India's presence in Afghanistan: What it means for Pakistan

The News, June 8, 2006
India's presence in Afghanistan
Rahimullah Yusufzai

The writer is an executive editor of The News International based in Peshawar

The recent abduction and beheading of Indian telecommunication engineer K Suryanarayana in Afghanistan has highlighted the brutal nature of the Afghan conflict. It also showed the violent Taliban opposition to India due to the latter's support for President Hamid Karzai's government and the presence of US-led foreign forces in the war-ravaged country.

Aware of Pakistan's concern over growing Indian influence in Afghanistan, it was obvious that India would soon cry foul and find a Pakistani hand in Suryanayarana's abduction and beheading in Zabul province. Before long, the Indian media had seized on an unsubstantiated story by the private Afghan TV channel, Tolo, to claim Pakistan Army's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was involved in Suryanarayana's murder. For the second time in the recent past, Tolo had interviewed a turbaned Afghan after introducing him as a Taliban spokesman and prompted him to declare that the ISI had overruled Taliban objections and ordered the execution of the kidnapped Indian engineer. The Taliban promptly denied that any of their three spokesmen had granted an interview to the channel and termed the man who was interviewed as an impostor.

The incident showed the limits of the propaganda war waged by adversaries wanting to harm each other. Until now, India saw Pakistani involvement in every act of terror on its soil and in Jammu & Kashmir. Now it has added Afghanistan to the list. Islamabad, on the other hand, is convinced that India has ganged up with anti-Pakistan elements in the Afghan government to use Afghanistan as a launching pad for subversive activities in Pakistan, particularly in Baluchistan and Waziristan.

It was intriguing that engineer Suryanarayana was driving on the newly-built highway from Kabul to Kandahar via Zabul with no security guards. Only his Afghan driver gave him company in one of the most dangerous stretches of territory in Afghanistan. One misstep in Taliban stronghold of Zabul and the chances are that a foreigner, or even an Afghan supporter of President Karzai, would be kidnapped or killed. There have been scores of such incidents and the southern province remains the hotbed of insurgency despite a number of security operations by the US-led coalition forces and the Afghan National Army.

Taliban gunmen waiting in ambush spotted their prey and intercepted the vehicle carrying the Indian and Afghan nationals. It is possible that the two had been followed or intelligence was passed on to the waiting Taliban about them. Taliban fighters and sympathisers are everywhere from Kabul to Ghazni and Zabul and onwards in Kandahar, Helmand, Nimruz, Farah and Herat. Realising the threat, the US has finally prevailed on Nato to provide more than 6,000 troops to cope with the increased Taliban attacks, make the area secure, and extend the writ of the embattled Afghan government. Britain, Canada and the Netherlands have reluctantly agreed to make available the extra soldiers for deployment in Kandahar, Urozgan and Helmand provinces.

Suryanayarana was seized and abducted near Hasan Karez village in Zabul's Shahjui district. Shahjui is the hometown of newly elected member of parliament Abdul Salam Rocketi, a former mujahideen and Taliban military commander who is one of the few Taliban leaders to have defected the movement and announced support for President Hamid Karzai's government. Even Rocketi, who got his name due to his expertise in firing RPG-7 rockets and destroying tanks and armoured vehicle carriers, couldn't do anything to prevent the abduction and killing of the Indian engineer. Such is the fear of the Taliban in these parts that nobody wants to risk his life by taking them on.

According to the Taliban, Suryanarayana was killed while trying to escape. He was beheaded. The Taliban first denied and later admitted that their fighters beheaded him in a fit of anger. His body was found not far from where he was abducted in the same Hasan Karez area. It meant that he was kept nearby. This proved that the claims by Afghan government authorities including the Zabul Governor that a big security operation had been launched to sweep the area and recover the two kidnapped men were just lies. Nothing of the sort happened. In fact, no real effort had gone into establishing contact with the Taliban.

No doubt this time the Indian government had shown urgency compared with its slow reaction in similar situations in the past. Its ministry of external affairs had expressed its willingness to negotiate the release of Suryanarayana on humanitarian grounds and rushed a three-member delegation for the purpose to Afghanistan. Though no headway had been made for establishing contact with the Taliban, there was hope that something good would come out of the effort by using tribal elders in Zabul as intermediaries or requesting independent persons familiar with Taliban to negotiate the terms for securing Suryanarayana's freedom. Unlike the previous occasions when India left it to the Afghan government to secure the release of its kidnapped nationals, this time New Delhi was determined to explore every means to save the Indian engineer's life. However, all these efforts proved inadequate in the end when Suryanarayana was killed before the Taliban deadline.

In return for Suryanarayana's release, the Taliban wanted an Indian government announcement to close down its embassy in Kabul and consulates in a number of provincial capitals, pullout of all Indians working in Afghanistan and stoppage of work on projects undertaken by Indian firms. A 24-hour deadline was also given along with the threat that failure to accept the demands would result in Suryanarayana's killing. The demands were far too many and the deadline was impossible to meet.

A dead Suryanarayana, who belonged to Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh, was of no use to the Taliban, who were hoping to win acceptance of one or two of their demands had the Indian engineer been alive. Indian foreign secretary Shyam Saran termed it a premeditated killing that took place even before the arrival of his country's negotiating team in Kabul. Terming the Taliban demand that all Indians leave Afghanistan within 24 hours as outrageous, he argued that it testified to the real motivation behind the act of terror. His reference to the sponsors of the Taliban was taken as a veiled reference to Pakistan, which was one of their biggest supporters prior to 9/11. Although Pakistan has distanced itself from the Taliban and has captured and delivered a number of their leaders and fighters to the US and Afghanistan, it continues to attract flak on account of its past policies. Islamabad's public concern over the growing Indian influence in Afghanistan and its allegation that New Delhi was using its embassies and consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad to fuel insurgency in Balochistan and Waziristan is nowadays mentioned as evidence that Pakistan would be happy if the Indians were forced to pack up and leave.

Suryanarayana's death earned a bad name for the Taliban and contributed to their reputation of being an extremist and ultra-conservative group given to violent ways. Six months ago in November 2005, they had kidnapped and killed another Indian national, Maniappan Raman Kutty, who worked as a driver in the southwestern Nimruz province with the Border Roads Organisation on the Indian-funded Delaram-Zaranj road linking southwestern Afghanistan with the Iranian seaport Chahbahar. On that occasion, the Taliban had complained that nobody in the Indian or Afghan government contacted them for his release and, therefore, were forced to kill him on the expiry of quite a few deadlines. Twice before that, the Taliban had abducted Indian workers and freed them after reportedly striking a deal with the Afghan government to secure release of Taliban fighters held by Kabul.

With the Taliban attacks on the rise, there is every possibility of further abductions of Indian workers in Afghanistan. India has sought the Afghan government's permission to deploy a contingent of Central Reserve Police Force in Afghanistan to protect the 2,500 Indians working on reconstruction and development projects mostly funded by New Delhi. Then there are Indians who like Suryanarayana are employed by the Bahrain-based al-Muet company, working with non-Indian firms. There are already 200 personnel of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police providing security to Indians working on India-aided projects in Afghanistan. Careful of Pakistani sensitivities and eager not to look weak, the Karzai government has until now delayed decision on the Indian request. Islamabad would not approve of the move, more so on account of reports in the Pakistani press that India would be deploying army commandoes near Pakistan's borders in Afghanistan.

