Wednesday, May 31, 2006

Law abiding India: Lessons for Pakistan

The News, May 31, 2006
Law-abiding India: model for Pakistan to follow
By Rauf Klasra

ISLAMABAD: Members of the Subcommittee of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) observed here on Tuesday that Pakistanis should at least learn some good lessons from the Indians as how to respect the law, where even a chief minister cannot dare violate an order issued by an ordinary city mayor of his province.

“The Indians are becoming a big democratic nation because they respect the law,” observed the PAC members while lamenting over sorry attitude of both the masses and civil, military bureaucracy to violate the laws without any fear.

The PAC members also conceded that in the past they had failed to hold powerful officials accountable during scrutiny of audit objections despite the fact they were present in the committee meeting.

The subcommittee met here with MNA Kunwar Khalid Younis in the chair, Ch Nisar Ali Khan and Rai Mansab Ali Khan as members to discuss audit objection regarding the Pakistan Post Office. Secretary Communication Tariq Mahmood and officials of the Auditor-General of Pakistan also appeared before the committee to discuss the irregularities in the working of the ministry.

During course of discussion on alleged corruption committed by the former director-general of Pakistan Post Office, Agha Masood, a retired military officer, Nisar said the PAC has failed to hold such powerful officials accountable despite knowing that they were involved in the irregularities.

Younis was of the view that Pakistanis needed to learn lessons from the Indians who were much better in following the law. While giving indirect reference to Pakistan policy to match the that of the Indians, Younis said Pakistan also needs to match India in good qualities, particularly democracy and respect for the laws.

To establish his point, he said that recently he was in India and a Congress chief minister of one state hosted a dinner in honour of Pakistani delegation.He said music stopped at 10.30pm. When inquired about the abrupt end to the music, they were surprised to know that under the laws no party could be held after 10.30pm.

Younis said it was quite shocking to know that the order to end party by that time was issued by a local mayor and the chief minister abide by the orders without making it an issue of ego. He said visiting Pakistanis were informed that mayor who had issued the order belonged to opposition party BJP.

Younis said it was fascinating for the Pakistanis to see a chief minister of India respecting the order of a mayor. He said no body dare to violate the law in India not even the chief minister. But, he regretted that in Pakistan no such precedent exists and they all need to learn lessons from the Indians. Respect for the law makes Indians more powerful nation.

Nisar said politicians were accountable to the media and general public but other segments of society particularly the civil, military bureaucracy was not held accountable for their misdeeds. He said federal secretaries were not held accountable while ministers always faced criticism. He regretted that after 15 years down the lane, the PAC now was discussing some audit objections pertaining to irregularities in the Pakistan Post Office. He said when the sitting DG Post Office Agha Masood had once appeared before the committee, the members remained silent and could not collect the moral courage to question him.

He said the Post Office was being run on personal whims of an individual but nobody could dare ask the DG during the meeting. He said even the Ministry of Communication and the Post Office were at logger heads because of the working of the DG. Younis said it was quite unfortunate to note that a culture was developing in Pakistan in which no one showed respect to rules and regulations.

David Albright's Testimony on Dr. AQ Khan

A. Q Khan Network: The Case Is Not Closed
Prepared Testimony of David Albright
President, Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS)
before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism & Nonproliferation Committee on International Relations
May 25, 2006

With the mounting confrontation over Iran’s nuclear weapons program, the Middle East could be standing at the brink of war once again. An American decision to attack Iran to prevent Ayatollah Ali Khamenei from acquiring nuclear weapons would not only risk engulfing the region in conflict but would also dramatically increase the chances of Iranian-supported terrorists striking the United States at home and its interests abroad.
President George W. Bush would not be facing this terrible quandary if an international smuggling ring, headquartered in Pakistan, had not helped Iran’s nuclear program for over a decade. At the head of the criminal syndicate was the Pakistani Abdul Qadeer Khan, known as the father of his country’s nuclear bomb and a man who former CIA Director George Tenet called “just as dangerous as Osama Bin Laden.”
Starting as an ingenious effort to sidestep western sanctions and outfit Pakistan with nuclear weapons, Khan and his ring of smugglers soon went global. The activity of this syndicate straddled four decades and involved countries, companies, secret bank accounts, and agents on four continents. Armed with a catalog filled with everything from whole gas centrifuge factories to nuclear weapon designs, this network helped outfit nuclear weapons programs in Libya, Iran, and North Korea and possibly aided Al Qaeda in its quest for nuclear weapons before the fall of the Taliban. Remnants of the Khan network may yet help other nuclear weapons programs and terrorist groups.
The operatives of the Khan network pedaled their wares and eluded authorities all over the world. As an example, consider Urs Tinner, a Swiss national, who organized the acquisition of manufacturing equipment in Europe and its shipment to a factory in Malaysia, where it was used to make centrifuge components, using centrifuge designs he provided. The parts were then shipped to Dubai and then on to Libya. Some of these components were the ones seized on the BBC China in October 2003. In a parallel effort, Urs, his brother Marco, and father Friedrich allegedly arranged for a centrifuge component to be made by an unsuspecting Swiss company using raw materials from abroad that had been ordered by a trading company in Singapore hired by Urs. The Tinners then arranged for the subcomponent to be sent to Turkey where another key player in the Khan network integrated it with other parts into a centrifuge motor assembly before shipping it to Dubai and then onward to Libya on the BBC China. In this case, U.S. intelligence agents were unaware that these parts were onboard the ship, and they eventually arrived in Libya.
Khan’s actions have made the world far more dangerous. His ground-breaking methods to acquire and then help others build nuclear weapons dramatize a path to nuclear proliferation that poses the greatest threat to our security today. Too long underappreciated, illicit nuclear trade is a scourge lying at the heart of all efforts by America’s current enemies to build or expand a nuclear arsenal. Motivated by greed or fanaticism, nuclear smuggling rings continue to find ready customers willing to pay exorbitant prices. The busting of the Khan network has not stopped Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, and others from seeking items illegally for their nuclear weapons programs. With such deadly materials and expertise on the black market, terrorist groups may finally find a way to obtain a nuclear weapon. Finding effective ways to stop this illicit trade will be one of the most important priorities for decades to come.
I would now like to discuss three specific points:
1) The Case is Not Closed.
In early May 2006, a spokesperson for the Pakistani Foreign Ministry implied that Pakistan’s investigation into the Khan matter was closed. The spokesperson stated that Pakistan had conducted a thorough investigation of Khan and his Pakistani accomplices and had shared its conclusions with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United States, and other countries.
However, the case is far from closed. Many questions remain about what Khan and his associates supplied other countries, particularly Iran. Specific questions involving Iran include the extent of centrifuge assistance, the logistics of that assistance, and the possible supply of nuclear weapon designs. These areas remain especially troubling as we try to determine exactly how close Iran could be to building nuclear weapons and what sensitive information may remain in circulation around the world that could fall into the hands of other enemies of the United States, including terrorists.
In addition, the information shared by the Pakistani government with the IAEA and other governments appears so far to be incomplete. Unraveling the activities of the network and ensuring that it remains shut down require the Pakistani government to provide more assistance to investigators, including giving the IAEA and affected governments direct access to question Khan and his associates verbally. Greater cooperation from Pakistan would allow the IAEA and affected governments to conduct more thorough investigations, to pursue more effectively criminal prosecutions of individuals involved in the network, and to recover physical remnants of the illicit procurement network that have not yet been found and that could provide the seeds for future, secret nuclear weapons programs.
Although Pakistan has taken steps to create a national export control system and to place additional controls over its nuclear scientists, Islamabad has not faced up to the difficult task of actually implementing an effective control system. One necessary step is to prosecute Pakistani members of the network to send a clear signal that Pakistan will punish illegal exporters severely and thereby reduce the likelihood that someone will step into Khan’s shoes. The fact that no prosecutions appear to be planned serves to increase suspicions that the Pakistani government is hiding information about the network’s activities, particularly information that could further embarrass itself or its military.
2) Key Questions Remain Unanswered.
Much has been learned about the Khan network through several intensive governmental, IAEA, and criminal investigations. However, many questions about the extent of the network still remain unanswered that are important in determining whether the network will rise again or remnants will become the seed for a new network.
While a number of individuals have been arrested or identified, investigators worldwide believe that other key participants may not yet have been identified out of an estimated total of 50 people who were actively involved in the network. Questions also remain about the full extent of these individuals’ activities in manufacturing and supplying centrifuges and associated equipment. This task has become more complicated because many investigations of the network started slowly, giving members of the network a chance to cover their tracks or destroy evidence. There is growing recognition that network members may have destroyed many key internal documents and records.
Whether or not all the key workshops and companies have been identified also remains unknown. Moreover, it is possible that components or pre-forms for uranium-enrichment plants have been produced but were not delivered to Libya. Perhaps they have been sent to other, unknown customers.
Another complicating factor is that the network also supplied Pakistan’s covert nuclear weapons programs. Pakistan has refused to tell investigators which items it imported from the network.
Questions remain about whether all the network’s customers have been identified. Did Saudi Arabia, Syria, or other countries receive items from the network? Did terrorists receive any items? With regard to Iran, Libya, North Korea, only in the case of Libya do investigators have a relatively complete understanding of the items supplied by the Khan network.
Questions persist about who received nuclear weapon designs from Khan and his associates, and just what type of designs they provided. A priority is determining whether Iran and North Korea received these nuclear weapon designs.
The key to the success of Khan’s network was its virtual library of centrifuge designs, detailed manufacturing manuals, and nuclear weapon designs. An important task for investigators is to retrieve as much of this information as possible. That effort requires, in turn, tracking down and prosecuting the members of the network with this kind of sensitive information. Given the ease of copying and hiding documents and digital files, this information may form the core of a future network aimed at secretly selling the wherewithal to build nuclear weapons.
3) The U.S. Government Needs to Cooperate With Swiss Prosecutions of the Tinners.
Although the focus today is on Pakistan and unanswered questions about the Khan network, the United States has been remiss in assisting the overseas prosecution of key members of the Khan network. The United States has ignored multiple requests from Swiss prosecutors for cooperation that have extended over a year.
The Swiss Attorney General sent requests to the United States for legal assistance in its case against Urs, Marco, and Friedrich Tinner in the spring and summer 2005. The prosecutors have not received a reply, or even a confirmation that the U.S. Government received the requests. Last fall, I assisted the prosecutors in contacting Under Secretary of State Robert Joseph and in writing him a letter requesting assistance. In particular, the letter asked for help in obtaining information and documents about centrifuges and centrifuge-related equipment relevant to the prosecution and arranging a visit to Oak Ridge National Laboratory to examine certain items removed from Libya by the United States. This letter, which was sent last February, has also remained unacknowledged and unanswered.
The Office of the Attorney General is disappointed over this matter. It is difficult to understand the actions of the U.S. Government. Its lack of assistance needlessly complicates this important investigation.
In contrast, Libyan authorities have greatly assisted Switzerland in its legal requests, allowing a visit to Tripoli to interview witnesses in April 2006 and promising documents that are expected to aid the case against the Tinners. Law enforcement agencies in the Far East and in South Africa have also cooperated with the Swiss prosecutors.
The United States should respond to the Swiss requests for assistance as quickly as possible. To continue to ignore these requests undermines the vital prosecution of key members of the Khan network and risks undercutting support for Swiss cooperation in non-proliferation matters. In addition, I find this lack of cooperation frankly embarrassing to the United States and those of us who believe that the United States should take the lead in bringing members of the Khan network to justice for arming our enemies with nuclear weapons.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.



