Pashtun Influence in Pakistan Army: An Analysis

Musharraf Contends with the Pashtun Element in the Pakistani Army
Terrorism Monitor: Jamestown Foundation
Volume 3, Issue 42 (October 31, 2006)

By Hassan Abbas
The recently concluded peace deal between the Pakistani army and pro-Taliban tribal elements in North Waziristan has led analysts to question why Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has backed down from military confrontation (Terrorism Monitor, October 5). The reason that the government made this decision is that keeping the Pashtuns of Afghanistan involved in the government process will keep Pakistani Pashtuns from revolting. It will be interesting to analyze whether Pashtun influence within the Pakistani army is a measurable factor, and if Pashtun power and opinion in the army have roles in these recent developments.

The Pakistani army stands today as the most organized, powerful and influential institution in the country. It has a cohesive and task-oriented profile with a strong esprit de corps. The composition and ethnic make-up of the Pakistani army have a long history—a brief reference to which is pertinent here. Before the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947, imperial British rulers defined the recruitment policies and orientation of the British Indian forces for a little under a century. They were convinced that certain classes of Indians described as martial races were more suitable for army service and would make better soldiers. In the area that is today Pakistan, the British-preferred recruitment hubs were the Punjab, which includes the districts of Rawalpindi, Jhelum and Attock and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), which includes the districts of Kohat, Mardan and Peshawar. After partition, Pakistan continued this unwritten policy at least until the late 1970s. From then onwards, it officially discarded this concept and tried to expand its recruitment base. The results today, however, are not any different from earlier times.

There are approximately 520,000 personnel on active duty in the army, which makes it one of the world's largest, according to GlobalSecurity.org. There are no official figures disseminated about the ethnic background of the officers as well as the ranks. Yet the estimation of two leading experts on the Pakistani army, namely Stephen P. Cohen of the Brookings Institution and Professor Hasan Askari Rizvi of Pakistan, indicates roughly that the Pashtun representation in the army is between 15-22% among officers and between 20-25% among the regular rank-and-file. However, Pashtuns from the NWFP, the third largest province out of four, and tribal areas together comprise only 16% of the country's overall population. Still, these figures are lower than the ratio of personnel from the largest province, the Punjab, which represents 56% of the country's population. Punjabi representation in the army is about 65% among officers and 70% among ranks. The remaining two provinces of the country, Balochistan and Sindh, consequently make up an even lower percentage of the army. The Pakistani army is often disdainfully dubbed as a Punjabi army by minority provinces. Among the well-informed though, the Pakistani army is considered a reserve of Punjabis and Pashtuns.

A more insightful fact is that out of the 11 chiefs of the army, four have been Pashtuns (Generals Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Gul Hasan Khan and Waheed Kakar), leading the institution for a total of 18 years (Dawn, October 13). Two of them imposed martial law and remained presidents of Pakistan. Ayub Khan, the first Pakistani commander-in-chief of the army, remained at the helm of affairs for eight years as army chief (1951-58) and an additional 11 years as head of the country (1958-69) (Dawn, October 13). Ayub Khan also promoted himself to field marshal in 1965 and is credited with developing the army into one of the most resourceful and powerful institutions in the country. If it is any indicator of his legacy, his hand-painted portrait can often be seen on the back of the trucks driving from one side of the country to the other—as the transport business overwhelming is in the hands of the Pashtuns.

Within the ranks, Pashtuns are known for their marksmanship, courage and loyalty. Although there are no all-Pashtun regiments, and only one corps of the 11 total is headquartered in NWFP, many important training centers for soldiers (Peshawar, Nowshera, Mardan) and the only military training academy for officers (Kakul) are located in the NWFP.

Hence, Pashtuns are very well placed within the Pakistani army's infrastructure. Although there is no such thing as a Pashtun grouping, their opinion certainly matters. After all, when they go on leave, they interact with the people of their area and are influenced by local opinions. What happens in the NWFP and the tribal areas directly affects their views to which the military hierarchy is not oblivious. According to the renowned analyst Ahmed Rashid, "The Waziristan deal was to prevent dissention within the Pakistan Army—border guards dying, defecting. The deal was to satisfy the Army" (Center for Conflict and Peace Studies, Kabul, October 4). There were reports even in 2004 when the military operation began in the area maintaining that there were desertions from the Frontier Corps, a paramilitary force led by serving army officers but whose ranks are mostly Pashtun; Pashtuns refused to fight Pashtuns, creating serious unrest. Consequently, at least one Pashtun major-general from the Orakzai tribe has prematurely retired, while more than a dozen colonels have had to be posted elsewhere. Recently, a well known senior police officer hailing from Waziristan has also put in his papers in protest.

A well-researched media report from The Globe and Mail released on September 20, 2001 that profiled Musharraf in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks insightfully remarked that, "Musharraf has earned particular praise for bridging differences between the Punjabi and Pashtun officers who dominate Pakistan's 520,000-strong army," indicating that Pashtun officers' opinions are taken seriously by him. He cannot be blamed for inconsistency, as far as this policy goes. His primary aim here clearly is to keep his constituency happy and united.

Bajaur Strike - Consequences?

Bajaur seminary strike could hurt Orakzai’s ability to negotiate peace’
By Iqbal Khattak
Daily Times, October 31, 2006

PESHAWAR: Monday’s airstrike on an alleged militant training camp in a madrassa in Bajaur Agency came as a surprise to NWFP Governor Jan Orakzai and threatens his credibility as a negotiator with tribal leaders, officials said.

Official sources told Daily Times on Tuesday that the governor and his team were “stunned” by the attack on the madrassa in which 83 people were killed, especially as it came at a time that the government was about to reach a peace agreement in the area.

The political administration of Bajaur Agency was negotiating a North Waziristan-like accord with militants. Nine members of the banned Tehrik Nifaz-e-Shariah Muhammadi were released on October 21 after four months in detention on terrorism charges, a move that was seen as an indication that a deal was close.

“Obviously, negotiations with the militants by the administration enjoyed the full backing of the governor. The chief administrator of Bajaur, Fahim Wazir, was not doing all this on his own.

“He was directed by the governor who believes the use of force in tribal areas is not the only solution the government should go for,” an official said, requesting anonymity.

Orakzai, a tribesman himself, was appointed governor earlier this year to help the federal government find a negotiated settlement to growing militancy in the tribal areas after the security situation in North Waziristan deteriorated.

“The Bajaur strike is a setback to the governor’s credibility. He had assured tribal elders and clerics that all issues would be tackled through negotiations and tribal traditions would be upheld to maintain security in the region,” the official said.

Get ready for suicide attacks: tribal cleric
* 15,000 attend demonstration in Khar, vow to ‘avenge’ attack
By Masood Khan
(DT: Nov. 1, 2006)

KHAR: Thousands of tribal protestors here on Tuesday welcomed a call for suicide attacks on coalition forces in Afghanistan, as anger against a madrassa airstrike on Monday swept through Bajaur Agency and North West Frontier Province, eyewitnesses said.

Around 15,000 people at a protest demonstration in the Khar area of Bajaur Agency also vowed to “avenge” the killing of “innocent people”.

“Are you ready to join suicide missions?” local cleric Maulana Inayatur Rehman asked the protestors, who said “yes”.

The cleric vowed to uphold the “supremacy of Islam”. “We will carry out even suicide attacks for jihad.”

Rehman said he had prepared a “squad of suicide bombers” to target Pakistani security forces in the same way that militants were attacking Americans in Afghanistan and Iraq, AP reported.

Wanted pro-Taliban militant commander Maulana Faqir Muhammad said President Musharraf was an “American agent, killing innocent people at the US behest”.

He dismissed government claims that foreign and local militants were present in the madrassa at the time of the airstrike. He said that he was ready to work with a tribal jirga for peace, but vowed not to renounce jihad. He announced that “American agents will be hanged publicly”.

“Elimination of Musharraf is a must to restore peace,” he told protestors carrying guns and chanting “death to Musharraf, death to Bush”.

Security forces stopped the protestors from marching on the Khar Bazaar, which remained shut.

Absolutely Intriguing Insights on What President Ishaq Khan May Have Taken to his Grave?

Picture: President Ghulam Ishaq Khan with Gulbadin Hikmatyar and Burhan-ud-din Rabbani

EDITORIAL: GIK: has he taken a big secret to his grave?
Daily Times, October 29, 2006

Ghulam Ishaq Khan (1915-2006) was a much more substantive man than today’s politicised and polarised Pakistan can ever fathom. He was a prodigy as a boy and never let his brilliance die down as he grew into a self-made man who was tough to beat in anything he touched. He hailed from a village in Bannu, joined the civil service at a humble level in the NWFP, and rose steadily until he was made finance minister by General Zia ul Haq. In 1985 he was elected chairman of the Senate and took over as president under the Constitution in 1988 after General Zia’s death in an air-crash in Bahawalpur.

Mr Khan was an 8th Amendment president who ruled in tandem with the army chief and the elected prime minister in the form of a ‘troika’ that effectively eclipsed the power of the elected politicians. He weighed in with the army chief, General Aslam Beg, and conspired to dismiss the PPP government in 1990, but he also prevented Aslam Beg from taking over as a military dictator by nominating his successor General Asif Nawaz six months in advance. He then fell foul of the PML government too and dismissed Nawaz Sharif because the latter was getting too big for his boots, only this time to see Nawaz reinstated by the Supreme Court. The army eventually had to get rid of both GIK and Nawaz Sharif to break the deadlock and consequently usher in another PPP government in 1993.

After this, GIK disappeared from public life and kept his mouth shut, unlike most other players on the national stage, some of whom have said more than they should have while still in office. Has he told his story in a memoir to be published posthumously, or has he taken answers to some very important issues of his tenure to his grave? The death of General Zia, whom he buried symbolically in a mosque built by a Saudi king, even though the place was not meant for burials, is still unexplained. Was there something in GIK’s decision to bury Zia in the Faisal mosque that we haven’t grasped? Consider.

