Saturday, March 31, 2007

A nervous breakdown?

A nervous breakdown?
By Ghazi Salahuddin
The News, April 1, 2007

We now know what this military-led government cannot do. It cannot establish its writ in the very heart of the capital, when challenged by female students of Jamia Hafsa seminary. It also cannot prevent the Talibanisation of Pakistan, as certified by the attack by hundreds of heavily-armed militants on security forces in the town of Tank in north-west of the country.

Ah, but you should also look at what it can do with its immense power and authority. It can organise a public meeting for President General Pervez Musharraf to address and take care of such details as to close down the educational institutions, commandeer a large number of buses and vans to bring people from near and distant places to attend the meeting and deploy over 8,000 security officials in and around the meeting place, Rawalpindi's Liaquat Bagh.

A lot has happened this week to demonstrate the power and the powerlessness of this government. And all this falls into a pattern. We have seen how the coercive power of the state is used in the vested interest of the ruling party and how this show of force truly reflects the deflation of government's authority. We have also witnessed how this drift has finally precipitated a serious crisis of governance.

What happened on March 9 -- the day on which the chief justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan was shown seated in front of the chief of the army staff -- has only served as a catalyst. How this issue was tackled on that day and during the next two or three days may be diagnosed by the social scientists as a serious malady, verging on a nervous breakdown of the administration.

So much else has happened since March 9 to essentially deepen the national sense of gloom. In many ways, the cricket fiasco has dominated the popular mood, particularly with reference to the mysterious murder of Bob Woolmer and the speculation that it is generating. We have intimations here of how our institutions are cracking up. At another level, you may want to think of how insistent, if not militant, religiosity had intruded into our cricket affairs. When we talk about institutions, our imagination also flies with PIA.

But let me look at all this in the two mirrors provided by the role that Jamia Hafsa's female students played on Tuesday and Wednesday and the public meeting in Liaquat Bagh that Musharraf addressed on Tuesday. For whatever reasons, we were not able to benefit from sufficient investigative reporting on these events. What linger in our minds are visual images seen on television and in photographs published by the newspapers. Incidentally, one published photograph of male Lal Masjid students beating a plainclothes policeman is starkly reminiscent of how the policemen deal with opposition protesters. Isn't interesting that these roles can sometimes be reversed?

Beyond any doubt, the stick-wielding Jamia Hafsa students, all draped in black burqas, presented a very dramatic sight. This was, of course, not the first time that they had demonstrated their clout, forcing the administration to give in. Still, there was a qualitative advance in their religious activism when they, with support from their Lal Masjid collaborators, kidnapped an old woman, her young daughter, her daughter-in-law and a six-month-old granddaughter on Tuesday night from a house in the neighbourhood. Their charge was that the women they had picked up were indulging in immoral activities. When the police arrested two teachers and two drivers of Jamia Hafsa on Wednesday, the male and female madressah students kidnapped two police functionaries and confiscated two police vehicles. This showdown ended with the surrender of the mighty administration.

While the Jamia Hafsa episode is an emblem of shame for our government and our apathetic civil society, the message conveyed by the Liaquat Bagh meeting is no less disturbing. If you look at it carefully, you will see how it exposes the moral basis of the democratic pretensions of the government. The idea was to show that Musharraf and the party he has assembled with the help, mainly, of turncoats and defectors, are very popular with the people. By the way, do you remember that referendum that became the fig leaf of legitimacy to the president?

Information to be gleaned from some reports published on the inside pages presents a weird situation. Roads leading to Liaquat Bagh were closed and only vehicles carrying the ruling party supporters were allowed to pass. The district administration, it was alleged, had told the shopkeepers in the area to pull their shutters down for security reasons. Hotels and restaurants in the vicinity were vacated and the hotels were told on Sunday that they would not rent their rooms for the next two days. During the meeting, police and army personnel were deployed on rooftops.

As for official resources invested in the public meeting, an article posted on BBC's Urdu.com estimated, in a lighter vein, that the cost per minute was about one million rupees -- calculated on the assumption that the meeting continued for three hours. Reporter Wusatullah Khan, not a novice by any means, took into account the publicity that had continued for a week, dominated by full and half-page advertisements in newspapers and the cost of security arrangements. There were large hoardings on all important thoroughfares. These calculations, guesstimates to be sure, included the cost of bringing people to the meeting place in commandeered vehicles.

Let me conclude with a quote from an article published by an English daily on February 16. It was an account by Tasneem Noorani, a former interior secretary, of his visit to India. Its title: "Primacy of law in India". As an aside, it should be noted that all our senior and expectedly learned and bright bureaucrats find it possible to speak their mind after they retire. You may also include retired military officers in this country. Look at the long list of retired officials who write for our newspapers and you will find that almost all of them are critical of the official policies. Why aren't they so perceptive when still in the gilded cage?

In any case, this is what Tasneem Noorani wrote: "Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Amritsar to address a political rally to support Congress candidates. It was reported in the press that the attendance at the prime minister's political rally was rather poor. Finding it odd I asked someone as to why the district administration was sleeping. Were they that incompetent that they could not arrange an audience for the rally of the prime minister? I was told that this did not happen in India. If the DC had tried to be efficient and to show his loyalty to the prime minister, he would have lost his job".

The writer is a staff member. Email: ghazi_salahuddin@hotmail.com

Transforming Pakistan's Frontier Corps: A Policy Brief

Transforming Pakistan's Frontier Corps
By Hassan Abbas
Terrorism Monitor, Volume 5, Issue 6 (March 29, 2007)
www.jamestownfoundation.org

While the jury is still out on whether General Pervez Musharraf's limitations in overpowering the Taliban in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas are primarily an outcome of "incapacity" or "unwillingness" (or both), the United States has committed itself to helping Pakistan transform its Frontier Corps into an effective fighting force. This effort is intended to improve Pakistan's ability to tackle the Taliban resurgence and eradicate al-Qaeda sanctuaries in the region. A grant of US$75 million a year is expected for the purpose as part of a $750 million fund to be disbursed in the next five years for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan (Dawn, March 17). It is a constructive step in principal, but without an innovative reform plan and implementation monitoring, the prospects of real improvement are dim. Pakistan has received billions of dollars from various international donor agencies over the years for different development projects, yet sadly, in many cases, a major chunk of the funds evaporate through corruption and mismanagement. This analysis attempts to understand the structure, strengths and potential of the Frontier Corps through the lens of its history and the political dynamics of the region. It also proposes some ideas for reform of the institution and better utilization of U.S. funds.

What is the Frontier Corps?

The Frontier Corps is a federal paramilitary force stationed in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan Province, known as FC NWFP and FC Balochistan, respectively. Both forces are separate entities that operate under the Federal Interior Ministry and are each headed by an Inspector General (IG). Both of these offices are invariably held by army officers (major generals) on deputation from the Pakistani Army. Currently, the IG FC NWFP is Major General Mohammad Alam Khattak and the IG FC Balochistan is Major General Shujaat Zamir Dar. Quetta and Peshawar (Balahisar Fort) serve as the respective headquarters of FC Balochistan and FC NWFP. Scouts Training Academy, Mirali in North Waziristan Agency serves as the primary training institution for FC NWFP.

The task of these forces is to help local law enforcement in the maintenance of law and order when called upon to do so. Border patrol and anti-smuggling operations are also delegated to the FC. Lately, these forces have been increasingly used in military operations against insurgents in Balochistan and militants in FATA. The total manpower of the Corps is currently around 80,000. All senior command positions in the Frontier Corps are filled by regular army officers who serve for a period of two to three years. Within army circles, few officers look forward to these assignments from their professional and career point of view.

It is also relevant to point out that FC Balochistan is comprised largely of non-Baloch, whereas a great majority of soldiers in FC NWFP are ethnically Pashtun. Secondly, FC Balochistan, comprised of 13 units, is not popular in Balochistan and is seen as an outside force that is widely believed to be involved in human rights violations and is known for the disproportionate use of force. On the other hand, FC NWFP, comprised of 14 units, has a comparatively better reputation among people of the province.

The Frontier Corps should not be confused with the Frontier Constabulary and the Frontier Force Regiment. The Frontier Constabulary, another federal paramilitary force (largely drawn from the NWFP, but operating in Punjab Province as well), has been gradually merging into FC NWFP since July 2002, whereas the Frontier Force Regiment is a unit of the Pakistani Army formed in 1956 from the amalgamation of three regiments: the Corps of Guides, the Frontier Force Regiment and the Pathan Regiment (Dawn, March 7, 2002).

History of Frontier Corps

The Frontier Corps was constituted by the Viceroy of British India, Lord Curzon, in 1907. It was an effort to organize and combine seven militias and scouts units operating in different tribal agencies bordering Afghanistan—namely, the Khyber Rifles (1878), the Zhob Militia (1883), the Kurram Militia (1892), the Tochi Scouts (1894), the Chagai Militia (1896), the South Waziristan Scouts (1900) and the Chitral Scouts (1903). These militias were largely loyal to British interests as they were part of the administrative units established by the British in the late 19th century. The units helped the British administrators manage the border area and operated as law enforcement contingents when needed. They also performed military duties on occasion, although not always successfully.

Bringing all these units under one command was primarily an administrative decision. An officer of the rank of a lieutenant colonel was designated as the inspecting officer of the Frontier Corps. Given the expansion of the force, the title was changed to inspector general (equal to the rank of a brigadier) in 1943. Two more units, the Second Mahsud Scouts (1944) and the Pishin Scouts (1946), were added to the Frontier Corps during British imperial rule (http://www.khyber.org). The standard British recruiting principle was to involve locals and share security responsibilities with them. Their trainers were British military officers and these units were known for their military-style discipline. Their perks and salaries were also better than other services.