U.S. Silence Impeding Swiss in Nuclear Case Expert Says Calls Have Been Ignored
By Joby Warrick
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, May 26, 2006; A16
Two years after the United States helped disrupt a notorious nuclear smuggling ring, the Bush administration has hobbled a Swiss effort to prosecute three of the alleged leaders by failing to share critical information, an American nuclear expert and Swiss law enforcement officials said yesterday.
Switzerland's federal prosecutor made at least four separate appeals for U.S. help over the past year, asking for access to documents and other evidence linked to the nuclear black market run by the Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. In that time, the Swiss have received no assistance, or even a reply, a spokesman for the prosecutor said.
"Swiss authorities are asking for additional assistance from U.S. authorities, but we haven't gotten an answer so far," Mark Wiedmer, press secretary for the Swiss attorney general's office, said in response to a reporter's inquiry. "We are confident the American authorities will provide the information we need."
The appeals were directed to the Justice Department, which has a bilateral agreement with Switzerland on sharing information in international criminal cases, and to the State Department's undersecretary for arms control and international security, according to officials knowledgeable about the requests. Calls to both agencies yesterday were not returned.
The problem was brought to light yesterday by a U.S. weapons expert who is advising Swiss prosecutors on the technical aspects of the Khan case. In testimony before a subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee, David Albright said the U.S. government had "ignored multiple requests for cooperation" in prosecuting members of the Khan network.
"The prosecutors have not received a reply, or even a confirmation that the U.S. government received the requests," Albright, a nuclear expert and president of the Institute for Science and International Security, told the panel. He said the lack of assistance "needlessly complicates" an investigation of great importance to both countries.
Swiss officials are seeking to bring charges against three businessmen who allegedly played pivotal roles in Khan's smuggling scheme. Swiss authorities have arrested Friedrich Tinner, a Swiss mechanical engineer, and his two sons, Urs and Marco, who are suspected of supplying the network with technology and equipment used in enriching uranium. Urs Tinner is also suspected of helping Khan set up a secret Malaysian factory that made thousands of components for gas centrifuges, machines used in uranium enrichment. Formal charges have not yet been brought against them.
Some of the components were en route to Libya by ship in December 2003 when they were intercepted by German and Italian officials in a raid that brought the smuggling ring to light. The United States, which provided key intelligence that led to the intercept, heralded the breakup of the Khan network as a major blow against nuclear proliferation.
In July 2004, President Bush viewed some of the components supplied by the Tinners during a visit to the Energy Department's Oak Ridge National Laboratory in eastern Tennessee. Bush called the Khan network "one of the most dangerous sources of proliferation in the world" and attributed the successful breakup to the efforts of "allies, working together."
Albright, in his testimony to the subcommittee on international terrorism and nonproliferation, said, "I find this lack of cooperation frankly embarrassing to the United States and to those of us who believe that the United States should take the lead in bringing members of the Khan network to justice for arming our enemies with nuclear weapons."
© 2006 The Washington Post Company

Frustration mounts between US, Pakistan

May 31, 2006
Frustration mounts between US, Pakistan
Congress pressures Pakistan to give more information about possible proliferation, upsetting already-delicate ties.
By David Montero | Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN - One of the central relationships forged after 9/11 has hit a rough patch. The latest irritant between Washington and Islamabad came last week as US lawmakers urged Pakistan to wring more information from disgraced nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, alleging that he may yet hold the blueprint to some of Iran's nuclear secrets.

Earlier this month, Islamabad officially closed its investigation. While Mr. Khan remains under house arrest, Pakistani officials say they've given Washington all the details they could get out of him - though that information has never been made public.

"Some question whether the A.Q. Khan network is truly out of business, asking if it's not merely hibernating. We'd be foolish to rule out that chilling possibility," said Republican legislator Edward R. Royce in a statement at the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation hearing. "Vigilance and greater international pressure on Pakistan to air out the Khan network is in order."

So far, the tough talk is coming only from Congress, suggesting that the White House may be more keenly aware of the many demands already placed on Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf, including the pursuit of Al Qaeda suspects, the curbing of cross-border attacks into Afghanistan, and the development of good governance to keep radical Islam at bay. Some analysts say that the demand for access to Khan risks pushing an already delicate relationship to the point of overburn at a time when Pakistan is warming up to Iran.

"Even if the US gets access to Khan, he might not be able to give information on [Iran]. Khan has never been to Iran," says Hasan Askari Rizvi, a defense analyst in Lahore, Pakistan. "If you apply pressure, you may not get the information you want. The US will have to determine its priorities."

Interrogating Khan is a wish that Islamabad has never granted: Washington has always had to go through the Pakistani military to get to Khan, cherished as a national hero. Some say that's the problem, that Khan has never been pressed hard enough. Pakistan authorities, however, defied Congressional demands last week, saying Khan would never be given up.

"The government of Pakistan does not allow direct interrogation of Khan," says Maj. Gen. Shaukat Sultan, spokesman for the Pakistani military. Pakistan's foreign minister, Khurshid Kasuri, recently told a parliamentary session that Pakistan would not "take dictation from anybody on our national interests."

Some saw double trouble in these words. For not long after he spoke them, Mr. Kasuri and Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz were busy feting Iran's foreign minister, who came to Islamabad with visions of building a $7 billion gas pipeline.

Other signs of a deepening relationship between the two Islamic republics include:

• a proposed joint investment company to boost bilateral trade up to $1 billion;

• the ratification of a bilateral preferential trade agreement by the Iranian Parliament;

• a new Iranian center in Pakistan to provide artificial limbs for quake victims;

• Pakistan's opposition to a military option in the Iranian nuclear controversy.

Washington's relationship with Islamabad, meanwhile, is under greater strain as the US and its allies in Afghanistan face stepped up attacks from the Taliban. Islamabad remains extremely sensitive to claims that the insurgency operates from across the border in Pakistan. Earlier this month, Col. Chris Vernon, chief of staff for British forces in southern Afghanistan, told the Guardian newspaper, "The thinking piece of the Taliban is out of Quetta in Pakistan. It's the major headquarters. They use it to run a series of networks in Afghanistan."

Nor has Washington's courtship of Pakistan's nemesis, India, helped matters. The US has offered a civilian nuclear deal to India while flat out refusing one to Pakistan.

It's all led to dampening of relations that some analysts say are now at their lowest point since 9/11.

"Pakistan's real gripe is with the Americans. In recent months an angry Musharraf has quietly, but deliberately defied them. Relations between the two countries have not been so poor since 9/11," writes noted journalist Ahmed Rashid in a recent edition of Pakistan's The Daily Times.

For analysts like Mr. Rashid, pursuing Khan now would be tone deaf at a time when Islamabad is in no mood to do Washington any favors or jeopardize its ties to Tehran.

"[Officials in Washington] don't understand the regime in Pakistan," contends Ayesha Siddiqa, an independent defense analyst in Islamabad. "It's a rent-seeking establishment, providing a service to the United States, like regimes in the Middle East. But ... beyond a certain point, [the Pakistanis] have a mind of their own."

Some see it differently, pointing out that the views recently expressed in Congress do not necessarily represent those of the Bush administration. "The US administration and the Pentagon understand the limits of what Pakistan can do, but the Congress does not," says retired Lt. Gen. Talat Masood, a political analyst in Islamabad. Mr. Masood says that Congress, being influenced more by public opinion, has unrealistic expectations that threaten relations with Pakistan.

That's a gamble, given that Khan may have nothing substantive to say. Giving up Khan is also a huge political risk for Pakistan, since it would only add fodder to the claim that Pakistan is America's stooge, analysts point out. Plus, if Khan sings, he may implicate some of those in power. "It's suicidal to hand him over," says Siddiqa.

What is needed instead are better measures to build trust, analysts say. A recent US proposal to generate economic activity in Pakistan's tribal areas, where the Taliban are said to be growing in popularity, is a concrete step in the right direction, points out Masood. He says more bilateral trade and education assistance are the needed antidotes to the current tensions.

Trust, he and others add, cannot be managed so long as the current relationship remains one of demand and follow. "Even if [Pakistan] follows the US verbatim, there will still be so many frustrations," says Masood. "Raising the expectations too high can spoil the relationship."

Bengali Anomalies

Daily Times, May 31, 2006
COMMENT: Bengali anomalies —William B Milam

This Zia was challenged by something like 23 military mutinies in his early years as the country’s leader. He put them down, sometimes ruthlessly. Perhaps because of that experience Zia slowly moved the military out of politics. Whether he knew it or not, intended it or not, Zia ur Rahman set Bangladesh on a glide path to a civilian dominance of politics

While I was in Pakistan in March, a friend gave me the book East Pakistan — The End Game: An Onlooker’s Journal, 1969-1971 by Brigadier (r) AR Siddiqi. Written in a matter-of-fact, non-emotive style, it is a riveting but disturbing read. Those readers who are still puzzled as to how the disaster of 1971 could have happened will understand it better after reading Brigadier Siddiqi’s candid descriptions of the feckless and ethnocentric attitudes that informed the policies of the day. The author clearly had a front-row centre view of events, and appears to have recorded them faithfully in his journal, which he has reproduced 35 years later.

