In the years of conflict in Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and other major Persian Gulf countries have financed thousands of madrassas for Afghan refugees in Pakistan, which resulted in a massive radicalization of young Pashtuns. In addition, the influx of Wahhabi Arab fighters and madrassa teachers transformed the dominant moderate Hanafi school of jurisprudence into a new breed of religious extremism, which resulted in the creation of the Taliban-type movement.

For instance, during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, not a single act of suicide bombing was committed against the Soviet military or their family members in Kabul. The first suicide bombing in Afghanistan was committed by two Arabs against the late Ahmad Shah Massoud, Afghanistan's former defense minister, on September 9, 2001. At least since 2003, young Pashtuns have become involved in suicide bombings, which go against their tribal and religious values.

A new breed of extremist Islamic sect is taking shape in the Pashtun heartland. Only a limited number of the 15 million to 20 million Pashtuns who live in Pakistan enjoy modern education. Sadly, secular and modern schools are being burned down by the Taliban in Afghanistan's Pashtun-dominated provinces. Each year, thousands of young Pashtuns are trained in the madrassas, and only a limited number of them have access to secular education.

Pakistan's military rulers have an interest in keeping the masses of Pashtun people ignorant. They need the support of Pashtuns to dominate other minority groups. Until now the Pakistani authorities have used the old British system of divide-and-rule to play off local Pashtun leaders and in exchange require their loyalty.

This colonial system has kept the masses of Pashtuns illiterate and uneducated, and only selected families have received quality education to fill senior positions in the military. The presence of Pashtuns in the Pakistani military is used to dominate Balochs, who have been struggling to gain their autonomy since the creation of Pakistan in 1947. Without the support of the Pashtun tribes, the Pakistan Army would be unable to control a widespread Baloch insurgency.

President General Pervez Musharraf is keen to keep the truce with Pashtun tribes and save his tacit alliance with extremist religious parties. He knows well that the expansion of conflict with Pashtun tribes in Pakistan not only forces them to unite against Pakistani authorities, but also could incite Balochs to side with the Pashtuns.

Pakistani military authorities want to keep the status quo in the tribal regions. They are more interested in the integrity of their territory than in the global fight on terror. Musharraf has always sought the cooperation of radical religious leaders instead of the main secular leaders because only the religious leaders are capable of reaching out to the radicalized Pashtuns tribes.

Pakistan's military interests are in the interests neither of the West nor of Pashtuns. Keeping Pashtun tribes divided and backward might serve the short-term militaristic interests of Pakistan. But it is already backfiring against the long-term interests of the West.

The Pashtun-dominated territories have become a de facto sanctuary for international terrorism. North Atlantic Treaty Organization and US forces are fighting and bombing those who have nothing to do with terrorist acts in the West. Al-Qaeda and other international terrorists are taking advantage of the religiously devoted and fiercely independent Pashtun tribes.

Indeed, extremist religious groups and local Taliban have become an alibi for Musharraf to continue his military rule in Pakistan, despite the contempt shown by the overwhelming majority of Pakistanis. Pakistan's military authorities have been able to persuade the West to accept their ill-conceived tribal policies of promoting radical extremist leaders to the detriment of more traditional moderate Pashtun leaders.

The West, instead of alienating and pushing Pashtun tribes further into the camp of extremists, could reach out and assist moderate Pashtun leaders. But young Pashtuns have undergone almost three decades of radicalization, and it will require much time to reverse the trend.

Haroun Mir was an aide to the late Ahmad Shah Massoud, Afghanistan's former defense minister. He works as a consultant and policy analyst in Kabul.