GIK as president inherited Pakistan’s nuclear programme from Gen Zia and took it to his heart. But he was quickly aware of the ‘new thinking’ of COAS General Aslam Beg and his ‘strategic defiance’, which effectively meant saying goodbye to the Arabs as ‘slaves of America’ who had given jobs to hundreds of thousands of Pakistani workers and had bailed Pakistan out when the money was tight in Islamabad. GIK knew that Gen Zia was fighting his sectarian war with Iran when he was killed. In 1986 Gen Zia let the Turis of Parachinar be massacred because they were going to Iran to take military training. In April 1988, Gen Zia unleashed Sunni fanatics on the Shias of Gilgit and then calmly shrugged off the killing of Shia leader Ariful Hussaini in Peshawar. If he was inclined to ‘cooperate’ with Iran with his nuclear programme in the beginning, he had plumped for the Arabs in his last days.

But GIK saw that Gen Aslam Beg had got close to Dr AQ Khan when he was vice chief of the army. By 1989 GIK knew that the deal AQ Khan had made with the Iranians in Dubai in 1987 had not been cleared with Gen Zia and that perhaps he also knew that three million dollars in Swiss francs had changed hands. As GIK’s relations with the Benazir government soured he knew that Gen Aslam Beg too was flying off the handle over the Gulf war, objecting to Pakistani troops defending Saudi Arabia and predicting that America would lose against Saddam Hussein and that that would break the stranglehold of the United States over the Middle East and bring dishonour to those like Saudi Arabia and Egypt who were “America’s slaves”.

Pakistan’s big secret is the death of General Zia. Is there enough circumstantial evidence to support the speculation that Gen Zia died because of a secret pro-Iran nuclear policy followed from within the army which its supporters didn’t want ended, and which General Zia was about to unearth? GIK sensed the recklessness and extremism of Gen Beg and joined Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif who was already greatly embarrassed by Gen Beg’s antics over the Gulf War and decided to get rid of him before he could make his position permanent. As Gen Beg bragged about selling the nuclear programme to an American ambassador, GIK was quick to appoint his successor. After that GIK also prevented Prime Minister Sharif from getting the next army chief of his choice: from the list of three he ignored General Hamid Gul and thus saved Pakistan from another anti-American adventurer.

The burial of General Zia inside the Faisal mosque was a symbolic gesture. It pointed to the choice made by Zia between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Zia had earlier named a city after the same king. Laying Gen Aslam Beg aside showed which way the wisdom of the old man had led him. That may be why Gen Zia’s son Ijaz ul Haq has never stopped complaining that Gen Aslam Beg had something to do with his father’s killing. Gen Beg’s own statements after the incident appeared contradictory. GIK knew that Pakistan’s nuclear programme was of national importance and he must have realised soon enough that there was a division about it in the army. He guarded it against all odds by keeping close to Dr AQ Khan but he must have disagreed with what Gen Beg wanted to do. What did he feel when Gen Zia was suddenly removed from the scene?

The death of Gen Zia meant victory of the ‘defiant’ doctrine promoted by Gen Aslam Beg. Was Gen Zia killed because he was on the brink of knowing the change of direction others in the army had initiated? Was this big secret about to come out? No one in Pakistan knows for sure except that the army under Gen Beg and even afterwards prevented proper investigation into the 1988 air crash. Thus it is possible that, again for the sake of Pakistan, GIK kept quiet about what he knew. Maybe he has taken Pakistan’s biggest secret to his grave.

Shut Up Sheik Hilaly

Sheik Hilaly on why women are 90% responsible for adultery
* Discusses the ‘uncovered meat’ theory of no hijab
Daily Times Monitor: October 29, 2006

The following are extracts from Sheik Taj Din al-Hilaly’s controversial sermon given last month, as independently translated by an SBS Arabic expert.

“Those atheists, people of the book (Christians and Jews), where will they end up? In Surfers Paradise? On the Gold Coast? Where will they end up? In hell and not part-time, for eternity. They are the worst in God’s creation.”

“When it comes to adultery, it’s 90 percent the woman’s responsibility. Why? Because a woman owns the weapon of seduction. It’s she who takes off her clothes, shortens them, flirts, puts on make-up and powder and takes to the streets, God protect us, dallying. It’s she who shortens, raises and lowers. Then, it’s a look, a smile, a conversation, a greeting, a talk, a date, a meeting, a crime, then Long Bay jail. Then you get a judge, who has no mercy, and he gives you 65 years.”

“But when it comes to this disaster, who started it? In his literature, writer al-Rafee says: ‘If I came across a rape crime, I would discipline the man and order that the woman be arrested and jailed for life.’ Why would you do this, Rafee? He said because if she had not left the meat uncovered, the cat wouldn’t have snatched it.”

“If you get a kilo of meat, and you don’t put it in the fridge or in the pot or in the kitchen but you leave it on a plate in the backyard, and then you have a fight with the neighbour because his cats eat the meat, you’re crazy. Isn’t this true?”

“If you take uncovered meat and put it on the street, on the pavement, in a garden, in a park, or in the backyard, without a cover and the cats eat it, then whose fault will it be, the cats, or the uncovered meat’s? The uncovered meat is the disaster. If the meat was covered the cats wouldn’t roam around it. If the meat is inside the fridge, they won’t get it.”

“If the woman is in her boudoir, in her house and if she’s wearing the veil and if she shows modesty, disasters don’t happen.”

“Satan sees women as half his soldiers. You’re my messenger in necessity, Satan tells women you’re my weapon to bring down any stubborn man. There are men that I fail with. But you’re the best of my weapons.”

“...The woman was behind Satan playing a role when she disobeyed God and went out all dolled up and unveiled and made of herself palatable food that rakes and perverts would race for. She was the reason behind this sin taking place.”

Also see: Howard Warns of Lasting Damage

How to Improve Education Standards?

Dr Mubarik Ali — Historian
Daily Times, OCtober 29, 2006

“We will have to focus on improving research methodology, set up libraries that include international research journals and put in a strong check and balance system to deal with corruption, ignorance and negligence among externals and supervisors, especially at MPhil and PhD levels. We will also need to educate people about copyright laws and plagiarism because without both it is unlikely that our universities and educational institutions will be credible abroad. The recent incidents of plagiarism in Punjab University and Karachi University have earned a bad name for Pakistan’s education system and have tarnished the image of our higher education institutions. Therefore, the government should take action against the culprits and make sure that such incidents never take place in future. We need to develop a sense of topic construction because most Pakistani researchers focus on extensive details, which are based on the history of a character and did not focus on the intensive aspects of a subject. Our externals, supervisors and even students conduct research for social status and economic reasons. A true research based society cannot be set up without making sure that research is strictly for academic reasons. HEC officials did not organise international level conferences and seminars where our researchers can exchange views with people from various countries and educational institution.”

Who rules the world?

Picture: Library of congress - Inside View

Capital suggestion: Libraries
By Dr Farrukh Saleem
The News, October 29 2006

History stands witness that whoever owns the largest library rules the world. In the 10th century, the library at Saint Gall was the largest in the Christendom (St. Gallen, present-day Switzerland). The library's first general catalogue, the Breviarum Librorum, had 426 titles.

In the 10th century, 1,300 km from Switzerland, Umayyad Abd al-Rahman III, Caliph of Cordoba, founded the University of Cordoba. Abd al-Rahman III built libraries. His sons were also extremely fond of books, and they gave Cordoba even more libraries. By the time Al Hakam II, Abd al-Rahman's son became caliph of Cordoba (961-976), Cordoba had become 'the most cultured city in Europe'; 900 public baths and 80,000 shops.

Muslim Cordoba had 70 public libraries. Al Hakam II first secured peace with the Christian kingdoms and then went on a massive translation drive commissioning translations of hundreds of books from Greek and Latin into Arabia. Al Hakam II then decided to unite the libraries of his father, his brother and his own. The united library had 44 volumes in the catalogue for the 400,000 volumes (compare that with St. Gall 's general catalogue with 426 titles).

Additionally, there was a royal library in Granada, a public library at the Grand Mosque in Seville, a royal library in Toledo and a public library at the Byazin Mosque in Valencia. Then there were private collections. Ibn Futaya had one of the biggest. Yusuf ibn Isamil, a resident of Jewish faith, also had a large collection. Under Muslim rule, there were more books in Cordoba than the whole of Europe.

Islam has a tradition of libraries. When we had libraries we ruled North Africa, Nimes (France), Sicily (Italy), Walachia (Romania), Cypress, Sardinia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Venice and Hungary. Islam used to be the religion of success. The Umayyads ruled over present-day Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Iran and all the way to Pakistan. Remember, Tariq bin Ziyad, an Umayyad general, had landed in Gibraltar and was named the governor of Hispania (present-day Portugal, Spain, Andorra).

Fast forward to 2006. The Library of Congress. Imagine, 850 kilometres of bookshelves (M2, the Lahore-Islamabad Motorway is 333 km). Imagine, "29 million catalogued books and other print materials in 470 languages; more than 58 million manuscripts; one million US government publications, one million issues of world newspapers spanning the past three centuries, 33,000 bound newspaper volumes, 500,000 microfilm reels, over 6,000 comic books, the world's largest collection of legal materials, films, 4.8 million maps, sheet music and 2.7 million sound recordings."

Here are some additional facts about the Library of Congress, the largest library on the face of the planet:

It maintains offices in New Delhi, Cairo, Rio de Janeiro, Jakarta, Nairobi and Islamabad to acquire research material;

It receives some 22,000 items each working day;

Half of its books are in languages other than English;

Its law library is the world's largest;

Its Asian Division has the largest assemblage of Chinese, Japanese and Korean materials;

Its Iberian, Latin American and Caribbean collections have 10 million items;

It has one of the largest rare book collections;

Its African and Middle Eastern Division has 600,000 volumes;

It has the largest collection of Russian-language materials outside of Russia

It has the largest and most diverse collection of scientific and technical information in the world.