It is obvious that the issue is complex and fraught with risks. Many Afghans say India and Pakistan were fighting a proxy war in their war-ravaged country. Supporters of the Karzai government don't like Pakistani criticism of their warm relations with India. The Taliban, on the other hand, consider India an enemy for supporting and strengthening the Afghan government and backing the presence of US-led foreign forces in Afghanistan. Pakistan would be happy if the Taliban continue to harass the Indians in Afghanistan though it doesn't want and cannot oppose the Karzai government due to American pressure. The US and Nato troops want to stay in Afghanistan for several years and their presence has fuelled fierce resistance by Islamic militant groups ranging from al-Qaeda to Taliban to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami. In the circumstances, we should expect more such incidents that would destabilise an already unstable region.
Email: bbc@pes.comsats.net.pk

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi getting back into action: Who is responsible?

Daily Times, June 8, 2006
‘LJ getting into action again’:Interior Ministry orders police to protect Shias
By Shahzad Malik

ISLAMABAD: The Interior Ministry has directed the police chiefs of the four provinces, Islamabad and Northern Areas to provide security to prominent Shia leaders and imambargahs.

The ministry issued the directive after intelligence agencies reported that activists of banned organisation the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ) were planning to kill Shia leaders. The LJ has been declared a terrorist organisation by the Pakistan government and the United States.

The National Crisis Management Cell of the Interior Ministry revealed that Abu Khabab, an Egyptian activist of Al Qaeda and an expert in bomb-making, had promised to assist LJ attacks on Shia targets in the country.

A report filed by the intelligence agencies to the ministry said the LJ activists Abdullah of Vehari, Moavia Bhai of Hangu, Saifullaha Abbasi of Abbottabad and Shoaib Khan of Peshawar had formed a gang and were planning attacks on the Shia community.

It said the gang had listed Shia leaders residing in Gilgit and worship places, including Jamiatul Muntazir in Lahore and imambargas in Binori Town and Rizvia Society in Karachi. The report said the gang had been preparing an attack and could trigger sectarian violence any time in the near future.

The ministry directed the authorities concerned to take special measures to protect imambargahs, mourning congregations and Zuljinah processions.

The Dangers From Within: An insightful analysis from Tariq Rahman

Dawn, June 6, 2006
The dangers from within
By Dr Tariq Rahman

PAKISTAN faces many dangers from within and without. This discussion looks at the former. There are three broad categories of dangers from within: ethnic conflict, class conflict and ideological conflict.

Let us take them one by one. Pakistan is a multilingual state. In such a state, it is possible to consolidate a group identity in terms of one’s language. As language is one component of culture, such an identity also takes into account cultural elements.

The Bengalis were the first to forge such an identity during the language movements of 1948 and 1952. The Sindhi nationalists did the same but with less strength and success in January 1970 and July 1972. Other groups, such as the Pakhtuns and the Seraikis, also used their respective languages to express separate identities. The reaction of the Pakistani state and the Punjabi-Mohajir elite of the 1950s and the 1960s to such expressions of identity was to declare these as old-fashioned ‘provincialism’.

The fact, however, is that ethnic identity — whether based on language, religion, common experience or some other distinctive perception — is deployed under modern conditions. Identity politics comes into play when different groups compete for jobs, admissions in educational institutions, development funds, powerful positions in the state structure and other goods and services.

It requires modern communications to disseminate the symbols of group identity, to create group solidarity and to organise protests and lobby the state. Pre-modern societies are tied to local economies and they think in terms of tribes, sub-tribes, clans, fraternities (biradaris) and families or in terms of occupational identities (weaver, potter, serf etc) rather than in terms of large identity groups.

Thus, the Pakistani elite dismissed the claims of ethnic leaders during the fifties and sixties as old-fashioned, backward-looking ‘provincialism’. They also used conspiracy theories to portray the ethnic leaders in a bad light. The favourite charge of the establishment was that ethnic movements were inspired by communists and foreign agents. While leftists favoured emancipation and some foreign powers did extend help to certain ethnic leaders, the left was actually weak and disorganised and foreign help did not amount to much. In the last analysis, the movements were as strong as their local supporters. And local support was driven by common grievances.

Ethnic movements are sustained by grievances. Thus, making symbolic concessions does not weaken them. Bengali was made one of the national languages of Pakistan but that did not weaken Bengali nationalism because the grievances did not go away. On the other hand, when Pashto speakers got a greater share in goods and services — through recruitment in the military and bureaucracy, work in the Gulf states, driving, manual labour, trade and smuggling — they abandoned all ideas of an independent Pakhtunistan and started talking about using the name for their province.

Thus, if we analyse the present dangers to the state in Balochistan, we must approach the problem through the grievances of the Baloch. These grievances are based on the distribution of resources, demographic balance and exercising power in the province. The fact is that natural gas is not available as easily to the Baloch as it is to people in Punjab.

The new port of Gwadar promises new jobs, plots of land, urban assets and a new home to the non-Baloch but to the Baloch it is tantamount to taking away a part of their land from them. Moreover, the Baloch feel overwhelmed anyway in their province because of the large Pakhtun presence and the cities being open to settlers. Now the Gwadar port is likely to be mostly non- Baloch.

As regards power, the Baloch are painfully aware that the army exercises the real power. As the army lives in cantonments which are like oases — completely different from Baloch cities and villages — they perceive these cantonments almost as colonial outposts. That is why they oppose them. During my own research on language politics in 1994 in Quetta and Mastung, when the area was quiet, I noticed that everybody resented the way people were stopped and searched in the cantonment. The club in the cantonment, whose facilities were excellent compared to those in the city, was closed even to university faculty. The Baloch considered this deeply insulting. The bitterness must have increased now.

In Sindh, too, the issue of ethnicity is a ticking time bomb. The province is virtually divided between the Urdu-speaking urban areas which support the MQM and the Sindhi-speaking people who look to various nationalist groups for leadership. Both resent the centre’s pocketing of revenues from the sale of cotton and those from the port and city of Karachi. But both have an inbuilt rivalry also. The potential for destabilisation is there and only by realising this can a solution be found.

Class conflict is possible because the rich are getting richer and the poor poorer. Moreover, the electronic media depicts a high quality of life which must be frustrating for most viewers. At the same time, because of privatisation and the withdrawal of subsidies, the state is no longer pushed about providing essential services to the people. Then, the judicial system is so weak that people do not believe they will ever get justice.

Under these circumstances, it is not unusual for people to take to rioting. This conflict can be expressed through the idiom of Islam but the young men used as cannon fodder, are driven by hunger and a sense of vengeance no matter what emotive slogans they use and what they profess to believe in.

Ideological conflict relates to the polarisation of views between the religious lobby and the secularists. Up to now the ruling elite, above all the military, had used the religious lobby to further its own interests, suppress pro-democracy secularists, fight for Kashmir and frighten the West into supporting strong men (mostly military) at the centre. But the religious lobby may become too powerful to be controlled.

After 9/11, the ruling elite is itself deeply divided. Part of it genuinely wants to reverse the policies of the Ziaul Haq era but there are some among it who still want to see a continuation of these. Thus the religious lobby retains its street power and can bring about civil conflict to counter secular forces. This can be really dangerous. Pakistan has survived many undemocratic interludes because even military governments have used the name of democracy to govern the country. The religious lobby may not use this fig leaf at all. And if this happens, we will be sent hurtling back into the dark ages.

Such are the internal dangers to Pakistan. Only seeing them for what they are can make us resolve them.