Pakistan inherited this organization in 1947 and continued to expand it by establishing many new units—for instance, Thall Scouts (1948), Northern Scouts (1949), Bajaur Scouts (1961), Karakoram Scouts (1964), Kalat Scouts (1965), Dir Scouts (1970) and Kohistan Scouts (1977). Even by 1947, the Corps had developed into a large force looking after the area from the Karakoram mountain range in the north to the Mekran Coast in the south. The area of responsibility was well over 2,500 miles in length. To manage and administer this growing institution, the FC was bifurcated into two units—basically separating Balochistan region from NWFP area. IG FC Balochistan was made responsible for the Zhob Militia, Sibi Scouts, Kalat Scouts, Mekran Militia, Kharan Rifles, Pishin Scouts, Chaghai Militia and First Mahsud Scouts. Some British officers continued to serve the FC until the early 1950s and Brigadier Ahmed Jan became the first Pakistani to hold the post of IG FC NWFP in 1950. In 1978, the post of IG FC was upgraded and since then an officer of the rank of major general heads the Frontier Corps.

When this analyst visited the Frontier Corps headquarters in Peshawar, Tall Scouts mess and FC post in Landikotal many years ago, there were smartly dressed Frontier Corps contingents who were hospitable and courteous. At the soldiers' level, their roots are in the area that they are serving and they take pride in their units' history. It is unfortunate, however, that very few of the locals are promoted to higher command positions, which are considered a reserve for officers from the Pakistani Army.

Political Role of Frontier Corps

During the early 1970s, the Corps was dragged into regional as well as local political battles at the behest of the state. Major General Naseerullah Khan Babar, IG FC NWFP, played a central role in 1973 in organizing and grooming anti-Daud Afghan resistance forces. Babar (who became the federal interior minister in 1993-95 and is known for galvanizing and supporting the Taliban) publicly acknowledges that Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ahmad Shah Masoud were among the Afghans who were first recruited as Frontier Corps personnel (on paper) and then trained by the Pakistani military's Special Services Group. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1978, these assets proved very valuable. During these years, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto also tasked IG FC NWFP to help create an environment whereby the federal government could incorporate tribal areas into mainstream Pakistan, but that was not to be. On the other hand, FC Balochistan (besides the army) was used in the mid-1970s by the federal government to crush the insurgency in Balochistan.

Performance & Reform of the Frontier Corps in Recent Years

When tasked with tackling the rising sectarianism in FATA during the 1990s, the Corps failed miserably. Various other factors, however, were also at play in this context, the most important being Pakistan's official support to the Taliban that lasted up to late 2001. Religious extremism oozing out of the Saudi funded madrassas and regional politics naturally influenced Corps personnel of whom a significant majority remains ethnically Pashtun.

The FC NWFP, however, did play an important role in the anti-narcotics drive. Simon Gillet, a UN advisor to the Dir District development project (in FATA) from 1996-2001, maintains that the Frontier Corps played a major role in eliminating poppy cultivation from Dir area (Asian Affairs, November 2000). The same cannot be said about FC Balochistan. For instance, one of its officials was found to be involved in drug smuggling quite recently (Dawn, February 9). Due to highhandedness and brutal military operations in recent years, the reputation of FC Balochistan is at its lowest ever. Efforts are underway to improve its image through involvement in the building of schools and hospitals, but Baloch grievances are simmering under the surface. The Corps installations in the province are routinely attacked by insurgents (Pakistan Times, December 26, 2004).

Since 2003, FC NWFP has been heavily involved in military actions in the tribal belt and has suffered significant casualties since the beginning of the campaign (The News, September 12, 2005). For almost all Frontier Corps units, this is their first combat experience (except for the Chitral Scouts which were involved in the Kargil operations against India in 1999). Media reports indicate that the Corps fared quite poorly while fighting pro-Taliban and al-Qaeda elements. Lack of professional training and adequate equipment coupled with poor communication systems and coordination negatively impacted their effectiveness.

Policy Recommendations

The United States has been supporting the Frontier Corps for the last few months with provisions of the latest communication equipment and bullet-proof helmets (Dawn, December 6, 2006; http://www.state.gov). Lately, it has made increased financial commitments toward the Corps capacity building, but without a mechanism to closely monitor implementation of the reforms, progress is not guaranteed. Civil society actors, senior police officials and bureaucrats from administrative services of the NWFP and Balochistan should be involved in the process.

It is equally important that Pakistan give up the colonial legacy of appointing commanding officers from outside Frontier Corps cadres, as local tribesmen must also be given responsibility to lead their own forces. Making the Corps directly accountable to democratic institutions will also add to the credibility of the institution in the eyes of the locals, especially in the case of Balochistan. Last, the FC NWFP should not be deemed as an alternative to the local political authorities and law enforcement. The FC remains the second line of defense in a customary sense. Ignoring the office of Political Agent, Levies and Khasadars (local tribal police) that manage the day-to-day running of the tribal areas will be a costly mistake. Pashtuns seldom respond well to messages sent through bullets and shows of force. Traditional conflict resolution processes and local law enforcement forces should also be strengthened and empowered parallel to the reform of the Frontier Corps.

Realignments...

Jamiatul Ansar, Khudamul Furqan merge
By Mohammad Imran
Daily Times, March 31, 2007

ISLAMABAD: Maulana Abdul Jabbar, the head of the Khudamul Furqan, has merged his banned militant outfit with Maulana Fazalur Rehman Khalil’s Jamiatul Ansar, also a banned organisation, sources told Daily Times on Friday.

Founded by Khalil, Jamiatul Ansar was previously known as Harkatul Mujahideen, which was banned by the Pakistani government following the 9/11 attacks because of the organisation’s involvement in militant activities.

The sources said the merger of the two groups – both from the Deobandi school of thought – took place last month, and common friends had been trying to resolve differences between the two militant commanders over the last three months. The sources said that Maulana Abdul Jabbar would be offered a key position in Jamiatul Ansar, currently being headed by Maulana Badar Munir.

Law-enforcement agencies arrested Maulana Jabbar some three years ago for his alleged involvement in an unsuccessful attempt on President General Pervez Musharraf’s life in Rawalpindi, but he was released in October last year, and he has kept a low profile since.

His outfit, Khudamul Furqan, is also suspected of being involved in terrorist attacks on churches.

Maulana Jabbar got involved in militant activities in the early 1980s after formally joining the Harkatul Ansar, and stayed in Afghanistan till Mulla Omar’s ouster. He later joined the militant outfit Jaish-e-Muhammad, founded by Maulana Masood Azhar, but formed Khudamul Furqan when difference between him and Masood Azhar emerged. Maulana Jabbar later alleged that the top leadership of Jaish-e-Muhammad had facilitating law-enforcement agencies in his arrest.

Count down to civill war begins now...

Cleric gives govt a week to impose Sharia
Daily Times, March 31, 2007

ISLAMABAD: Maulana Abdul Aziz, the prayer leader at Lal Masjid and principal of Jamia Hafsa, on Friday gave the government a week’s deadline to “enforce Sharia” in the country, otherwise “clerics will Islamise society themselves”. “If the government does not impose Sharia within a week, we will do it,” Aziz told a gathering after Friday prayers. Similarly, he gave the Islamabad administration a week to shut down “brothels”, otherwise “seminary students will take action themselves”. “If we find a woman with loose morals, we will prosecute her in Lal Masjid,” he said. Sources told Daily Times that the Jamia Hafsa administration would compile a record of brothels and gambling dens over the week, and then launch a drive. They said the seminary believed these places were being run in collaboration with civil society organisations. “Jamia Hafsa will hold a conference on April 5-6 at Lal Masjid, where ulema will finalise a strategy against brothels and gambling dens,” said Aziz, adding that the drive would not be limited to Islamabad. mohammad imran

Friday, March 30, 2007

Remember Caesar, thou art mortal

From this turmoil some good must come
By Ayaz Amir - Dawn, March 30, 2007

THIS is a movement different from other movements in our history. Sparked in the first instance by the courage and fortitude of one man, My Lord the Chief Justice, it has been given body and shape by the legal fraternity whose unity and enthusiasm, from Khyber to Karachi, have been exemplary.

It is hard praising gentlemen of the bar and the bench. Some of our best lawyers have served military dictators with aplomb and distinction. And there has been no shortage of judges who have felt proud to collaborate with generals and deliver the most extraordinary verdicts in their favour. But our fortunes may be about to turn. On the eve of the 60th anniversary of our existence, a new history is being written and new traditions set.

Not for nothing are leading lawyers reluctant to come to the government’s defence. It is not easy living with the open contempt of one’s colleagues.

The media (most of it) has also been remarkable, informing the nation of what has been happening. It is this synergy between lawyers and the media which has created the climate in which a seemingly powerful military ruler, who seemed to have everything going for him, has been put on the defensive. On his face there seems to have settled nowadays a permanent look of unrelieved tension. So much for commando resilience and staying cool under fire.

‘In the Line of Fire’ was the title of the General Musharraf’s much-lauded memoirs. Experienced hands, familiar with the fate of similar memoirs, said the book would soon be on the footpaths where second-hand books are sold. I suppose we’ll have to find out.

This movement is guided by a clear aim, the legal community fighting for and seeking to enforce a single commandment: withdraw the misguided reference against the CJ and do so unconditionally. Munir Malik, the President of the Supreme Court Bar Association, puts it succinctly: there is nothing to talk about, simply withdraw the reference. Other things like the judiciary’s independence and the rule of law will come automatically once this fundamental objective is secured.

I must say Munir is proving to be a good president of the senior bar. A man of few words, when he speaks he is forceful and to the point. A Lawrence College man, a year senior to me, he is doing his old college proud.

Incidentally, Justice Jawad Khawaja who has resigned from the Lahore High Court to show his solidarity with the legal fraternity spent two years in Lawrence College as a junior school boy. If I am not being too unfair, Lawrence College’s main claim to fame used to be to produce academic duffers who would then go into the army and do well there. I am glad if it is beginning to acquire a slightly different reputation.

Clarity of aim is important because confusion of aim has destroyed or led astray many a popular upsurge in our history, be it the anti-Ayub agitation of 1968-69 which toppled Ayub but gave us Yahya Khan and in time led to the breakup of Pakistan; or be it the anti-Bhutto agitation of 1977 which was launched for the holding of fresh elections but which, along the way, acquired Islamic trappings –the evocative slogan, Nizam-i-Mustafa (Islamic rule) – and then fell like a ripe plum into General Ziaul Haq’s lap. This was 30 years ago but Pakistan has still to recover from the consequences of that hijacking.