The National Library of Pakistan has a mere 130,000 books (The National Library of India at Kolkata has a million books). Imagine, the Library of Congress has more books than the combined collection at the national libraries of Brunei, Maldives, Suriname, Comoros, Djibouti, Qatar Bahrain, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritius, Gabon, Gambia, Kuwait, Oman, UAE, Albania, Lebanon, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Sierra Leone, Togo, Turkmenistan, Benin, Tajikistan, Guinea, Azerbaijan, Chad, Somalia, Senegal, Tunisia, Mali, Burkina-Faso, Cameroon, Kazakhstan, Cote d'Ivoire, Syria, Mozambique, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Uganda, Iraq, Malaysia, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Morocco, Algeria, Sudan, Egypt, Iran, Turkey, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Indonesia, Guyana and Niger (and the OIC claims to 'represent the interests of 1.2 billion Muslims').

Imagine, 1.2 billion Muslims have fewer books than 300 million Americans. Imagine, Saudi Arabia has 262 billion barrels of proven oil reserves but the King Faisal Centre for Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh has 90,000 titles. Imagine, the caliph of Cordoba had three times more books than does the National Library of Pakistan.

So, who should be ruling the world? It's not nuclear fission devices. Its not plutonium implosion devices. It's not thermonuclear weapons. Its not hydrogen bombs. It's not chemical explosives. It's not radiological weapons. It's not strategic or tactical arsenal. It's not the amount of highly enriched Uranium. It's not solid propellant missiles.

It's the size of one's library. And, the Library of Congress is the biggest there is.

The writer is an Islamabad-based freelance columnist. Email: farrukh15@hotmail.com

Bajaur worldview?

Tribal jirga calls Osama and Mulla Omar ‘heroes’
By Masood Khan
Daily Times, October 29, 2006

KHAR: A meeting of pro-Taliban tribal militants and elders on Saturday called Osama Bin Laden and Mulla Omar “heroes of the Muslim world” and vowed joint efforts to fight the “enemies of peace” in Bajaur Agency.

A jirga of the Mamoond tribe and local pro-Taliban militants in the Umree area of Mamoond tehsil announced that tribal people would protect Pakistan’s borders.

The announcement comes days after the political administration of Bajaur Agency released nine suspected Al Qaeda militants, triggering rumours that a North Waziristan-like peace accord was also likely in Bajaur, which overlooks Afghanistan’s Kunar province where Osama and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar are suspected to be hiding.

“We have no links with terrorism. We were peaceful tribesmen and we are peaceful tribesmen today,” wanted local Taliban commander Maulana Faqir Muhammad told the jirga. “We are not involved in attacks on security check posts nor are we killing security personnel. We are citizens of this country and want its development,” he added.

Faqir said the government was responsible for the law and order problem in the tribal areas. He said that Pakistan’s western border was “fully secured” when the Taliban were ruling Afghanistan and added that the Taliban’s ouster in 2001 resulted in a “serious threat” to the country’s western borders.

He said no one would be allowed to disturb peace in Bajaur Agency. He said that his comrades had no other agenda except to uphold the supremacy of Islam. He welcomed the release of nine Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat Muhammadi activists. The organisation is currently banned. He said that “jihad against the enemies of Islam” would continue. He said that Sharia could only be enforced through “practical jihad”, and not democracy.

What Musharraf is upto and story of Ram Lal

POSTCARD USA: Aitzaz lights up Washington —Khalid Hasan
Daily Times, October 29, 2006

Aitzaz Ahsan came to Washington last week but so brief was his visit that it reminded me of the one Ghalib compared to saiqa au shoal au seemab, or a flash of lightening, a leaping flame or mercury. He was come and gone before you could say he came. I don’t think there is another in Pakistan who can keep an audience entranced with the sparkle of his conversation as Aitzaz Ahsan can. Quite a few years ago, a young woman from parts foreign asked my friend Zafar Rathore, “And what do you do Mr Rathore.” “Madam,” he replied, “I converse.” So does Aitzaz Ahsan.

We had him over at the small group we have here where anyone interesting from back home is invited to come, break bread with us in a Pakistani restaurant in Springfield, Virginia and converse. The group I named the Kebab Masala Group, since it always met in a restaurant by that name (which went out of business, naturally) actually bears a rather high-sounding name, which could well be that of a think tank in this city of think tanks and tanks of the other kind. It is called the Washington Policy Analysis Group and it was founded over 15 years ago. It has survived all these years for two reasons. It has no office bearers. And it has no membership fee. The rule is that everyone pays for dinner except the guest speaker. To Aitzaz Ahsan’s credit, it should be noted, that at the end of the evening, he offered to chip in. And although it would have been a rare experience to see a lawyer parting with not taking money, he was told, “No, thank you but thank you.”

Nobody asked but half of us were wondering why the brightest light in the toiling masses party was not in London, sitting to the right of the Mohtarma as she reassured Nawaz Sharif that reports of her contacts with the President’s men were overrated. Whether she convinced Nawaz Sharif, who being a cricketer, has a keen eye for the ‘doosra’, is hard to say. I think from now on, he is going to watch her hand and where she pitches the ball. Nor should he be faulted for that. You only have to lower your guard once and your middle stump will be in the vicinity of short fine leg.

But back to Aitzaz Ahsan. He reminded everyone that Gen. Pervez Musharraf was not the spokesman of the Pakistan People’s Party and anything he said or anything said on his behalf should not be confused with the party’s outlook on the weather. He said such stories were spread to throw “the cat of suspicion among pigeons”. He went on to paint a pretty unnerving picture of the ‘free and fair’ elections that the regime is promising everybody, including Charlie’s aunt who can be found, I am told, in the vicinity of Wah Village. He told us about ‘ghost polling stations’ and computer sleight of hand (hats off to Gen. Rafaqat Syed, the Columbus of this novel method of ‘ascertaining’ popular will) artists who produce not rabbis but votes out of their hats. By the time Aitzaz was done with the political bits, he had convinced everyone that Gen. Musharraf was not going to hold elections in order to leave office. Another thing was also clear. Staff scenarios notwithstanding (and in Pakistan they have a sorry record), the General was not riding a tiger. More likely, it was the tiger that was riding him.

Then Aitzaz Ahsan told us a tale — and there is no better raconteur than the man Admiral Ardeshir Cowasjee once named the Cambridge Chaudhry. To the Admiral’s great disappointment, the man he used to call ‘Cicero’ went to the ‘dark side’ by way of a judicial doosra. In Multan jail, AA said, where he was lodged by Gen Zia-ul-Haq, his saving grace was the delightful company of the late Comrade Kaswar Gardezi. The two of them were often served by an Indian who had been there for many, many years. His sin: he had strayed into Pakistan from a neighbouring Indian village and nabbed as a ‘jasoos’. The man we’ll call Ram Lal would have lived happily in Ajmer Sharif with his mother had he not tried to bowl a googly to that master batsman among Saints, the great Khawaja Moinuddin Chishti. His mother used to go to the Khawaja’s shrine every Thursday to light a lamp. One Thursday, being unwell, she gave some money to Ram Lal to make the offering on her behalf. Ram Lal instead of going to the Saint, went gallivanting with his loafer friends. His argument, “Khawaja has been lying there for hundreds of years, he is not going to go away anywhere so what is the hurry, he will get his offering another day.”

The Khawaja, he told Aitzaz Ahsan, doesn’t like being double-crossed, which was why Ram Lal found himself some days later staring into the business end of a very mean-looking gun pointed at him by a Pakistani border guard. Ram Lal said he had been acquitted of the espionage charge but was still here because the moment he stepped out of the jail, he would be an alien without papers and they would pick him up again for more of the same. The jail superintendent confirmed that Ram Lal was right. Years passed. Aitzaz was freed, Zia’s plane crashed, elections were held, Benazir Bhutto became prime minister and who should become the interior minister but Aitzaz Ahsan. One of the first things he did was to ask how many Indian prisoners there were in Pakistani jails. Over 800, he was told. A larger number of Pakistanis was in India. Aitzaz succeeded in persuading his Indian counterpart about an exchange, which took place and Aitzaz saw to it that Ram Lal was safely sent back to Ajmer.

Some time later, he went to Ajmer for a conference — having changed plans to do so on an earlier occasion in favour of a more touristy trip. Having known what the Khawaja had done to Ram Lal, Aitzaz was not going to take any chances. He also wanted to take Ram Lal with him. His Indian hosts mounted a search for Ram Lal but failed to find him. It turned out that on return Ram Lal had been picked up by RAW and given the treatment, this time for being a Pakistani spy. After some time they got bored and let him go. That was the last anyone saw of Ram Lal. He probably went to the Khawaja and said, “I have had more than my share of ill fortune, so if there are no hard feelings, may I leave and disappear somewhere in this vast country so that RAW won’t pick me up again for target practice.” The Khawaja must have smiled and said, “You are cleared to do.” That was the story of Ram Lal that Aitzaz Ahsan told us.

So who knows, the Khawaja may be nice to Aitzaz and his party, though one should bear in mind that Gen. Pervez Musharraf went to see the Khawaja too, the last time he was in India. He couldn’t go the first time, which is perhaps why the Agra summit failed. The moral of the story in Ram Lal’s words: “Ye Khawaja bara sakht hai agar naraaj ho jai tau.”

Khalid Hasan is Daily Times’ US-based correspondent. His e-mail is khasan2@cox.net

Police Reforms in Pakistan: An Evaluation

Police, order and crime
By Azam Khalil: The News, October 28 2006

"We enact many laws that manufacture criminals, and then few that punish them."
Tucker

When the "Chief Executive's" order No.: 22 of 2002 was promulgated, it touted that the age old police system created by the British occupying forces in the subcontinent was never a just system nor a suitable proposition for a "free" country like Pakistan.

The Police Order 2002, as it was called, among other things laid out that the police, "has an obligation and duty to function according to the constitution, law and democratic aspirations of the people." "Such functioning of the police requires it to be professional, service oriented, and accountable to the people." "It is expedient to redefine the police role, its duties and responsibilities." "It is necessary to reconstruct the police for efficient prevention and detection of crime, and maintenance of public order."

These were lofty ideals and therefore required skill and political will for implementation. Unfortunately the political leadership of this country is not prepared to create an atmosphere of good governance that can strengthen and improve the image of institutions.