A hardliner's approach which also needs to be heard

Emerging threat from US-India nexus
By Shireen M Mazari
The News, June 7, 2006

The US may claim that it has de-linked its relationship with India from that with Pakistan, but ironically, its policies relating to India now impact Pakistan's security concerns as never before and US government representatives continue to identify common security issues for Pakistan and India. In the context of the former, much has already been written in this column earlier on the direct security threat that the US-India nuclear deal poses to Pakistan, which will provide safeguarded US nuclear fuel for India's civil reactors and thereby liberate a large quantity of un-safeguarded Indian fissile material from these reactors. This can now be diverted to weapons production, allowing India to stockpile a vast nuclear arsenal.

In the context of the US constantly linking Pakistan and India in terms of regional security policies, we have now seen General Peter Pace, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, during a visit to New Delhi, urging Pakistan and India to work together to fight the Taliban. What was General Pace implying, given that India shares no border with Afghanistan and the highly questionable presence of Indian forces in Afghanistan is already a source of a security threat for Pakistan? Does he actually seek a more enlarged Indian military presence in Afghanistan? If so, is he truly unaware of the security dilemma and threat that would pose to Pakistan?

He also indulged Indian commanders as they apparently briefed him on New Delhi's concerns regarding Pakistan's Afghan policy. Now why should Pakistan's Afghan policy be a source of concern for India? Do we voice our concerns, of which there are many, to the US regarding India's Nepal policy, especially in the historical context of India's territorial expansion in the neighbourhood? And are we to actually believe General Pace's naiveté when he remarked that the Indians brought to his attention, "that the Taliban has sanctuaries in Pakistan"? Or was he actually using the Indians to voice his own accusations? Interestingly, while he declared that "Pakistan's President Musharraf is fighting hard to clear those territories" (that is, the so-called sanctuaries), the Pakistan army and state's efforts in this fight against terrorism was totally ignored.

This has been a common trait in US statements regarding Pakistan's massive contribution to the war against terror in the region. The state's role is barely mentioned and an attempt is always made to de-link the president from the state -- which seems to be an effort to undermine the state of Pakistan by insinuating that the state may not be fully supportive of the president's anti-terrorist commitment. This does no service either to Pakistan, which continues to sacrifice its own citizens in the fight against terrorism, or to the president in terms of his relationship to the state and society.

Clearly what we are seeing is a heightened arrogance on the part of the US with scant regard for the sensitivities of its allies. This is especially true in the context of Pakistan, whose nationals are often referred to as "Paks" in public remarks by US officials, including retired generals. Because we choose to be too accepting of all that is dished out to us, I suppose we are naturally prime targets of the prevailing American arrogance. But this arrogance is far more widespread. The US has only recently declared that the driver of the US truck that rammed into civilian traffic in Kabul, killing and injuring a number of Afghans, cannot be prosecuted in Afghanistan because of an agreement between the US and the Afghan government. So effectively US forces can act with impunity in Afghanistan.

Not that the US is concerned particularly with international norms and laws presently -- especially in terms of its soldiers and the treatment they mete out to their prisoners. According to a Los Angeles Times report of June 5, new policies on prisoners being drawn up by the Pentagon will leave out a key provision of the Geneva Convention that specifically bans "humiliating and degrading treatment". Given the level of abuse that prisoners in Iraq and Guantanamo Bay are already being subjected to, this action will only give a covert face to what is already a reality. For those in Pakistan, this arrogance becomes a direct issue of concern because one is increasingly seeing it being reflected in the Indian leadership's statements towards Pakistan and their approach to the bilateral dialogue -- especially the issues of conflict that show no sign of moving towards resolution. While the Indians have been exceptionally clever in creating a myth about their willingness to dialogue on all issues with Pakistan, while focusing primarily on atmospherics and trade, the reality of India's inability and unwillingness to dialogue on the conflictual issues in a substantive manner occasionally surfaces in bizarre ways that belie claims of the growing civil society interaction at all levels between Pakistanis and Indians.

A recent example of this was the issue of participation by Pakistani students from elite schools in a seminar/workshop on Kashmir in Pune, India. The project was part of the Initiative for Peace undertaken by the United World College, Hong Kong, over the last few years. This year the focus was on Kashmir and, as usual, Pakistan's elite schools chose their students who worked hard on learning about the Kashmir issue and dutifully sent their passports to the Indian High Commission in Islamabad. Close to the time of the planned departure, and after a period of almost three weeks, the Indian High Commission informed the students that their visa forms had been misplaced. Despite hastily re-filling these forms and despite a supposed intervention on the part of the High Commissioner himself, the students could not make it to Pune so the meeting on Kashmir went ahead without the main Pakistani participation.

Now what were Indian fears regarding Kashmir? Would they have been put in an awkward position if the Pakistanis had reiterated President Musharraf's proactive proposals on Kashmir and asked why there had been no Indian response? Or were they expecting embarrassment on their human rights abuses for almost over two decades in occupied Kashmir? Whatever the case, India's hard line approach towards political issues, and the rigidity of its Kashmir policy, do get exposed occasionally. And we should learn from these brief revelations of India's real intent on bilateral conflicts and its arrogant efforts to shift the focus to atmospherics and platitudes even as it seeks to undermine Pakistan at multiple levels internationally -- be it in misrepresentations to third parties or in efforts to seek intervention indirectly within Pakistan's internal dynamics under cover of the war on terror. It is in this context that Pakistan needs to be wary of the emerging US-India strategic nexus, both in terms of form and content.

The writer is director general of the Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad. Email: smnews80@hotmail.com

Thoughts on Pakistan's Nuclear Issue

The News, June 6, 2006
Doing our homework on the nuclear issue
Nasim Zehra

In an unequivocally "united" move Pakistan's key political parties, cutting across deep divides, passed a resolution on A Q Khan and the country's nuclear programme. The resolution categorically stated that "Pakistan's nuclear programme is vital to our defence and is not directed against anyone. Pakistan is a responsible nuclear state and is fully cognisant of its responsibilities in international politics," and that Pakistani scientists "enjoy the respect and appreciation of all Pakistanis, and our nation is indebted to them for the remarkable progress that our country has made in the field of nuclear technology, weapons development and energy security." The resolution also ruled out the handing over of Mr Khan to the United States.

While the points raised in the resolution have been regularly reiterated by different members of the Pakistani government, ranging from the president to the foreign minister and the bureaucrats, this resolution holds special significance. One, because of its timing. It has come as a direct response to the May 25 hearing of the US Congressional Sub-committee on Terrorism and Nuclear Non-Proliferation on the A Q Khan case. The committee basically concluded that Pakistan was the most dangerous country for its proliferation activities.

Two, the Senate resolution is a bipartisan, direct and comprehensive response to the attempted pressure by Washington on the Pakistani government regarding the A Q Khan case, proliferation and the nuclear command and control system for Pakistan's nuclear programme. Three, this is perhaps the clearest and most unambiguous articulation of Pakistan's response to the repeated demand made by different sections of the United States' policy-making community and by the IAEA that Pakistan's lead scientist be handed over to the IAEA, or that the IAEA and US officials be given direct access to A Q Khan. Four, the assertion comes at the time of intense US pressure on Iran. Unlike the diplomatic exchanges, it is a clear assertion and communication of Pakistan's sovereign right to responsibly develop and manage its nuclear programme.

While the hearing was based on evidence that was both dated and insufficient, it will be a tool that various lobbies opposed to Pakistan's nuclear programme will use. For example, in addition to the testimony a few think-tanks in Washington have also organised simulation exercises premised on the possibility of Pakistan's nuclear programme falling into the hands of "extremists." On May 17 the article, "Choosing among bad options: The Pakistani 'loose nukes' conundrum," by Thomas Donnelly, was posted on the American Enterprise Institute's web publication, National Security Outlook.