So perhaps it is a good thing that the lawyers’ struggle, for all the public sympathy it is attracting, is staying first and foremost a lawyers’ struggle and not turning into something else. Good that the Jamaat-i-Islami, although verbally committed to this battle, is still keeping its powder dry and not throwing its cadres into the fray (something easy for it to do) because if that happens we will soon start hearing slogans of ‘Islami Inqilab (revolution)’ which for the moment we can do without.

Good that more and more people think that Maulana Fazlur Rahman is playing a double game, saying all the right things but not doing anything to undermine the interests of the military government. The Maulana is an astute man but often too astute for his own good. Still, by exposing himself thus he performs a useful public function. It increases the public’s awareness of humbugs.

Musharraf’s hands are tied, but how? Because unless he sweeps everything from the table and imposes emergency or martial law he must abide by the Constitution, moth-eaten and mutilated as it is. He tried using strong-arm tactics with the Chief Justice but when Justice Chaudhry stood his ground, there was nothing that Musharraf could do.

He is not the man he was and this crisis has weakened him further. Everyone recognises this, the Q League, the people of Pakistan, even our American friends, the godfathers of this dispensation. So tough decisions like sweeping everything from the table and ordering a general clampdown are no longer Musharraf’s to make. If he insists, it is doubtful whether his own constituency will go along with him. While we shouldn’t put any folly beyond the General Staff, we should give it the credit of recognising when a liability is a liability.

The problem, however, is not Musharraf. Because as things stand, if he falls into the pit he has so assiduously dug for himself, it is not democracy that will replace him but a freshly-groomed product of the General Staff who can be trusted to follow the pattern we are so familiar with: promising the nation deliverance and giving it hell. Haven’t we had enough of these circus performances?

The problem is to salvage the Constitution from the wreckage strewn around this dispensation. If My Lord the Chief Justice is restored, other things will fall in place. The choice then will not be Musharraf’s to abide or not to abide by the Constitution. He will be subject to its provisions.

The clock is ticking and in Sep/Oct this year his term comes to an end. Getting elected from these assemblies is now out of the question. Even the Q League won’t have the stomach for such a farce. And if Musharraf, flouting all dictates of good sense, insists on grappling with the impossible, that will be the cue for resignations from the assemblies followed by mass unrest.

But the key to all this is the independence of the judiciary and the restoration of My Lord the Chief Justice so that the judiciary acts as the Constitution’s guardian, as it should always have done, instead of being Marie Walewska or Madame Pompadour (take your pick) to a succession of some of the most hollow dictators our eastern climes have known.

A small caveat though. Roman emperors celebrating a triumph would have a slave standing beside them in their chariot, whispering into their ear: “Remember Caesar, thou art mortal.” If My Lord the Chief Justice is restored, let his restoration not go to his head. Humility should be his garment and prudence his guiding principle.

Look where we are. The religious seminary, Jamia Hafsa, located but a short distance from ISI headquarters in Islamabad takes the law into its own hands, abducting police officials and releasing them only after the Islamabad administration succumbs to its demands. The town of Tank near Dera Ismail Khan in the Frontier Province is attacked by militants, the first time such a thing has happened in Pakistan. This is the writ of the state.

So what games is the General Staff playing? Musharraf has already done the nation a favour by triggering this judicial crisis which may yet lead, unless misfortune is woven into our destiny, to the triumph of constitutionalism.

He can do another by taking off his uniform, now not so much a mark of distinction as an emblem of fear and timidity. He may yet be remembered with gratitude but only if he seizes the moment. Events are moving fast. If he remains a prisoner of his fears it won’t be long before it is too late for him to do any good.

Who will fight this Talibanisation in Pakistan?


Who will fight this Talibanisation?
Editorial, The News, March 30, 2007

The events of recent days in the NWFP town of Tank and in Islamabad should shatter the assessment of all those policymakers, government functionaries and members of civil society who thought that Talibanisation was a feature only of FATA or some other remote and backward area of the country. Tank, which is now under curfew, and where several people were killed as extremists (thought to be allied with a Waziristan militant commander with whom the government brokered a 'peace deal' last year) launched an all-out attack on Tuesday night, is the district headquarters of Tank district and not far from Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and Lakki Marwat, all reasonably large towns of NWFP. The violence there began on Monday after a school principal had the courage to call in the police after jihadis barged into his institution and tried to win new recruits to their cause. The local SHO also responded and he sadly paid for it with his life, reportedly killed in the most cold-blooded manner possible, after he thought he had managed to broker a truce with the militants who would leave the school peacefully and without any new schoolboys in tow. The principal was kidnapped the following day from his home and he too paid for his courage in standing up to these extremists with his life -- on Thursday it was reported that his body was found from South Waziristan. The militants who attacked Tank on Thursday have been linked to pro-Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud since this is his area of influence, although he has himself denied any such connection. However, it is worth reiterating that on many occasions in the past militants have carried out attacks against government installations and security personnel or killed so-called 'informers' in areas under their influence but then disassociated themselves from these acts. One can only hope that the president is absolutely one hundred per cent accurate when he says that those elements in the intelligence agencies who in the past had supported the Taliban, the jihadis and their sympathisers are no longer in the service of the government and that now any assistance to these extremists is coming, if at all, from retired intelligence officials.

The other disturbing development is taking place right in the heart of the federal capital. In this case particularly, the government and the Islamabad local administration are to blame for not having acted earlier when the female students of Jamia Hafsa had forcibly and illegally occupied a children's library demanding that this occupation would end only after the government rebuilt a portion of a mosque complex that had been demolished by the Capital Development Authority because it was built on encroached land. Now since those protesting claim to be religious students, one would first like to ask them their position on the legality of a house of worship – both from the temporal and the theological point of view – that is built on encroached land. Had the government acted promptly and strongly against this illegal occupation of the library and told the students and their madressah patrons that mosques built on illegal land are not legal, and had the students been ejected and not allowed to roam around Islamabad and launch 'raids' perhaps what happened on Wednesday could have been pre-empted. But as usual, the government seemed to sleep through this all, with the religious affairs minister claiming a "breakthrough" some weeks ago in the occupation stand-off.

This 'breakthrough' was that the government would rebuild the demolished parts of the mosque. The minister also managed to pose for the cameras as he laid the first 'brick' of this promised rebuilding operation. But the naivete of the minister and all those in the government who agreed to this view of giving concessions to the undue and illegal demands of extremists in the country was once again proven wrong when after being given a foot they proceeded to demand a mile. Hopefully, in any future negotiations, the services of the good minister will not be used. Instead of leaving the library and returning to their seminary as any God-fearing law-abiding citizens would have done (they in fact would not have occupied the library in the first place), they placed more demand before the government and refused to end their occupation. The initial 'raid' they conducted on one of the capital's busiest bazaars amazingly went unnoticed by the police and local administration, again making one wonder whether some elements in either or both organisations were perhaps sympathetic to the cause of these extremists. An SHO has apparently been suspended for failing to act against the students when they 'raided' the market but one would like to ask the government what it plans to do in the case of the minister, whose 'breakthrough' emboldened these extremists so much that they believed they could go about dispensing their own warped interpretation of religion and law on everybody else, holding even policemen hostage in the process.

What is perhaps equally worrying is the fact that there may be many in Pakistani society who may think that what these extremists posing as students have done is good and necessary. After all, with all the intolerance and bigotry that one is exposed to as a Pakistani in the course of one's daily life (from the mosque imam's often virulent sermon, the bias and prejudice manifest in the national curriculum, the overdose of religious programmes and channels on television, to the increasing tide of religiosity in society and the tendency among many people to bring in religion into just about everything), the government and civil society have themselves to blame for this increase in Talibanisation. As for the government, it fails on several counts. Foremost among them is its remarkable -- and sadly enduring -- inability to take a stand against extremists forces such as in Tank and the Jamia Hafsa students, deeming such matters 'sensitive' and then burying its head in the sand like an ostrich, pretending everything is all right, and continuing to think (at least some sections of the government and security establishment do, it would be fair to assume, subscribe to this view) that a way of having leverage with our regional neighbours means supping with the extremists and jihadis. In addition to this, the government is guilty of adopting a clear double standard. liberal and law-abiding progressive elements are tear-gassed and lathi-charged when they organise peaceful protests but when the extremists and obscurantists indulge in violent protests they are given undue concessions and a free hand to act with impunity. Tank and the Jamia Hafsa episode should serve as a wakeup call to the government. It must act decisively now. The future is only going to get bleaker unless madressah and national curriculum reforms are carried out and the overt display of religion in national life is curtailed, to levels normally found in other Muslim countries such as Malaysia or the Gulf states. As for civil society, and those who think they are non-extremist (i.e., progressive, liberal and/or moderate), they better stand up and speak against the extremists or risk their very existence and way of life coming under a permanent threat.

'Suicide attack' on Pakistan army BBC - March 29, 2007
At least two people have been killed in a suicide bombing at an army base in north-east Pakistan, the military says.

One of the dead was a soldier, the other the bomber, officials said. Eight troops were also hurt in the blast at the base in Kharian in Punjab province.

The bomber walked up to troops and blew himself up, a military spokesman said.

This is the second such attack on the army in recent months. Last November, 44 recruits were killed in a suicide blast in North West Frontier Province.

The bomb in Kharian, a cantonment town 130km (80 miles) south-east of the capital, Islamabad, went off next to a military vehicle, officials said.

"The soldiers were sitting near their vehicle outside the garrison area and the bomber came and blew himself up," military spokesman Maj Gen Waheed Arshad told the AFP news agency.

There have been a series of suicide blasts in Pakistan in recent months.

Pro-Taleban militants have been threatening to launch suicide attacks against the army unless President Pervez Musharraf ends his support for international forces in Afghanistan.