Reactions to the book will differ. Some readers will want to draw lessons that are applicable to today’s concerns. I suppose, even though the attitudes and behaviour seem as outdated as the Stanley Steamer, there are parallels to today’s crises — the Balochistan insurgency, for example, or even the turbulence in the Tribal Areas. But, for me, the book turned my thoughts back to happy days in Bangladesh, and to my recent study of the differences between that country and Pakistan.

I was in Bangladesh in what now must be considered its halcyon age — when the autocratic government of Ershad, a government that had come to power by military coup and tried to camouflage itself in civilian garb, was overturned by an overwhelming popular movement. For once, and almost the last time, the two major Bangladeshi political parties had agreed on one thing: to get rid of Ershad and, under an independent interim government, elect a new government freely and fairly. They even agreed in advance on who should head the interim government.

By 1990, freedom and democracy seemed on the march to triumph everywhere. The Philippines threw out Ferdinand Marcos in 1986. Pakistan appeared to join the democratic ranks in 1988. In 1989, the Berlin Wall was torn down, and the East European countries — those ancient capitals that had fallen behind Stalin’s Iron Curtain 45 years earlier — emerged as free and independent countries, all busily preparing to be democracies. Two years later, the Soviet Union itself collapsed, and many of the imperialist conquests of the tsars reasserted their independence. All of this inspired a book that declared autocracy dead and democracy triumphant: Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History.

So why not Bangladesh? Its turn came on December 6, 1990, after a campaign of political pressure that had built in intensity since September. This campaign had included all the tools of an escalating political resistance — speeches, demonstrations, marches, hartals and some violence like burning cars and beating up people. (The goondas never run out of work.)

Ershad had been fending off such pressure for eight years. Up to 1990, he had been successful, primarily by keeping the opposition divided — a tactic that was relatively easy to utilise since the leaders of the two parties seemed genetically disposed to disagree. They were unsplitable, however, in 1990, which in itself was a special triumph for democracy.

Ershad had met his match this time around. As the pressure built, he grew more desperate. He declared an emergency, giving himself the powers to impose a curfew and to ban demonstrations — the usual tricks. It didn’t work; the pressure only intensified. Finally he turned to the army, and sent an emissary (a serving military officer) to seek its active support (in the streets). In what must have been one of the most interesting meetings in South Asian history, the army leaders turned him down. They did not wish to kill fellow Bengalis to save his presidency, even though he was one of their own.

When the end came for Ershad, it had the kind of special Bengali flavour that we have all come to expect. Constitutionalism was preserved at all cost. Ershad didn’t just flee the office; first his vice president, Moudud Ahmed, resigned and Chief Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed, the agreed choice of the two political parties to lead the interim government, was appointed vice president. Then Ershad resigned and, under the constitution, the vice president succeeded him.

The Bangladesh Army walked away from politics 15 years ago, and despite what must be the great temptation and provocation of dreadfully inept governance on the part of both parties since then, has not yet retraced its steps. Every succeeding day, as we read of Bangladesh governments reaching yet another level of ineptitude, we pray that the army will resist the temptation and ignore the provocation, and allow the Bangladeshi people, as they must someday, to rectify the situation through the ballot box.

This army was nurtured in the same traditions as the army of Pakistan — theoretically, at least. What explains their different paths? In fact, in the army of “united” Pakistan, the Bengali units were separated from and un-integrated with the West Pakistani units, for the most part. This certainly must account for some difference between the two armies.

In its first years as a national army of an independent state, the Bangladesh Army followed the Pakistani pattern of intervention in politics. But even this similarity soon became a difference. The army chief, Zia ur Rahman, became a political leader and ultimately president. As the leader who restored stability and promised a better future, he became a popular symbol of hope in the hard scrabble lives of Bengali peasants.

This Zia was challenged by something like 23 military mutinies in his early years as the country’s leader. He put them down, sometimes ruthlessly. Perhaps because of that experience (did he conclude that the military was no more to be trusted than the civilians?), Zia slowly moved the military out of politics. Whether he knew it or not, intended it or not, Zia ur Rahman set Bangladesh on a glide path to a civilian dominance of politics. We do not know exactly why; did he believe in democracy, or just in himself?

It wasn’t just a civilian facade, but a civilian government, led by an ex-military leader who kept his word and took his uniform off. He became a genuinely elected civilian president. His assassination in 1981, perpetrated by a general who not only was dismayed that his career was abridged, but was angry also at Zia for pushing the army out of the political limelight, interrupted the glide and Ershad’s coup in 1982 tried unsuccessfully to turn it back. But the die was cast. Or, perhaps more accurately, half cast; the civilians have yet to emulate Zia’s effective governance.

I remember that when we looked at Pakistan and Bangladesh in the late 1970s, we thought that, though separate countries, they remained quite similar in their politics — both ruled by the military, both led by a general named Zia. We couldn’t have been more wrong.

William Milam is a former US ambassador to Pakistan and Bangladesh. He is currently at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington DC

Monday, May 29, 2006

The AQ Khan "factor"

Daily Times, May 28, 2006
EDITORIAL: The AQ Khan ‘factor’ again!

A US Congress subcommittee on international terrorism and non-proliferation has heard the testimony of an expert who said that the case of nuclear proliferation against Dr AQ Khan of Pakistan was “far from closed” and that the Pakistani nuclear scientist should be exposed to further inquiry by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) so that the real extent of his “help” in the development of Iran’s covert nuclear programme could be determined. Some people see this development as a pressure tactic against the Pakistan government to get it to cooperate some “more”.

Pakistan’s response — with an eye to its impact at home — will be predictable: it will not submit to any pressure from the Bush administration and it will not expose Dr AQ Khan to any external inquiry. That raises another question: will the “pressure tactic” be followed by an official demarche from Washington? We doubt that very much, given the trouble that the United States is having with Iran and its proliferation from within the NPT. The other factor is the status of Pakistan as a US ally. For the time being at least, the two states need each other, although problem areas are developing in the relationship.

President Pervez Musharraf has not defended the proliferation activities of Dr AQ Khan and his “network”. Indeed, he has explained carefully his non-participation in the nuclear smuggling activities of the scientist who was made to confess on TV that his activity was his own private project. President Musharraf has told an American interviewer that he sacked Dr AQ Khan after discovering that he was travelling to Iran without officially informing anyone. There is no effort at hiding what the scientist did, but strong arguments have been advanced to defend the decision not to “throw him to the wolves” of the IAEA. One is that he is a “national hero”, another that Pakistan cannot afford an airing of its nuclear programme if Dr Khan decides to “sing” — in excess of what might be required — to save his own skin.

There is no doubt that Dr Khan is a “national hero”. Unfortunately, in both India and Pakistan people who thought up and made the bomb have been inserted as icons in the new nationalist rhetoric. Dr Khan is supported by the combined opposition in parliament in Islamabad; and the parties, which may think differently about him individually, have come together to denounce the Musharraf “set-up” as the persecutors of a “mohsin” (benefactor) of the nation. If the United States chooses to make the “pressure tactic” of the Congress sub-committee official, and President Musharraf is seen to defy it, he might yet improve his popularity with the common man. Ironically, however, by lamenting loudly the “maltreatment” of the Great Scientist, the opposition is indirectly endorsing the role of the army in the country’s civilian affairs. No one believes that Dr Khan could have done what he did without the generals being in the loop. And it is almost certain that the elected civilian prime ministers did know something of what was happening.

Pakistan’s nuclear programme was a covert project. It went on because the United States and its allies needed Pakistan to fight their Cold War against the Soviet Union. Their moral position was also greatly undermined by the fact that Israel and India were allowed to refuse to sign the NPT and develop their nuclear weapons capability. In fact, the Bush administration seemed to adopt a more realistic policy towards the nuclear “mavericks”, almost legitimising the “three outside the NPT” as nuclear powers. But Pakistan’s case became complicated by reason of Dr Khan’s shenanigans. Under the circumstances, Pakistan has done everything it could to come clean on the charge of sneaking proliferation. It is not in denial and is willing to pass on more information provided Dr Khan is not asked to be “handed over”. That’s where the red line is drawn. It is not possible to do any more than that politically.

The Bush administration knows that. This means that the nuclear “pressure” tactic is meant to extract concessions from Pakistan on some other issue, possibly Afghanistan. *

Nawaz Sharif's Claim

The Hindu, May 29, 2006

Pakistan establishment reacts angrily to Sharif claim
Islamabad, May 29 (PTI): Pakistani establishment today reacted angrily to the claim by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif that he had come to know about Kargil invasion by his Army from his Indian counterpart Atal Bihari Vajpayee and accused him of distorting the facts.

The ex-premier had been continuously informed regarding the Kargil operation and he himself had inspected the forward bases in the northern areas during the Kargil incident, Information Minister Mohammed Ali Durrani said reacting to Sharif's claim in an interview to PTI in London, which was widely carried by the Pakistani media.

"Nawaz Sharif was fully aware of the whole scenario but now his allegations are reflection of his petty personal motives. He is trying to falsify the truth," the minister said in a statement.

He said Sharif, in his interview, has not only distorted the facts regarding the Kargil issue but also violated the oath that he took as Prime Minister.

Durrani said the insistence by Sharif that he had no information of the issue and came to know through a call from Vajpayee is a proof that former Prime Minister was involved in a conspiracy against his own army.

Defence Spokesman Maj Gen Shaukat Sultan said that a person who had been Prime Minister of the country twice should not have been making "irresponsible allegations".

"No sensible person could believe the story concocted by the former Prime Minister," he was quoted as saying by daily 'The News'.

Friday, May 26, 2006

Inside Iran: Two insightful articles from NYT



New York Times, May 25, 2006
Op-Ed: The Persian Complex
By ABBAS AMANAT
New Haven

IT is easy to label Iran's quest for nuclear energy a dangerous adventure with grave regional and international repercussions. It is also comforting to heap scorn on President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for his earlier denial of the Holocaust and his odious call for the obliteration of the state of Israel. The rambling intransigence expressed in his recent letter to President Bush offers ample insight into this twisted mindset. Yet there is something deeper in Iran's story than the extremist utterances of a messianic president and the calculated maneuvering of the hard-line clerical leadership that stands behind him.

We tend to forget that Iran's insistence on its sovereign right to develop nuclear power is in effect a national pursuit for empowerment, a pursuit informed by at least two centuries of military aggression, domestic meddling, skullduggery and, not least, technological denial by the West. Every schoolchild in Iran knows about the C.I.A.-sponsored 1953 coup that toppled Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh. Even an Iranian with little interest in his or her past is conscious of how Iran throughout the 19th and 20th centuries served as a playground for the Great Game.