Significantly the Pakistan embassy in Washington also met with senior State Department officials and raised the issue of the May 25 testimony. The State department has opted to duck the matter with not a single official showing up at the hearing. The chairman of the sub-committee complained at least three times during the hearing that the State Department had been invited to make its own case on Pakistan and the A Q network. If there was a method to this madness, it remains unclear. However, since the State Department made a clear choice to not present any facts presenting Pakistan's case to the committee, many have wondered if the hearing was "orchestrated" to put pressure on Pakistan.

Clearly, Pakistan is in this alone. The Bush administration, currently seeking Congressional support for the Indo-US nuclear deal, is keen to strengthen its non-proliferation credentials to counter the non-proliferation critics of the deal. Hence, at this point, especially, there will be no support forthcoming for Pakistan. Otherwise too, Pakistan's nuclear programme and the A Q Khan affair remain an issue of ongoing divergence between Washington and Islamabad. Pakistan's own political instability and more importantly the A Q Khan affair obviously put Pakistan in the dock. So has the broad strategic conclusion in Washington that nuclear weapons in the hands of a Muslim state are unacceptable.

The question is really about Pakistan's own ability to project Islamabad's policies and actions on the A. Q Khan case and its nuclear programme. The Senate resolution was a necessary political statement spelling out Pakistan's bottom line on these issues. However, Pakistan has not opted for the transparency required to project the substance of the major steps it has taken to safeguard its own nuclear programme and nuclear arsenal and also to promote international nuclear non-proliferation. These include:

(i) An on-going dialogue on safety and security of nuclear/strategic facilities and assets; (ii) creation of a tight command-and-control structure over Pakistan's nuclear assets; (iii) cooperation with the IAEA and the US on the Iranian nuclear issue; (iv) cooperation, through specific steps, in dismantling the proliferation network involving A Q Khan; (v) adoption of export control legislation and regulations reflecting the highest standards (such as NSG, MTCR, Australia Group) -- even without reciprocal benefits.

These steps have been taken without compromising state-controlled tight security and the secrecy of Pakistan's own nuclear programme. Many have been taken with technical support from the US. Despite Pakistan's sensitivity regarding external infringement in the nuclear-strategic area, the US has been able to secure several important advances in Pakistan's cooperation on these issues, but ones that both sides remain quite about.

Pakistan needs to publicly articulate these steps. It needs to reiterate its commitment to a comprehensively and fairly worked-out fissile fuel cut-off treaty. Similarly Pakistan needs to reiterate its commitment to signing the CTBT as part of a broad South Asian nuclear restraint regime that Islamabad first proposed in 1998. Islamabad also needs to publicly reiterate its earlier proposal that Pakistan and India discuss ways to strengthen non-proliferation and promote strategic stability.

The onus is also on Islamabad to be seen as an active player on the world scene promoting non-proliferation, while safeguarding its own security-driven nuclear programme. In addition to making a categorical statement, as has been made by the government and now by the politicians, projecting Pakistan's operational policy on non-proliferation would be an effective response. This approach would also help to create a context within which real Pakistan's cooperation with the US and other members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group can take place.

Pakistan needs to be proactive, imaginative and bold. Maybe parliament, and especially the Senate's Foreign Affairs Committee, should work out a strategy to proactively promote and project Pakistan as a responsible nuclear state. Part of the pressure that Pakistan faces can be treated by removing the disconnect between Pakistan's policy content and the articulation plus projection of policy. Also, the Senate's multi-party committee may be the appropriate platform from where the initiative should be taken to drain out populism from public discourse on national security. Often state institutions and the political parties have been responsible for reducing debate on national security issues like the nuclear programme to mere point-scoring battles. A matter-of-fact and well-informed debate means that the people of Pakistan are not reduced to thinking that taking steps to better manage our own nuclear programme and to become a responsible nuclear state within the international community amounts to "selling" or compromising Pakistan's nuclear programme; a fear that has been responsible for the government's decision to not be more open about the steps taken to safeguard our nuclear programme and to promote non-proliferation.

The writer is an Islamabad-based security analyst and adjunct professor at SAIS Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC. Email: nasimzehra@hotmail.com

Rentier states of the Muslim world

Daily Times, June 6, 2006
Daily Times - Site Edition Tuesday, June 06, 2006
COMMENT: Rentier states of the Muslim world —Ishtiaq Ahmed

A rentier is an individual whose income is derived from the free gifts of nature such as land. He lets others use the land or any other such free gift of nature in exchange for rent. His own investment is nil and he retains overall ownership. In political science and international relations a rentier state is one which derives all or a substantial portion of its national revenues from indigenous natural resources that are rented to external clients who work on it and produce an income.

In most states national wealth is the product of multifarious activities performed by private entrepreneurs, traders, middlemen and workers. As a result raw materials or natural objects are converted into objects that have both use value and exchange value. Major portions of the population are involved, directly or indirectly, in the production process. The state collects revenues through taxes and levies imposed on such commodities and services.

In contrast, in a rentier state the gifts of nature — usually one or two items, which are valued highly in the international market — suffice to provide a huge income. The production process involves foreign investors and a foreign work force. The local population is alienated from the production activity. Therefore the income of the state is not derived from infrastructural output or risks taking in the market.

I am sure that by now this discussion on the concept of a rentier state must sound familiar. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the Arab Emirates are classic examples of the rentier state. Control of the rent-producing resources lies with the ruling families and their associates. The rest of the indigenous population is denied political freedoms, but guaranteed economic advantage and welfare facilities. This bribery of sorts is calculated to keep them politically passive.

These countries employ people from all over the world. Highly skilled Western employees draw handsome salaries while people with the same qualifications from Third World countries are paid much less for the same job and skills. The worst off is the semi-skilled and unskilled work force from the Third World. They are denied the right to organise and unionise to protect their interests.

Consequently a democratic civil society that can express, promote and protect the opinions and interests of the indigenous as well as foreign populations does not exist. In fact the ruling class ensures that the local population and the foreign work force do not develop common interests.

However, the rentier states are not completely insulated from the rest of the world. Events elsewhere affect them too. In recent years the local Shia communities and even Sunni citizens of these states have been agitating for political reforms. Cases of female domestic servants being molested and raped are reported all the time. Several strikes and agitation have been reported recently. The states have dealt with workers’ unrest by firing and deporting them. Such threats coerce most of them to continue working for low wages and under very harsh conditions.

This is all the more disgraceful because for quite some time now all international media carry advertisements inviting investors to buy apartments in Dubai. I am sure the trend will also emerge in the other Persian Gulf states. The advertisements only represent glitter and glamour. We know that celebrities like Michael Jackson have moved to Dubai and others are likely to follow.

In the Western world permanently domiciled immigrants are granted citizenship after a few years but it is impossible for the foreign labour force, which includes a very large number of Muslims, to obtain the citizenship of the rentier Arab states. They have small indigenous populations which makes them particularly wary of granting citizenship to foreigners. However, they are not hesitant to sell property to rich foreigners. Thus the rentier states are fully co-opted into global capitalism as free zones for the movement of capital and rich people.

Casual visitors to the airports in the Emirates and the other smaller states are dazzled by the grand variety of consumer goods on sale. I wonder if the rich ever ponder over the fact that the super-modern buildings and seven-star hotels that they own or live in are the product of the ruthless exploitation of the poor. This is after all the era when human rights are supposed to be part of the customary law so that these states too must respect them.

Saudi Arabia with its rigid Wahhabi ideology and totalitarian system has not liberalised its lifestyle in the same fashion as Dubai, Sharjah and other Emirates. There are no golf courses or luxurious sea resorts for the entertainment of global fun-seekers though it is perceived as the major rentier state in the Arab world. It is seen to violate more human rights than any other Arab rentier state.