Wednesday, March 28, 2007

Back in the Game – Tribes and Society in Pakistan

Back in the Game – Tribes and Society in Pakistan
Hamid Hussain
Defence Journal, April 2007

It is not a question how much a man knows, but what use he can make of what he knows. Josiah Gilbert Holland

Human beings live with various identities and these identities transform over the course of time. Family, clan, tribe, ethnicity, nation and religion are some of the manifestations of these identities. These identities can be like circles and various circles interacting or at times clashing with each other. Intertribal relationship, access to external resources and interaction with central authority are key elements of the tribal society. Modern India took its current shape under British rule. In case of agriculturalist tribes inhabiting plains, central government had an upper hand and they were easily brought under central authority with little bloodshed. Centralization of state under British Raj had a mixed effect on the tribal structure of sub-continent. The effect of urbanization and attachment to central state structures resulted in weakening of tribal bonds especially in the heartlands. In case of tribes at the periphery especially Pushtun and Baluch tribes along British India’s frontier with Afghanistan, a different methodology was adopted. The terrain is rugged and can not sustain large scale agricultural activity. There is no revenue source which is the magnet for central government to assert its control more aggressively. Permanent stationing of large number of troops to keep turbulent tribes in check was not considered a cost effective approach. Indirect rule through tribal leaders and leaving tribesmen alone to settle their own problems was the preferred method used during British rule. Military expeditions were used intermittently to punish crimes. Pakistan continued the same policy with some modifications. Like all post-colonial nation states, Pakistani state has been trying to forge a national identity supplanting other identities especially in case of tribes at the periphery of the state. The results of these efforts have been mixed. In some cases, state has been able to successfully link various tribal groups to the concept of nation state through their attachment to the structures of the central state. On the other hand, some groups who were either not welcomed or resisted their links with central state at best gave only nominal allegiance to the state. They tried to confront the state whenever state found itself in difficult times.

Tribes at the periphery of the empires and their successor nation states have survived for centuries by raiding and plundering neighboring settled areas and joining invaders passing through their territories to seek fortunes in far away lands. Later with delineation of boundaries of nation states, smuggling became a major source of income for these tribes. Smuggling cartels of tribesmen engage in smuggling of luxury goods, alcohol and drugs worth billions of dollars between Gulf States, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Prior to independence, tribesmen were not allowed to control resources in settled areas and their activities were restricted to their own lands. They were allowed to serve in paramilitary forces and army and after retirement these tribesmen would go back to their ancestral lands. Since 1947, a dramatic change has occurred and government institutions such as schools, colleges and hospitals have helped to strengthen bonds with the state. In addition, many educated tribesmen have found opportunities in lower and higher levels of government service. A number of senior civil servants and army officers from tribal territories have held high posts in the country. This has resulted in a dichotomy. On one hand, tribesmen are trying to get all the benefits of the centralized state and insisting on getting civil service and military job opportunities and sending representatives to national assembly and senate. On the other hand, they want to maintain their independence and no interference from state. This means that their representatives in assemblies are free to debate and vote on laws passed by elected bodies but same laws are not applied in their own constituencies. Similarly, civil and military officers from tribal territories enforce laws of the state except in the areas of their origin. At some point tribal societies have to confront this dichotomy. Clash of interests of urban classes and settled populations with those of tribal areas will invariably increase frictions in the society.

In October 2001, when U.S. forces landed in Afghanistan, Pakistan deployed paramilitary forces and regular army troops in tribal areas. Then Corps Commander Lieutenant General Ali Muhammad Jan Orakzai (a Pushtun belonging to Orakzai tribe and now Governor of North West Frontier Province) then Inspector General Frontier Corps (IGFC) Major General Hamid Khan (now Lt. General and Corps Commander Peshawar) and then Governor Lt. General ® Iftikhar Hussain Shah patiently worked with tribal elders and deployment was done without any violence. All these three high ranking officers were Pushtuns and this helped a lot during their negotiations with tribal leaders. Afghan front was quite for a while but in the last three years, violence is escalating. U.S. approach of aggressive military tactics in violence ridden Pustun areas of Afghanistan and overall hostility towards Pakistani tribal areas has complicated the situation. Increasing violence in Afghanistan is the main factor but without understanding intricate dynamics of the region and tribal politics, a knee jerk military approach looking only at the numbers killed without pondering over the end game plan will only bring grief to Americans and more bloodshed to the region. Under intense U.S. pressure, General Pervez Mussharraf launched military operation in Waziristn in 2004 against the wishes of even many members of the armed forces. The result was disastrous. Paramilitary forces and regular troops suffered heavy casualties and violence quickly spread to a larger geographic area. Military then embarked on use of heavy artillery, gunship helicopters and fixed wing aircrafts to regain momentum. This resulted in collateral damage and alienation of large number of tribesmen. The most devastating blow to government came when militants started to target tribal leaders allied with government. Government lost its intelligence assets as locals stopped providing information for the fear of retaliation from militants. In the absence of local intelligence, any military operation in tribal areas is doomed to fail. General Mussharraf quickly understood this and this was the major factor in his decision to cut a peace deal with local militants. This was necessary to give time to government to rebuild its local intelligence network; however the tough task was to convince Americans that this is the correct approach. Musharraf took N.W.F.P. Governor Lt. General ® Ali Muhammad Jan Orakzai on his visit to Washington and both tried to convey this point to the administration officials. Washington agreed to give few months to see the result of this approach. Escalating violence in Afghanistan and continued flow of fighters from Pakistan resulted in gradual intensification of pressure on Pakistan to do something. In February 2007, Vice President Dick Cheney visited Islamabad for heart to heart talk with Musharraf. He brought Deputy Director of Operations of Central Intelligence Agency with him to provide evidence of militant activity in Waziristan.

Washington wants swift action from Pakistan in Waziristan but unable to understand Pakistani dilemma. Pakistani security forces are operating under significant limitations. Most important factor is the perception that these forces are being used to help U.S. interests rather than Pakistani interests. The hearts of officers and rank and file are not in this fight and if active engagement is stretched, it may impact on the morale and discipline of the security forces. A small number of officers and men have been disciplined for their refusal to participate in military operations in tribal areas. In terms of manpower, paramilitary forces are overextended. Large numbers of Frontier Corps N.W.F.P. (recruited from tribal territories and settled districts, officers are seconded from army) personnel are deployed in North and South Waziristan as well as troubled areas of Khyber and Bajawar agencies. If another problem erupts in any tribal territory (sectarian or law and order), it will be difficult to rush paramilitary troops there. Frontier Constabulary (recruited primarily from settled districts, the officers are seconded from Police service) is also stretched thin. This force is designed for control of law and order in areas between tribal territories and settled districts called Frontier Regions (FRs) as well as serving as back up for police force in settled districts. More than two third of Frontier Constabulary is deployed outside FRs. This is one of the factors that militants have expanded their influence in FRs when they came under pressure in tribal areas. In case of any new crisis, government will have to use regular troops. In addition, a large number of Pushtuns recruited from settled districts of N.W.F.P. serve in Frontier Corps Baluchistan (an independent entity headed by a Major General).

Different groups of local and foreign militants based in tribal areas joined hands when Pakistani security forces launched operations against them. Foreign militants (including Uzbeks, Chechens and Arabs) and their local tribal allies fought against Pakistani security forces. It is inevitable that there will be differences among these groups about ideology, methodology and most importantly financial resources and these differences will result in armed clashes. The first shots have already been fired when tribesmen clashed with foreign militants (especially Uzbeks) and their local supporters in March 2007 resulting in death of over 100 people in Waziristan. It is not clear whether local tribesmen with their own agenda developed differences with foreigners or they are confronting foreigners at behest of government. The most difficult problem for Islamabad will be how to tackle this situation? Some will argue that it is better to let the tribesmen take care of the problem and leave government forces out of the loop. Others will argue that government should provide active support to local tribesmen in confronting foreign militants and their local supporters. Foreign militants may decide to strike Pakistanis security forces and try to provoke a large scale response in an attempt to incite tribesmen against government. It will be tempting for Islamabad to launch another large scale military operation to solve foreign militant issue once and for all, however the move may backfire sending tribesmen back into the arms of most extremist groups operating in the area. In short term, covert support with intelligence and arms to tribesmen and financial rewards for dead and injured tribesmen may be more than adequate. More important is to think about long term consequences. Even if local militants are able to solve the foreign fighters issue, this will invariably strengthen their own hold in the area, further eroding government’s authority and opening the doors of future armed conflict among militant groups. Case of Afghanistan is a classic example of such feuds perpetuated by external financial resources and complications of use of tribal militias by government. A number of factors are responsible for the escalating violence inside Afghanistan. A major factor is U.S. failure on military, intelligence, political and reconstruction fronts. It is unlikely that removal of all foreign fighters will result in cessation of hostilities in Afghanistan. A more broad based strategy and cooperation among all key players to find a grand bargain is the only viable option to bring peace and stability to the region. It will take a long time and patience on part of all players to bring back the equilibrium of influence of tribal leaders and government’s limited authority back to tribal territories. Tribesmen should be encouraged to discuss consequences of uncontrolled militant activity by a number of groups in their territories. Islamabad’s focus should be on tackling the issue of militants. Fundamental changes to tribal structure and administration which are long overdue but in current state of affairs are unlikely to succeed. Anyone who is negatively affected from the change will resist the change and will not be hesitant to use violence to thwart government’s attempts. This violence will be solely related to local affairs but will invariably contribute to general instability thus providing ideal environment for extremist groups to increase their influence. One example will show the complexity of the problem. In 1999, about 25 villages were detached from Mohmand Agency and attached to settled districts. Tribesmen usually do not pay land revenue and get electricity free of charge. Attachment of these villages to settled districts meant that they would come under Pakistani law and had to give up some of the privileges enjoyed before. This caused resentment and a small group calling itself Mohmand Resistance Movement attacked some government installations especially electricity towers causing hardship to a large area of Mohmand agency.