Pakistan is called a "police state" not that people in uniform are to be blamed for the disgusting state of affairs but because the politicians have misused the institution ruthlessly converting the department into an instrument of political power. Therefore, no one, was surprised when instead of improvement, the police took another plunge and is now considered to be one of the lowest of lows in Pakistan.

The spirit of the Police Order 2002 died long ago when serious violations were tolerated in the rotation of the posting policy and the death blow came when instead of following the time tested policy of seniority and merit, a new formula called, "The best of the best," was introduced to put a few "unscrupulous" but blue eyed officials in the fast track to give them "out of turn promotions."

Moving on, our short-sighted political leadership put in place a "hotch potch" posting method that has forced the entire top echelon of the police cadre to become and behave as personal servants for politicians instead of behaving as employees of the state. Now if we look at the state of affairs in different provinces, things are more or less the same and not conducive for foreign or domestic investment as trumpeted by the prime minister every other day.

Let us begin in NWFP; the police is caught in between the policies of the federal and provincial governments whose priorities for law and order are at great variance, even at contradiction with each other. The result is that powerful, mafia type gangs have emerged who can easily purchase police and political support. The smugglers operate freely selling goods such as, electronic items, arms and ammunition, drugs and contraband cigarettes.

The police lack the muscle and will to go after these barons and the Afghan/India supported insurgency has sent things beyond the control of Pasha's men. In Balochistan, the police seem to have become irrelevant due to two serious shortcomings. One is basic lack of training and the other is the reluctance of police officials to serve in the troubled and "hot" province.

Since the government allowed some officers to flout their orders of postings in Balochistan things have degenerated to a point where no one obeys the orders of their posting to Balochistan and those already there are reluctant workers marking time to move out. Therefore, when the government talks about its writ in this province it should also be put in place a uniform policy and then ensure that there was no one however well connected who could violate the laid down policy about postings.

Coming to Sindh, the police is working in the worst conditions that can be described; this is in spite of a thorough professional at the helm of the department. Dichotomy reins supreme in Sindh and that can never allow the spiral in street crime to come down. There is no policy of posting and people have forgotten the term 'tenure' in the province.

The prime minister had a meeting on October 14 and was, so to say, grieved at the state of affairs, particularly in Karachi. Mirza Jahangir scored a moral victory when the prime minister in the presence of the governor and chief minister ordered that all SHOs and SPs must be posted on merit. So far so good, how long the merit will sustain is another question. He also allowed recruitment of another 5000 cops in an effort to "recover" the city from the criminal gangs who at times have the support of powerful politicians. While good persons if posted at vital positions are bound to make a difference, it was the overall policy that mattered the most. And seen in totality of the scene, it was adhocism that ruled the day, the policy that will achieve the objectives of the Police order 2002 seemed to be still far away.

Finally let us see the situation in the most populous province of the country, Punjab. Here the situation is most chaotic, especially in the rural areas where 9 out of 10 people can never depend on police support for protection of their life and property. The province has a well-meaning Inspector General of Police but who seems to be failing to enforce merit and fair play. Again the serious handicap of the police department is the posting policy whereby the most corrupt and therefore inefficient officers are given choice postings. Another serious hurdle is the largesse being distributed among political cronies in the form of reemployment and extensions.

So many directions were received by the police that simply a new section had to be created tasking half a dozen officials to monitor the progress on the directions received by the department from the political bosses in Punjab. In urban areas politicians are calling the shots and mercilessly implicating their political opponents in false cases. This is not possible without the support of the local police.

The superior judiciary that was already overwhelmed with the burden of the sheer number of cases has intervened in some cases in an effort to put things back on track, they may even have travelled the extra mile that strictly speaking is not their job, but the police has refused to improve, the disappearance of one Bashir from Sialkot and the harassment of the complainant's wife by the police in spite of court interventions tells the present state of affairs.

In Lahore the capital city or the show window of the government has a mercurial city police chief in Kh Khalid Farooq who has been able to stop the rising crime and improve certain areas where dacoity detection has risen to 53 per cent, and murder challans have hit a high of 58 per cent as compared to 50 per cent last year. 91 per cent of kidnapping for ransom cases were resolved, 45 per cent motorcycles were recovered and 32 per cent cars were retrieved.

All this was achieved with only 60 per cent of the 17,000 officers sanctioned for Lahore's police force. 40 per cent of officials are doing protocol and VVIP security, and 350 to 400 are performing duty in the chief minister's house, while more than 100 are engaged in CPO. The rest are engaged in odd jobs.

The policy of bifurcating the police into operations and investigation wings has failed to bear fruit because in Punjab the rate of challans sent by the crime branch used to be a healthy 38 per cent, now with an insipid chief of the investigation wing it has slipped to 17-18 per cent. This official was tried in the training wing and then the I G prison but failed, instead of being sent home, he pulled strong political strings and landed in the sensitive job of chief of the investigation branch. This area was critical for failure or success of the department.

The experiment of posting SPOs in every police station has failed and soon the old system will be revived. The Punjab police also suffers due to excessive new experiments, like the creation of vigilance cells, monitoring cells and high-powered committees that overlap the work of all additional IGs and DIGs. This results in bickering that sometimes leaves a bad taste. This policy is responsible for poor management.

Ziaul Hasan has tried to create a consensus for evolving a policy and giving direction to the department. However, instead of helping in creating harmony these experiments result in intensified turf wars.

For example the following two cases will tell the story of the Punjab police, a havaldar who masquerades as chief of staff with a senior official had his room sealed by former IG Sadat Ullah Khan. Now his 28 punishments have been set aside with one stroke of the pen. Secondly a policy decision was issued announcing that all SHOs in Lahore are required to be inspectors so all sub inspectors working as SHOs were transferred. The next day one blue-eyed sub-inspector was promptly put back as SHO. So where is the police order? Leave aside it was enacted for the benefit of the people.

The writer is a Lahore based columnist. Email: zarnatta@hotmail.com

Muslims in India

INDIA: PM FEARS REPORT ON MUSLIMS WILL BE EXPLOSIVE
New Delhi, 26 Oct, 2006: (AKI/Asian Age)

The Indian government is worried about the impact of a report that lists the findings of a committe that was appointed last March to look into the social, economic and education status of Muslims in India. According to sources, the report has essentially detailed data proving that the status of Indian Muslims today is below that of low caste Hindus or dalits, once also known as untouchables. India's prime minister Manmohan Singh has not given any time to Justice Rajinder Sachar (Retired), who had reportedly asked for an appointment to discuss the findings in the report.

The Sachar committee's had been constituted in March last year for a term of 15 months, which expired in June. It was given an extension till October. Justice Sachar, when contacted, said that the term had now been extended till November, and that the October date that had incidentally been printed in all newspapers at the time was a "mistake."

He did not respond to a question about the appointment with the prime minister. Sachar himself had stated earlier this year in a recorded interview that he would be ready with the report before June as most of his work had been completed.

Informed sources said the Indian prime minister is now not keen for an early release of the report, which has been delayed till next month. The Justice Sachar Committee, which had worked hard through the months collecting data, carrying out interviews and meeting respondents in different states, is reported to have been astonished over the findings which have shown a sharp decline in the social, educational and economic status of Muslims. The sources said that the data itself will require serious responses from the government and a strong demand from concerned citizens and political parties for direct action.

The Sachar Committee has received many representations with a detailed appeal by well-known activists and residents of Gujarat giving an insight into the plight of Muslims in that state. Gujarat has a history of religious tension. In March 2002 more than 1,000 people, most of them Muslims, were killed in Hindu-Muslim riots.

This section of the report showed that the 2002 killings in Gujarat had adversely affected the education of minorities as thousands of Muslim families had not been able to return to their homes till now. Many did not send their children to school, fearing for their safety. Eighty-five percent of the state are Hindus while Muslims in the state account for around 14 percent of the total population.

Economically, the condition of the state's Muslims in the aftermath of the riots was worse than before. The Sachar Committee found that it was difficult for Muslims to get loans from banks which had branded many Muslim-dominated localities as "negative zones." Residents of these areas were automatically denied loans and credit cards by the banks.

The Sachar Committee has information on the ghettoisation of Muslims taking place in Gujarat, with the representation pointing out that areas like Juhapura, with a population of 200,000, had no health centres and were not on the development map of the district administration and the government. The representation has urged the Sachar Committee to recommend measures to stop the creation of "Muslim-free zones" by the government in the state capital Ahmedabad and other parts of Gujarat.

The Sachar Committee has aroused great interest and controversy during its tenure with voluntary groups conducting independent studies to facilitate the larger inquiry. There was some criticism of the terms of reference of the committee which were found to be shallow in that it had not been authorised to make suggestions for improving the living conditions of Muslims and that Muslim women had not been singled out as a specific category. The government, sources said, is worried that the findings will create a political storm, with the states ruled by the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) protesting against the collected data, the secular parties demanding remedial action, and the minorities deciding to vote against the Congress in states like Uttar Pradesh.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had distanced himself from the Sachar Committee when it had asked for a Muslim headcount in the armed forces, with his media adviser briefing journalists to say that he was not involved in any way in the functioning of the committee.

However, once the report is presented to him, the Manmohan Singh will be in the firing line and will have to handle the political consequences of the findings, the sources said, pointing out that the task will be made more difficult because of the forthcoming assembly elections.
(Aki/Asian Age)

Another Interesting Take on How Should the U.S. Handle Pakistan

Denying Terrorists Safe Haven in Pakistan
by Lisa Curtis: The Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder #1981: October 26, 2006 |

The recent upsurge in Taliban attacks against coa­lition forces in Afghanistan and continuing links of global terrorist networks to groups based in Pakistan are leading many in the United States to question Islamabad’s commitment to fighting the global war on terrorism. Washington should review Pakistani efforts to deny terrorists safe haven and its overall policy toward Pakistan, which is at the center of interna­tional anti-terrorism efforts.