Iranians also know that, hard as it may be for latter-day Americans and Europeans to believe, from the 1870's to the 1920's Russia and Britain deprived Iran of even basic technology like the railroad, which was then a key to economic development. At various times, both powers jealously opposed a trans-Iranian railroad because they thought it would threaten their ever-expanding imperial frontiers. When it was finally built, the British, Russian (and American) occupying forces during the Second World War made full use of it (free of charge), calling Iran a "bridge of victory" over Nazi Germany. They did so, of course, after Winston Churchill forced the man who built the railroad, Reza Shah Pahlavi, to abdicate and unceremoniously kicked him out of the country.

Not long after, a similar Western denial of Iran's economic sovereignty resulted in a dramatic showdown that had fatal consequences for the country's fragile democracy and left lasting scars on its national consciousness. The oil nationalization movement of 1951 to 1953 under Mossadegh was opposed by Britain, and eventually by its partner in profit, the United States, with the same self-righteousness that today colors their views of the Iranian yearning for nuclear energy.

Mossadegh was tried and sent into internal exile and Mohammed Reza Shah was reinstalled largely to safeguard American geopolitical interests and with little regard for the wishes of the Iranian people. A quarter-century later, Americans were "taken by surprise" when an Islamic revolution toppled the shah and transformed a country that seemed so friendly to the United States. But if Americans suffered from historical amnesia, for many Iranians, among them Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the thread of memory led clearly from the Great Game to the Great Satan.

For a country like the United States that is built on paradigms of progress and pragmatism, grasping the mythical and psychological dimensions of defeat and deprivation at the hands of foreigners is difficult. Yet the Iranian collective memory is infused with such themes. Since the early 18th century, Iran has been involved in four devastating civil wars. America's own highly traumatic Civil War was, notwithstanding Britain's sympathy for the South, a largely domestic affair. In the civil wars that Iran endured, however, the Turks, Afghans, Russians and British played major parts. And before the arrival of Western powers, Iranians held bitter memories of the Ottomans, the Mongols and the Arabs.

These intrusions punctuated the Iranians' modern historical narrative with conspiratorial fears and have helped to nurture a cult of the fallen hero, from the 1910's guerrilla leader Mirza Kuchak Khan to Amir Kabir, a 19th-century reformist prime minister, and later Mossadegh. Such painful collective memories have made Iran's pursuit of nuclear energy a national symbol of defiance that has transcended the motives of the current Islamic regime.

If the United States resorts to sanctions, or worse, to some military response, the outcome would be not only disastrous but, in the long run, transient. Just as the West did with Iran's railroad and oil industry, it can for a time deny Iran nuclear technology, but it cannot wipe out Iranians' haunting memories. And no doubt the Islamic regime will amply exploit these collective memories to advance its nuclear program even as it stifles voices of domestic dissent. Even more than before, Iranians will blame outside powers for their misfortunes and choose not to focus on their own troubled road to modernity.

If that course continues, Iran will most likely succeed, for ill or for good, in finding its own nuclear holy grail. Legend has it that the Persian king Hushang, an equivalent of Prometheus, introduced fire to the Iranians. But unlike his Greek mythological counterpart, who stole it from gods, he accidentally discovered it while fighting with a dragon.

Abbas Amanat is a professor of history at Yale and author of the forthcoming "In Search of Modern Iran."


New York Times, April 30, 2006
Essay: The Epic of Iran
By REZA ASLAN

FOUR hundred miles from the bustling metropolis of Tehran lie the magnificent ruins of Persepolis. Built some 2,500 years ago, Persepolis was the royal seat of an Iranian empire that, at its height, stretched from the Indus Valley to the Mediterranean Sea. Though the imperial city was sacked two centuries later by Alexander "the Accursed" (as Iranian chroniclers referred to him), the towering columns and winged beasts that still stand guard over the lost throne of Iran serve as a reminder of what was once among the most advanced civilizations on earth.

I first visited Persepolis two years ago. Born in Iran but raised in the United States, I knew the place only from dusty academic books about the glories of pre-Islamic Iran. I was totally unprepared for the crowds I saw there. Busloads of schoolchildren from nearby Shiraz filed through the complex of temples and palaces. A tour guide walked an older group up a stone stairway etched with row upon row of subject nations humbly presenting themselves before the king, or shah, of Iran. Families laid out sheets and napped in the shade cast by the intricately carved walls.

Breaking away from the crowd, I noticed a boy scrawling graffiti on the side of a massive stone block. Horrified, I shooed him away. When I moved closer to see what he had written, I immediately recognized a verse, familiar to many Iranians, taken from the pages of Iran's national epic, the "Shahnameh."

Damn this world, damn this time, damn this fate,
That uncivilized Arabs have come to make me Muslim.

Written more than a thousand years ago by Abolqasem Ferdowsi, the "Shahnameh," or "Book of Kings," recounts the mythological history of Iran from the first fitful moments of creation to the Arab conquest of the Persian Empire in the seventh century A.D. Ferdowsi was a member of Iran's aristocratic class, which maintained a strong attachment to the heritage of pre-Islamic Iran. According to legend, he composed the "Shahnameh" under the patronage of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna, who promised him one dinar for every couplet. But when Ferdowsi presented the sultan with nearly 60,000 couplets, a flustered Mahmud offered him a fraction of his promised reward. Insulted, Ferdowsi rejected the money and returned home to the city of Tus, where he died impoverished and embittered. But his poem endured.

Numerous partial translations of the "Shahnameh" exist in English, but the only complete version went out of print more than 80 years ago. Now, Viking Press has published most of the poem in an accessible volume translated by the Iran scholar Dick Davis. A poet himself, Davis brings to his translation a nuanced awareness of Ferdowsi's subtle rhythms and cadences. His "Shahnameh" is rendered in an exquisite blend of poetry and prose, with none of the antiquated flourishes that so often mar translations of epic poetry.

The "Shahnameh" has much in common with the blood-soaked epics of Homer and with "Paradise Lost" and "The Divine Comedy." But in truth, it's difficult to find a literary equivalent, especially one that has had as profound an impact in shaping, and preserving, one nation's identity. Most Iranians have either read the "Shahnameh" or have heard it read. Its verses are sprinkled into everyday conversation. Children are named after its heroes and political enemies likened to its villains. For many Iranians, the "Shahnameh" links past and present, forming a cohesive mytho-historical narrative through which they understand their place in the world. The poem is, in a sense, Iran's national scripture, and Ferdowsi Iran's national prophet.

Ferdowsi wrote only in Persian, and his history of creation ignores traditional Islamic cosmology in favor of the "pagan" creation myths of his ancient Iranian ancestors. But this should not be seen as reflecting any hostility toward Islam. As Davis notes in his introduction, Ferdowsi was a pious Muslim; his epic speaks reverently of the Prophet Muhammad and his son-in-law Ali. Nevertheless, the "Shahnameh" displays an unmistakable antagonism toward the Arabs and the culture, if not the religion, they imposed on Iran. The book's first villain is an Arab — the Demon-King Zahhak, whose shoulders, kissed by Satan, sprout two voracious serpents that feast daily on the brains of young Iranian men. Zahhak is ultimately defeated by a noble Iranian peasant warrior named Feraydun, who imprisons him in Mount Damavand, where he will suffer eternally for daring to usurp the throne of Iran.

The message is hardly subtle. In fact, Ferdowsi's animosity toward the Arabs carries the poem to its tragic end, when the warrior Rostam stands before the invading Arab armies and laments,

When the pulpit's equal to the throne
And Abu Bakr's and Omar's names are known
Our long travails will be as naught, and all
The glory we have known will fade and fall.
The stars are with the Arabs, and you'll see
No crown or throne, no royal sovereignty.

Still, the marvel of Ferdowsi's poem is how it tries to strike a balance between the two dominant threads of Iranian cultural identity, Persian and Islamic. And yet throughout Iran's history, the "Shahnameh" has often been used as a weapon in the continuing struggle between the turban and the crown.

For example, the Pahlavi shahs, who came to power in 1925, promoted study of the poem as a means of de-emphasizing the country's Islamic heritage and thus stripping the clerics of their ideological authority. They built a magnificent mausoleum for Ferdowsi in Tus to serve as an alternative pilgrimage site to the tombs of the imams. They commissioned an official edition of the "Shahnameh" and compelled schoolchildren to memorize passages that emphasized the glories of kingly rule. In 1971, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi journeyed to Persepolis to celebrate 2,500 years of kingship with an opulent party for hundreds of international luminaries featuring plates of roast peacock stuffed with foie gras and 5,000 bottles of Champagne. Standing on that hallowed ground, surrounded by soldiers dressed as ancient warriors, the last shah brazenly linked his rule to that of the semi-divine kings of the "Shahnameh."

It was an extravagant gesture that alienated Iranians and hastened the shah's downfall. Eight years later, during Iran's revolution, he was forced into exile. Almost immediately, the clerical regime began a vigorous campaign to cleanse the new Islamic Republic of all references not just to the Pahlavis but more generally to the country's pre-Islamic past. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini considered the "Shahnameh" an offensive, even sacrilegious, text that explicitly endorsed monarchy. He discouraged public readings of it, declaring all nonreligious poetry as makruh, or "detestable." In 1979, Khomeini's right-hand man, the Ayatollah Sadegh Khalkhali, tried to bulldoze both Ferdowsi's tomb and Persepolis, before the provisional government stopped him.

Today, as a new generation of Iranians struggles to define itself in opposition to a widely reviled religious regime, the "Shahnameh" is re-emerging as the supreme expression of a cultural identity transcending all notions of politics or piety. Radio Tehran, "the voice of the Islamic Republic," begins every morning's broadcast with a reading from the poem. The country's most popular tourist attraction is not Khomeini's tomb or the tombs of the imams, but the ruins of Persepolis, where the government is currently rebuilding the gardens and pavilion built for the shah's infamous Persepolis spectacular.

When I visited, young Iranians were milling about the grounds in a trance, touching everything, as though a touch could transport them to another Iran. I stood with them in front of the palace walls, trying to imagine Persepolis as Ferdowsi must have seen it, recalling the eulogy he wrote a thousand years ago for a civilization he watched pass away in his mind's eye.