Efforts of coordination among U.S., Pakistan and Afghanistan have not been successful. U.S. set up a Tripartite Commission which gave an opportunity to military officers from U.S., Afghanistan and Pakistan to interact with each other. In March 2006, Washington brought Afghan and Pakistani military officers to Germany where issues of border security were discussed. In 2006, Afghan President Hamid Karzai suggested that tribal elders from Pakistan and Afghanistan should be invited to address violence in the region. A nine member delegation of Afghan Jirga Commission headed by Pir Syed Ahmed Gilani visited Pakistan in March 2007 to discuss the volatile situation in tribal territories of both countries. In the absence of a long view and concrete measures it is unlikely that simple gatherings of tribal elders will solve the complex problem. Divergent interests of different tribes and clans, intra-tribal rivalry, suspicions of key nation state players and presence of large number of players on the scene will make any comprehensive solution very difficult if not impossible. Violence in tribal territories will not abate as long as Pakistan and Afghanistan governments are at loggerheads with each other. It will be tempting for both governments as well as U.S. to use local tribal proxies to try to serve their perceived interests which will further increase violence in tribal areas.

Tribesmen are masters of taking full advantage from a crisis. Large sums of money are now available from different sources. Money for Jihad from rich Gulf countries, money to counter Jihad from United States, Pakistan, Afghanistan and money from other sources such as drug and transport mafia and Iran is flowing to tribal territories and tribesmen are happy to grab it from every source. Pakistani tribesmen not happy with Islamabad will go to Kabul while Afghan tribesmen not happy with Kabul will look towards Islamabad. Wazir tribal elders have been traveling to Kabul to plead their case. In March 2007, about 60 tribal leaders from Pakistani side visited Afghanistan and met with Afghan officials. They asked NATO and Afghan officials to deal with them directly rather than routing everything from Islamabad. Pakistan is playing the same game by working with some tribesmen on the other side of the Durand Line (border between Pakistan and Afghanistan). If violence escalates and Pakistan’s authority over its border areas wanes, then U.S. may have to re-adjust its mission in Afghanistan. Non-Pushtun Afghans are waiting for that opportunity. They may get restless sooner than expected. Division of Afghanistan along ethnic lines with Hindu Kush as border may be the intended or unintended consequence. In that case, Pakistani state will come under intense pressure with a clear danger of fracture along ethnic and ideological lines. Pushtuns will be major losers as violence will be invariably intra-Pushtun and the battlefield will be their cities, villages and mountains.

In Baluchistan, the situation is more complex. Here two different types of tribal forces are at work: Baluch and Pushtuns. Baluch tribesmen are operating under ethnic and nationalist umbrella. Baluch are alienated from Pakistani state and society. Their small numbers and negligible representation in various segments of the society is reinforcing their alienation. In the last sixty years, Baluch have risen several times against the state authority. Since 2004, violence has rapidly escalated in Baluchistan. Baluch militants attacking security forces, critical infrastructure of gas pipeline and railways while security forces responding by launching operations against Baluch. Members of three major tribes: Bugti, Marri and Mengal are actively involved in armed struggle against government. Government is trying to use intra-tribal rivalry and competition to thwart the efforts of hostile tribesmen. This is a recipe for long term instability. Sincere efforts of a comprehensive dialogue with Baluchs need to be put on a fast tract. Genuine grievances of Baluchs need to be addressed and Islamabad has to take Baluchs into confidence in all matters pertaining to development in the province. Pushtuns in Baluchistan are not monolithic. In addition to tribal divisions they have different political visions. Afghan Pushtuns based in Pushtun dominated areas of Baluchistan have been successful in maintaining some influence in that region. Insurgents fighting Afghan and coalition forces in Afghanistan have also found support among these Pushtuns. This support is based on religious, ethnic and tribal bonds. On the other hand nationalist Pushtuns see current violence in which Pushtuns are dying on both sides as against their interests.

Pakistan-Iran border is also becoming hot. There have been several shootouts between smugglers and other trouble makers and security forces of both countries. In February 2007, Pakistanis security forces arrested seven Iranian trying to enter Pakistan. There was disagreement between two countries about who should interrogate these suspects and in protest Iran closed its border. In early 2007, a Sunni group called Jundullah claimed attacks on Iranian security forces in Baluchistan-Sistan region. Iran is building a fence along its border with Pakistan which is the cause of resentment among Baluchs of both countries. In addition, this attempt of fencing of border by Iran will affect smuggling operations therefore smugglers will partly finance the activities of Baluch insurgents operating on both side of the border. Iran fearful of U.S. intentions, see Pakistan’s cooperation with U.S. with suspicion and worries that Washington and Islamabad may be colluding to cause headaches for Tehran by stirring trouble in Iranian Baluchistan. Some Gulf sheikhdoms fearing decline of their fortunes in case of success of Gwadar port are also quietly funding some Baluch armed groups. In view of increasing frustrations of Washington and Kabul, it is also tempting for them to support Baluch groups. They may see rise of ethnic and nationalistic Baluchs as a buffer against religious extremism emanating from the region. That project can be sub-contracted to Indians who will be happy to oblige. Indians may consider this option to use it in future as a bargaining chip over Kashmir. The deal may have a clause of ‘You stop supporting my terrorist and your freedom fighter and I’ll stop supporting my freedom fighter and your terrorist’. If instability of the area bordering Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran increases, Baluch may be tempted to emulate Iraqi Kurds and try to carve out their own autonomous region.

Everyone shares the responsibility of current dangerous situation in a volatile region. Washington is responsible for its short sightedness, arrogance, alarming ignorance of local realities and refusal to accommodate concerns of others. Afghans are responsible for infighting and tendency to jump on any wagon passing by for narrow interests and in the process turning their beautiful country into rubble. Pakistan and Iran are responsible for indiscriminately using Afghan proxies for their own agendas callously disregarding enormous loss of life and property at their chosen battlefield. Arabs, rather than channeling their petro-dollars for development decided to use their money for erecting forces of destruction and extremism. All of them are now complaining about the bitter harvest, blaming others while ignoring their own role. It is unrealistic to expect that tribal territories will be violence free. All necessary ingredients of armed confrontation such as tribesman’s love of his independence, suspicion or hostility against a distant and uncaring central state, rugged terrain, availability of state of the art weaponry, plenty of financial incentives, tribal rivalries and ideological indoctrination are in place and only a small incident can result in spontaneous or planned violence. A certain amount of conflict will be ongoing in view of clash of interests of various players. All efforts should be geared towards keeping violence to a minimum level. All parties especially nation state actors need to act prudently and avoid the temptation of using tribesmen for their own narrow interests.

Patience, an essential commodity in such an environment has never been an American virtue. U.S. and NATO need to re-assess their priorities and accept the ground reality that without regional cooperation and taking into consideration genuine national security interests of Pakistan and Iran, hope of a peaceful Afghanistan will be a mirage. On their part, Pakistan and Iran need to accept changed realties and desist from interfering in Afghanistan‘s affairs. They should do it not for Afghanistan but with a clear understanding that stoking such flames will invariably come back to burn their own house. They have the right to express their concerns but funding their Afghan proxies for a violent showdown is not in their own interest. They should learn a lesson from their previous such misadventures. Afghan government has to understand its own limitations and it should try to avoid confrontations with its neighbors. Regional cooperation especially among Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran is critical to defuse tensions in border tribal territories. Governments at loggerheads with each other and public accusations only give more room to non-state actors who will try to expand their area of influence at the expense of the state authority. This applies to all countries where Afghanistan will see its border areas coming under insurgent influence, Pakistan seeing the influence of armed militants encroaching on settled districts and Blauch militants gaining more confidence while Iran experiencing a jumpstart of insurgency in Baluchistan-Sistan region. U.S. and NATO troops will be in the middle of this web of intrigues and shifting alliances. If violence crosses a certain threshold unleashing centrifugal forces, then tribal forces of the region may become the catalyst for major instability and even possible fragmentation of three important states: Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. In the last one hundred and fifty years, representatives of a central government (British followed by Pakistan) have penetrated deep into tribal territory and society with an attempt to control them and expand government authority. However, each attempt ended with some kind of accommodation with tribal leaders and practice of indirect rule. Ironically, one hundred and fifty years later, successors of the Raj and new kids on the block are learning the same lesson again.

Consider not only present but future discords … If one waits until they are at hand, the medicine is no longer in time as the malady has become incurable. Machiavelli

Dr. Hamid Hussain is an independent analyst based in New York. His website is www.viewsonnews.net

Tuesday, March 27, 2007

Jihadis roaming free in NWFP

Jihadis in a school
Editorial The News, MArch 29, 2007

Monday's incident in the NWFP town of Tank near Kohat, where militants wanting to recruit young people to their cause forced their way into a school and which then resulted in a gun battle between the police and them, is a very disturbing indicator of just how bold the obscurantists and militants have become in the country. The gunfight that ensued resulted in the death of three people, injured over a dozen and endangered the lives of innocent schoolchildren. One can only wonder how in the world these extremists can justify their audacious and illegal action through religion. The incident is also worrying because it shows the level of intolerance, bigotry and coercion that seem to be on display in the province. The one good thing out of the incident is that the police at least put up a valiant effort and managed to kill one of the extremists. For many months now, the settled districts of NWFP bordering FATA have experienced a rising tide of Talibanisation, coming mainly from the FATA region. What is unfortunate is that no one in civil society is willing to resist these elements who want to impose under pain of death their rigid and literalist interpretation of religion on everybody.

Of course, it would be fair to say that much of NWFP society is conservative but that shouldn't mean that it should be forced to digest a particular view of religion and faith by elements who have clearly taken it upon themselves to be the guardian of morality and just about everything else. Also, the conduct of these jihadis, who claim to be fighting a cause based on their religious beliefs, suggests that something is terribly wrong with their interpretation of the precepts of their belief -- one of which is that there should be no compulsion in religion. It also points to the likelihood of jihadi outfits using some form of coercion or undue persuasion in getting new recruits to their cause and that what happened at the school in Tank may well be the tip of the iceberg (there are reports to suggest that other such incidents of young boys being taken away right from school have taken place). The situation is clearly alarming because it seems extremists in NWFP are free to go to any school of their choosing and take students with them, without parental consent. The government needs to act against this Talibanisation with an iron fist and should not wait for similar things to happen inside schools in Karachi, Lahore or Islamabad.