Pakistan has made invaluable contributions to combating al-Qaeda over the past five years by cap­turing scores of key leaders and helping to foil numerous deadly plots. However, Islamabad will need to adopt a more comprehensive policy against violent extremism to fully deny groups and indi­viduals the use of Pakistani territory as a base for global jihad.

Pakistan has traditionally relied on violent extrem­ists to accomplish its strategic objectives in both Afghanistan and India. Although President Pervez Musharraf has articulated his desire to turn Pakistan into a moderate and modern Islamic state, his govern­ment has taken little concrete action to make the country inhospitable for individuals and groups seek­ing to destabilize Afghanistan or India and plotting international acts of terrorism. Reports of links between those involved in the foiled London airliner bomb plot in mid-August and Pakistani terrorist groups that traditionally operate in Jammu and Kash­mir demonstrate the dangers of not cracking down on violent extremism in Pakistan.

Washington needs to strengthen its policy toward Pakistan in ways that both demonstrate long-term U.S. commitment to the relationship and press Pakistan to expand its efforts against violent extremists. The best chance for success against vio­lent extremism in Pakistan lies in a strategy that prioritizes economic and democratic development and the pursuit of better relations with neighboring countries, namely Afghanistan and India. Washing­ton should support these objectives and encourage greater economic interdependence among these three South Asian countries.

Pakistan and the Taliban

Before the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Pakistan supported and recognized Taliban rule in Afghanistan. Although Pakistani officials largely disagreed with the Taliban’s harsh interpreta­tion of Islam, they viewed the Taliban as their best chance to achieve their own strategic objectives in the region and believed that the international com­munity would eventually accept Taliban rule in Kabul as inevitable. Pakistan continued to support the Taliban into the late 1990s, long after Osama bin Laden took refuge there in 1996 and despite the growing problems that it created in Pakistan’s rela­tions with Washington. Pakistan’s high-stakes policy vis-à-vis the Taliban derived from its aims of denying India, as well as Iran and the Central Asian coun­tries, a strong foothold in Afghanistan and ensuring a friendly regime in Kabul that would refrain from making territorial claims on Pakistan’s Pashtun areas along the Pakistan–Afghanistan border.[1]

The 9/11 attacks and their impact on U.S. for­eign policy quickly changed Pakistan’s earlier cal­culations on the benefits of supporting the Taliban. President Musharraf broke off official ties with the Taliban, supported the U.S. invasion of Afghani­stan, and contributed substantially to breaking up the al-Qaeda network in the region. Pakistan has captured and turned over to the U.S. scores of senior al-Qaeda leaders and has helped to disrupt terrorist plots that would have resulted in hun­dreds, possibly thousands, of deaths.

Despite the official break with the Taliban, Islam­abad has failed to crack down forcefully on Taliban leaders or actively disrupt their activities in Paki­stan. Officials of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelli­gence Directorate maintain relationships with Taliban leaders and may see benefits in keeping good ties with the Taliban in the expectation that the Taliban might again play a role in Afghanistan’s politics. Taliban leaders apparently roam freely in Quetta, Baluchistan, and Taliban fighters shelter in Pakistani border areas after attacking coalition forces in Afghanistan.[2]

Pakistan’s lax attitude toward the Taliban has contributed to renewed Taliban attacks in Afghani­stan, but other factors are also facilitating instabil­ity. U.S. Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte says the Taliban is exploiting local grievances on issues such as corruption and poor governance to attract recruits and reestablish its power base. He also attributes the recent increase in Taliban attacks to more NATO operations along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border.[3]

Although Pakistan is not solely responsible for the increased Taliban attacks, it could help to stem them by denying Taliban forces rest and safe harbor on Pakistani soil. Washington should therefore make the issue of denying terrorists safe haven in the border areas a focal point of its partnership with Pakistan. The importance of denying terrorists safe haven as part of an overall counterterrorism strat­egy is well documented. In its July 2004 report, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States highlighted the need to develop a “realistic strategy to keep possible terrorists inse­cure and on the run.”[4] The March 2006 National Security Strategy says that “we must prevent terror­ists from exploiting ungoverned areas,”[5] and the 2005 State Department counterterrorism report indicates that “[d]enying terrorists safe haven plays a major role in undermining terrorists’ capacity to operate effectively, and thus forms a key element of U.S. counterterrorism strategy.”[6]

Musharraf’s Tribal Areas Deal: Curtailing or Emboldening Terrorism?

Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which consist of seven semi-autonomous tribal agencies along the border with Afghanistan, constitute one of the most dangerous terrorist safe havens in the world today. According to the 2005 State Department counterterrorism report, the FATA has been “a safe haven for al Qaida and Tali­ban fighters since the fall of the Taliban in Decem­ber 2001.”[7] The lack of central government authority in this region and the fact that the local population shares a Pashtun identity with the Tali­ban make it a particularly attractive location for the Taliban and its al-Qaeda supporters to hide.

Since 2004, the Pakistan military has deployed some 80,000 security forces to the area to disrupt the terrorists, but these military operations have also damaged traditional tribal institutions, increased radicalism in the region, caused the deaths of several hundred Pakistani soldiers, and met with increasing opposition from the broader Pakistani population. Public opposition to the mil­itary operations in the FATA spiked in late August following the Pakistan military’s unpopular assassi­nation of an elderly Baluch politician who had spearheaded a rebellion in Baluchistan province.

Because of the growing problems with the FATA military operations, President Musharraf on Sep­tember 5 announced a “peace deal” with tribal lead­ers of the North Waziristan Agency that includes an end to offensive Pakistani military operations in exchange for the tribal rulers’ cooperation in restricting Taliban and al-Qaeda activities. The Pakistan government wants to restore the tradi­tional form of governance in the region and co-opt the tribal elders and political representatives through an infusion of economic assistance for new roads, hospitals, and schools. The U.S. supports Pakistani efforts to bring more government services to the region and to turn it into a regularly admin­istered province. Washington is also providing assistance to help Pakistan control the region by equipping Pakistan’s paramilitary Frontier Corps, funding the construction of more than 100 border outposts, providing high-tech equipment to help Pakistani forces better locate terrorists attempting to cross the border, and funding an air wing with helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft.[8]

The next several months will be crucial in deter­mining whether Musharraf’s Waziristan deal will advance U.S. interests by denying safe haven to ter­rorists or enhance Taliban and al-Qaeda influence in the region, making it easier for terrorists to plot, organize, and train. Although President Musharraf denies that the pact was made with the Taliban, reports that scores of Taliban militants were recently released from Pakistani custody are worrisome.

To make the pact effective, Islamabad will have to enforce its terms strictly, which means com­ing down hard on any elements that are found protecting or shel­tering Taliban or al-Qaeda. This may require Musharraf to punish lower-level individuals within his own intelligence and security ser­vices who have helped Taliban leaders evade capture by U.S. forces in the past. This is a tall order for Musharraf, given the deep institutional links between the intelligence and security ser­vices and the Taliban. He has already faced at least two assassi­nation attempts because of his counterterrorism cooperation with the U.S. Although the U.S. sees an urgent need to deny safe haven to terrorists along the Paki­stan–Afghan border, President Musharraf carefully calculates each counterterrorism step that he takes to ensure his own survival.

If, as Musharraf claims, the Waziristan pact is aimed at increasing cooperation from the local tribes against the terrorists, Pakistan should find it increasingly easier to close in on Taliban and al-Qaeda hideouts. The U.S. will need to monitor the situation closely and judge the merits of the pact based on whether it results in fewer cross-border attacks into Afghan­istan and more information on Taliban/al-Qaeda activities and hiding places. Washington needs to focus all of the tools and resources at its disposal on dealing effectively with this troubled region. Fail­ure to do so will further destabilize Afghanistan and make it easier for terrorists to plan and execute their next international attack.

Tripartite Meeting: A Step in the Right Direction

The recent tripartite meeting of Presidents George W. Bush, Hamid Karzai, and Musharraf in Washington is a first step in defusing tensions between the Afghan and Pakistani leaders result­ing from the increased Taliban attacks. It is now widely acknowledged that the fate of Afghanistan is closely linked to Pakistan and the policies that it pursues over the next several years. Therefore, the U.S. needs to continue these high-level three-way meetings to bring the countries into greater align­ment and to build economic and security linkages between their governments that will make them increasingly interdependent and interested in their mutual stability and security.

The Administration is already moving in this direction with the pursuit of reconstruction oppor­tunity zones (ROZs) in the Afghan–Pakistan border areas, which would allow products produced in these remote areas to receive trade preferences in the U.S.[9] The U.S. Congress would need to pass legislation to implement the ROZ program. The Bush Administration and the next U.S. Congress should work together to fast-track implementation of the ROZs so that Afghan and Pakistani leaders will immediately begin to benefit from working cooperatively on peaceful trade-related projects.

During the tripartite meeting, Presidents Karzai and Musharraf also agreed to establish tribal jirgas (gatherings) of Pashtun local leaders from both sides of the border. President Karzai has commented that he hopes the jirgas will provide assurances to both Islamabad and Kabul that each country’s peace and prosperity is good for the other.[10]

Links Between Kashmiri Militancy and International Terrorism

Links between Pakistan-based Kashmiri militant groups and international terrorist incidents further demonstrate the need for Islamabad to adopt a zero-tolerance policy toward violent extremism. Reports surfaced in mid-August that one of the prime suspects in the London airliner bomb plot had family ties to Maulana Masood Azhar, the leader of the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM), a radical Kashmiri terrorist group.[11] Indian security forces captured Azhar in Kashmir in the early 1990s and then released him in 1999 during a hostage swap to free 155 passengers on a hijacked Indian plane that flew to Kandahar, Afghanistan. The Indian govern­ment also released two other suspected terrorists— British-born Omar Sheikh and Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar—to end the hijacking crisis.