Iran is a different type of rentier state. Originally its wealth from oil was the product of the technological and infrastructural input of British petroleum companies. However after the 1979 revolution, foreign oil firms lost their privileges. Also because of its own very large labour force Iran could not possibly employ Third World workers on a large scale. Shiites from Pakistan, Afghanistan and India do find openings in Iran, but by and large the labour force is domestic.

Before the revolution, the Shah and his close associates enjoyed a monopoly over power and the rents from oil. After 1979, this fell into the hands of the Shia clerics. The latter continued with the tradition of authoritarian government despite the popular mass base of the revolution. Even when representative institutions were introduced the supremacy of the clergy was maintained and the scope for democratic civil society virtually scuttled. This is all the more tragic because industrialisation had been going on under the Shah and there existed an educated and qualified professional class that could have taken Iran forward on the road to economic prosperity and development.

Under the circumstances, the rentier states of the Muslim world are either consumer and entertainers’ paradises or bastions of reactionary Islam.

The author is an associate professor of political science at Stockholm University. He is the author of two books. His email address is Ishtiaq.Ahmed@statsvet.su.se

Hats off to Amir Mir: "pen is mightier than the gun"

The pen is mightier than the gun
By Amir Mir

“The APNS award in the category of the Best Investigative Report goes to Mr. Amir Mir of Monthly Herald. But the award cannot be given to him right now and the president of the All Pakistan Newspapers Society (APNS) would honour Amir Mir once the award distribution ceremony is over,” declared the senior vice president of the APNS who was conducting the annual award distribution ceremony in Islamabad on May 26, 2006. In the audience was present the chief guest of the function — General Pervez Musharraf, in his capacity as the President of Pakistan.

The announcement surprised me. Here I was sitting in the hall of a five-star hotel, waiting to receive the prestigious souvenir for which I had travelled all the way from Lahore. Yet, I must confess, I had prepared myself for any eventuality — the very presence of General Musharraf prompts such caution. The script for the ceremony was supposed to be a trifle different. Let me explain: a little before the ceremony began, at the time of entering the hall, I had handed over a letter to the APNS President.

The letter expressed, in as polite words as possible, my inability to receive the award “from a military dictator — General Pervez Musharraf — who has trampled the Constitution time and again since his military takeover in October 1999 and has no respect for the supreme law of the land.” Ask yourself: can you receive an award for best investigative report from a man who doesn’t believe in freedom of expression and can’t tolerate opinions different from his? Mockery, too, must have its limits.

My letter to the APNS president said, “Journalism is a sacred profession, whose foundation lies on freedom of expression. But on the contrary, the APNS has invited a military dictator as chief guest for the distribution of awards, who has no respect for the basic principle of press freedom. Being a military dictator, he neither believes in freedom of expression nor tolerates difference of opinion. Therefore, although honoured much by the APNS, my receiving the award from a military dictator would be a stain on the worthy souvenir.”

At the same time, I made it clear in my letter that I do not want to relinquish the opportunity to receive my award, and that also without creating any fuss in the ceremony. I therefore asked the APNS president to ensure that during the award distribution ceremony, I am given my award either by him or by any other senior journalist. But hardly had I handed over the letter to the APNS president, a war of words ensued. The APNS was unwilling, for innumerable reasons, to spoil the ceremony or annoy the man who was both the Chief of the Army Staff and the President of Pakistan.

My repudiation to shake hands with the General on stage was based on a broad perimeter rather than any personal reason: the chief guest of the APNS ceremony undoubtedly adhered to the top echelons in both the fundamental departments, the army and the politics – in his capacity as the Army chief as well as the president. I do not know what Musharraf loves. But he is not particularly fond of the Constitution.

The General staged a coup in October 1999, following then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s decision to invoke his constitutional powers to remove him from the coveted slot of the Army chief. He had himself elected as president through a farcical referendum, sweeping aside the constitutional requirement of election by parliament. This is despite the fact that anyone violating the 1973 Constitution is to be tried for treason charges under Article 6 of the supreme law of the land. This was my dilemma: do you shake hands and receive a souvenir from such a man?

Adherence to democratic principles has been my inheritance. My father, Prof. Waris Mir, was a fiery journalist who adopted a defiant posture against General Ziaul Haq, another president in uniform. He died at the age of 48 years because of the pressure, and ensuing mental torture, inflicted on him by the Zia regime. You cannot let your father down, can you?

As the APNS office-bearers tried to persuade me to receive the award from Musharraf, I told them I could not revert from my stance as my father had taught me that “Truth is superior to national interest” since the former is static, while the latter keeps changing with the change of rulers. However, the worthy APNS maintained that either I agree to receive the award from General Musharraf or return home empty-handed. Believing a compromise violated my father’s memory, I refused to rescind my position.

The general arrived in a dinner suit, surrounded by commandos. The APNS President made the opening speech, commending the government for providing a breathing space to TV channels but holding it guilty for stifling the print media. He said that because of the government pressure, most newspapers have adopted the policy of self-censorship and reporters are reluctant to file stories based on truth. His speech kindled the hope in me of not returning empty-handed from the ceremony.

It was now the General’s turn to speak. He claimed he had liberally “granted” freedom of expression and speech to journalists, even to those overstepping their limits and hurting the national interest. Freedom of expression, overstepping limits and national interest are sweet words, conveying noble sentiments. Yet they take on quite another meaning when you are removed from the post of editor, as I was from the Weekly Independent in June 2003, under the establishment’s pressure. My crime? I used to, as I still do, write bitter truth. That is enough for the establishment to label you as an anti-state element working for the enemy country.

With this label, I joined the Monthly Herald of Dawn Group of Newspapers and continued writing with the same professional zeal as ever, hence further substantiating my image of being ‘anti-state’. And I had to pay the price. In November 2003, my car was set on fire in Lahore right in front of my residence. My crime? I had authored a book, The True Face of Jehadis, which is a combination of information and analyses of the post-9/11 state of the jihad and the jihadi groups in Pakistan and their hidden and known links with intelligence agencies.

The findings of the US State Department’s Annual Report for the year 2003 in the Human Rights section had pointed out that the day the car was set ablaze, the head of the state was in Lahore, my city of residence. Even otherwise, a couple of days before the incident, while addressing an iftar dinner of newspaper editors in Islamabad, the all- powerful head of the state was quoted by the media as saying that Amir Mir of the Monthly Herald is an ‘Indian agent’ who is bent upon playing havoc with the national interest. Yet I could not refract from my vision of the relationship between the ‘truth’ and the ‘national interest’.

Eventually, the defenders of the national interest were successful in convincing the owners of the Monthly Hereld that I am an ‘anti-state element’ so the sooner they get rid of me the better. And so they did by making me quit. Look at the delicious irony: the General was supposed to award me for an investigative report I had done for the Monthly Herald before my ouster. The story for which I was to be awarded, said that in a bid to control terrorism, the Musharraf regime has given carte blanche to the American FBI, which is prying open the country’s sensitive national security system.

To wrap things up, the announcement by the stage secretary that I cannot be given the award was enveloped in disappointment, since my award was the first one in the queue and I was kind of hopeful that the APNS would do something to give me my award, yet it was a faint hope and nothing else. All I had done was exercise my freedom of expression and my right to freedom. Yet I was denied my right in a gathering where pledges of press freedom, freedom of expression and speech were being renewed. The APNS award distribution ceremony still flashes across my eyes as a great big farce, clearly depicting the true picture of the state of press freedom in Pakistan.