The US-Pakistan Relations

A people-to-people relationship with Pakistan
By Ryan C Crocker
The News, March 28, 2007

Over the past five years the United States and Pakistan have built an extraordinarily close relationship as allies and strategic partners at the government-to-government level. But relations between peoples are the cement that holds together the elements of a strategic partnership. During my tenure as US ambassador to Pakistan I have been very interested in promoting these human and cultural bonds between our two countries. Nothing better demonstrates the breadth and the depth of the long-term, strategic partnership between Pakistan and the United States than the rapid growth in education programmes between our two countries.

Our USAID programme has provided over $200 million to education programmes in Pakistan over the last five years, encouraging student learning in some of Pakistan's most remote regions by training teachers in participatory learning, increasing parental involvement and supporting infrastructure improvements for primary schools. Regionally, these programmes have focused on Sindh, Balochistan, the FATA and the Islamabad Capital Territory. Since October, 2006, these programmes have been extended to the earthquake-affected areas of the NWFP and AJK.

These are the best known examples of the importance of education in the US-Pakistan partnership. But there are many more examples. We have developed a programme with Pakistani schools and NGO partners, called "ACCESS," that encourages non-elite Pakistani youth to study English. ACCESS provides micro-scholarships to these students to attend English Literacy Centres at quality schools in Pakistan. To date, nearly 1,000 high school students in Lahore, Multan, Karachi, Peshawar, Islamabad and Gwadar have studied under the ACCESS programme. And we are now looking to extend this programme to provide opportunities for ACCESS graduates to attend universities in Pakistan.

The "YES" -- Youth Exchange and Study -- programme, funded in part by the US State Department and managed in Pakistan by the Karachi-based International Education and Resource Network, takes Pakistani students on year-long foreign exchange programmes in the United States during their high school years. As many as 158 Pakistani high school students have participated in the YES programme since it began in 2003.

Another State Department programme has partnered with Pakistan's National Education Foundation and Eastern Washington University to provide in-service teacher training for 400 female teachers in the FATA. The FATA Female Teacher Training programme also provides micro-loans to parents of young girls to encourage families to keep their daughters in school. This program is benefiting some 300 schools in the FATA and NWFP.

Academic linkages between Pakistani and American institutions have been important since the beginning of the US-Pakistan relationship. The Institute for Business Administration in Karachi, one of Pakistan's leading institutions of higher education, was founded in 1955 with technical assistance from the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. Today, the US Department of Agriculture provides major funding support for agricultural and forestry programmes at the University of Faisalabad, the University of Peshawar and the Pakistan Forest Institute.

Nothing better demonstrates the deepening relationship between Pakistan and the United States than the recent, rapid growth in academic exchanges. When I arrived in Pakistan in 2004, about a dozen Pakistani students were studying in the US on Fulbright scholarships. Today there are over 200, with 150 new Pakistani participants in the Fulbright programme each year.

The Pakistan Fulbright programme is now the largest Fulbright programme in the world. It has active Pakistani participation on its board of directors and its executive staff. Pakistani funding also makes an important contribution to the Fulbright programme in Pakistan. In the coming academic year we expect to re-initiate the reciprocal part of the Fulbright programme by bringing American senior scholars to Pakistan.

In the last six months we have seen many more American scholars travel to Pakistan. The US embassy has encouraged this growing interchange between American and Pakistani scholars and researchers. All of us involved were particularly pleased that the American Institute of Pakistan Studies held its annual scholarly convention this year in Islamabad.

The need to encourage people-to-people relationships led us to undertake another important initiative. The embassy's consular staff has worked very hard to streamline the visa process to encourage Pakistanis to travel to the United States. We've made remarkable progress. Visa issuance was 30 per cent greater in 2006 than in 2005, including an increase of 55 per cent for issuance of student visas. The numbers of Pakistani visitors to the United States are now returning to pre-9/11 levels.

These are strong examples of deeper and stronger ties between the American and Pakistani people. As I take my leave from Pakistan, I take those strengthening ties as one of my fondest and most important memories of my tenure as US ambassador to Pakistan.

The writer has served as US ambassador to Pakistan since 2004. His next assignment, which he will be taking up soon, is American ambassador to Iraq.

Musharraf's Fate

VIEW: Musharraf can’t rule forever —MOHSIN HAMID
Daily Times, March 28, 2007

General Musharraf must recognise that his popularity is dwindling fast and that the need to move toward greater democracy is overwhelming. The idea that a president in an army uniform will be acceptable to Pakistanis after this year’s elections is becoming more and more implausible

I was one of the few Pakistanis who actually voted for General Pervez Musharraf in the rigged referendum of 2002. I recall walking into a polling station in Islamabad and not seeing any other voter. When I took the time required to read the convoluted ballot, I was accosted by a man who had the overbearing attitude of a soldier although he was in civilian clothes. He insisted that I hurry, which I refused to do. He then hovered close by, watching my every action, in complete defiance of electoral rules.

Despite this intimidation, I still voted in favour of the proposition that General Musharraf, who had seized power in a coup in 1999, should continue as Pakistan’s president for five more years. I believed his rule had brought us much-needed stability, respite from the venal and self-serving elected politicians who had misgoverned Pakistan in the 1990s, and a more free and vibrant press than at any time in the country’s history.

The outcome of the referendum — 98 percent support for General Musharraf from an astonishing 50 percent turnout — was so obviously false that even he felt compelled to disown the exercise.

Rigged elections rankle, of course. But since then, secular, liberal Pakistanis like myself have seen many benefits from General Musharraf’s rule. My wife was an actress in “Jutt and Bond,” a popular Pakistani sitcom about a Punjabi folk hero and a debonair British agent. Her show was on one of the many private television channels that have been permitted to operate in the country, featuring everything from local rock music to a talk show whose host is a transvestite.

My sister, a journalism lecturer in Lahore, loves to tell me about the enormous growth in recent years in university financing, academic salaries and undergraduate enrolment. And my father, now retired but for much of his career a professor of economics, says he has never seen such a dynamic and exciting time in Pakistani higher education.

But there have been significant problems under General Musharraf, too. Pakistan has grown increasingly divided between the relatively urban and prosperous regions that border India and the relatively rural, conservative and violent regions that border Afghanistan. The two mainstream political parties have historically bridged that divide and vastly outperformed religious extremists in free elections, but under General Musharraf they have been marginalised in a system that looks to one man for leadership.

What many of us hoped was that General Musharraf would build up the country’s neglected institutions before eventually handing over power to a democratically elected successor. Those hopes were dealt a serious blow two weeks ago, when he suspended the chief justice of Pakistan, Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry.

For General Musharraf, Justice Chaudhry had become a major irritant. He had opened investigations into government “disappearances” of suspects in the war on terrorism. He had blocked the showcase privatisation of the national steel mill. He had, in other words, demonstrated that he would not do General Musharraf’s bidding. With elections due later this year, and challenges to irregularities like the rigging that took place in 2002 likely to end up in the Supreme Court, an independent chief justice could jeopardise General Musharraf’s continued rule.

Like many Pakistanis, I knew little about Justice Chaudhry except that he had a reputation for being honest, and that under his leadership, the Supreme Court had reduced its case backlog by 60 percent. His suspension seemed a throwback to the worst excesses of the government that General Musharraf’s coup had replaced, and it galvanised protests by the nation’s lawyers and opposition parties, including rallies of thousands in several of Pakistan’s major cities yesterday.

More troubling still was the phone call I received recently from a friend who works for Geo, one of Pakistan’s leading independent television channels. The government had placed enormous pressure on Geo to stop showing the demonstrations in support of Justice Chaudhry, and the channel had refused to comply. When my friend told me that policemen had broken into Geo’s offices, smashed its equipment and beaten up the staff, I felt utterly betrayed by the man I had voted for.

Despite his subsequent apology for the incident, General Musharraf now appears to be more concerned with perpetuating his rule than with furthering the cause of “enlightened moderation” that he had claimed to champion. He has never been particularly popular, but he is now estranging the liberals who previously supported his progressive ends if not his autocratic means. People like me are realising that the short-term gains from even a well-intentioned dictator’s policies can be easily reversed.

General Musharraf must recognise that his popularity is dwindling fast and that the need to move toward greater democracy is overwhelming. The idea that a president in an army uniform will be acceptable to Pakistanis after this year’s elections is becoming more and more implausible.

The United States has provided enormous financial and political support to General Musharraf’s government, but it has focused on his short-term performance in the war on terror. America must now take a long-term view and press General Musharraf to reverse his suspension of the chief justice and of Pakistan’s press freedoms. He should be encouraged to see that he cannot cling to power forever.

Pakistan is both more complicated and less dangerous than America has been led to believe. General Musharraf has portrayed himself as America’s last line of defence in an angry and dangerous land. In reality, the vast majority of Pakistanis want nothing to do with violence. When thousands of cricket fans from our archenemy, India, wandered about Pakistan unprotected for days in 2004, not one was abducted or killed. At my own wedding two years ago, a dozen Americans came, disregarding State Department warnings. They, too, spent their time in Pakistan without incident.

Yes, there are militants in Pakistan. But they are a small minority in a country with a population of 165 million. Religious extremists have never done well in elections when the mainstream parties have been allowed to compete fairly. Nor does the Pakistan Army appear to be in any great danger of falling into radical hands: by all accounts the commanders below General Musharraf broadly agree with his policies.

An exaggerated fear of Pakistan’s people must not prevent America from realising that Pakistanis are turning away from General Musharraf. By prolonging his rule, the general risks taking Pakistan backward and undermining much of the considerable good that he has been able to achieve. The time has come for him to begin thinking of a transition, and for Americans to realise that, scare stories notwithstanding, a more democratic Pakistan might be better not just for Pakistanis but for Americans as well.