Where are your valiant warriors and your priests,
Where are your hunting parties and your feasts?
Where is that warlike mien, and where are those
Great armies that destroyed our country's foes? . . .
Count Persia as a ruin, as the lair
Of lions and leopards. Look now and despair.

Reza Aslan is an Iranian-American scholar of religions and author of "No god but God: The Origins, Evolution and Future of Islam."

"A Plea for Open Borders"



The News, May 26, 2006
A plea for open borders
By Kanak Mani Dixit

Flying back into South Asia in the middle of the night, it becomes a ritual to look down at the India-Pakistan border nearly 40,000 ft below. And before long, the lights of Lahore become visible in the north, even as the pilot of Air India flight 112 comes on the intercom to announce the arrival of the frontier. Far south of Lahore and southwest of Amritsar, the border is a lit-up fine line in the darkness of the desert and one can imagine the concertina wire, the service road, the watchtowers and the gun-toting border guards. The calamity that this border represents is so heart-rending that this columnist cannot but repeat the refrain every time he flies over it.

It should not be the task of romantic peaceniks alone to bemoan the rigidity of this border, but that is how it is for now. Economists, political analysts, professors and editors, not only of India and Pakistan but of the larger South Asia, should be continuously agitated by the 'hardness' of this frontier. Why? Because it is a symbol and also a very physical presence highlighting the lost possibilities through the decades.

The opinion makers of South Asia should be working overtime to convert the closed India-Pakistan border into a porous frontier but the reality of realpolitik keeps our imagination at bay. We are at business-as-usual when we should be helping build a groundswell demand for the opening. If Jawaharlal Nehru and Jinnah did not foresee a distancing between the populations of India and Pakistan, why should succeeding generations follow the dictates of geopolitics this mindlessly?

As things stand, foreign ministry bureaucrats in Islamabad and New Delhi are on the job, working gingerly on the India-Pakistan rapprochement, doing what little they can in the absence of the groundswell from civil society. We do have, therefore, the Muzaffarabad-Srinagar bus route and the Khokropar-Munabao rail link restored, but these are modest achievements unable to generate momentum for the larger opening. Bigger initiatives have not been taken because the analysts and opinion makers are willingly locked into the unimaginative, self-preserving conservative agenda of their respective national elites. This sense of self-preservation keeps the gentlemen from going excitedly against what is considered the 'national' agenda, and so the demand from the citizenry fails to arise

Would India and Pakistan as nation states be compromised in their national identity and manoeuvrability if the border were to be opened up and visas freely given out to feed the demand on both sides? Of course not. Would 'cross-border terrorism' increase or decrease with such an opening? For sure, it would not increase? Would a border opening and the revival of economic and cultural linkages after five decades of cruel closure promote the cause of peace even more? Without a doubt, because many layers would thus be added to the peace constituency. Then why are the elite commentators not speaking along these lines, why are the mullahs and the pundits quiet about rapprochement, and why are the leaders of industry so subdued on the matter?

It is the atmosphere of distrust created over the decades, encompassing three-and-a-half wars and fuelled by the anger of the Partition refugees on both sides, stoked by the Islamist and Hindutva forces, the militarist takeover of Pakistani society, the imperiousness of the Indian state machinery, and the Kashmir issue which holds all Southasia hostage in its intractability.

From up here on AI 112, the frontier runs north-south like a pretty necklace but it is an obnoxious presence nonetheless. The Nepal-India border, let it be repeated, stands up as the ideal frontier of South Asia. It is open, porous, respectful of identical demography and sensibilities on the two sides, allows unimpeded commerce -- and yet keeps national identities and respects sovereignties. Transferred to the India-Pakistan sphere, the consequences for the economies are mind-boggling.

The advantage of an open border would naturally accrue first to the people of the neighbouring regions of Punjab-Punjab and Sindh-Rajasthan-Gujarat. Each state or province is a powerful part of its respective national union or federation, so the reason they have not been able to force Delhi and Islamabad to ensure a thaw at the border is hard to fathom. With the receding memories of Partition, with the India-Pakistan rapprochement despite the vicissitudes, it is time for the chief ministers in Amritsar, Ahmedabad, Jaipur, Karachi and Lahore to respectfully inform Islamabad and New Delhi of their intention to meet to discuss loosening the bilateral frontier.

Let the chief ministers do what is good for their people. Only then will we see the end of the caricature that is the lowering-the-flag ceremony at the Wagah-Atari border point, where army men on each side stomp their boots and provide crass examples of what is said to be the national attitude, which we know is not so. It is time that those lights at the border are switched off.

The writer is a journalist based in Kathmandu Email: kanakd@himalmag.com

History of Al-Qaeda in Pakistan: Some Anecdotes

Daily Times, May 26, 2006
SECOND OPINION: Who tried to kill Benazir Bhutto? —Khaled Ahmed’s Review of the Urdu press

Osama bin Laden wanted concessions in Peshawar and Nawaz Sharif wanted funds. Osama paid for services rendered. But somewhere in all this, Benazir Bhutto too became a target. She says Nawaz Sharif got money from Osama to oust her. There are reports that terrorist Ramzi Yusuf did try to kill her. Who put him up to it? Ramzi had a free run of Islamabad, staying at the Islamic University where Al Qaeda’s founding philosopher Abdullah Azzam had taught.

Columnist Hamid Mir wrote in Jang (March 27, 2006) that ex-ISI operative Khalid Khwaja had recently revealed that Osama bin Laden had paid Nawaz Sharif money to get rid of Ms Bhutto’s government in 1989 and that he himself had carried the money to Mr Sharif. The truth was that Osama was not interested in bringing a no-confidence vote against Ms Bhutto, he was more interested in getting his Arab friends out of trouble in Peshawar.

That year Hosni Mubarak, Gaddafi and King Hussein had asked Ms Bhutto to get rid of the Arab terrorists in Peshawar. In the operation that was mounted, Abu Musa’b Al Zarqavi too had to spend six months in jail in Peshawar. After his release he was imprisoned in Jordan too.

Khalid Khwaja was then retired from the ISI but was personally serving Nawaz Sharif and flying Nawaz Sharif’s personal plane between Pindi and Lahore. He proposed that Osama pay money to end Ms Bhutto’s government so that his men would not be bothered any more. One Khayyam Qaiser got some of the money but returned it to Khalid Khwaja because no next ruler would save Osama’s men in Peshawar.

Author Jason Burke in his book Al Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (IB Tauris 2003) gives a large profile to Sipah-e-Sahaba in the terrorism that began in the training camps of Afghanistan. He claims that an attempt on Ms Bhutto’s life was unsuccessfully made by Ramzi Yusuf on the instigation of Sipah-e-Sahaba. The money came from his relative Khalid Shaikh Muhammad who was then living in Karachi disguised as a Saudi businessman. Ramzi got injured outside Ms Bhutto’s Karachi house when his bomb went off prematurely. Severely injured, he was visited in hospital by senior Sipah-e-Sahaba leaders. Ms Bhutto, whose government was in coalition with Sipah-e-Sahaba in Punjab, accused Osama bin Laden.

Burke doesn’t connect Khalid Sheikh Muhammad and Ramzi with Al Qaeda at this stage. He also, by and large, avoids looking into the ISI connection probably because that is outside his ken. The book is very carefully written to avoid making claims to knowledge that the author cannot confirm from his own experience. In April 2006 Sipah-e-Sahaba is back with the ISI with a big show of force in Islamabad staged after an “understanding with the government”.

Writing in Jang (March 27, 2006) Hamid Mir stated that Nawaz Sharif had done a lot of planning to help the Americans get Osama bin Laden. The Americans thought they could trust Nawaz more in the matter of capturing Osama. In 1998 when Nawaz Sharif was prime minister the Americans bombed Afghanistan for the first time. In 1999, it was agreed between Nawaz Sharif, American adviser on security Sandy Burger, Shehbaz Sharif and ISI chief Ziauddin to mount an operation to capture Osama. The army chief, Pervez Musharraf, was unaware of it.

American writer Bob Woodward has revealed that an operation was afoot in 1999 in the border areas in Pakistan, which also triggered the reaction from JUI’s Maulana Fazl ur Rehman that any American found in the area should be shot on sight. Nawaz Sharif had also banned Harkat ul Ansar and declared war on Al Qaeda, but was toppled in 1999.

The fact that Nawaz Sharif was helping the Americans nab Osama has been confirmed. Mr Sharif may have been trying to kill a lot of unlikely birds with one stone. No one will ever know who got Sipah-e-Sahaba and Ramzi to try to kill Ms Bhutto. Her allegation is on record and the fact that Ramzi did try to kill her has also been mentioned by some.

Writing in Jang (March 26, 2006) Ata ul Haq Qasimi referred to a statement made by singer Abrar ul Haq on the question of music as a source of peace of mind. A woman had asked if namaz was not the only source of this tranquillity. The columnist stated that the ulema were not united on the concept of entertainment in Pakistani culture. Were music, photography, singing, painting, poetry and cinema allowed as entertainment or not?

The truth is that entertainment is not allowed. Pakistan’s grief springs from its incompleteness. No one knows if this grief will come to an end after an end of culture, but this is what we think we should do. Kill culture and achieve purity and happiness.

According to Nawa-e-Waqt (March 30, 2006) chief of now-banned Harkat ul Mujahideen Maulana Fazl ur Rehman Khaleel, who lives in Islamabad, was kidnapped by unknown persons along with his driver and cruelly beaten up. He was thrown at a spot in Fatah Jang in a serious condition.

The Harkat chief was in a precarious condition but the doctors hoped that he could survive. The paper reported that Fazl ur Rehman was busy doing tabligh these days.

Khaleel is Musharraf’s “jihadi option”. He was Osama’s logistics man and fell out with Shamzai’s blue-eyed boy Masood Azhar, another of the ISI’s jihadi options. At one point he co-signed Osama’s threats to the West. Who could have thrashed him? Most probably it was an intra-jihad spat.

Famous historian Dr Safdar Mehmood wrote in Jang (March 31, 2006) that the educated people of Pakistan were becoming increasingly aware that Pakistan had become the colony of the US and the US could bomb our region any time and arrest anyone it wanted any time and then go back home. They thought that Pakistani rulers had become functionaries (karinday) of America and, after the Bush visit, had come to realise that America itself was not satisfied with these rulers.