The writer is the former editor of Weekly Independent, currently affiliated with Reuters and the Gulf News

Courtesy: The Post, June 2, 2006

"Boom aside, Pakistan disparities linger": Boston Globe

Boston Globe
Boom aside, Pakistan disparities linger
By Declan Walsh, Globe Correspondent | June 4, 2006

LAHORE, Pakistan -- Pakistan's bumpy streets are crowded with wheezing rickshaws, garishly decorated trucks, and motorcycles carrying as many as six people. Now, add an incongruous newcomer to the chaos -- the latest Porsche.

The country's first Porsche dealership opened last month with a glitzy ceremony at one of Lahore's most exclusive clubs. Importer Abukhar Bokhari said he has already sold 30 cars -- three-fourths of his annual quota. ``Business is booming," he said with a smile.

The glamorous sports cars are the high end of a little-publicized economic boom in a country more frequently associated with Islamic extremism and anti-American sentiment.

Despite the devastating earthquake in October, Pakistan's economy grew by 8.4 percent last year, second only to China in Asia. This year's gross domestic product growth is forecast at a healthy 6.3 per cent. Exports increased by 19 percent over the past year and per capita income will reach $800 by June, up one-third from last year, according to the government.

Bokhari said he expected the iconic 911 to be his most popular model -- a fitting irony since the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks set the stage for Pakistan's dramatic turnaround.

After America launched its ``war on terrorism" in late 2001, Pakistan's president, Pervez Musharraf, cut his ties with Afghanistan's extremist Taliban government and joined the hunt for Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda leadership. In return, he won key economic rewards that pulled the Pakistani economy out of a nosedive.

The United States forgave $1.5 billion in debt and in 2004 offered Pakistan $3 billion in economic and military assistance over five years. Washington also ended sanctions it had imposed on Pakistan after controversial nuclear bomb tests in 1998.

Money from outside the country also fueled economic growth. Wealthy Pakistanis living abroad, nervous about their position in the West after 9/11, started to send their savings home. Foreign remittances jumped from $1.5 billion a year in 2001 to about $4 billion currently, triggering a massive investment boom.

Property prices have soared, the Karachi stock exchange has become the top performing exchange in Asia, and sales of televisions, mobile phones, cars, and other luxury goods have soared.

``9/11 was a horrible tragedy, but it saved Pakistan," said Nassir Kasuri, the 28-year-old son of Pakistan's foreign minister and the owner of a new Porsche 911.

Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, a former New York banker, has won praise from international financial institutions for increasing tax revenues and privatizing state companies in banking, cement, and utilities.

Industrialist and real estate developer Asif Kamal, who recently bought an investment bank and is constructing a 20-story office building in downtown Lahore, said of the new prosperity: ``It's the best it's ever been. There's never been so much money and so many opportunities."

Kamal recently bought a new Porsche Cayman S for about $140,000 -- about $80,000 more than the US list price because of Pakistan's punishing tariffs on foreign car imports. ``It's a nice toy, just for fun," he said with a smile.

But many economists and businessmen warn that the boom has a worrying downside. The spending splurge is limited to a small minority of rich Pakistanis. Most of the country's 160 million people remain desperately poor, barely able to afford a motorcycle. The rich-poor divide is wider than ever, and poverty remains particularly deep in rural areas. Only 46 percent of the population is literate, compared with 63 percent in economies of similar size.

Inflation, which rose to 11 percent last year before easing to 8 percent, is the main difficulty.

Outside Kamal's office stood Abdul Rehman, a 55-year-old ``tea boy" who has served hot drinks in Kamal's company for the past 30 years. His monthly salary of $103 is increasingly stretched by soaring prices for flour, sugar, and transportation, he said.

``A bag of sugar that used to cost 25 rupees two years ago is now 40 rupees," or about 80 cents, said the father of six. ``It's really terrible."

In contrast with India or China, Pakistan's economic boom has done little to swell the ranks of its middle class, which remains small.

The government has increased health and education expenditures -- it says the percentage of people living below the poverty line has dropped from one-third to one-quarter -- but continues to pour money into expensive military hardware, despite a diminishing threat from neighboring India. Last month, Musharraf ordered 62 new F-16 jets from the United States at a cost of $2.5 billion.

Economists worry the boom is built on foundations of sand. The stock market is considered to be dangerously overvalued. Property prices have dipped in cities such as Lahore, but remain at Western levels in the capital, Islamabad. The Central Bank recently made front-page news with a stern warning about the dangers of further inflation. The current account deficit is projected to rise from $1.8 billion in 2005 to $5.5 billion this year.

Shahid Javed Burki, a former World Bank vice president, has cautioned that Pakistan is in the grip of a ``casino culture" and is showing the symptoms of a major financial crisis similar to one suffered by Mexico a decade ago.

``When I look at all these things that preceded the Mexican crisis, I can see all of them present in Pakistan today," he said at a conference in Washington last month.

Economist Shahid Kardar said: ``You can see the way society is polarizing between rich and poor on the streets, and it's very alarming."

Diplomats are also concerned. ``Pakistan is going in the right direction but it's traveling on a tightrope," said one British official, who said a splurge in credit card spending had left many consumers vulnerable to a downturn.

The uncertainty is also linked to tough political issues.

Musharraf, who came to power in a 1999 military coup, needs to muster as much support as possible ahead of elections promised for next year.

General Jahangir Karamat opposes long involvement of army in politics

Govt asked to stabilise internal situation: Karamat opposes long involvement of army
By Anwar Iqbal
Dawn, June 4, 2006

WASHINGTON, June 3: Pakistan’s outgoing Ambassador to Unites States, Gen Jehangir Karamat, has advised the government not to involve the army ‘for too long’ in Waziristan and Balochistan because it can be ‘counterproductive’ to do so. He emphasised dialogue to resolve these issues.

Gen Karamat, who leaves for Islamabad later on Saturday after representing Pakistan in Washington for two years, dismissed media speculation as ‘baseless rumours’ that he had been asked to head an interim government before the 2007 elections.

In a wide-ranging interview to Dawn, Gen Karamat said: “We should try to institutionalise our relations with the US and strengthen the Karzai government in Afghanistan because it is in our interest to do so.”

He said that without political and economic stability at home, it would be difficult to project a positive image of Pakistan abroad.

Gen Karamat, also a former army chief, said that in 1997 he could have toppled the Nawaz Sharif government but he did not, because he thought it was not ‘in the national interest’ to undo a democratically elected government.

He said the general impression that Mr Sharif had sacked him was wrong. He recalled that in some statements he had criticised the attitude of the then government towards the Supreme Court. Mr Sharif told him it was not right for a general to publicly criticise the government, he said.

At this stage, Gen Karamat said, he came to the conclusion that it would be better for him to quit than to impose yet another martial law on the country.

The ambassador said he believed the US administration was not seeking direct access to Dr A.Q. Khan and the sudden interest some members of Congress were showing in him was linked to Congressional hearing on the Indo-US deal, which had revived interest in all things nuclear.

Describing the 2007 elections as ‘a huge opportunity’ to establish democracy in Pakistan, he said both PPP and the PML-N should be allowed to participate in these polls.

He, however, advised the leaders of these parties - Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif - not to let their personal interests prevail over party interests.

He acknowledged that in the US Pakistan was routinely blamed for whatever happened in Afghanistan, but pointed out that the sudden increase in insurgency had been caused by summer which allowed insurgents to enhance their activities.

Gen Karamat also advised the Afghan government not to raise these issues publicly and discuss them at the trilateral forum created for the purpose. The forum includes representatives from Pakistan, Afghanistan and the US.