Mohsin Hamid is the author of “Moth Smoke” and the forthcoming novel “The Reluctant Fundamentalist”. This article was originally written for the New York Times

Monday, March 26, 2007

The Truth About Talibanistan: Time

The Truth About Talibanistan
Time, March 22, 2007
By Aryn Baker / Kabul, Afghanistan

The residents of Dara Adam Khel, a gunsmiths' village 30 miles south of Peshawar, Pakistan, awoke one morning last month to find their streets littered with pamphlets demanding that they observe Islamic law. Women were instructed to wear all-enveloping burqas and men to grow their beards. Music and television were banned. Then the jihadists really got serious. These days, dawn is often accompanied by the wailing of women as another beheaded corpse is found by the side of the road, a note pinned to the chest claiming that the victim was a spy for either the Americans or the Pakistani government. Beheadings are recorded and sold on DVD in the area's bazaars. "It's the knife that terrifies me," says Hafizullah, 40, a local arms smith. "Before they kill you, they sharpen the knife in front of you. They are worse than butchers."

Stories like these are being repeated across the tribal region of Pakistan, a rugged no-man's-land that forms the country's border with Afghanistan--and that is rapidly becoming home base for a new generation of potential terrorists. Fueled by zealotry and hardened by war, young religious extremists have overrun scores of towns and villages in the border areas, with the intention of imposing their strict interpretation of Islam on a population unable to fight back. Like the Taliban in the late 1990s in Afghanistan, the jihadists are believed to be providing leaders of al-Qaeda with the protection they need to regroup and train new operatives. U.S. intelligence officials think that Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, may have found refuge in these environs. And though 49,000 U.S. and NATO troops are stationed just across the border in Afghanistan, they aren't authorized to operate on the Pakistani side. Remote, tribal and deeply conservative, the border region is less a part of either country than a world unto itself, a lawless frontier so beyond the control of the West and its allies that it has earned a name of its own: Talibanistan.

Since Sept. 11, the strategic hinge in the U.S.'s campaign against al-Qaeda has been Pakistan, handmaiden to the Taliban movement that turned Afghanistan into a sanctuary for bin Laden and his lieutenants. While members of Pakistan's intelligence services have long been suspected of being in league with the Taliban, the Bush Administration has consistently praised Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf for his cooperation in rooting out and apprehending members of bin Laden's network. But the Talibanization of the borderlands--and their role in arming and financing insurgents in Afghanistan--has renewed doubts about whether Musharraf still possesses the will to face down the jihadists.

Those doubts are surfacing at a time when Musharraf confronts his biggest political crisis since grabbing power eight years ago. Since March 12, Pakistani streets have been the scene of clashes between police and thousands of lawyers and opposition activists outraged by Musharraf's decision to suspend the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, for alleged abuse of office. Musharraf's critics say the President is attempting to rig the system to ensure he stays in power. Their ire boiled over when Pakistani police raided a television station to prevent it from covering protests outside the Supreme Court. Some Pakistanis who have excused Musharraf's authoritarianism in the past now portray him as a jackbooted dictator. "I think he has ruined himself," says retired Lieut. General Hamid Gul, former director general of the Pakistani intelligence organization Inter-Services Intelligence. "He's not going to be able to placate the forces he has unleashed."

Because Musharraf also heads Pakistan's army, it's unlikely that he will be forced from office. But a loss of support from his moderate base could deepen his dependence on fundamentalist parties, which are staunch supporters of the Taliban. If the protests against Musharraf continue, he will be even less inclined to crack down on the militants holding sway in Talibanistan--grim news for the U.S. and its allies and good news for their foes throughout the region. Says a senior U.S. military official in Afghanistan: "The bottom line is that the Taliban can do what they want in the tribal areas because the [Pakistani] army is not going to come after them."

In fact, the territory at the heart of Talibanistan--a heavily forested band of mountains that is officially called North and South Waziristan--has never fully submitted to the rule of any country. The colonial British were unable to conquer the region's Pashtun tribes and allowed them to run their own affairs according to local custom. In exchange, the tribesmen protected the subcontinental empire from northern invaders. Following independence in 1947, Pakistan continued the arrangement.

After 9/11, Islamabad initially left the tribal areas alone. But when it became obvious that al-Qaeda and Taliban militants were crossing the border to escape U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan sent in the first of what eventually became 80,000 troops. They had some success: the Pakistani army captured terrorist leaders and destroyed training camps. But the harder the military pressed, the more locals resented its presence, especially when civilians were killed in botched raids against terrorists.

As part of peace accords signed last September with tribal leaders in North Waziristan, the Pakistani military agreed to take down roadblocks, stop patrols and return to their barracks. In exchange, local militants promised not to attack troops and to end cross-border raids into Afghanistan. The accords came in part because the Pakistani army was simply unable to tame the region. Over the past two years, it has lost more than 700 troops there. The change in tactics, says Gul, was an admission that the Pakistani military had "lost the game."

The army isn't the only one paying the price now. Since Pakistani forces scaled back operations in the border region, the insurgency in Afghanistan has intensified. Cross-border raids and suicide bombings aimed at U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan have tripled, according to the senior U.S. military official. He concedes that "the Pakistanis are in a very difficult position. You could put 50,000 men on that border, and you wouldn't be able to seal it."

The troop drawback has allowed Pakistani militants allied with the Taliban to impose their will on the border areas. They have established Shari'a courts and executed "criminals" on the basis of Islamic law. Even Pakistani-army convoys are sometimes escorted by Taliban militants to ensure safe passage, a scene witnessed by TIME in North Waziristan one recent afternoon. "The state has withdrawn and ceded this territory," says Samina Ahmed of the International Crisis Group. "[The Taliban] have been given their own little piece of real estate."

The militants are using sympathetic mosques in Talibanistan to recruit fighters to attack Western troops in Afghanistan, according to tribal elders in the region. With cash and religious fervor, they lure young men to join their battle and threaten local leaders so they will deliver the support of their tribes. Malik Haji Awar Khan, 55, head of the 2,000-strong Mutakhel Wazir tribe of North Waziristan, was approached a year ago to join the Taliban cause. When he refused, militants kidnapped his teenage sons. "They thought they could make me join them, but I am tired of fighting," says Khan, who battled alongside the Afghan mujahedin in the war against the Soviets. "This is a jihad dictated by outsiders, by al-Qaeda. It is not a holy war. They just want power and money."

Tribal leaders interviewed by TIME say they do not support the aims of the jihadists. But the Taliban's campaign of fear has worn down local resistance. Malik Sher Muhammad Khan, a tribal elder from Wana, says, "The Taliban walk through the streets shouting that children shouldn't go to school because they are learning modern subjects like math and science. But we want to be modern. It's not just the girls. In my village, not a single person can even sign his name." Khan estimates that only 5% of the inhabitants of Waziristan actively support the militants. Others benefit financially by providing services and renting land for training camps. The rest, he says, acquiesce out of fear. A few months ago, militants stormed his compound in retaliation for his outspoken criticism of their presence in the area. During the melee, a grenade killed his wife. "If I had weapons, maybe I could have saved her," he says. "We have no way to make them leave."

The emergence of Talibanistan may directly threaten the U.S. Locals say the region The emergence of Talibanistan may directly threaten the West too. Locals say the region has become one big terrorist-recruitment camp, where people as young as 17 are trained as suicide bombers. "Here, teenagers are greeted with the prayers 'May Allah bless you to become a suicide bomber,'" says Obaidullah Wazir, 35, a young tribesman in Miranshah. National Intelligence Director John McConnell told the Senate Armed Services Committee last month that "al-Qaeda is forging stronger operational connections that radiate outward from their camps in Pakistan to affiliated groups and networks throughout the Middle East, North Africa and Europe." Muzafar Khan, a headman from one of the local tribes, told TIME that Uzbek commander Tahir Yuldashev, leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and a suspected confidant of bin Laden's, commands some Uzbeks, Chechens, Arabs and local fighters from his base in the borderlands. "We know they are al-Qaeda," says Khan. "They are foreigners, they have different faces, and they don't speak Pashto." He claims that "their camps are easy to find. Even a child could show you."

The camps hold from 10 to 300 militants and are usually hidden deep in the forest, according to local residents. They have simple structures, low concrete-and-brick buildings with high walls. Some have underground bunkers for protection in case of attack. Outsiders easily mistake them for traditional village housing. "We know they exist," says the U.S. military official in Afghanistan. "But it's like finding a needle in a haystack." A Pakistani intelligence official says there are training camps in the region and that Pakistan is doing everything it can to find them and destroy them. "I don't say that [foreigners] are not here, but wherever we know of their presence, we go after them and take action," he says. The best hope for dislodging al-Qaeda from the region may be local tribesmen, who have recently engaged in heavy clashes with foreign and local militants around the town of Wana.

Will Musharraf join the fight? Though the U.S. is pressing Musharraf to do more to rout terrorists in Pakistan, his political survival still depends on parties that resent his ties to Washington. There is a widespread view in Pakistan that Vice President Dick Cheney, during his trip to Pakistan two weeks ago, reprimanded Musharraf for failing to rein in the militants. But officials on both sides say the partnership between Bush and Musharraf remains solid. "Is it doing more? Well, yeah, it's doing more. We all gotta do more, do better, do different. It's a war," says a senior Western diplomat in Pakistan. "But for folks to sit there in Washington or London or wherever and say, 'Damn it! We're tired of this. Go fix it,' is not hugely helpful."

That may be true. But the Bush Administration is beginning to recognize that to stabilize Afghanistan and prevent the rebirth of al-Qaeda, it has to contain the growth of Talibanistan. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher announced in Islamabad that the U.S. intends to give an extra $750 million to Musharraf over the next five years to support development in the tribal areas. "I think this commitment to the development of Pakistan, this commitment to a long-term relationship, is another example of the very broad and deep relationship we have and that we are developing with Pakistan," Boucher said. "We have a fundamental interest in the success of Pakistan as a moderate, stable, democratic Muslim nation."