As a historian Dr Mehmood is too simplistic. His honour-based vision ignores the compulsions of the state. But honour accompanied by economic and social breakdown is of no use. Today we would be ill-served by our willingness to carry out an unsophisticated analysis of the current situation.

Quoted in Nawa-e-Waqt (April 1, 2006) ex-ISI chief Hameed Gul said that Iran would not accept dictation from America because Iran had guts (jaan hai). He said that American ambassador’s statement that there would be no AQ Khan in future was a violation of diplomatic norms. He added that there was ember in the ashes of the Muslim ummah and it will become a fire.

The high point of honour is martyrdom. The high point of wisdom is survival. Clearly Gen Gul wants Ahmadinejad to achieve martyrdom to redeem the ummah. But we will not stop killing the Shias in Pakistan no matter what Ahmadinejad does for us. *

Thursday, May 25, 2006

A Taliban comeback: Myth or reality?



Daily Times, May 25, 2006
VIEW: A Taliban comeback? — Ahmed Rashid

Musharraf is between a rock and a hard place. A fair election would most likely result in a parliament hostile to continued army rule. A rigged election endangers his grip on power and the army’s prestige. However, military rule has run its course in Pakistan. It is deeply unpopular and no longer has the credibility to resist Islamic fundamentalists

As unprecedented Taliban violence sweeps across southern Afghanistan, four players in the region — Afghanistan, Pakistan, the US and NATO — are locked in a tense standoff rather than cooperating to defeat the terrorists. At stake is the future survival of Afghanistan’s moderate government and stability in Pakistan.

To prop up Afghanistan and combat the Taliban, the US and NATO may have to make major concessions to Pakistan’s military regime, but any concessions would anger the Afghans, encourage the extremists and allow the unpopular military to dominate Pakistan’s political scene for another five years.

More than 200 people were killed and hundreds wounded in fierce fighting that swept four provinces in southern Afghanistan starting May 18 and continued for the next three days. It was the worst bout of violence since the defeat of the Taliban in December 2001 and the opening shots in a promised Taliban offensive this summer to deter some 9,000 NATO troops from deploying in southern Afghanistan.

“NATO will not fail in Afghanistan.... the family of nations will expect nothing less than success,” said General James Jones, the head of US and NATO forces in Europe, adding that NATO will double its deployment in Afghanistan to 18,000 troops. Jones also made an impassioned plea for NATO governments to end the caveats that they impose on their troops, making it next to impossible for commanders to run a proper military campaign. The caveats number 71, and Jones calls them “NATO’s operational cancer’’ and “an impediment to success.”

President Hamid Karzai and the Afghans worry about NATO. Unlike the US-led combat force, some NATO countries contribute troops only for reconstruction. The Taliban know this and test NATO’s commitment. Some 800 Afghans and 34 foreign soldiers have been killed this year in escalating violence, as small Taliban groups expand to hundreds of fighters each. An indirect confirmation of the growing Taliban presence and the difficulty in fighting them without large civilian casualties was evident in late May, when in a single night of bombing on a Taliban stronghold in southern Afghanistan, the coalition forces claimed to have killed 80 fighters but the operation also took some 17 civilian lives.

But this setback is unlikely to change the Taliban design to test US resolve. NATO’s deployment is part of Washington’s agenda to reduce its forces in Afghanistan. The US is pulling out 3,000 troops this summer and maybe more before the November congressional elections. Most Afghans anticipate a full US withdrawal, despite American promises that it remains committed to Afghanistan. The Karzai government is angry with Washington, and also frustrated at the US attitude towards Pakistan.

Senior NATO officials in Madrid have said that Pakistan’s military regime is turning a blind eye to Taliban recruitment and control in Balochistan province. Pakistan has lost more than 600 troops fighting Al Qaeda and other terrorist forces in the North West Frontier Province, but has done little to control the Taliban in Baluchistan, say NATO officers.

American and European officials have urged President Pervez Musharraf to do more. “We are trying to engage with Pakistan and convince them to do the right thing,” says a senior NATO officer. A recent NATO delegation to Islamabad tried to woo the military by offering officers visits to NATO schools in Europe. Pakistan insists it is doing what it can to rein in the Taliban. General Shaukat Sultan, the army’s principle spokesman, says Pakistan will act the moment NATO or the US gives, “actionable intelligence as to where Taliban leaders are.”

However Pakistan’s real gripe is with the Americans. In recent months an angry Musharraf has quietly, but deliberately defied them. Relations between the two countries have not been so poor since 9/11. In March Bush spent just a few hours in Islamabad after spending several days in India, where he gave recognition to India’s nuclear weapons programme, but refused to do the same for Pakistan.

So in recent weeks Islamabad has said the investigation into top nuclear scientist AQ Khan, the world’s worst proliferator of nuclear technology, is at an end — just when Washington again urges Pakistan to allow US investigators direct access to Khan, who is under house arrest in Islamabad and could prove that Iran is intent on making nuclear weapons. More than a decade ago Khan provided key nuclear equipment to Iran. However, Islamabad is in no mood to do Washington any favours or annoy Tehran.

“Yes we are under a lot of pressure on the issue of Dr AQ Khan, but we will not surrender,” Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri told the upper house of parliament on May 19. “We are an ally of the US in the global war on terror, but we will not take dictation from anybody on our national interests.’’ Pakistan also pushes ahead to build a gas pipeline from Iran through Pakistan to India, at a cost of US $7.2 billion, despite repeated US warnings not to do so.

The push for a lucrative gas pipeline to India, however, has not reduced Pakistan’s public antipathy towards India. The Pakistani army accuses Washington and NATO of turning a blind eye to India funding an insurgency in Balochistan that has claimed hundreds of lives. India denies the charge. Pakistan is also convinced that the US and Afghanistan are allowing Indian spy agencies unparalleled access among the Pashtun tribes in southern Afghanistan, from where they are destabilising Pakistan.

So it’s not surprising that the military still looks to the Taliban as its long-term proxy force in Afghanistan. The military assumes that they have as much of a right as the government in Kabul to influence events and make key appointments in the Pashtun belt in southern Afghanistan — even though Afghanistan is a sovereign state. The army has a legacy of influencing the south since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 27 years ago. Pakistan wants the Americans and NATO to concede to its version of reality and also give the Taliban and other Afghan extremist factions a place at the table in Kabul.

Musharraf’s real aim is to get unqualified US endorsement for his re-election as president for another five-year term, while retaining his post as army chief. Thus, recent statements by senior US officials, including National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, demanding free and fair elections in 2007 and civilian control over the Pakistan, disturb Pakistani generals.

Musharraf insists there will be free and fair parliamentary and presidential elections, but the army is already making plans to limit the participation of the Pakistan People’s Party, the largest secular opposition party. In 2002 the army rigged the elections, and parliament is now packed with pro-army politicians and Islamic fundamentalists.

Musharraf is between a rock and a hard place. A fair election would most likely result in a parliament hostile to continued army rule. However a rigged election endangers his grip on power and the army’s prestige, and he views US support for the army as critical in mitigating international fallout. However, military rule has run its course in Pakistan. It is deeply unpopular and no longer has the credibility to resist Islamic fundamentalists. At the end of the day, Washington might do what it has done time and again: take a deep breath and support the only ally that may still stand between the planned US withdrawal and the return of the Taliban.

Ahmed Rashid is the author of “Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia” and “Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia” and a correspondent for “The Daily Telegraph.” This article appeared in YaleGlobal Online (www.yaleglobal.yale.edu), a publication of the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, and is reprinted by permission. Copyright (c) 2003 Yale Center for the Study of Globalization

"Roadmap for Democracy": A must for Pakistan



Gulf News , Oman Tribune, The Nation ( Pakistan ) May 24, 2006
A Roadmap for Democracy
Husain Haqqani

Recent developments in Nepal and Nigeria serve as examples for how nations can overcome entrenched authoritarian structures through popular mobilization and thoughtful political action. Nepal ’s parliament, restored by King Gyanendra after massive street protests, has voted to strip the King of all substantive powers. That paves the way for Nepal ’s transition, hopefully on a more stable basis, towards constitutional democracy under a titular monarch. King Gyanendra’s effort to use his nation’s difficulties, including the brutal Maoist insurgency that plagues the countryside, to concentrate power in his own hands appears to have been thwarted. It took a combination of international pressure, manifestation of the people’s opposition to the King in the streets of Katmandu and cooperation among Nepal ’s various political parties to ensure the diminution of the King’s authority. Nepal still has a long way to go in its transition to democracy but its political leaders have clearly agreed on a roadmap for that transition.

In Nigeria , the Senate threw out a proposed constitutional amendment that would have allowed retired General Olusegun Obasanjo to seek a third term as the country’s president. Like Pakistan , Nigeria has also had a chequered history of intermittent civilian and military rule. General Obasanjo had been Nigeria ’s military ruler from 1976 to 1979. Then, he handed over power to an elected civilian government that was subsequently overthrown by the military. Obasanjo entered politics and was elected president in 1999 as a popular civilian politician after a round of disastrous military dictators.

Obasanjo did not consider himself indispensable for his nation in 1979 and refrained from actively demanding the amendment to the Nigerian constitution that would allow him to run for office again next year. Nigeria ’s constitution limits elected presidents to two terms of office. But Obasanjo’s colleagues campaigned hard to change the constitution to enable their leader to secure the presidency again. The decision of the Nigerian parliament to reject the proposition is likely to strengthen democracy in Africa ’s most populous country. The Nigerian military probably prefers one of its own, a former general, in power. But Nigeria ’s politicians have made it known that they do not like the idea of changing the country’s constitution to suit an individual or to please the country’s military establishment.

Educated Pakistanis who are equally disillusioned with the country’s military and political leaderships must look at the experiences of Nepal and Nigeria to identify prospects for change within their own country. King Gyanendra had justified his own power grab on grounds of the ineffectiveness and ineptitude of Nepal ’s civilian politicians. The Nepalese military and a strong segment of the country’s business elite supported the King’s stated desire for stability secured with an iron hand. But the politicians turned to the masses and were eventually able to demonstrate greater popular support for their messy democracy than for King Gyanendra’s ‘efficient autocracy.’ Pakistan ’s politicians, too, would have to do the same.

Once Nepal ’s people took to the streets, Gyanendra’s international support vaporized. The international community backed the demand for restoration of parliamentary government and it is unlikely that the cantankerous nature of Nepal ’s politics will change the world’s commitment to constitutional democratic rule in Nepal .