The JEM had apparently made an earlier unsuc­cessful attempt to free Azhar by kidnapping five Western tourists, including American citizen Donald Hutchings. One of the tourists was beheaded, and the others were never found and are presumed dead. Pakistan officially banned the JEM in 2002, but Azhar has never been formally charged with a crime.[12]

The JEM has also been linked to the kidnapping and brutal murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl in January 2002. Pearl’s kidnappers demanded the release of Pakistani prisoners from Guantanamo Bay, an immediate end to the U.S. presence in Pakistan, U.S. delivery of F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan, and the release of Mullah Zaeef, the former Afghan ambassador of the Taliban regime to Pakistan. Omar Sheikh later con­fessed to Pakistani authorities that he masterminded Pearl’s kidnap­ping. Sheikh was also involved in the kidnappings of Westerners in India in 1994 that were aimed at freeing Masood Azhar. In July 2002, Sheikh was sentenced to death by an anti-terrorism court in Pakistan.[13]

The JEM has roots in the Afghan war against the Soviets, and its cad­res trained at Taliban camps in the late 1990s. The JEM (then called the Harakat-Ul-Mujahideen) reportedly suffered several casualties during the U.S. strikes on terrorist training camps in Afghanistan in 1998 in retaliation for al-Qaeda bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa.

Terrorist Attacks Jeopardize Indo–Pakistani Talks

Indian allegations of Pakistani involvement in the July 11 Mumbai train blasts, which killed nearly 200 people, are severely straining Paki­stan–India relations. On September 30, the Mum­bai police commissioner told a news conference that the authorities had finished their investiga­tions into the Mumbai blasts and had concluded that the attack was planned by Pakistan’s intelli­gence service and carried out by the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LET) and their opera­tives in India. He also said that the Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) had assisted in the attacks. India has said that it will test Pakistani resolve in countering terrorism through a joint mechanism agreed to by the Indian and Pakistani leaders in Havana, Cuba, in late September. Pres­ident Musharraf has so far been reluctant to take concrete steps to rein in jihadists that fight in Kashmir, mainly because his government believes the militancy is Islamabad’s only way to keep pres­sure on India and to force New Delhi’s hand in negotiations over the contested territory.

The U.S. considered labeling Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism for its support to militant groups fighting in Kashmir in the early 1990s. Although the Kashmir militancy erupted indige­nously in Srinagar—the Muslim-dominated sum­mer capital of Jammu and Kashmir on the Indian side of the Line of Control (LOC)—over griev­ances related to political representation of the Muslim community, Pakistan quickly took advan­tage of the situation and provided support to Kashmiri militant groups.

The U.S. again pressured Islamabad on its sup­port to militants fighting in Kashmir during the 2001–2002 military crisis between India and Paki­stan, in which a total 1 million troops were mobi­lized on both sides of the border. To defuse that crisis, then Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage secured a commitment from President Musharraf in early June 2002 to end the infiltration of militants across the LOC, which divides Kashmir. Armitage conveyed the Pakistani pledge to Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihar Vajpayee, who subse­quently agreed to pull back Indian forces, ending the military standoff.[14] Despite reduced military tensions, India did not agree to resume official dia­logue until 18 months later in January 2004.

President Musharraf would find it politically challenging to pursue a broader crackdown on domestic terrorists that strike in India and abroad. The religious parties would label such a crackdown as a surrender to India over Kashmir. However, he could draw support for such a crackdown from other parts of Pakistani society, such as the secular political parties, the business community, and Paki­stanis who have been involved in people-to-people exchanges with Indians over the past few years.

A more serious dialogue on Kashmir between India and Pakistan and deeper engagement by the U.S. would help to give Pakistan confidence that its viewpoint has been taken into account. The U.S. should not try to involve itself directly in resolving the dispute, but it should continue to talk about the issue separately with both sides and inject ideas into their dialogue process. President Musharraf is clearly hedging in talks with India by allowing Kashmiri militant groups to continue to operate. The U.S. needs to convince Musharraf to instead put his faith in the India–Pakistan dialogue.

A genuine peace process between New Delhi and a wide spectrum of Kashmiri leaders that addresses political grievances and human rights issues would also help to temper the Pakistani public’s emotional reactions to Kashmir and widen public support for a genuine crackdown on violent groups. Encourag­ing travel back and forth across the LOC (started by the Muzaffarabad–Srinagar bus link) and greater interaction and cooperation between officials from both sides of the LOC will widen the constituencies for peace and help to isolate violent extremists.

Weakening Extremism by Promoting Democracy

Promoting a more open and transparent political process in Pakistan will also help to curb the influ­ence of extremist groups, thereby reducing support for terrorism. Before the 2002 elections, religious parties that backed the Taliban traditionally received less than 8 percent of the popular vote and had been marginalized in the 1988, 1990, 1993, and 1997 national elections.[15] In the 2002 elec­tions, however, the religious parties performed well in the areas bordering Afghanistan and increased their total vote share to about 11 percent, partly because of changes in election rules that favored them over the secular parties and partly because of anti-American sentiment in the Afghanistan–Paki­stan border provinces.[16] The secular Pakistan Peo­ple’s Party (PPP), which is led in exile by former Prime Minister Benazir Bhuto, grabbed about 25 percent of the popular vote in the 2002 elections.

The full participation of the main secular demo­cratic parties, including the PPP and the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), in the 2007 elections would provide more political choices to Pakistani voters and instill greater confidence in Pakistan’s democratic process. Charges of corruption leveled against Benazir Bhutto and her husband have tainted her personal reputation, but the PPP as a party con­tinues to attract individuals who support secular-based policies. The PPP recently led efforts in the Pakistani parliament to repeal the controversial Hudood ordinances that discriminate against women. The Musharraf government has since put efforts to repeal the controversial ordinances on hold as a result of pressure from the religious parties.

The Pakistan military’s pervasive involvement in civilian affairs has stifled the development of civil society and the establishment of democratic insti­tutions. Pakistan has been ruled by the military for over half of its existence. Even during periods of civilian rule, the military has wielded tremendous power over decision-making. Although the military is unlikely to submit fully to a civilian government in the near term, Washington should set bench­marks that begin to restrict the military’s role in Pakistani politics. U.S. legislation prevents Wash­ington from providing assistance to a government put in place by a military coup, but the Bush Administration has permitted assistance to Paki­stan since 9/11 under a waiver to this law. The annual recertification of this waiver should be tied to free and fair elections in 2007 and a return to civilian rule.

The Role of U.S. Assistance in Countering Extremism

Carefully targeted U.S. aid programs can also help to counter anti-American sentiment and limit the influence of radicals who use hatred of the U.S. to mobilize political support. A visible U.S. aid presence in the country will reassure the Pakistani population that Washington is committed to aver­age Pakistanis, not just to the military leadership. U.S. assistance programs that focus on building institutions and promoting human rights and democracy would also show that the U.S. is com­mitted to Pakistan’s success as a stable and prosper­ous country and deflate extremists’ arguments that Washington is interested only in exploiting Paki­stan for its own purposes. Washington must work to overcome the suspicions of Pakistanis who remember when the U.S. abruptly cut off its large-scale aid program because of Pakistan’s nuclear program in the early 1990s.

Polling in Pakistan and other parts of the Muslim world has demonstrated the significant impact that U.S. humanitarian aid has on peoples’ perceptions of America. A poll by Terror Free Tomorrow, a U.S. nonprofit organization, indicated that favorable attitudes toward America doubled following the U.S. response to the October 2005 earthquake in Pakistan.[17] The U.S. should search for ways to emulate the kind of humanitarian programs that were employed following the earthquake on a more permanent basis and to publicize more effectively the assistance that Washington has already pro­vided. Regrettably, security concerns have forced the U.S. to limit the size and scope of its assistance projects in the country. Most U.S. assistance to Pakistan over the past five years has been in the form of budgetary support and debt relief, which has helped Pakistan’s macroeconomic indicators but has limited the direct impact of U.S. aid on the broader Pakistani population’s attitudes toward America.[18]

What the U.S. Should Do

To strengthen U.S. policy toward Pakistan and to press Islamabad to address the roots of violent extremism, the United States should:

1. Maintain a robust U.S. assistance program but make it more visible to the Pakistani peo­ple. The U.S. should target more of its assis­tance to development, health, and education projects that affect the grassroots of society. Since 9/11, most U.S. economic assistance has gone either to debt relief or to direct budget support of the Pakistan government. While this aid has improved Pakistan’s macroeconomic indicators, it has had little impact on the aver­age Pakistani’s perception of America. The U.S. embassy and aid mission in Islamabad should work together to develop programs that dem­onstrate Washington’s interest in promoting economic development and democracy. The embassy’s public diplomacy office should sub­mit regular stories to the local press detailing U.S. assistance programs and their impact on the lives of average Pakistanis. Implementing more U.S. assistance programs that focus on economic development and promoting human rights and democracy will demonstrate that the U.S. is committed to the success of Pakistan as a stable and prosperous country and help to deflate the extremists’ arguments that Washing­ton is interested only in exploiting Pakistan for its own purposes.

2. Provide a consistent message regarding denying safe haven to all terrorists, regard­less of whether they attack coalition forces in Afghanistan or innocent civilians in India or elsewhere. Washington should privately acknowl­edge the links between the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and Pakistan-based groups that target India and should convey U.S. expectations that Islama­bad develop an equally uncompromising policy toward all three groups. This means that Paki­stan must shut down training facilities associ­ated with international terrorist incidents, including institutions run by the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba in Muridke and the Jaish-e-Moham­med in Bahawalpur. Washington should emphasize the dangers of Islamabad’s maintain­ing a permissive attitude toward groups that commit terrorism and remind Pakistani offi­cials that U.S. laws require sanctions against states that support terrorist groups.

3. Develop a more proactive U.S. policy to sup­port the restoration of democracy. Washing­ton should convey a consistent public message that calls for free, fair, and transparent elections in 2007 and emphasizes the importance of democracy as a way to lessen the influence of extremist forces. The U.S. should also discour­age further changes in the election rules or other government manipulations of the elec­toral process. The full participation of the Paki­stan People’s Party and the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), the two main secular demo­cratic parties, in the 2007 elections would pro­vide more political choices to the Pakistani voter and instill greater confidence in the dem­ocratic process. Despite legislation that gener­ally prohibits providing U.S. assistance to any government put in place by a military coup, U.S. assistance to Pakistan is permitted under a waiver to this law. The annual recertification of this waiver should be tied to free and fair elec­tions in 2007 and a return to civilian rule.