That infusion of U.S. money would go far toward developing a region nearly devoid of civil infrastructure. There's no doubt that in the long run, schools, hospitals, roads and electricity would do much more to quell militancy than would an increased military presence. But that kind of development takes years. As the militants consolidate power, Musharraf needs to take bolder steps. The judicial crisis and the resulting protests have weakened Musharraf's credibility among the moderate, secular Pakistanis who could provide a bulwark against the threat of jihadism. Musharraf has pledged to hold general elections at the end of the year, but regaining the support of moderate groups may require him to go further and open up the vote to opposition leaders Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, who have both been exiled. If Musharraf can prove that he is committed to democracy, Pakistanis may well choose to keep him in power. Armed with such a mandate, Musharraf would be better poised to tackle militancy in the tribal areas. Pakistan's Foreign Minister Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri concedes that the peace agreement with the tribes in Waziristan has "weaknesses" that the government is addressing. An official says Islamabad intends to send two new brigades of troops to seize back the initiative.

Last month the same mountain passes used by militants set on attacking U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan served as passage for an unlikely delegation of 45 tribal elders from Pakistan's borderlands. They were headed for a meeting with Hamid Karzai, the President of Afghanistan, who has openly criticized Musharraf's failure to stem Pakistani support for the Taliban. "We have had too many years of war, too many widows, too many orphans, too many amputees. If this jihad continues, it will destroy Afghanistan and Waziristan," said an elder. "We need help, and we no longer trust the Pakistani government." The leader of the delegation presented Karzai with a traditional Waziri turban, a great soft-serve swirl of butter-yellow silk. As he placed it on the President's head, he said, "You are our President. You can free us from this disaster. We are at your service, and we support you." That the tribesmen would turn to one of Musharraf's rivals for help against the Taliban is a telling indictment of his leadership. And if Musharraf doesn't find a way to re-establish control over Talibanistan, he may find his backers in Washington giving up on him too.

With reporting by WITH REPORTING BY SIMON ROBINSON/ ISLAMABAD, GHULAM HASNAIN / DARA ADAM KHEL

The Turkish Dilemma

Confident Turkey looks east, not west
By Simon Tisdall
The Guardian: March 26, 2007

Turkey was not invited to Europe's big birthday bash on March 25 despite being an official candidate for EU membership. Ankara expressed disappointment at a 'missed opportunity'. Media reaction to the perceived snub was sharper.

"In the 1990s, the EU was a giant organisation governed by prominent leaders," said leading columnist Mehmet Ali Birand. "Today it has become a fat midget that lacks perspective and is governed by small-thinkers."

Disillusion with the EU has deepened since Brussels part-suspended talks in December after a row over Cyprus. The hostility, as seen from Ankara, of French presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy and the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, has poisoned the pot further.

But anger and frustration is slowly giving way to a new, more assertive idea: that perhaps Turkey does not really need Europe after all ... -- ... and the EU will come to regret its insultingly complacent chauvinism as Turkey goes its own way.

"Europeans underestimate the importance and influence of Turkey," said Fuat Keyman, professor of international relations at Istanbul's Koc University. "If they are serious about the future of Europe as a power in global affairs, they need to change their thinking."

Turkey was recalibrating its external ties and the EU was but one part of the equation, Dr Keyman said. "Membership should not be seen just as a gift to Turkey. There are benefits for Europe, too."

Semih Idiz, a foreign affairs columnist, goes further: "The EU is off the radar. It has confirmed Turkey's worst expectations. At present, it's an irrelevancy."

Turkey's newfound confidence about life beyond Europe is based in part on a booming economy, whose sustained, IMF-supervised seven per cent annual growth rate far outperforms large EU states. Export earnings are rising too, including in the Arab lands of the old Ottoman Empire.

Demographic trends are also boosting independent thinking, said Guven Sak, an Ankara-based economist. "In Turkey the working age population as a proportion of the total population is growing. In Europe, the opposite is true."

Nor should Europe fear a new barbarian horde at the gates. Rates of growth meant that by 2015, Turkey could become a net importer of labour, he said.

Turkey's increasingly important regional leadership role is also changing the way it views the EU. As a vital transit hub, it provides much of Europe's oil and gas from the Caspian basin, Russia and, prospectively, the Turkic republics of central Asia. This is leading to closer cooperation with Moscow and reviving ideas of a Turkic Commonwealth from Azerbaijan to Kazakhstan.

The 'reformed Islamist' government in Ankara is also cultivating the Arab and Muslim world. It signalled a new strategic relationship with Egypt this week. It sent peacekeeping troops to Lebanon last year. It talks to Iran when many will not or cannot. Close links to Israel have not prevented the building of ties with Hamas and the Palestinian Authority. And despite tensions with the Kurds, Turkey is northern Iraq's main economic partner. Istanbul is the likely venue of next month's Iraq summit.

Rising ultra-nationalism and 'neo-Ottoman' thinking, Islamist extremism and political instability are the acknowledged dangers of Turkey's rise. But its strength is its 70 million people's drive and energy, a dynamic resource that flabby, middle-aged Western Europe lacks.

And then, there is fierce pride. "Ours is the only country to reconcile Islam with a fully functioning, multiparty democracy in a modern, secular republic," said opposition MP Sukru Elekdag. "Our experience shatters the myth that Islam cannot accommodate democracy."

Officially, Turkey still wants to join the EU, says Faruk Logoglu of the Centre for Eurasian Strategic Studies in Ankara. But Europe must banish its ignorance and acknowledge its own needs. "Europe is not yet ready for Turkish membership," he said. "It's going to take a long time to educate the European public."

The US-Pakistan Relations

US senators seek exiled leaders' participation: Musharraf urged to hold fair elections
By Anwar Iqbal
Dawn, March 25, 2007

WASHINGTON, March 24: Chairman and three senior members of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations have urged President Pervez Musharraf to ensure that the coming elections are open and free and the exiled leaders of the PPP and the PML-N are allowed to participate.

In a letter to President Musharraf, released to the media on Saturday, the four senators remind him that no democratic government can be credible without the protective check of a free press and urge him to order Pakistan's security and intelligence agencies to stop harassing journalists.

The senators -– Joseph R. Biden, John F. Kerry, Patrick J. Leahy and Blanch L. Lincoln -– describe the coming year as "a crucial one" for Pakistan's democratic development and for its relationship with the United States.

"Handled properly on both sides, the relationship has the potential for significant and sustained improvement," say the senators, adding: "We believe that the US and Pakistan can and should be firm allies in the decades to come."

But they warn that if this relationship "is handled improperly, the strides made by both our countries in recent years could well be imperilled."

The senators say that they wrote this letter as supporters of the US-Pakistan relationship, adding that they understand "the complicated political pressures" to which the Musharraf government is subject but "given the enormous stakes" the US has in developments in Pakistan, "we feel it is appropriate to raise with you several issues of concern."

The top on their list is the issue of "open elections and open government".

As Pakistan prepares for upcoming elections, "we urge you to ensure that the Pakistan people can benefit from a robust democratic campaign and engage in open and vigorous debate about their political future," the senators say.

They recall that the 2002 elections met "widespread international scepticism", in particular concerning "the extensive involvement of the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies in the electoral process and in daily governance".

They say that since those elections, they have received increasingly frequent reports of abuses such as arbitrary arrest and detention, mistreatment in custody and repression of journalist and political figures critical of the government.

The senators remind President Musharraf that he has often spoken publicly about Pakistan's need for a vigorous, moderate democracy.

"The single most concrete measure of progress would be to allow all legitimate parties and candidates to contest the elections, including the senior leadership of the Pakistan People's Party and the Pakistan Muslim League.

"Unless the leaders of Pakistan's two oldest and most firmly established parties are free to return from exile and campaign for office, it will be difficult for the international community to regard the 2007 elections as a true expression of democracy."

They note that in recent months, there have been reports of abuse and harassment of journalists and NGO workers -– both Pakistani and foreign.

"We urge your office to issue explicit public instructions to all members of Pakistan's security and intelligence community to cease harassing journalists and government critics -– and to punish any officials guilty of acts of abuse or harassment to the full extent of the law."

The letter also notes continued Taliban and Al Qaeda activities in Afghanistan and quotes senior US and Nato officials as saying that "the Taliban leadership operates from headquarters in or near Quetta."

The letter refers to the peace agreement between the government and tribal elders in Waziristan and complains that the agreement has led to "a campaign of violence" targeting anti-Taliban elements in the tribal region and also caused an increase in cross-border attacks in Afghanistan.

The senators argue that Pakistan's plan to fence the Afghan border will jeopardise civilians on both sides, without meaningfully reducing Taliban activities.

They note that Afghanistan does not yet accept the Durand Line and opposes the fencing on the same grounds that Pakistan opposed India's fencing of the Line of Control.

"We urge you instead to focus on disrupting the Taliban's command and control network ... in particular, we urge your government to seek the arrest and detention of Mullah Omar, Jalaluddin Haqqani, Sirajuddin Haqqani and other high-ranking Taliban believed to reside in Quetta, Peshawar and other areas in Pakistan."

The letter also urges Pakistan to continue and increase efforts to stop militant groups from using Azad Kashmir as a staging ground for attacks inside the Indian occupied Kashmir.

"We understand that groups like the Lashkar-i-Tayyaba and Jaish-i-Muhammad (often with only loosely changed names) continue to operate in Pakistan."

The letter claims that Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the Srinagar-based social service wing of Lashkar-i-Tayyaba, has been publicly identified as a suspected key element in August's foiled Heathrow Airport bombing plot.

The letter identifies Jaish-i-Muhammad as another key suspect in the same bombing plot and claims that leaders of the two groups continue to "enjoy safe haven on Pakistani soil".

"We would be interested in discussing the most effective ways of combating not merely these groups themselves, but the climate of political alienation and economic stagnation that makes it easier for these extremist groups to recruit new members."The senators conclude their letter with an assurance that they want the US to do "far more than we have done in the past to help Pakistanis build the sort of moderate, democratic, stable, economically-vigorous society that you and the vast mass of your fellow citizens so clearly desire."