The “Charter for Democracy” recently signed by Pakistan ’s major political leaders Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto and Mr. Nawaz Sharif offers hope that the still popular exiled politicians might return to Pakistan in time for the 2007 parliamentary election. A popular uprising is more difficult to organize in Pakistan than in Nepal . One of the reasons why Pakistan ’s first military ruler, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, shifted the country’s capital from Karachi to Islamabad was precisely to forestall the fall of a government through popular protests.

People power is more easily manifested in countries where the commercial center, political and cultural hub and state capital are all in one city or close to each other. In Pakistan ’s case, the federal capital ( Islamabad ) is a city mostly of diplomats and civil servants while centers of commercial and political activity are widely dispersed. Unless an agitation campaign is organized in several Pakistani cities simultaneously it is unlikely to be effective. The last such campaign, in 1977, succeeded because it was encouraged by the refusal of the military-intelligence complex to put it down with force. The international community was quick to support the opposition at that time, which is less likely at the present moment.

Since 1977, Pakistan ’s military and intelligence services have ensured through manipulation that each of Pakistan ’s major cities is controlled by a different political faction. Since the 1999 coup d’etat, General Pervez Musharraf has benefited from disagreements within opposition ranks and the lack of sufficient organization of Pakistan ’s mainstream political parties. The military regime has, through the political wings of the intelligence services, exacerbated dissension among opposition ranks and exacerbated the relatively weak organization of the PPP and PML(N).

It is difficult to be fully organized as a political party while being hounded by the state apparatus. Although it is fashionable for some to criticize the mainstream parties for not developing party infrastructures beyond the personality cults around part leaders, the role of Pakistan ’s establishment in undermining political parties should not be underestimated.

“The Charter for Democracy” marks the end of mutual hostility and confrontation between the major parties, which was accentuated by the military-intelligence combine between 1988 and 1999 and then cited as justification for the military’s continuous meddling in politics. If Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif decide to get on a plane and return to Pakistan , the supporters of the two mainstream parties would be encouraged to mobilize. That would make it difficult for the Musharraf regime to stage-manage the results of the 2007 election. If Pakistan ’s parliament acts like the Nigerian Senate and turns down any attempt by Musharraf to change the rules of the game again by amending or reinterpreting the constitution then Pakistan might also get another chance of becoming a democracy. The Musharraf regime has responded to the revitalization of Pakistan ’s opposition by highlighting concerns, shared by a section of the Pakistani intelligentsia, about the capabilities of Pakistan 's opposition leaders. But the real issue for Pakistan goes beyond that of personalities, a fact ironically cited by Musharraf himself in recent remarks. Pakistan has to get beyond military rule and decide upon its form of government, without adulteration. Pakistanis are convinced that there is no alternative to democracy and a general doubling as president in uniform is hardly democratic.

Soon after coming to power in 1999, General Musharraf had the option of building a civilian political base for himself. But he squandered the goodwill of his early days and stuck with the Pakistani military’s tried and tested remedy of taking over a faction of the Pakistan Muslim League and running the country with a combination of military strong-arming and intelligence manipulation. Despite exile and exclusion from the electoral arena, coupled with consistent propaganda and repression of their families and associates, Pakistani politics still revolves around Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, on the one hand, and the military on the other. Those who want the military out of Pakistan ’s politics might have no choice now except endorsing the Bhutto-Sharif combine.

(Husain Haqqani is Director of Boston University’s Center for International Relations and Co-Chair of the Hudson Institute’s Project on Islam and Democracy. He is the author of the Carnegie Endowment book ‘Pakistan Between Mosque and Military’)

No positive development on Siachen issue



India, Pakistan fail to break ice on Siachen
Rediff India Abroad
May 24, 2006

With Islamabad refusing to agree on authentication of present troop positions on Siachen glacier, talks between India and Pakistan on demilitarisation of the world's highest battlefield -- Siachen -- failed to yield any breakthrough in New Delhi on Wednesday.

The new India-Pakistan battleground

However, concluding the two-day defence secretary-level talks, the two countries issued a joint statement in which they agreed to continue their negotiations to resolve the vexed 22-year-old issue in a peaceful manner. The two sides also reaffirmed their commitment to continue the ceasefire in Siachen in place since November 2003.

"In this round of discussions, we could not make a breakthrough," Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee said.

"Pakistani is not agreeing to the proposal for authentication of positions (held by the Indian and Pakistani forces) for quite some time and this is the area of difference which can continue," he said, replying to questions on the outcome of the talks between Defence Secretary Shekhar Dutt and his Pakistani counterpart Lt Gen (retd) Tariq Waseem Ghazi on demilitarisation of the Siachen Glacier.

The two countries had agreed in-principle in October last year to re-deploy troops from existing positions.

Wary of repeat of Kargil experience, New Delhi does not want to 'risk' disengagement from dominant heights on the Saltoro Ridge unless there is 'clear acceptance of authentication' by Islamabad. India wants 'iron-clad' guarantees from Pakistan.

Wednesday, May 24, 2006

Debate on Hudood Ordinance: A Commendable Effort of GEO TV



GEO TV
http://www.geo.tv/zs/
Does the Hudood Ordinance completely conform to the injunctions of the Quran and Sunnah?: Views of 26 important and influential Islamic leaders in Pakistan

Click the title above for details.

Oil Refinery in Gwadar & Oil pipeline to China: A crucial move from Pakistan




Daily Times, Wednesday, May 24, 2006
Pakistan, China considering oil pipeline from Gwadar

* Aziz says oil refinery at Gwadar, pipeline to Western China, would quicken oil import for Beijing
* Says nuclear energy technology cooperation expanding

By Irfan Ghauri

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan and China are considering a feasibility study for an oil pipeline from Gwadar port to Western China to transport China’s oil imports from the Gulf, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz said on Tuesday.

The Gwadar and Karachi ports offer the shortest access to the Arabian Sea for Western China, as well as Central Asia, Aziz said at a seminar on 55 years of Pakistan-China relations, organised by the Institute of Strategic Studies.

An oil pipeline from Gwadar to Western China would greatly reduce the time and distance for oil transport from the Gulf to China, he said. A major oil refinery at Gwadar would further facilitate China’s oil imports.

Pakistan is now in a position to exploit its strategic location at the crossroads of South Asia, Central Asia and West Asia to promote “corridors of cooperation” including oil and gas pipelines, electricity grids, and transit trade, the prime minister said. He said the Karakorum Highway would soon be upgraded so it could remain open all year round.

The prime minister said the two countries were also expanding cooperation in nuclear energy and space technology. “A significant area of cooperation between Pakistan and China has been the harnessing of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes under international safeguards - for the production of electricity,” Aziz said. “The two countries are working towards further expanding cooperation in this area.”

Pakistan and China have always pursued their friendship for mutual benefit and never at the cost of any other country, Aziz said. “We have not sought hegemony nor shall we accept hegemony from any quarter. Our relationship is designed to promote security and cooperation with out neighbours as well as with our global partners,” he said.

“Our relations are not designed to be used against any third country. We do not subscribe to concepts such as balance of power, pre-emption and unilateralism. We believe in strengthening the United Nations system to address and resolve all regional and global issues,” he said.

Aziz said both countries seek a level playing field without trade barriers and tariff walls and Pakistan would welcome greater Chinese investment in its economy, particularly in infrastructure, telecommunication, energy, IT, construction, mining and textiles.

Answering questions, the prime minister said the biggest challenge facing the Sino-Pak relationship was to create new areas of cooperation and sustain their friendly relations.

He said Central and South Asian cooperation was imperative for the economic growth of the two regions. Stability in Afghanistan was vital to enhancing ties between the two regions vital. Pakistan is already negotiating with some Central Asian countries to create links for electricity import, he said.

"Pakistan arming Taliban": Views of an important Pakistani political leader

Daily Times, May 23, 2006
Pakistan arming Taliban, says Asfandyar

ISLAMABAD: Awami National Party (ANP) chief Asfandyar Wali Khan on Tuesday accused Pakistan of arming Taliban militants and stirring trouble in Afghanistan.

“Insurgency is rampant only in areas of Afghanistan adjoining Pakistan,” Asfandyar told an Afghan news agency. Afghan provinces away from Pakistan’s borders are calm, Asfandyar added. “Pakistani authorities and agencies are involved in the ongoing war and lawlessness in areas on both sides of the Durand Line.”

The ANP chief pondered where the Taliban were getting their weapons if not from Pakistan. He condemned the ongoing tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan and urged both the governments to resolve all disputes through negotiations.

He asked the government of Pakistan to review its foreign policy, saying, “Pakhtuns in Pakistan and Afghanistan are suffering because of international politics.” sana

Tuesday, May 23, 2006

"How Can We Live Together?"

Prince Hassan bin Talal: "How Can We Live Together?"
Brandeis University Commencement: 21st May 2006, United States of America

President Reinharz,
Chairman Kay,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Friends,

Thank you. It is a fantastic honour for me to be invited here to Brandeis, a university well known for its academic excellence, unique cultural perspective and commitment to social justice. I am delighted to join you today on what is for you a window onto a successful and fulfilling future. If John F. Kennedy was right that this nation's first great leaders were its first great scholars, then I have no doubt that your studies here have prepared you to be part of a new generation of visionary leaders. So it is only right that I start by offering my warmest congratulations to all of you as you complete your formal education.

My question today is a simple one: "How Can We Live Together?" At a time when political and cultural conflicts threaten us like never before, with dangerous friction between religious communities and competition for resources, when we have witnessed horrific acts of indiscriminate violence, how do seven billion souls reach a civilized consensus on cohabiting a world so abundant and yet so fragile? How can we ensure that Martin Luther King's famous "I have a dream" does not turn into a nightmare in which billions are born into miserable lives of poverty, humiliation and retribution?

Well, first of all, as I address you today - Jews, Christians, Muslims, Baha'is, Hindus, Buddhists and Jains from 50 states and over 100 countries - this university itself is a testament to the ideal of unity in diversity. It is truly a world in microcosm, where all races, ages and religions meet to affirm the combined genius of humanity. Still, we all know the real world is not quite so idyllic, and that tensions and fragmentations thousands of miles away can have devastating effects over here. But the important thing to remember is that as human beings our commonalities are so much greater than our differences. We hear on CNN about Shia and "Sunny" Muslims in Iraq. Well, whether you're a Sunny Muslim, a Cloudy Muslim, or even a Sushi (both Sunny and Shia), you are still heir, like Jews and Christians, to the great Abrahamic heritage. As the Sufi poet, Jalaluddin al-Rumi, said:

"Come now whoever you are,
Come without any fear of being disliked,
Whether you are Muslim, Christian or Jew.
Come whoever you are,
Whether you believe or do not believe in God,
Or if you believe in the sun as God.
This door is not a door of fear;
This is a door of good wishes."