Zulifikar Ali Bhutto’s last interview

Zulifikar Ali Bhutto’s last interview
Khalid Hasan
The Friday Times, June 2-8, 2006 - Vol. XVIII, No. 15

The last formal interview given to a journalist by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto took place on 10th August, 1977, just over a month after his overthrow and 33 days before his arrest, imprisonment, trial and execution on 4th April, 1979.

The journalist was Inam Aziz, who with Habibur Rehman, had been invited from London to meet Zia-ul-Haq. Inam Aziz, one of Pakistan’s great campaigning editors, was a known admirer of ZAB, which should have made him a persona non grata in the military government’s book, but those were early days and the regime was still trying to find its feet. On 8th August, Inam was in Lahore, the day ZAB landed to a welcome whose like the city had not accorded to anyone since Liu Shao-chi. While milling crowds were escorting Bhutto, who had just been released from “protective custody,” to Nawab Sadiq Hussain’s residence, Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani, who was on his way to the airport, was waylaid, pulled out of his car, roughed up and made to shout ‘Jiye Bhutto’ by exuberant PPP workers.

Inam Aziz recounted his meeting with ZAB in Stop Press , a little-noticed but fascinating autobiography. During the Zia years, it was only his London-based Urdu daily Millat that continued to denounce military rule. It is another matter that when the PPP came to power, men like Inam Aziz found themselves banished from the camp of victory, but that is another story for another day. What follows is Inam Aziz’s recollection of ZAB’s last recorded interview.

He was taken to see Bhutto by Maulana Kausar Niazi. Bhutto with his photographic memory recognised Inam, greeting him by name, though he had only met him a couple of times. Inam presented Bhutto with a box of Havana cigars, one of which Bhutto lit up. The interview had barely begun when there was a phone call for Bhutto in the next room. When he returned fifteen minutes later, he was fuming. When Inam asked who had called, Bhutto said, “It was Zia and he threatened to kill me. I have told him that if I survive, I will have him and 35 of his generals hanged for treason.” After some time Bhutto said, “He held me responsible for the manhandling of Noorani. This is the first time he has been impertinent with me. When he came to see me in Murree, he could not stop ‘sirring’ me. Today there was arrogance in his voice.” When Inam remarked that Zia’s threat should be taken seriously, Bhutto drew at his cigar and said, “I am not afraid of death. I am a man of history and you cannot silence history.”

When Inam quoted Zia as saying that he would hold elections in 90 days and transfer power, Bhutto smiled, “You expect these people to hold elections! Don’t expect liars to speak the truth.” When Inam told him that Zia had cited God as a witness to his pledge to hold free and fair elections, Bhutto remarked, “That’s another of his lies. I have just told you about my conversation with him, so you can decide for yourself if there will ever be elections in this country.” When Inam asked him about his fall, Bhutto smiled and said, “To tell you the truth, I chose the wrong advisers. I have come to hate members of this pseudo-intellegensia who received favours from me but have now joined hands with the army.” On the rigging charge, he said he had not ordered it and only seven constituencies may have been involved.

Bhutto told Inam about the inquiry he had ordered into the rigging and the resulting 10-page report of which the army had a copy. The investigation had found that the American government was heavily involved in the post-election unrest. Hundreds of millions in PL-480 funds were spent to fuel the protest movement. In some mosques mullahs had been found with dollars. During the agitation, as soon as someone was injured, opposition parties would arrive on the scene and begin doling out money. The American embassy was orchestrating the effort. He added that the US embassy had been told that the government had evidence of American meddling and would like a meeting on the issue with the Secretary of State. Some days later, the US embassy replied that Secretary of State William Rogers would be in Paris for a NATO meeting and a representative could be sent to meet him.

The cabinet chose Aziz Ahmed, who arrived in Paris with the evidence. The meeting with Rogers took place at the American embassy, but whenever Aziz Ahmed would try to raise the issue of American interference, Rogers would tell him that the US and Pakistan being old friends, what had happened in the past should not impede the resumption of good relations. Whenever Aziz Ahmed would try to open his briefcase to reach for the documents he was carrying, Rogers would stop him and assure him that Pakistan would have no further cause for complaint. After the meeting, Aziz Ahmed left his briefcase with Ambassador Muzaffar Ali Qizalbash for safekeeping. When he returned to his hotel after attending a reception, he found his room vandalised. He called the manager who expressed shock and astonishment. Since Aziz Ahmed knew who his “visitors” had been, he decided against approaching the police. “Do you realise now what a clash with a big power can involve?” Bhutto asked Inam.

When Inam asked Bhutto what would happen if elections were held in 90 days, he replied that all the waderas and zamidars would be wiped out and even he would be finished as a wadera , but if the people felt that he would meet their aspirations, they would not reject him. When Inam asked him why the army was only able to stage coups in Pakistan and not in India, Bhutto replied that 85 per cent of the army comes from the Punjab, as does the bureaucracy. When the two join hands, political forces become helpless. He conceded that political forces, in order to protect their interests, often become tools in the hands of this army-civil combine. When Inam rose to take his leave, Bhutto said, “If you learn when you return to London that I am still alive, come back and we will meet.” When Inam replied that if Bhutto returned to power, people like him would not be able to get to see him, Bhutto replied, “I don’t think this time things are going to be like that.”

Bhutto, of course, never regained power and Inam Aziz died in London in 1993.

– This is a regular column by TFT’s Washington correspondent. He can be reached at khasan2@cox.net

Pakistan bans Da Vinci Code movie

BBC: June 4, 2006
Pakistan bans Da Vinci Code film
Pakistan has banned The Da Vinci Code, which has been the subject of protests from members of Pakistan's small Christian community.
Culture Minister Ghulam Jamal said the film was blasphemous.

The screen adaptation of Dan Brown's book revolves around the theory that Jesus married Mary Magdalene and their descendants survive today.

A number of states in India have banned the film, although the federal censors have cleared it for release.

Supported

Mr Jamal said: "Islam teaches us to respect all the prophets of Allah Almighty and degradation of any prophet is tantamount to defamation of the rest," the official Associated Press of Pakistan news agency reported.

The government had indicated last week that it wanted to ban both the film and the book. The book has been available in Pakistan for some time.

Christian protestors have been supported by the country's six-party Islamic alliance, the MMA.

On Saturday, Andhra Pradesh became the seventh state in India to ban the film.

Greater Autonomy for Kashmir: Is that the end?

Daily Times, June 4, 2006
Ex-Indian CJ to head working group on Kashmir autonomy

By Iftikhar Gilani

NEW DELHI: Former chief justice of India AH Ahmadi will head a working group to examine the demand for autonomy, devolution of powers and special status to Jammu and Kashmir.

CPI (M) MLA Yusuf Tarigami will be the convener of the group that will scan the history of Jammu and Kashmir since partition and suggest the new centre-state relationship within two months. It will be the most influential group among five other groups promised by Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh last month after holding a two-day roundtable with politicians of Jammu and Kashmir. The task of these groups will be to prepare and submit reports on various issues at the next roundtable expected to be held in August.

Sources in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) said that Dr Manmohan Singh has authorised Held Kashmir Chief Minister Ghulam Nabi Azad to nominate representatives from all political parties for the group.

The most tiring task before the group will be to discuss the idea of “greater autonomy”, floated by the National Conference of Dr Farooq Abdullah, and the “self rule” idea, pressed by the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) of Mufti Muhammad Sayeed.

"How America Divorced Arabs"?