4. Highlight the F-16 sale and how it demon­strates American support for Pakistan’s long-term security in the region. The recent announcement of the resumption of U.S. F-16 sales to Pakistan passed without much fanfare, even though Pakistani officials had repeatedly told U.S. officials over the past several years that releasing the F-16s was crucial to building confidence in Pakistan about the U.S. commit­ment to the relationship. A senior U.S. official should deliver a major speech on the U.S. inter­est in Pakistan’s long-term security and describe how the F-16 sale fits into this context. Pakistan’s reluctance to crack down on the Tal­iban and Kashmiri militant groups is driven largely by Islamabad’s perception that it needs an insurance policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan and India. The U.S. should search for ways to dem­onstrate that Washington wants a long-lasting and broad-based relationship with Islamabad and will remain committed to a secure and sta­ble Pakistan, thereby enhancing Islamabad’s perceptions of its own security in the region.

5. Maintain and fortify U.S. diplomatic efforts to facilitate the building of peace between India and Pakistan. New Delhi’s allegations that a Pakistan-based terrorist group and Pakistan’s intelligence agency were involved in the Mum­bai bomb blasts could derail Indo–Pakistani bilateral talks unless Pakistan takes concrete steps to crack down on domestic terrorist groups. While Washington should encourage such a crackdown, it will also need to acknowl­edge Pakistan’s interest in seeing substantive movement on India–Pakistan talks on Kashmir. In this context, Washington should encourage New Delhi to take additional confidence-build­ing measures on Kashmir and to involve the Kashmiris in a peace process that addresses human rights concerns and political grievances.

6. Institute regular trilateral meetings with senior U.S., Pakistani, and Afghan officials, such as the Bush–Musharraf–Karzai meeting held in late September. The U.S. needs to take the lead in mediating differences between Kabul and Islamabad and injecting ideas into the discussions to help to overcome their mutual mistrust. The U.S. should support the idea of establishing tribal jirgas on both sides of the border as a way to build confidence between the two governments. Washington should also strongly discourage further mud­slinging between Kabul and Islamabad of the sort that occurred in mid-September. Clearly, Pakistan has a role to play in achieving a stable and prosperous Afghanistan. Washington needs to convey to Islamabad both the priority that it places on ensuring stability in Afghanistan and that the U.S. will remain committed to this goal over the long term.

7. Encourage economic integration among Paki­stan, Afghanistan, and India so that each has a vested interest in overall stability in the region. Washington should vigorously pursue trade, development, and investment initiatives that mutually benefit all three countries. The Bush Administration and the next U.S. Congress should fast-track legislation implementing ROZs along the Afghan–Pakistan border. The U.S. should also actively encourage trade between Pakistan and India and consider initiatives that would bring Indians and Pakistanis together in cooperative efforts to reconstruct and rehabili­tate Afghanistan. Greater economic interdepen­dence and integration among the three countries will contribute to stability in the region as each country begins to view good relations with its neighbors as benefiting its own economy. Imple­menting the South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA) would further this process.

8. Establish an interagency working group on Pakistan that meets regularly to assess the cur­rent status of aid programs, counterterrorism operations, democratic development, and Paki­stan’s relations with Afghanistan and India. The working group should be led by the State Department and be tasked with developing a more integrated U.S. policy toward Pakistan. It is becoming increasingly clear that Pakistan is at the center of the international fight against ter­rorism, and the U.S. needs a stronger inter­agency process to develop its Pakistan policy. In the past, the different U.S. agencies that deal with Pakistan have often argued over issues related to the extent of Pakistani counterterror­ism cooperation. The arguments have developed between those who have a vested interest in con­tinuing to receive the Pakistani cooperation that is forthcoming and those who see an urgent need for greater cooperation. The bureaucratic infighting has often polarized the two camps of opinion and stifled the development of a care­fully crafted approach toward achieving U.S. counterterrorism goals in the region.

Conclusion

Stability in Afghanistan and in South Asia more generally is closely linked to the policies that Islam­abad pursues over the next few years, including actions that limit the Taliban’s ability to operate on Pakistani soil, peace efforts with neighboring India, exploration of trade and investment opportunities in the region, and a return to democratic politics. The U.S. needs to pursue these objectives with equal vigor to help Pakistan address the roots of violent extremism and begin to contribute to greater stabil­ity and peace in the region and beyond.

Lisa Curtis is Senior Research Fellow for South Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.

Inside the U.S. - Pakistan Relationship

How to Save the Pakistan Relationship
Marvin G. Weinbaum
Newark Star Ledger, October 23, 2006

Pakistan and the United States are increasingly questioning the benefits of their strategic partnership. Officially Washington continues to lavish praise on President Musharraf for aligning his country against global terrorism. But many of Pakistan’s extremist groups and associated Islamic institutions appear to be operating with near impunity and fueling the insurgency in Afghanistan.

Musharraf’s commitment to a peace process with New Delhi has earned him high approval in Washington; yet Pakistan’s security services are blamed for complicity in terrorist acts against India. The Pakistan President is applauded for his vision of an enlightened, moderate Pakistan in the face of reported violations of civil liberties and denials of women’s rights, and a federal government powerless to enact reforms.

US policy makers may believe that Musharraf is indispensable at Pakistan’s helm, but many critics balk at continuing to give him a virtual pass to perpetuate his country’s military ascendance and resist a full probe of its past nuclear-related transfers. Even if many in Washington are willing to accept that his assurances to the US are sincere, they believe Musharraf’s domestic constraints make it doubtful he can deliver on his promises.

In Pakistan, Musharraf’s cooperation with the United States has become a growing liability. The expectations are gone that by deserting the Taliban in 2001 Pakistan would reap handsome rewards.

Aside from American relief efforts following last year’s earthquake, US assistance, most of it dedicated to the military and for budgetary support, is barely noticed by the public. Washington’s offer of nuclear cooperation with India and its denial to Pakistan are seen as testimony that the US has cast its lot economically and strategically with India. This is underscored by the failure to reach an investment agreement with Pakistan during President Bush’s March visit, and refusal to amend US textile policies that hinder Pakistan’s industry.

Largely because Washington indiscriminately labels most conflicts across the Middle East and Afghanistan as part of the war on terrorism, most Pakistanis see it as a war against Islam, and thus not their war. The Musharraf government’s unpopular, failed militarization of the tribal agencies is generally seen as undertaken at the behest of the US. The public seems prepared to accept intelligence sharing, but sovereignty-sensitive Pakistanis are deeply offended by Washington’s declaration that the American military would enter Pakistani territory, even if uninvited, to apprehend a high value Al Qaeda figure.

How then do the two countries shore up an increasingly problematic but critical relationship? If Washington must alter some policies, so too must Pakistan. For starters, the US should revise its assistance priorities, show greater sensitivity in its public diplomacy, and take a more pro-active role in facilitating resolution of Pakistan’s differences with India.

For Pakistan, only significant changes in the domestic political landscape offer any hope for a sustainable partnership. Musharraf cannot satisfy his allies or realize the aspirations of most Pakistanis with his jerrybuilt political party and ultimate dependency on the loyalties of his generals. He must move quickly to build a more inclusive constituency that includes those progressive political elements he has shunned and tried to cripple. Otherwise, he can only win next year’s legislative elections by aligning his opportunistic party followers with one of the larger jihadi-supporting Islamic parties. Even then Musharraf and his backers will have to resort to large-scale electoral manipulation in order to ensure a parliamentary majority. Legitimacy will also be an issue should President Musharraf decide, as expected, to seek reelection from lame duck national and provincial assemblies and insist on remaining army chief too.

The US has too much at stake to remain as passive as it has. Washington refrained from cautioning or criticizing Musharraf when he claimed the presidency through a stacked referendum, arbitrarily enhanced his constitutional powers, pre-cooked national elections,and then reneged on a pledge to take off his uniform. The US thereby managed to reinforce the impression it prefers military governments to democratic ones.

A failure now to encourage Musharraf to open the political system will doom hopes for progressive policies. It will only produce a coalition inclined to be more confrontational with India and Afghanistan. For many in Pakistan it would also confirm the US as a fickle ally that will once again desert Pakistan if it should succeed against Al Qaeda. For an alliance that endures, Washington must counter the widely held view that the American partnership is with Musharraf and the army, not with the people of Pakistan.

Assertions and opinions in this 'Perspective' are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy

Marvin G. Weinbaum is a Scholar-in-Residence at the Middle East Institute. He is a former US State department analyst for Pakistan and emeritus professor at the University of Illinois.

Dr. A Q Khan Controversy: Update

Pakistan launches major image-building offensive in US
The News: October 24, 2006
By Shaheen Sehbai

WASHINGTON: Pakistan has launched a major image-building offensive in the US to convince decision makers and think tanks to put the Dr AQ Khan saga of nuclear proliferation behind them and treat Pakistan as a responsible nuclear power.

The man in-charge of the Pakistani nuclear programme and assets, Lt-Gen Khalid Kidwai, head of the Strategic Planning Division, who was himself deeply involved in debriefing Dr AQ Khan, is currently in Washington and is scheduled to meet senior officials as well as members of the Carnegie, Rand Corporation and other think tanks to speak about this new Pakistani image.

The Pakistani initiative comes after the North Korean nuclear test generated renewed interest in what Pakistan may have provided the North Koreans and Iran through the AQ Khan network.

Meanwhile, a senior military officer held a briefing at the Pakistan Embassy on the Eid day in connection with this image-building offensive in which the US media was also invited to “correct misperceptions about the Pakistani nuclear programme.”

Speaking on condition of anonymity, the official used extensive charts and a PowerPoint presentation to elaborate the command and control structures of the Pakistani nuclear programme and assured the audience that there was absolutely no chance of Pakistani nuclear assets falling in the hands of terrorists or Islamic fundamentalists.