As for myself, as a descendent of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), I am a Muslim and not an Islamist. I even have the honour of being the only Muslim board member of the Centre for Hebrew Studies at Oxford. When I received a degree at Queen's University in Belfast, Northern Ireland, with a Jewish chancellor in a non-denominational university, my Irish friends asked me about "Islamist terror". I asked them: "Is there such a thing as Christianist terror?" No, terror is terror: it has no race, religion or nationality, nor is it something done only by those we happen not to like.

Now that we have moved from "Cold War "to "hot peace", we must understand each other like never before, and we cannot ignore beliefs that legitimise destructiveness. To deal with such beliefs, a multilayered approach is needed: military, political and cultural. So the challenge didn't end with the collapse of the Soviet Union; that's when it started.

It is a question of finding an appropriate and justifiable response. You see, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am a Marxist - of the Groucho kind. Groucho Marx once said that, "military intelligence is a contradiction in terms," and with no disrespect to anyone, we do have to think beyond solving our security issues militarily. To address conflict intelligently, we must identify the complex nature of the risks we face.

This is what has rightly been called "smart power: the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion." The United States possesses not only the most powerful armed forces in the world, but also, far more importantly, thanks to its ideals of liberty and justice, it possesses more smart power than any other country. And coming from where I do, the heart of the Middle East, I am aware of just how vital it is for our human co-existence that you reach out and use this smart power. That is what wins hearts and minds, and reminds the world what makes America great.

Don't worry, Ladies and Gentlemen, I don't intend to give a monologue about the need for dialogue. But when Jean-Paul Sartre said "L'enfer c'est les autres" - Hell is Others - I believe he meant that difference and diversity are worth more than just our tolerance. I have tried hard to build a healthy respect for diversity in our region, and to turn adversaries into friends. When we were negotiating the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel in 1994, Shimon Peres said to me: "We are surrounded by enemies!" I told him: "You think you've got problems - we're surrounded by friends!" And it's true, we are beset by competing nationalisms. Aldous Huxley described nationalism as "a common misunderstanding of history and a common hatred for your neighbour." So in an interdependent era we have to go beyond narrow ideas and build a partnership in humanity.

Nowhere is this more important than in the Middle East. We are all deeply troubled by typical-but-true stereotypes of unaffordable oil, terrorism and undemocratic regimes. It's true, we have many problems, but I still believe that through altruism we can mobilise the "silenced majority". To address these problems, we in the region need to communicate with the other, and each other, collectively. By empowerment of the needy and by creating gender parity, and stakeholding, we can put "anthropolicy" ahead of "petropolicy" and we can build democracy and citizenship from the bottom up. And when we talk about promoting security and resolving conflicts, I'd like to emphasize the participation of women. For example, due to tragic recent conflicts, Iraq today is 62% women, so their involvement in the transformation of our region is even more vital.

Turning bloody conflict into broadminded co-existence takes some imagination. The first era of globalization was around sixty millennia ago, when our ancestors left Africa in search of a better life. As they eventually occupied all corners of the globe, a myriad of histories, cultures and memories emerged from the common core. But the differences are only superficial - whatever the colour of our skin, there is no difference in the colour of our blood.

Our current era of globalization is fraught with danger, but is potentially very rewarding. Despite the large distances between us, instant communications bring us closer than ever, showing clearly how similar our hopes, fears and dreams really are.

Although the web of interconnection sometimes magnifies our political and religious differences, we cannot let this blind us to our common destiny. Our planet has wealth in abundance but also 'limits to growth', as we in the Club of Rome have proven. Our challenge - your challenge - is to draw on our collective wisdom to put a shared vision into action. We have no alternative.

This common destiny is hardly surprising when we see our histories so closely connected. Let me give you an example. The other day a Jewish American filmmaker came to Jordan to interview me for a documentary about one of the golden ages of Abrahamic thought. It so happens that Moses Maimonides, one of the greatest Jewish thinkers of the last millennium, and the celebrated Muslim sage Ibn Rushd (Averroes), were both born in the town of Cordoba, in Andalusia, what is now southern Spain, during the Islamic caliphate. By expanding on the knowledge of the ancient Greeks, it was Ibn Rushd, an Arab Muslim, who helped to ensure that philosophical giants like Aristotle became one of the foundations of the European Enlightenment.

Maimonides wrote almost all his books in Arabic and was openly influenced by the great Muslim thinkers who came before him. And so, in turn, the spiritual creativity of Thomas Aquinas, a towering icon in the history of Christianity, was heavily indebted to Maimonides and Ibn Rushd. By standing on the shoulders of giants these great thinkers furthered the collective wisdom of humanity.

Looking back on this age of intellectual exchanges between these three wise men - one Jew, one Christian, one Muslim - we might ask: we have come so far in science and medicine, but what about ethics and humanity? And more importantly, can we really have a clash of civilizations when all our civilizations are built upon the same edifice?

This history reminds us that no one nation or religion has a monopoly on truth. Maimonides himself wrote that we must "pursue the truth from whatever source it emanates." Of course, enlightenment transcends political divides, but even in those days it wasn't easy: all three suffered excommunication, exile and the public burning of their books by their own co-religionists. Fast-forward ten centuries, and the politicization of religion still threatens to tear us apart.

Against the polarity of populisms we see today I would like to suggest instead an alliance of sanity. My friend Professor Shimon Shamir of Tel Aviv University is right to talk not a grudging acceptance of the other, but of a genuine belief in his power to enrich our human existence. Interdependence means committing to live with each other, not despite each other. As fellow children of Abraham, the moral codes of our faiths are based on justice, equality, freedom, charity and faith in God. Although our respective creeds are 'our truths', we know that God's love and compassion is such that He alone is fit to judge us.

So religion need not be a source of conflict between people and nations. We must ensure that religious values remain above politics, so that the quest for enlightenment can be a shared experience, part of what it means to be human. In troubled times like these, we need our faith to offer us guidance. As Ecclesiastes reminds us:


"Lakol z'man, v'et l'chol chefetz tachat ha-shamayim: et laledet, v'et la-mut; et livkot, v'et lis'chok ... et l'vakesh, v'et l'abed ... et lea-eahov, v'et lin-snoh. ... et milchama, v'et shalom."

(To everything there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the heaven: a time to be born, and a time to die ... a time to weep, and a time to laugh ... a time to seek, and a time to lose ... a time to love, and a time to hate; a time for war, and a time for peace.)

As the elected moderator of the World Conference for Religions and Peace, I mediate between nine faith groups. You might think it's a contradiction in terms: an elected prince, a prince who promotes civil society. But I work to maintain the true spirit of our great traditions because otherwise they are hijacked by the privatisers of religions - Abu-this and Abu-that, the new noms de guerre. (I sometimes say we were better off when we were all "ibns" - sons of - rather that "abus" - fathers of - although I do recall sitting down after a speech in Scotland to hear my host saying "Thank you very much for speaking, Hassan bin... bin... bin Laden!" It's true, I did once have a long bushy beard when I was your age, back at university, but that's where the similarity ends!)

Before I conclude, I would like to leave a few thoughts with you.

Firstly, it is important to express your views, and sometimes even your anger, but at the same time remember that the noble art of conversation is not a martial art. Many Muslims and Jews today feel their identity is jeopardised. While we recognize the importance of working against Semiticophobia, against Islamophobia, and all forms of intolerance, we must also see the need to work for something, for a dialogue between our peoples. That's why, for example, we have created a Parliament of Cultures in Turkey.

Secondly, you've learned here at home. Now if you haven't already, I urge you to go and put yourself in the shoes of others, and see the world from their perspective. Learning by analogy is the best way to learn. In 1872, the Chinese government sent 120 boys, average age 12, here to the US. They stayed with their American host families for 9 years. These special experiences gave them completely different lives than other Chinese people. They lived in two cultures naturally and peacefully throughout their lives.

Thirdly, we must never stop thinking creatively about the future. Whatever motivates you, whether it's fairer global trade or saving gorillas, don't conceive of the future as an empty space to be colonized by the present and driven by the market. Search for new conceptual models and new metaphors. Creativity sets us apart from other species, yet so often we stand in our own way, keeping its full potential unrealized. The internet has changed our lives for the better. But what about developing our "innernet"? How about some virtuous reality to go with our virtual reality? We can be children of our past and masters of our present, but we have a responsibility to become creators and custodians of our future. Every right comes with a responsibility. Remember what Edward Gibbon wrote: "And when the freedom they wished for most was freedom from responsibility, then Athens ceased to be free."

Finally, I believe we must think of globalization not just as the spread of capitalism or deeper economic and political ties, but as the emergence of a universal consciousness, whereby "an injury to one is an injury to all" (to quote the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa). This is what I call an ethic of human solidarity. We are in the process of creating a global community, and the cornerstones of our vision are values which from time immemorial have been a part of the collective consciousness of the human species, which have ensured their survival, and which have stood the test of time:

- Respect for life;
- Responsibility towards future generations;
- Protection of the human habitat;
- Altruism nurtured by a sense of mutual interest
- Recognition of human dignity and worth.

Ladies and Gentlemen, it's a strange world we live in where we have conquered space and put a man on the moon, yet 35,000 people die of hunger every day. Can we organize this marketplace of ideas and of egos - including my own! - and find practical ways to reconcile interests and responsibilities? Multilateral cooperation is at a crossroads. The 20th century legacy of ideas and institutions we have inherited are ill-equipped to deal with the challenges of this young century. We need to build institutions that can mediate perpetual conflict, and create rules that bring peace through legitimacy. You are the future, and that is your challenge.

Ultimately, though, my faith tells me to be optimistic. I believe that reason will prevail over prejudice, science over ignorance, freedom over oppression, and ecological wisdom over shortsighted waste. Our collective learning curve is getting steeper, not flatter. There are no problems that the human brain cannot solve, and there is always time. As the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) said: "If an individual has an opportunity to plant a tree, even if he knows the Day of Judgement is imminent, let him plant the tree."

Thank you, ladies and gentlemen