Daily Times, June 4, 2006
POSTCARD USA: How America divorced the Arabs —Khalid Hasan

The Americans lost the Arabs: the Arabs found the Chinese, or the Chinese found the Arabs. Freeman said in the Chinese, the Arabs see a partner who will buy their oil without demanding that they accept a foreign ideology, abandon their way of life or make other choices they’d rather avoid

Of all the people I have seen, heard or run into in Washington, no one has impressed me more than Charles W Freeman Jr, a former US diplomat and a man of utter brilliance and tremendous good humour.

Do we’ve men like him in our foreign service? I can’t think of anyone quite like him. I will concede though that we are not without a few like Munir Akram at the United Nations who have courage and conviction and who work hard to keep the flag flying even when those who have taken it upon themselves to fly that flag, often look like putting it away in the basement in mothballs.

Charles Freeman (no one calls him Chuck, be assured) is the president of one think-tank in this city of Washington, which has been trying to change the stereotyped image of Arabs and the Arab world that is common, be it newspaper cartoonists or policymakers. His is also one think-tank, which despite Freeman’s excellent contacts in the Arab world, especially Saudi Arabia, where he was ambassador during the first Gulf War, is woefully short of funds. In fact, last year he told a meeting of his Middle East Policy Institute that this could well be the last time it was meeting as it had all but run out of money. Happily, that prediction has not come true.

Freeman speaks Chinese, French and Spanish and has a working knowledge of Portuguese and Italian. “I’ve always made a practice of trying to learn the language wherever I’ve been,” he explains. “I didn’t do as well as I would like to have done with Tamil, in South India, but I did learn Mandarin at the interpreter level, Taiwanese, and Thai, although I’ve lost much of it, and I’ve worked hard at Arabic,” he once said. He interpreted for President Nixon on his historic visit to China.

Freeman is also one of the five sponsors of the Committee for the Republic, which has called for an “examination of the nation’s rush to empire”. I don’t suppose that has exactly earned him an invitation to a White House dinner. I think it is important for people in Pakistan to know that Washington is not entirely peopled by the replicas and clones of Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Condoleezza Rice. There are also men like Charles Freeman, though their number is small. But they matter and what they think and write and speak is received with respect. Sometimes they also manage to change things.

Recently, Freeman spoke in California on Arab-Chinese relations. He began his speech by informing his audience, “I want to speak with you this morning about foreign affairs, by which, of course, I mean failing marriages, extramarital relationships, and instances of bigamy, maybe even polygamy. It’s pretty racy stuff compared to most diplomacy. Those of you who may be offended should leave now. I will be brief. Therefore, I will be superficial. But this doesn’t bother me at all. Decades ago, a wise man from the East told me that, if something is worth doing, it is worth doing superficially. I have always heeded his advice. He was, of course, from the East Coast of the United States.”

Freeman called US-China relations a “failing marriage” and recalled how Chinese President Hu Jintao had been insulted by Bush and his people when he visited Washington in April. He was denied a state dinner, the Chinese national anthem was announced as that of the Republic of China, a known Falun Gang agitator was permitted to join journalists on the White House grounds where she shouted at the Chinese president for three minutes before being removed.

Protesters just outside Blair House, where the president was staying, were allowed to protest late into the night and when Hu’s staff complained, it was referred to DC police, which had knocked off work an hour before, unless it were paid overtime.

From Washington, Hu flew to Riyadh “where there was no confusion at all about how to treat him”. Freeman said, “Basically, the Arabs give us oil and we give them back little green portraits of dead American presidents. Until recently, they ploughed the money we paid them back into the American economy — about $800 billion in private Arab investment by the turn of this century. And everyone benefited. Then came 9/11. A few bad actors determined to wreck this happy partnership managed to do so.”

American business in the Arab Gulf crashed from first to fifth place. “Mutual affection between Arabs and Americans has, in short, been succeeded by mutual fear and loathing, punctuated by occasional self-righteous American demands for major Arab behaviour modification — demands that they embrace an American reform agenda of elections, women’s liberation, religious pluralism. You know the list,” he added. Consequently, the Americans lost the Arabs: the Arabs found the Chinese, or the Chinese found the Arabs.

Freeman said in the Chinese, the Arabs see a partner who will buy their oil without demanding that they accept a foreign ideology, abandon their way of life, or make other choices they’d rather avoid. They see a major civilisation that seems determined to build a partnership with them, does not insult their religion or their way of life, values its reputation as a reliable supplier too much to engage in the promiscuous application of sanctions or other coercive measures, and has no habit of bombing or invading other countries to whose policies it objects.

The Arabs, he said, are Muslims “and they don’t have to divorce us to take a second wife. Hence their romances with China and India”. He predicted that soon there would be more Saudi students in China than in America.

No marriage, Freeman pointed out, turns out the way it is expected to, but the one between the Saudis and the Chinese, given the solid foundation on the addictive behaviour of the oil consumer, shows every sign of being destined to last. At the moment, it is suffused with the joy of mutual discovery, even infatuation, if not something close enough to love, he said.

And therein lies a lesson that the Americans are determined not to learn.

Khalid Hasan is Daily Times’ US-based correspondent. His e-mail is khasan2@cox.net

Introducing Intelligence Bureau of Pakistan

Daily Times, June 2, 2006
EDITORIAL: IB harassment of newspapermen

Pakistan and India have been engaged in a peace process since January 2004; top officials on the two sides meet regularly and promise to enhance people-to-people contact; they are talking about trade and other exchanges and so on. But none of this activity seems to have reached the attention of the Intelligence Bureau, whose low level personnel continue to slither and slide in the old grooves and behave as if they are the last bastion of defence against the Indian “enemy”.

This was obvious when a few days ago some journalists emerged from a reception at the Indian press councillor’s residence in Islamabad. A man in civvies stopped the car of Rana Qaisar, this newspaper’s bureau chief, and asked him to identify himself and narrate the purpose of his visit to the Indian press councillor’s house. Upon this, Mr Qaisar correctly asked the man to first identify himself and explain why he was asking such questions. The unidentified man would not give his identity and pressed with his questions. Upon this, Mr Qaisar declared that he was not under any obligation to identify himself to someone he (Mr Qaisar) did not know and put the car in motion. The man then tried to grab Mr Qaisar’s collar, forcing the latter to stop the car and get out. A fracas ensued which was joined by other newspapermen returning from the reception. At that point it emerged that the man in civvies was an IB sleuth. A bizarre aspect of this incident is that later the IB-wallahs meted out the same treatment to a TV journalist.

Later, Mr Qaisar called the federal minister for information, Mohammad Ali Durrani, who said that he would call back in 30 minutes but never followed up on that promise. So much for Mr Durrani’s credentials with Mr Qaisar. The next day, Mr Qaisar had to call the minister himself, but to no avail. Mr Qaisar also informed the DG of Inter-Services Public Relations, Gen Shaukat Sultan, who merely said that Mr Qaisar should have identified himself. Of course, the official responses failed to take heed of the fact that an intelligence official, especially if he is not in uniform, must first identify himself before questioning someone. No one is going to identify himself if accosted by an unknown person. The natural response when asked such a question is to counter-question the person and ask him for his identity.

The second aspect of this episode is the obvious question of why IB personnel should be harassing people who openly attend functions at the Indian High Commission. Clearly, the IB should have known that the Indian press councillor was holding a reception; clearly, the IB should also have known that the city’s media community would attend the reception. What is the purpose of deputing intelligence officials to inquire about the identities of guests? What would the IB do with such a guest list, harass them?

It’s about time the government purged its ranks of these Cold War warriors. Or at least tell them that the rules of the game need to be changed and they have to change with them.

The IB owes Mr Qaiser an apology. Can Mr Durrani obtain one for Mr Qaiser? *