“Pakistanis are moderate people and despite the misconceived image of Islamic fundamentalism, ‘we do not have any closet revolutionaries,’” he said. “Even all the military coups in Pakistan have been non-violent,” the senior officer said.

The briefing was attended by senior Pakistan Embassy diplomats and the US and Pakistani mediapersons, who asked a number of questions, mostly relating to the Dr AQ Khan affair.

The official said AQ Khan would never be handed over to any foreign country as he was still considered a hero in Pakistan and there was a groundswell of emotions recently when he went through prostrate surgery.

He said Pakistan had carried out a thorough interrogation based on questions provided by the US, IAEA and other agencies. “We asked him all those questions and provided all the answers that he gave honestly without adding or subtracting anything,” the official said.

Asked when the interrogation of Dr Khan may end, the official said as far as Pakistan was concerned the chapter was closed but if there were any questions, which arose later, Pakistan would be willing to put them to Dr Khan.

He disclosed that the US had not sent any questions for Dr Khan since the last eight months, indicating that the US may not have anything else to ask him.

In answer to questions the official gave details of what Dr AQ Khan had been doing including supply of some 200 P-1 and three or four P-2 centrifuges to Iran. He said Dr Khan suffered depression frequently and at times he would just refuse to answer any questions but no third degree methods had been used to extract information from him.

The official disclosed details of how Dr Khan had written two letters during his interrogation, one to his daughter and another to the Iranians, which had been intercepted. General Musharraf had also referred to these letters in his memoirs.

He said the letter to his daughter was so detailed and disclosed everything about Pakistan’s nuclear programme. “Dr Khan was adamant to disclose anything before his letters were intercepted but when he was confronted with his own hand writing and the likelihood that his own daughter may become a target of the British or the US agencies because she had carried sensitive information about the Pakistani programme, he collapsed and asked for clemency from President Musharraf.”

He said the letter to his daughter was carried by her to London but had not been provided to the journalists, which Dr AQ Khan had mentioned. Copies of that letter were also sent to Europe by the family to be used just in case something happened to Dr Khan.

The official insisted that whatever Dr Khan had been doing was not known to the Pakistani authorities as he had been given a blank cheque and a free hand to import or export anything. “This was not only a failure of Pakistani intelligence but also a massive failure of international intelligence,” he observed.

During questions, the official remarked that Pakistan was prepared to subject Dr Khan to the lie detection test but Pakistan did not have the polygraph machines and the US had refused to supply these machines.

The official, in his presentation, also referred to the Indo-US nuclear agreement and said Pakistan needed access to such technology as it had plans to generate over 8,000 MW of energy from nuclear reactors in the coming years.

He said if Pakistan were denied parity by the US, it would have consequences because Pakistan will have to meet its needs from some other sources. “The US offer of civilian nuclear technology to India should not be country specific, but should provide a level playing field for Pakistan as well.”

Also see: Dr. Khan's Role in North Korea Bomb Denied

Centrifuges Smuggled to Dubai: Dawn October 24, 2006

Plight of Pakistan Police

Mirpurkhas DIG suspended after overnight ‘coup’
By Muhammad Khalid
The News, October 24, 2006

MIRPURKHAS: The Mirpurkhas range deputy inspector-general of police was suspended and his personal staff officer along with a gunman arrested in the wee hours of Monday after overnight dramatic events.

In a row which has been brewing between DIG Saleemullah Khan and Inspector-General of Police Sindh Jehangir Mirza for some time, raids are also being conducted for the arrest of Additional DIG Shahid Bajwa, who is considered as a close aide of the DIG.

The suspension orders came after the DIG tried to get an FIR registered against the provincial police chief overnight Monday for alleged wrongful and illegal orders/action under various sections of the Pakistan Panel Code.

Mirza had reportedly directed Khan a few days ago not to leave Mirpurkhas without his permission. But the boss’s order apparently angered the DIG, who directed an SHO to lodge a case against the IG. The SHO informed the Mirpurkhas DPO of the DIG’s orders soon after receiving them. DPO Abdullah Sheikh then apprised the IG of the situation, who after getting approval from Islamabad immediately suspended Khan.

In the meantime, police sprang into action and arrested the PSO to the DIG, Danish, and his gunman Muhammad Saleem. Both were taken to some unknown place. All records of the DIG office were seized and telephones of his residence and offices were disconnected.

On Monday morning police lodged cases against the DIG, his PSO and the gunman for allegedly using powers beyond authority, creating hurdles to government working and threatening government officials.

Later, speaking to The News from an unknown place, the suspended DIG said many police officers, including the IG, were not happy with the progress in the Manoo Bheel case and the arrests of the main accused in the case, landlord Abdul Rahman Marri, and some SHOs on the charges of running illegal and private torture cells.

“I am being punished for taking action against lawbreakers and showing development in the Manoo Bheel case under the directives of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which annoyed my IG,” Khan said.

He said that, on the orders of the provincial police chief, an FIR was registered against him for creating obstacles to official duties and snatching the Roznamcha (daily report) of a police station. “No one is beyond the law. If I can be booked in the false case of Roznamcha-snatching, why cannot an FIR for wrongful orders be lodged against the IG Sindh who too is not beyond the law?” he asked.

The basis of the orders was illegal and unjustified and “I will fight to get justice” at all costs and even bring the situation to the knowledge of the Supreme Court, he said, noting the apex court had appointed him chief investigation officer in the Manoo Bheel case.

How to resolve Shia-Sunni Schism?

An Islamic-Western alliance against sectarianism in Iraq
Mehlaqa Samdani October 24, 2006

Pittsfield, Massachusetts - At a time when the Muslim and Western worlds seem to be drifting apart, alleviating the sectarian conflict in Iraq presents a unique opportunity for both camps to work together and achieve a common goal. A coordinated effort between Muslim civil society actors and Western groups would not only serve to bridge the sectarian divide in Iraq but could also begin to heal the growing mistrust between the Muslim world and the West.

Last week, the Organization of the Islamic Conference held a meeting of Iraqi Shiite and Sunni ulema who painstakingly produced an eight-point declaration known as the Mecca Document. The document aims to bridge the sectarian divide in Iraq by forbidding Shiites and Sunnis from killing each other. This is the first real initiative undertaken by the Muslim world to stop sectarian violence in Iraq. However, it must not be the last and should be supplemented with civil society initiatives.

The meeting in Mecca should be followed up with the creation of a forum of Iraqi Shiite and Sunni ulema with the primary responsibility of issuing counter-fatwas to the inflammatory rhetoric of Zarqawi’s successor, Abu Hamza Al-Muhajir. Every statement issued by extremists referring to Shias as grandsons of Ibn Al-Alqami (the Shia vizir who was complicit in the Mongol invasion of Baghdad in 1258) and sanctioning violence against them should be discredited by the forum with quotes from the Qur’an and the Prophet Muhammad that urge unity among the ummah (the Muslim nation).

The ulema, the real “power-brokers” in Iraq, have a vital role to play -- their authority and influence among the populace far exceeds that of the government. Had it not been for the efforts of spiritual leader, Ayatollah Sistani, Iraq would have descended into civil war a long time ago. Despite repeated provocations from Sunni militias he has urged restraint among his followers.

The Mecca meeting and the resulting declaration should be widely publicised in Friday sermons, and media outlets in Iraq should use it as an opportunity to initiate nationwide dialogues between moderate Shiite and Sunni ulema.

The OIC should also coordinate with former Iranian president, Mohammad Khatami, who heads the International Center for Dialogue based in Geneva. OIC member states and Western donors should provide funding to the Center and sponsor Shia-Sunni peace camps for Iraqi students following the Seeds of Peace model. Conflict resolution practitioners from the United States and Europe should be invited to conduct peace workshops where young Iraqis are taught non-adversarial means to address conflict and given the opportunity to deconstruct the dehumanising stereotypes they have developed for each other.

The Mecca Document should also form the basis of addressing the larger theological divide between the two sects.

Historically, theologians have made attempts at reconciliation. The most prominent initiative took place in Cairo in 1946 with the formation of Jamat al Taqrib (The Group of Rapprochement). The group aimed to unify the various schools of Islamic thought and to legitimize the Shiite legal code as a separate school of jurisprudence. In 1959, Mohammad Shaltut, the head of the renowned Islamic University of Al-Azhar recognised Twelver Shiism as a separate school and passed a fatwa endorsing it. The Jamat al Taqrib, however, eventually came under attack by Sunni extremist groups and ended in 1972. The OIC should attempt to revive the process by establishing a new generation of theologians committed to the same goal in Iraq and elsewhere in the Muslim world.

Development organisations in Iraq can also serve to mitigate sectarian strife. Muslim groups such as Islamic Relief and Muslim Aid should institute joint development programmess for Shiites and Sunnis, disbursing additional funds to communities where the two sects agree to work together. Whether formulating public works programmes or small income generation projects, the underlying principle during implementation should be the inclusion of both sects.

Western involvement with these initiatives must come in the form of security assistance. Coalition forces in Iraq have a critical role in extending protection to the various peace initiatives mentioned above. Development organizations, media outlets and other civil society actors have repeatedly been targeted and need protection to function effectively. Coalition troops should therefore provide additional security to these civil society actors so as to increase the former’s credibility and popularity among the local population.

Western governments should also publicly laud the civil society effort to end sectarian conflict in Iraq and pledge their support through a donor’s conference. Since civil society initiatives cost relatively little, Western governments should have no trouble coming up with the required funds while at the same time greatly improving their image among ordinary Iraqis and the wider Muslim world.

All eyes are on Prime Minister Nour Al Maliki’s peace plan to unite sectarian political parties in his government. In order for the plan to find popular acceptance, it must be supplemented with simultaneous peace initiatives at the grassroots level. An effective strategy consisting of Western groups and Islamic civil society actors could go a long way toward developing the next generation of Iraqis who will be able to resist the incendiary behaviour of extremist political and religious groups.

* Mehlaqa Samdani is a free-lance writer based in Pittsfield, Massachusetts. This article is distributed by the Common Ground News Service (CGNews) and can be accessed at www.commongroundnews.org.